Defining Success in Counterinsurgency

[SteveMetz]

I've been doing some research on the Chechen conflict as preparation for a paper on high value targeting and counterinsurgency that I'm presenting to the RAND Insurgency Board next month. I noted that by 2007, a combination of offensive actions and political reform/reconstruction had so beaten the movement down that it was basically a combination of terrorism and banditry.

It struck me how common that pattern is. U.S. (and U.K.) doctrine and strategy posit "peace"--the absence or near-absence of organized violence--as the end state in counterinsurgency. Is this feasible? Should we instead have doctrine and strategy that posits an end state where the insurgency cannot seize power or exercise total control over significant parts of the country, but where terrorism and banditry are still relatively common? I know that's not desirable, but is it the most realistic definition of success?

[John T. Fishel]

Hey Steve--

Good point/post. Back in 86 - 87 we (Max, me, and others in SWORD) were trying to define what COIN success in El Salvador would look like. None of us thought that it would end with a peace accord that gave the government nearly everything it wanted. So, we thought that success would probably be when the threat was down to the level of a police problem. That is, it would be essentially banditry that would not require the army to address. At most, the AF would have to provide some helicopter mobility and the navy would need to exercise its coast guard function.

Cheers

JohnT

[Tom Odom]

Interesting question, Steve. I can say that in our portrayal of ops in a campaign frame here at JRTC we are not looking for peace as in absence of conflict. Sometime, my friend, I want you to get down here for an MRE. I believe you would find it quite interesting, especially if you could come and stay for a couple of weeks.

I would also add that when I wrote a campaign plan for the Great Lakes area of Africa in 1995, I used reduced conflict/reduced killing as the desired endstate. To have posited "peace in our times" as an endstate then would have been absurd. DATTs normally don't write campaign plans but we needed one to frame our efforts as a country team. USEUCOM picked it up and used it. It also stimulated State to name a regional coordinator--Ambassador Dick Bogosian--for the Great Lakes.

Best

Tom

[Surferbeetle]

It struck me how common that pattern is. U.S. (and U.K.) doctrine and strategy posit "peace"--the absence or near-absence of organized violence--as the end state in counterinsurgency. Is this feasible? Should we instead have doctrine and strategy that posits an end state where the insurgency cannot seize power or exercise total control over significant parts of the country, but where terrorism and banditry are still relatively common? I know that's not desirable, but is it the most realistic definition of success?

Steve,

The USAID website on Conflict Management has some interesting references that speak to acceptable equilibrium points in areas experiencing some level of conflict.

A peaceful, stable world is a key foreign policy priority for the United States. Yet violent conflict and instability are widespread in the developing world, affecting almost 60 percent of the countries in which USAID operates.

Many of the most important causes of violence, extremism and instability – such as stagnant or deteriorating economies, weak or illegitimate political institutions, or competition over natural resources – are the central concerns of aid. Development assistance must take this into account. Therefore, the Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (DCHA/CMM) was created to change the way aid is planned and implemented.

This month's Atlantic also has a pretty interesting article about tipping points/equilibrium points in US communities by Hanna Rosen titled 'American Murder Mystery'.

Falling crime rates have been one of the great American success stories of the past 15 years. New York and Los Angeles, once the twin capitals of violent crime, have calmed down significantly, as have most other big cities. Criminologists still debate why: the crack war petered out, new policing tactics worked, the economy improved for a long spell. Whatever the alchemy, crime in New York, for instance, is now so low that local prison guards are worried about unemployment.

Lately, though, a new and unexpected pattern has emerged, taking criminologists by surprise. While crime rates in large cities stayed flat, homicide rates in many midsize cities (with populations of between 500,000 and 1 million) began increasing, sometimes by as much as 20percent a year.

I am thinking about models which describe 'violence', for want of a better word, and are able to address the many faceted things we see in '4GW' conflicts; relevant metrics and methodologies used to predict incidents that can also be used train folks who work in this arena are of particular interest. I very much appreciated the list of references you once posted to this board and if you have a list on this topic that you would be willing to share I would appreciate it.

Does your bike use a kevlar chain? I have an old r850r that I still love to ride around on...german engineering makes for an enjoyable ride. Their new superbike looks to be pretty interesting but the k1200rs (practical, comfortable, and wicked fast) that I test rode a few years back still haunts me, one of these days I will have to do something about that.

