Contractors Doing Combat Service Support is a Bad, Bad Idea

[Sargent]

Tell a cop that he has to spend two years stocking the shelves at Safeway or a firefighter that he has to spend two years as a frycook and you are going to get the same answer. For that matter, tell the average stockboy at that Safeway that he has to risk his life to spend two years arresting criminals or a frycook that he has to risk his life putting out fires and you will get a similar answer. Few people are suited to the types of jobs that CA entails and fewer still are willing to do them. I hardly think that it is unreasonable for those individuals to expect to be allowed to do those jobs. I would take a guy who wants to to the job over a guy who has been forced to do the job. This is precisely why the draft is a non-starter.

SFC W

The better comparison is to how firefighters live while on duty: during that time they all take turns at the stove and the sink. None of them quit because that is part of their jobs and lives. In fact, as far as I can tell, they quite enjoy it -- it builds camaraderie amongst the personnel, they know the importance of a good meal, etc.

I might also point out that, until recently, such self-support was the norm in the army. Troops arranged themselves in messes, were given food, and prepared it themselves. Again, from what I've read, most enjoyed this setup.

The fact of the matter is that even for the trigger puller at the pointiest end today, most time is not spent engaged in combat. Most of the time is spent in a variety of tasks that are akin to housekeeping duties -- ie, not things for which anyone signed on the dotted line.

Finally, if folks enlisted knowing that this was the set-up, their expectations would not be a problem.

Regards,
Jill

[Uboat509]

The better comparison is to how firefighters live while on duty: during that time they all take turns at the stove and the sink. None of them quit because that is part of their jobs and lives. In fact, as far as I can tell, they quite enjoy it -- it builds camaraderie amongst the personnel, they know the importance of a good meal, etc.

And CA guys also do that, but there is world of difference between picking up some unpleasant duties at the unit level and moving to to a place where you ONLY do those duties.

I might also point out that, until recently, such self-support was the norm in the army. Troops arranged themselves in messes, were given food, and prepared it themselves. Again, from what I've read, most enjoyed this setup.

How recent are you talking? Units have had sepparate mess sections at least since the '40s. In any case that does not solve the problem of all the other support activites that CSS takes care of.

The fact of the matter is that even for the trigger puller at the pointiest end today, most time is not spent engaged in combat. Most of the time is spent in a variety of tasks that are akin to housekeeping duties -- ie, not things for which anyone signed on the dotted line.

Again, there is a world of difference between doing unpleasant tasks around the unit that need to be done and being sent someplace where that is ALL that you have to look foreward to.

Finally, if folks enlisted knowing that this was the set-up, their expectations would not be a problem.

True. Many of them would simply not enlist.

SFC W

[Schmedlap]

Just a few points...

- My company was tasked with providing 2 Soldiers to help the support platoon prepare food. We raised hell over that because we were only getting 2 hots meals per week, but were losing 2 men everyday for the tasking while we were were grossly undermanned and overtasked (neither of those attributes are unique to my situation - every unit in Iraq is undermanned and overtasked, particularly as Soldiers rotate to and from mid-tour leave). The XO threatened to cut off the food for LOGPAC if we didn't pony up. We said fine - we need men, not the brown lettuce. Eventually either the LTC or CSM put an end to the foolishness and we got our men back. The lesson here is that units are overtasked, overstretched, and having enough men is more important than having green eggs instead of poundcake.

- Leaders can handle cohesion in their own way. We don't need a designated time, place, or manner of feeding. Using that justification for revamping some aspect of our CSS makes no sense to me. Sounds like a rationalization for a conclusion already reached.

- While I agree with the comments about Soldiers likely opting to ETS if tasked with being a cook instead of an infantryman, I think it is more important to point out that it would simply be a bad idea, regardless of how enthusiastic Soldiers are about it. Specialization of skills helps to make us more effective. Every nervous system has a certain threshold of tasks that it can be trained to perform well in a given period of time. We've already got enough training requirements and time constraints. Adding in a duty completely unrelated to the skills or knowledge of a combat arms Soldier for a significant period of time does more harm than good. I have never heard a Commander or First Sergeant object to a tasking on account of morale. It was always due to it depriving the Soldier of training or depriving the unit of his exertions. It is tough enough to develop our future leaders. Swapping out a rifle for a ladle doesn't help - especially if it is for a year or more.

[Sargent]

And CA guys also do that, but there is world of difference between picking up some unpleasant duties at the unit level and moving to to a place where you ONLY do those duties.

