Call me a cynic...
Bill,Originally Posted by Bill Moore
Darwin is an interesting guy who managed to uncover a fundamental truth. I am of the opinion that civilization is an extremely thin veneer and we forget this at our peril. Nature, be it at the chemical, microbial, plant, or animal level (this includes us) is all about equilibriums. There is no static decisive point for a species other than extinction.
Examining Iraq it appears that the in-country factions are waiting for our election results to reveal the future orientation of America's foreign policy while scheming about how to maximize any resulting opportunities. There was alot of anger in that country when I was there, and alot of blood has flowed since then. Somebody will have to continue to cut deals so that stability efforts can take hold. We just need to keep in mind that it's not Kansas nor will it ever be. I have always been a fan of the school of 'walk softly but carry a big stick' and feel that some of these lessons are a viable solution to our troubles.
Chechnya may indeed be an applicable model for a future Iraq. Even the Russians (not such big fans of the whole PC thing) have not been able to stamp out conflict and bring complete stability to that country. The British Empire, (PC-capable as required) even with their vaunted Colonial Service had on-going issues in several of their colonies. The Romans did well using non PC techniques but I submit that they were stuck with equilibrium points just like we are.
This weekend I am going to draft up a note for Rob Thorton on his stability thread about public private partnerships vs. the limited/non-existent rule of law environment and would appreciate your insights if you get a chance. I am going to try to cover north america, latin america, and europe vs. iraq....this will probably require a couple of beers to build up some steam however.
Regards,
Steve
Last edited by Surferbeetle; 06-13-2008 at 10:21 PM.
Sapere Aude
What amazed me as I did my Chechnya research was that when the Russians shifted to a combination of mailed fist and hearts and minds approach, and "Chechnyization," it worked pretty well. They shattered the resistance as a true political threat, and drove it to pure terrorism and banditry. Chechnya is not doing too badly today (although the conflict has spread to neighboring states).
Significant differences
SurferbeetleI am of the opinion that civilization is an extremely thin veneer and we forget this at our peril. Nature, be it at the chemical, microbial, plant, or animal level (this includes us) is all about equilibriums. There is no static decisive point for a species other than extinction.
I think this is a great point, it takes very little to disrupt the current politcal/social balance, but that doesn't mean an insurgency can't be defeated. If the insurgency is the disrupter, it must be defeated to return to an acceptable equalibrium. We may be talking past one another with vague concepts, such as "defeat" when talking about insurgencies. You defeat an insurgency using several lines of effort, and one of those LOEs is removing their cause(s) to continue fighting, thus making deals with the insurgents can be a LOE in order to establish or re-establish an equalibrium point. The idea that we never negotiate with the enemy is usually seriously flawed, but we do want to negotiate from a superior position. There are no book answers, it always depends on the nature of the insurgency.
Where we frequently get it wrong is:
1. The USG attempts to define success criteria, which leads to the USG taking the lead role in a counterinsurgency, instead of a supporting role. Who ultimately defeats the insurgents, the USG or the HN?
2. We attempt to transpose Western values upon non-Western societies, which in itself results in non-equalibrium.
3. We frequently fail to understand the nature of the conflict we're embarking upon before embark. Iraq for example, in my opinion, should not be viewed as the COIN model we base our doctrine on. As I have argued before, we need to develop a doctrine for occupation/regime change for situations like Iraq and Afghanistan, and possible future scenarios.
When I first wrote about it I called it regime/occupation doctrine, but my boss more accurately called it revolutionary war. Think about it:
a. We invaded a country and overthrew their government.
b. We just didn't replace the leader, we imposed a foreign form of government upon them in the midst of the fight.
c. We provided the bulk of the fighting forces, and still provide a significant portion of the fighting forces, thus we are in fact foreign revolutionaries, we are engaged in revolutionary warfare.
d. Counterinsurgency doctrine is wholly inadequate for this type of warfare. Equalibrium is a long ways off, since we significantly disrupted the social-politicalsphere. Something close to the former equalibrium may return if we see a military coup in Iraq and the re-establishment of martial government.
In a more traditional COIN scenario where we are in a supporting role, I agree that equalibrium may be the U.S. exit point, then the HN carries on with the transformation needed to decisively defeat/end the insurgency. In Iraq what does equalibrium look like?
We must take into account that our interests don't necessarily dovetail with the nation's interests we are supporting. We need to clarify the interests of both nations before we embark (of course you couldn't do that with Iraq, because the follow on government didn't exist yet, another argument for revolutionary warfare doctrine), and attempt to define our exit point before we enter, so military planners inconjunction with other key interagency players can work towards an endstate. This is challenging enough, but not near as challenging as what we're doing in Iraq.