Regards,

Steve

[SteveMetz]

Does your bike use a kevlar chain? I have an old r850r that I still love to ride around on...german engineering makes for an enjoyable ride. Their new superbike looks to be pretty interesting but the k1200rs (practical, comfortable, and wicked fast) that I test rode a few years back still haunts me, one of these days I will have to do something about that.

Regards,

Steve

It's a belt--not sure if that's the same thing.

The K1200R is really hot. I looked at one but learning to ride at age 51 on a 167 HP bike would have been double dumb instead of just single dumb. I have one buddy that keeps telling me I'm idiot for getting what I did--that I need to learn on a used 350cc Suzuki.

Had to take it to the dealer for something they missed in the initial inspection yesterday. My first ride in traffic on major roads. Went very well. Still ragged on the starts and shifts and my hands get tired very quickly, but coming along. And successfully keeping it rubber side down.

[William F. Owen]

It struck me how common that pattern is. U.S. (and U.K.) doctrine and strategy posit "peace"--the absence or near-absence of organized violence--as the end state in counterinsurgency. Is this feasible? Should we instead have doctrine and strategy that posits an end state where the insurgency cannot seize power or exercise total control over significant parts of the country, but where terrorism and banditry are still relatively common? I know that's not desirable, but is it the most realistic definition of success?

This is exactly the end-state that the British Empire adhered to for over 200 years, and was applied in Northern Ireland, and everywhere else. Almost all of the Empire had problems with bandits, and frightful people.

Kilcullen also noted this in one of his papers. I think Paget talks about it explicitly, though I am currently away from my library so I can't check.

I do note that FM3-24 has something to say about controlling the level of violence on Page 33. (Page 1 Chap 2)

The "acceptable level of violence" (explicit in UK NI Doctrine) form also adheres to the classic concept of military defeat - Delbruck Destruction and Exhaustion? -. The Insurgent capability to create useful change is so undermined that it becomes demonstrably useless, and thus erodes their will to continue. - though non-military means may also have eroded his support.

Additionally, one of the few useful distinctions I can make between fighting insurgents and fighting formations is that mechanisms of military defeat are, in a few key areas, distinctly different, so this would suggest that Steve may be on exactly the right track.

I would further suggest that looking at Colombia from this perspective would be very interesting for obvious reasons.

So, we thought that success would probably be when the threat was down to the level of a police problem. That is, it would be essentially banditry that would not require the army to address. At most, the AF would have to provide some helicopter mobility and the navy would need to exercise its coast guard function.

John! You should have been a Colonial Policeman! Incisive and useful.

[Fuchs]

Should we instead have doctrine and strategy that posits an end state where the insurgency cannot seize power or exercise total control over significant parts of the country, but where terrorism and banditry are still relatively common? I know that's not desirable, but is it the most realistic definition of success?

That may be reasonable as a definition for mission success, but it is lacking as definition for political success.

The politicians bear the responsibility for waging war, and I personally cannot accept any war as success that does not improve the situation in comparison to not waging war at least for the own country.
In other words: Political success depends not only on what's being achieved, but also at what costs it was achieved.

[MattC86]

That may be reasonable as a definition for mission success, but it is lacking as definition for political success.

The politicians bear the responsibility for waging war, and I personally cannot accept any war as success that does not improve the situation in comparison to not waging war at least for the own country.
In other words: Political success depends not only on what's being achieved, but also at what costs it was achieved.

True - and all the more relevant given the unrealistic expectations this war (wars?) has/have been waged under. The domestic public as a whole was not prepared for a drawn-out conflict with an uncertain outcome. That makes an ambiguous "victory" in this COIN effort domestically tough to swallow, and consequently tough to drum up support for, particularly as sentiments that "all that money could be better spent elsewhere" mount.

Combine that with a media-driven political fight over each report of a car bomb, kidnapping, or killing ("guess the surge didn't work after all"), and such an ambiguous end-state does not strike me as particularly appealing to the general public.

Regards,

Matt

[Granite_State]

True - and all the more relevant given the unrealistic expectations this war (wars?) has/have been waged under. The domestic public as a whole was not prepared for a drawn-out conflict with an uncertain outcome. That makes an ambiguous "victory" in this COIN effort domestically tough to swallow, and consequently tough to drum up support for, particularly as sentiments that "all that money could be better spent elsewhere" mount.

