Toward Sustainable Security in Iraq and the Endgame

[wm]

Rob,
Successful national restoration in Iraq is a double edged sword (or is that a scimitar?). Having it join Barnett's "have"/"functioning core" nations may not be as wonderful a thing as many seem to think--especially since America does not seem to have that simple strategy and view of the desired endstate for our involvement with Iraq that RA alluded to with his link.

1) A successful or unsuccessful Iraq has consequences beyond the ME in terms of U.S. influence. It certainly has consequences within the ME for future agreements. Its a "brand name" issue, if Iraq rises from the ashes so to speak (and I believe it can given its people and resources), the early international perceptions of U.S. involvement become tempered. Its security is paramount to its ability to do so. Our friends and enemies are and will be watching to see how Iraq does, and if we remain committed to honoring any agreements we make, or in more general terms, how our involvement worked out. In that regard it is in our interests that Iraq succeed.

An important consideration here is the view taken as to the means by which Iraq succeeds. By this I mean how is Iraqi success at rebuilding itself viewed. Is the success understood to have occurred despite US involvement or because of US involvement? If the former, I think Iraq earns more respect in the region. If the later, then Iraq likely is viewed as little more than an American lackey. I doubt the nations of world will like us better because we helped Iraq rise from the ashes that many view us as having put it into.

2) Iraq's success or failure affects us domestically in political and economic ways beyond our foreign policy goals. I'm not just talking about the election of political leadership - although that can be an effect derived from it. It has something to do with the way we ascribe value to ourselves and to others - I know that is pretty subjective, maybe that is one for MarcT

Same applies to how the Iraqis view themselves. My point above applies here as well I think.

3) Iraq's ability to secure itself does more then just affect Iran's ability to spread influence. It may also affect its other neighbors in positive ways. If Iraq can over time extend control over its borders it influences Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Kuwait in other ways. From the way trade and people flow, to positively influencing events that are destabilizing to those states Iraq's ability to secure its self matters. Many of these issues provide additional animosities and stresses upon which political leaders in some of those states either must contend with in the domestic and international community, or in some cases use as rational to impose policies to which their populations might not otherwise agree. These states are also important to us both in terms of our bilateral relations and in terms of how their broader relations with their neighbors and the international community - they count in our foreign policy and Iraq's security affects them.

I am more concerned about the downside of Iraq appearing as a regional power. Seems to me we've already seen the kind of conflict that can arise when a couple of ME nations vie to be the regional hegemons (Iran v. Irag for 10 years or so in the 1980s, for example and of course there was that little event between Iraq and Kuwait that provoked DS/DS--could also look at more ancient history of the region).

4) Economically Iraq matters - and so its security matters. Its not just the oil and natural gas with regard to the global energy market, historically (going way back) - Iraq's geography and culture have played a key role in regional and (for western world at the time) international economics. It may have more to offer in terms of natural resources and agriculture production then any of its neighbors. It also has significant human capital - given sustainable security, and development - those people may bring forward advances in many areas - political, technology, religious, cultural, etc. Without sustainable security though the benefits of civilization remain elusive.

I seem to remember that Iraq once provided a haven for many Palestinians who were unabe to find meaningful employment in Israel/occupied territories--sort of a gastarbeiter presence similar to Turks in W. Germany in the 70s and 80s. But this is another double edged sword not unlike the illegal alien workforce that is doing America's yardwork (among other "menial" tasks).

[Rob Thornton]

Wayne,
There all good points. I'll try and adress them.

An important consideration here is the view taken as to the means by which Iraq succeeds. By this I mean how is Iraqi success at rebuilding itself viewed. Is the success understood to have occurred despite US involvement or because of US involvement? If the former, I think Iraq earns more respect in the region. If the later, then Iraq likely is viewed as little more than an American lackey. I doubt the nations of world will like us better because we helped Iraq rise from the ashes that many view us as having put it into.

I'm not sure "liking us" is what matters. I think "respecting us", and having transparency in terms of how we approach both foreign policy investments and war is what matters. If Iraq sits back and lets somebody do all the work for them, that would be viewed differently then say if Iraq continued to do what it could, and as it could do more it did so until a point where it assumed full responsibility. Its in both their interests and ours for them to recover as quickly as possible. I think the issue of being viewed as an American lackey comes into play based on who is doing the labeleing and why, and whether or not Iraq has the fortitude and latitude to stand on its on. My estimate is they will both because they are not afraid to act in their interests, acknowledge but reject our advice and becuase they have the resources to do so over time.

I am more concerned about the downside of Iraq appearing as a regional power. Seems to me we've already seen the kind of conflict that can arise when a couple of ME nations vie to be the regional hegemons (Iran v. Irag for 10 years or so in the 1980s, for example and of course there was that little event between Iraq and Kuwait that provoked DS/DS--could also look at more ancient history of the region).