I'm intrigued by this! Isn't Counterinsurgency Doctrine merely the body of teaching that informs the countering of an insurgency?
If the doctrine is inadequate what don't understand about the problem?
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Response
Technically you're correct, we are now dealing with an insurgency against the occupation and the Iraqi government (the form of government we created). We're also dealing ethnic conflict and a terrorist threat that is separate from the insurgents and civil conflict combatants (though the terrorists attempt to exploit both), but the insurgents and civil conflict combatants also use terrorism as a tactic. But we'll move beyond that and address the specific question at hand.I'm intrigued by this! Isn't Counterinsurgency Doctrine merely the body of teaching that informs the countering of an insurgency?
If the doctrine is inadequate what don't understand about the problem?
The doctrine doesn't adequately address standing up a government from scratch, but assuming that exists somewhere, does it address how to implement revolutionary change? If we think we may have to completely transform a country's political and social system in the future, we should have a doctrinal basis of sorts to work from. The situation we have Iraq today is of our own making. The COIN doctrine only captures the current fight, it doesn't address the transition between combat operations and establishing a new government. Assuming we could have done this better, we would have fewer problems today. Instead it appeared to be an afterthought. If we were going to overthrow another country today, have we captured the lessons on how to establish a new government?
Direct Action vs. Indirect Action
Bill,
I mentioned this RAND reference on Nation Building over on Rob Thorton's thread on stability. The monograph is certainly a start, however 'standing up a government' is a massive topic spread out over many disciplines and just one reference cannot begin to do justice to the complexity involved.
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States, NATO, the United Nations, and a range of other states and nongovernmental organizations have become increasingly involved in nation-building operations. Nation-building involves the use of armed force as part of a broader effort to promote political and economic reforms, with the objective of transforming a society emerging from conflict into one at peace with itself and its neighbors. This guidebook is a practical “how-to” manual on the conduct of effective nation-building. It is organized around the constituent elements that make up any nation-building mission: military, police, rule of law, humanitarian relief, governance, economic stabilization, democratization, and development. The chapters describe how each of these components should be organized and employed, how much of each is likely to be needed, and the likely cost. The lessons are drawn principally from 16 U.S.- and UN-led nation-building operations since World War II and from a forthcoming study on European-led missions. In short, this guidebook presents a comprehensive history of best practices in nation-building and serves as an indispensable reference for the preplanning of future interventions and for contingency planning on the ground.By living outside of the US periodically during the 60's, 70's, and early 90's I have noted a gradual homogenization of fashion cultures around the world ('sneaker' casual followed by the current hip-hop trend in particular). The 'Culture' of a society is so multi-faceted however, that I question any one nation's ability to 'completely transform' an indigenous political and social system no matter what the means used. To use a surfing/boogie-boarding/sponger analogy, fighting the wave is not going to get you where you want to go, instead you need to accept what the wave is, and use the power of the wave in order to achieve your goals.
Regards,
Steve
Sapere Aude
Interesting guy Tom...Was he the one who eventually assigned the head USLO role in Mogadishu? If so, he signed off on a letter of apreciation for me and the rest of my platoon mates.Ambassador Dick Bogosian
As for the issue of level of banditry and terrorism, I would have to say that if you can start to bring things down to that point, it does make it easier to mobilize the population behind your efforts.
For some reason, it seems that we have had the most success when the terrorist and the criminal is villified, versus the "insurgent". The latter term invokes differences of opinion here at the SWC, and that carries over to the theater. I think the terrorist is a easier fruit to crush.
I don't know if Dick was in Mog, He may have been. I last saw him in DC when Ambassador Dave Rawson and I spoke on a 10 anniversary panel at USIP in 2004. Dick is one of the good guys
Tom
Last edited by Tom Odom; 06-15-2008 at 01:44 PM.
Nation building versus reality
http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=5602
Jedburgh posted this link to an excellent article that I think seriously challenges some of arguments made in the RAND study on Nation Building posted by Surferbeetle.
Both articles leave considerable wiggle room (gray space), but in general the RAND study states that some level of democratization and economic development are essential, and that our numerous failures in the past at nation building were largely due to insufficient input (i.e. dollars and Joes).
On the other hand Dr. Birtle argues the following:
This tendency is highlited in the RAND study on nation building. Dr. Birtle continues with:There is a tendency on the part of many Americans, for example, to believe that economic capitalism and political democracy are sure remedies for resolving internal conflicts.
The rhetoric proved naïve. Eco*nomics and materialism were not as deterministic as many had thought, and even Rostow eventually admitted that “as for the linkage between economic development and the emergence of stable political democracies, we may, in retrospect, have been a bit too hopeful.”