Combine that with a media-driven political fight over each report of a car bomb, kidnapping, or killing ("guess the surge didn't work after all"), and such an ambiguous end-state does not strike me as particularly appealing to the general public.

Regards,

Matt

I see what you're saying, but ambiguous or not, that end-state could result in virtually all U.S. combat troops coming home. Hard to see that and a functioning Iraq or Afghanistan not being perceived as a victory, even if partial.

[Fuchs]

"Pyrrhic".
You forgot "Pyrrhic" next to "victory".

[Ken White]

"Pyrrhic".
You forgot "Pyrrhic" next to "victory".

that there's no such thing as victory in an insurgency, all one can do is achieve an acceptable outcome -- and that's pretty well going to happen.

[MikeF]

"We're not after the Holy Grail on Iraq, we're not after Jeffersonian democracy…There's not a desire for what people might see as perfection, adequate is good enough, if you will."
- General David Patraeas, Testimony to Congress, April 2008

“Success will be when Al Qaeda has no safe havens in Iraq and Iraqis can protect themselves. Success will be when Iraq is a nation that can support itself economically. Success will be when Iraq is a democracy that governs itself effectively and responds to the will of its people. Success will be when Iraq is a strong and capable ally in the war on terrror.
-President Bush, Fort Bragg, NC, 21MAY08

The tone is definitely a shifting- from optimistism to pragmatism.

[John T. Fishel]

stand up the new Panama National Police in 1990. Does that count?

Cheers

JohnT

[Ken White]

The tone is definitely a shifting- from optimism to pragmatism.

Just the usual and to be expected case of reality intruding on political exuberance and hyperbole. Politicians, mostly, don't understand the limits or war and tend to use big glowing words and too simplistic ones like 'victory,' 'win' and 'lose' to dazzle or sway the great unwashed. It's stupid and ignorant...

They shouldn't do it but they're politicians after all. Can't expect too much.

[MattC86]

Just the usual and to be expected case of reality intruding on political exuberance and hyperbole. Politicians, mostly, don't understand the limits or war and tend to use big glowing words and too simplistic ones like 'victory,' 'win' and 'lose' to dazzle or sway the great unwashed. It's stupid and ignorant...

They shouldn't do it but they're politicians after all. Can't expect too much.

I feel it's more than just idiot politicians. It's ingrained American identity. We don't act in our self-interest, we change the world in great moralist crusades, as is our mission. So much of what we've done since 9/11, though it cries out for a realist response, has taken this idealist overtone.

I think it's easy to laugh at how stupid that all sounds, but I believe it truly does underwrite so many of our perceptions. That precludes a domestic public from accepting an "acceptable level" of banditry and terrorist violence - particularly when one side (my side) is determined to subjugate achieving foreign policy goals to taking potshots at a disliked president. . .

As Wilf pointed out, the British Empire was essentially built on an ambiguous level of control and peace in its territories. The British public accepted this as the expected order of things - Americans do not, and it's not just our current neurotic and highly-politicized culture, either. There was more than enough domestic discontent with the American version of "imperial policing" efforts in the Caribbean, the Philippines, and the like.

So what's the solution?

Regards,

Matt

[MattC86]

I see what you're saying, but ambiguous or not, that end-state could result in virtually all U.S. combat troops coming home. Hard to see that and a functioning Iraq or Afghanistan not being perceived as a victory, even if partial.

Right - that will ease some, but not all, of the discontent. The fact that neither state will be a totally successful, peaceful, and prosperous free democracy (at least in our idealized sense) means that people will still view it as a failure, even if the major American commitment is over.

This also means that the public as a whole is probably never going to view what we did in Iraq (potentially Afghanistan) as a success, and thus a complication for dealing with further instabilities and the like.

Regards,

Matt

[Ken White]

I feel it's more than just idiot politicians. It's ingrained American identity...So what's the solution?

Still, you asked...

- Fix our education system to eliminate the froth and feel good self esteem foolishness, educate and train people who have no business going to college for other employment and instill a knowledge of the wider world, our governmental system and at least one foreign language. That MUST include the inner city and poor rural schools.