It is a risk. Of course many view U.S. power as a risk. Nigeria is a regional hegemon is W. Africa. China and India play increasingly important roles in their regions. States with more resources, drive and energy may become more influential then their neighbors. The issue is how they use their influence, i.e. do their actions engender stability or instability, do their actions match their narrative? How Iraq integrates into the broader ME is something of an open question - however its recent experiences will shape some of that. Its one of the reasons why our involvment remains a requirment in this moment - our assistance in shaping their institutions matters. Did you know we've assisted them in building in an IG like function in MoD and IGFC? I both know the advisors who assited them in building it and understanding its value as well as having experienced its value first hand (another thread for sure - but it worked in helping them get some accountability and oversight into the MoD). I bring it up because we are assisting them in builidng in accountability and oversight into their instituitions - accountability and oversight is key to sustainability.

Do we want Iraq to go it alone or is it in our intrests to assist them in integrating into the regional framework? Would we want them put in a position where their best alternative was to turn to Iran for support because they could not sustain their security yet? Somebody is going to make use of Iraq's resources - should it be a responsible government of Iraq, or a neighbor who opposes our vital interests openly? The decisions we and the broader regional and international communities' make now will help set the tune on how Iraq relates to the rest of the world in the future.

I seem to remember that Iraq once provided a haven for many Palestinians who were unabe to find meaningful employment in Israel/occupied territories--sort of a gastarbeiter presence similar to Turks in W. Germany in the 70s and 80s. But this is another double edged sword not unlike the illegal alien workforce that is doing America's yardwork (among other "menial" tasks).

There are at least two cosndierations here. One is a political willingness to do something - a choice. This choice is based on political willingess reflected in its domestic and foreign policies which are shaped by how it sees its interests best preserved and advanced. What are the advantages and risks with adopting policies - not only with regard to how it relates to others, but the danger to its own citizens as potentially destabilizing influences are encouraged, allowed or illegally make their way in.

The second part is the states ability to secure its borders and points of entry, and respond to destabilizing influences within. A security sector that integrates border and domestic security with its intelligence sector for the purpose of protecting its legitimate citizens is both part of a state's obligation to its population and the means to secure its sovereignty. It allows it to regulate and tax trade, preserve order, etc.. The capability to do so does not mean it must keep everyone out, but without the capability it could not do so if it chose to.

Like you brought up both of these are issues we contend with in our own domestic and foreign policy debates - as does almost every other state that has more to offer the person or groups leaving one place for another.

I think your concerns are legitmate in that they should shape how we view our involvment with regard to our other policy goals and how we conduct our relations with Iraq's neighbors. However, I still think our own foreing policy goals are better preserved and advanced by assiting Iraq in its recovery and integrating it into the region. I think key to this is Iraq's achieving sustainable secuirty.

Best, Rob

[wm]

Rob,
Thanks for your thoughtful replies. I agree with your point about other nations respecting versus liking the US--lazy use of language on my part. However, gaining respect is not enough. Even though other nations may respect the USA, they still may not do the things which we Americans believe are the right things to do. America needs to be prepared for those eventualities--which was an underlying concern in my point about Iraq becoming a regional hegemon--and decide how it will respond to them. Sort of like having a plan to deal with one's kids that are having temper tantrums (or coping with one's teenaged offspring in general ).

I still think our own foreing policy goals are better preserved and advanced by assiting Iraq in its recovery and integrating it into the region. I think key to this is Iraq's achieving sustainable secuirty.

On this point, I would like to agree. However, I have concerns that America has some foreign policy goals that may well be contradictory or at least contrary to each other. This makes it hard to see any one course of action (COA) (such as ensuring that Iraq achieve self-sustainable security) as being a better way to achieve this goal than other posible COA.

BTW, I presume you noticed that I modified your position from sustainable security to self-sustainable security. These are two very different policy goals. Which one does America really want for Iraq (or any other nation it helps out with SFA)? Is there a "one-size-fits-all" answer to this ?

[Rob Thornton]

Hi Wayne,

BTW, I presume you noticed that I modified your position from sustainable security to self-sustainable security. These are two very different policy goals.

I think you have the right of it with "self-sustaining". This gets after the need to go beyond train and equip and assist in the development of the systems which make self sustaining security possible. It requires a holistic look by both the "assister" and the "assistee" Both words may not fully show the relationship though because its context driven. Much as U.S. policy realizes the need for partners and allies in its foreign affairs, so too do other states to varying degrees based on their security concerns and FP goals. The level of cooperation and participation varies over time and circumstance I think.

Which one does America really want for Iraq (or any other nation it helps out with SFA)?

I beleive self sustaining security is the goal. But that goal is relative to Iraq's capability and capacity when measured against its security environment - so we need to manage our expectations with regard to our level of assistance lest we unduly risk other FP interests. Assisting Iraq to get itself to a point where it can self sustain more, frees up more of our own means, and promotes Iraq's own self-image and interests as a sovereign state - which in my opinion also advances some of our interests.

Is there a "one-size-fits-all" answer to this ?