Unrealistic expectations about the power of mate*rial changes have been matched on the political front. As historian Daniel Boorstin warned in 1953, “If we rely on the ‘philosophy of American democ*racy’ as a weapon in the world-wide struggle, we are relying on a weapon which may prove to be a dud.”Allowing for some wiggle room, I'm finding myself in Dr. Birtle's camp based on experience, and this is coming from a reformed neo-conservative (the Reagan years). Just like any other former addict, when I hear lofty ideas floated about I tend to get excited and want to embrace them, but then I have to remind myself that, "no, no, no, I don't smoke it no more, I'm tired of waking up on the floor."Counterinsurgency and nation building theorists have all too often ignored this reality and have fallen into the culturally insensitive trap of trying to radically transform foreign societies.
Last edited by Bill Moore; 06-21-2008 at 11:01 PM.
This paper is one of a group that were given in the Special Warfare and Incipient Insurgency Working Groups at the XVIII MORS, which was held at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center, Ft Bragg, N.C., on 19-21 October 1966:
Guidelines for Measuring Success in Counterinsurgency
This study represents an attempt to establish valid guidelines for measuring the progress of the war in South Vietnam as well as in similar situations of insurgency and revolutionary warfare that may arise elsewhere in the future. As far as it is known, this is the first, and it is believed a successful, attempt to spell out a series of steps by which reasoned concusions may be drawn regarding this special kind of situation. Although the war in Vietnam has been used as the primary source of inputs for this study (and many references will be case specific to Vietnam), the level. of generalization extends far beyond the borders of Vietnam. The individual evaluations necessary to apply the guidelines to a specific case will vary widely according to the cultural setting. But the guidelines themselves are generic to insurgency and revolutionary warfare and should be of considerable aid to those faced with the daily task of knowing whether we are winning or losing, and by how much.
Yet, lets not forget that the Chechens themselves were partly if not wholly responsible for the fracturing of the insurgency which in Chenya II the Russians actually exacerbated rather than instigated. The original demand of the Chechen sepratists/freedom fighters was
The original Chechen independence movement was in many ways high-jacked by Islamic radicals (although Dudayev was also partly to blame for appealing to Islamist forces to protect the republic). The tension between the ―moderate (sufi) nationalists and ―Wahhabi factions was initially submerged during the First Chechen War when all parties concentrated on repelling the counter-productive and brutal response of the Russian armed forces. However, with the steady erosion via assassination of the government‘s higher echelons- Dudayev 1996, Yandarbiyev in 2004, Maskhadov in 2005, Basaev and Sadulaev in 2006, etc – and the increasing difficulty of controlling an array of jamaats or armed groups, many of whom have differing agendas, tensions have come to the surface with the reported split between Prime Minister, now Emir, Doku Umarov and his former Prime Minister Akhmed Zakaev.
Zakayev steadily distanced himself from Umarov whom he considered to be dangerously influenced by radical ―Wahhabi‖ factions and resigned upon Umarov‘s declaration of a Caucasus Emirate in 2007. Of the rebel forces in Chechnya only Isa Munayev and Sultan Arsayev have publicly sided with Zakayev. Some of the remaining government-in-exile has thrown its weight behind Umarov, who has declared Zakayev a traitor for his attempts to reach out to the pro-Russian Chechen government, while others declared that Umarov‘s declaration was in violation of the Chechen Constitution of March 1992 and that, as a result, Umarov was no longer President. Zakayev and the moderates have long sought a negotiated settlement of the Chechen problem based upon a desire to see Moscow adhere to the defunct Soviet Constitution of 1990 elements of which were retained in the Russian Federal Constitution, a text, moreover, whose wording regarding the precise meaning of ―sovereignty‖ is disputed by both sides. According to the law passed by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on 26th April 1990 all Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics (ASSR), of which the Chechen—Ingush ASSR was one, were upgraded to union republics giving them the theoretical right to secede from the Union.
As for Chechnya being peaceful that's only because Russia decided to install Ramzan Kadyrov and his "gang" in power. They have continued to fight Yamadaev's units (who were then sent to Georgia to get them out of Kadyrov's hair). Also, Sulim Yamadaev was recently assassinated in Dubai on, IMO, Kadyrov's orders. Essentially what we have in Chechnya is a complicated morass of nationalist/separtist forces, clan "violence entrepeneurs" (to use Vadim Volkovs phrase) and now marginalised but still influential Wahhabis (for lack of a better term) who are all engaged in a complicated game of balancing, bandwagoning and exploting the Russian presence for their own goals while, above all this, Russia tries to play each force off without appearing to be the puppet master (a role at whch, IMO, they have never really succeded). Subtly is to Russia what hout cusine is to McDonalds.
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