- Scale back so-called 'entitlements to a realistic and affordable level to assist in eliminating the culture of dependency that has grown in the US over the alst 70 years.

- Force the US media to return to journalism instead of celebritology and educate the ignorant on how their government works.

- Mandate English as the official language; commercial use of others is fine but all tests and governmental signs, anything remotely official, should be in English.

- Retool the Executive branch to get rid of all the foxes watching henhouses. The FAA, for example, cannot promote air travel, foster a secure operating environment, manage the airways and insure flight safety -- those things are conflicts of interest and the US government is rife with them.

- Restore some luster to the State Department and get the GCCs out of the pro-consul bit.

- Repeal all the idiotic incumbent protection laws like the FEC establishment and McCain-Feingold.

- Reform our dysfunctional budget process and force Congress to stop micromanaging, interfering and reacting whimsically to enforce what they (not the 'American people') want or think right but to do what is best for the nation -- starting with fewer special interest protection laws.

You asked. All that in the too hard box? Probably.

So what's realistically to be done? Vote out all incumbents at all levels and keep doing that until the idiots get the message. It'll take about 15 years for that for it to sink in but until we start electing competent people who are not professional pols, it'll continue to get worse instead of better.

[Ken White]

Right - that will ease some, but not all, of the discontent. The fact that neither state will be a totally successful, peaceful, and prosperous free democracy (at least in our idealized sense) means that people will still view it as a failure, even if the major American commitment is over.

That 'idealized sense' is due to politicians saying dumb things, they build expectations that are totally unrealistic (and not just in Iraq). Fortunately, most Americans are smarter than their politicians.

This also means that the public as a whole is probably never going to view what we did in Iraq (potentially Afghanistan) as a success, and thus a complication for dealing with further instabilities and the like.

I suspect that will be only partly true -- and the division will be on political / ideological grounds.

[MikeF]

Every generation needs a new revolution.

-Thomas Jefferson.

[Bill Moore]

the absence or near-absence of organized violence--as the end state in counterinsurgency. Is this feasible? Should we instead have doctrine and strategy that posits an end state where the insurgency cannot seize power or exercise total control over significant parts of the country, but where terrorism and banditry are still relatively common? I know that's not desirable, but is it the most realistic definition of success? SteveMetz

I don’t agree with this for several reasons, but will focus on one. Insurgencies can ebb and flow, so if an insurgency is beat down to the level where the police can control it, that doesn’t mean it will stay down (we have this numerous times in regions of Iraq and Afghanistan). If the insurgency isn’t defeated (this term does need further definition), it can re-strengthen to a level where they can overcome the police, and then it boils into a national emergency again (for the inflicted country).

If you look at it from the U.S. perspective, then perhaps sending in combat forces to beat down an insurgency to the level that the HN can hold its own is an acceptable course of action (clear end state for the military). However, the conflict is hardly over for the HN, and if it is in our national interest for the existing HN government to remain in control, then the USG may still desire to be involved in the conflict at various levels (USAID, economic development, information support, and perhaps even military advisers for their security forces).

From the HN perspective, I can’t see anything less than defeat of the insurgents being acceptable. Defeating an insurgency can be more complex than defeating a conventional military force, and it will involve all elements of national power down to the village level to defeat their foot soldiers and their ideology, and to establish or re-establish government legitimacy over the entire population (this may be the strategic endstate).

The USAID website on Conflict Management has some interesting references that speak to acceptable equilibrium points in areas experiencing some level of conflict. Surferbeetle

I’m over simplifying, but this is a politically correct version of waging war/peace. This means we (whoever we may be) go into a conflict without the intent of defeating the enemy, but simply to achieve an acceptable middle area. This can be the cruelest form of war, a low level conflict that carries on forever preventing social and economic development. Why not let one side prevail? This may appear to be cruel and indifferent, but I think war is a form of social/political evolution. If there is compelling need for a group of people to evolve and there is no other recourse (political or other peaceful method of change) to facilitate that evolution, man will result to conflict. Simply getting to a so called equilibrium point will not solve the underlying issues, and it may freeze frame a region into a permanent state of conflict.

If we're going to commit forces, then let's do it to win. Insurgenices can be defeated, as written elsewhere throughout this council it is the HN that defeats the insurgency, and if our help is needed, then we assist them. Our actions are not decisive, they are enabling.