I don't think there is, I'm don't believe there should be. Each situation must be considered of its own merit. I think some of the questions I put into the ODP for SFA piece should be asked up front. The geopolitical environment is dynamic, so a state's interaction with others needs to account for that both in terms of what is important in the now/short term and what better serves its long term interests. This is one of the sources of friction you mentioned in reconciling FP objectives - often the actions we take to address a short term need don't serve us well in the long term, and often those that better suit our long term objectives don't address the pressures or sense of immediacy of the moment.

There are many reasons this is so I think - our form of government, our election cycles, our value of of free press, our strategic culture, etc . - however its not a uniquely American issue - from polis to politic its been a feature. It is something we must recognize though and muddle through as best we can. While a state with sufficient means can legitimately have more room between "either" and "or" to make decisions, the argument will not be based on means alone, but will be influenced by politics which often only appear rational to the person, party or constituents who base their position off of their own goals, vision and perception of what is best for them, their constituents and their view of what the state should be. That changes over time through new events, changes in culture, changes in power (ours and others), etc. so too will some of our policies - not necessarily all at the same time, or in congruence with one another.

Well - need to go - talk to you later, Best, Rob

[Steve Blair]

On this point, I would like to agree. However, I have concerns that America has some foreign policy goals that may well be contradictory or at least contrary to each other. This makes it hard to see any one course of action (COA) (such as ensuring that Iraq achieve self-sustainable security) as being a better way to achieve this goal than other posible COA.

BTW, I presume you noticed that I modified your position from sustainable security to self-sustainable security. These are two very different policy goals. Which one does America really want for Iraq (or any other nation it helps out with SFA)? Is there a "one-size-fits-all" answer to this ?

Sorry to cut in on the conversation....

I think that, given the nature of our system, it's almost inevitable that we will have contradictory foreign policy goals. Each administration (and for that matter each iteration of the Senate and House Foreign Policy Committees) will have its own agenda (or agendas), and often bits of a previous agenda linger on in the minds of a group of staffers or others...and get slipped into current (or new) policy. Or, out of respect for a previous administration, a policy that has already started may be left in place...running almost on autopilot (Vietnam is to my mind a classic example of this...both with Kennedy and Johnson).

Like Rob, I don't think there's a "one-size-fits-all" answer for this stuff, because each situation is going to be unique in some aspects. We need to be able to tailor our goals and expectations and not try to fit a single template over each circumstance.

[wm]

Like Rob, I don't think there's a "one-size-fits-all" answer for this stuff, because each situation is going to be unique in some aspects. We need to be able to tailor our goals and expectations and not try to fit a single template over each circumstance.

I concur. I am just a Cassandra or "voice crying in the wilderness," trying to remind folks that the quest for a silver bullet solution to foreign policy problems is very much like the quest for the Holy Grail. Seems to me American policy wonks and/or implementers of policy initiatives forget that too often.

[Ken White]

sure do forget it. Worse, there are millions out there (many of whom like to comment volubly on both sides of the political weblogs) who have never learned

"...the quest for a silver bullet solution to foreign policy problems is very much like the quest for the Holy Grail."

Too much effort is expended in attempting to achieve the impossible...

[Rob Thornton]

Steve - glad to have you and Ken on the thread

Steve said:

I think that, given the nature of our system, it's almost inevitable that we will have contradictory foreign policy goals. Each administration (and for that matter each iteration of the Senate and House Foreign Policy Committees) will have its own agenda (or agendas), and often bits of a previous agenda linger on in the minds of a group of staffers or others...and get slipped into current (or new) policy. Or, out of respect for a previous administration, a policy that has already started may be left in place...running almost on autopilot (Vietnam is to my mind a classic example of this...both with Kennedy and Johnson).

made all the more complex given the nature of political interaction in our domestic and foreign policies. Its not just our policy which is subject to change, but the policies of all the participants. This is the interactive nature of politics and people. This is why policy objectives require continued engagement - the interaction does not stop just because we say it does - or as Clausewitz remarked "In war the result is never final, the outcome is merely a transitory evil, for which a remedy may still be found in political conditions at a later date."

Wayne said:

trying to remind folks that the quest for a silver bullet solution to foreign policy problems is very much like the quest for the Holy Grail.

made yet more fun by our constant reinterpretation of what is "holy" and our redefining of what a "grail" is. As such getting consistency in our means and ways by which go pursue any policy objective is made all the more difficult. It is the policy equivalent of a self-inflicted GSW to the foot. The value each element (or party) places on its own political philosophies and and the way they devalue the other elements creates a self constraining bias. It creates conditions where policy objectives may be forfeited either because those policies or objectives do not fit their specific view, or because their bias and loyalties prevent them from realizing the significance. This seems to be true even when the goals are actually the same - but because the other party put it in motion it must be renamed, restaffed, redefined, etc. to put their brand name on it. Doing so takes time and interrupts funding and resourcing and generates undue fog and friction. We are powerful enough that our biggest impediment to achieving our policy goals is often ourselves. No good deed will go unpunished.

Best, Rob