Well, the model need not be so absolute. Furthermore, returning to such a way of doing things might argue for a lighter logistical footprint that did not require a level of work such as you described. Maybe you could make it part of a rotation out of the line for some period, to give a unit a rest while they do some easy work for a while. Since it's obvious that the troops can live on well less than what is found on the average FOB, such a reduction ought not be a problem.

"- Live among the people. You can’t commute to this fight. Position Joint Security Stations, Combat Outposts, and Patrol Bases in the neighborhoods we intend to secure. Living among the people is essential to securing them and defeating the insurgents."

One might also infer from this that the FOB-centric model is not going to work for a significant portion of the deployed population. Thus, a change is going to have to come in CSS.

How recent are you talking? Units have had sepparate mess sections at least since the '40s. In any case that does not solve the problem of all the other support activites that CSS takes care of.

Well, I'm an historian -- "recently" is last century, especially when there's several thousand years of military history against which the comparison is being made. Many of my colleagues call me a "wonk," because I do 20th century history. So I apologize for the confusion -- you and I just have a way different sense of time.

True. Many of them would simply not enlist.

You can be as inclusive or exclusive as you wish to be in defining the infantryman's job. And throughout history, how that was done never really stopped men from joining the armies of the world. The Roman Legions dug ditches and build roadways when they weren't fighting. You might get a slightly different enlistment mix. That may be a good thing right now -- I could imagine that an enlistment profile that included a degree of increase in interest in such matters might be useful in COIN.

Furthermore, this is what we are asking the Iraqis to do -- all the CSS comes out the battalions. It seems like we are making a pretty significant mistake in not providing a working model for how the job gets done. The IA can't just throw money at the problems. I would say we could make a lot of headway getting the IA on track with American units showing them how to do such things by example. Imagine that, the entirety of the American military in Iraq as a giant, CSS MTT.


Cavguy wrote:

Jill, lots of respect for you and your husband.

Gee, nobody ever complimented me for doing my doctorate.

Regarding your complaints about the fobbits getting steak and lobster and the guys in the COP's not, that's just whining. I venture I've spent as much time in COP's or remote locations as anyone else, and it's just the nature of the beast. You can't mermite lobster to COP's because it becomes unsafe in the 4-6 hours between it being cooked and delivered via LOGPAC to the field. We usually got steak though. The selection was much more limited than on the FOB, but hey, what do you expect? My guys did enjoy their platoon rotation back to the fob for maintenance/rearm/refit, where they enjoyed the bounty provided for about 48h every two weeks.

I am not so concerned about complaints -- although, given the history of attitudes towards REMFs, it's not something that ought to be dismissed too easily. What I am wondering about is simply best exemplified by the insanity of having steak and lobster on the FOBS when you don't have a decent system for those outside the wire. It is a very wierd set of priorities. When you hear from a defense consultant that the bounty on a FOB is excessive, you really have to wonder at what is going on.

I am also concerned at the costs and resource usage of our logistics tail. For how much longer will we be able to be profligate in the use of fuel to truck all of this stuff around? Or how about all of the generators that are running? Something is going to have to give soon, because we won't be able to afford this much longer -- just as Vietnam had to end because we couldn't sustain the dollar outflows anymore. This, though, could be a much bigger shift -- it won't just end a war, it will force a change in the way we do everything.

Look, here's the point -- I look at the contractor/cs/css issue, and for a variety of reasons I see a problem. If I haven't hit the nail on the head with a solution, well, forgive me, this isn't my day job. I may be wrong about the solution, but I don't think I'm wrong about the problem.


Schmedlap wrote:

My company was tasked with providing 2 Soldiers to help the support platoon prepare food. We raised hell over that because we were only getting 2 hots meals per week, but were losing 2 men everyday for the tasking while we were were grossly undermanned and overtasked (neither of those attributes are unique to my situation - every unit in Iraq is undermanned and overtasked, particularly as Soldiers rotate to and from mid-tour leave). The XO threatened to cut off the food for LOGPAC if we didn't pony up. We said fine - we need men, not the brown lettuce. Eventually either the LTC or CSM put an end to the foolishness and we got our men back. The lesson here is that units are overtasked, overstretched, and having enough men is more important than having green eggs instead of poundcake.

I could read this and say that the problem is that the contractor system is not meeting the needs and the units are not really well-prepared to deal with it. I would venture to say that such episodes will become more frequent and more ridiculous. Again, I may not have hit upon the right solution, but I think the problem is there. You can fight with me over tactics, but that doesn't change the strategic situation.

Leaders can handle cohesion in their own way. We don't need a designated time, place, or manner of feeding. Using that justification for revamping some aspect of our CSS makes no sense to me. Sounds like a rationalization for a conclusion already reached.

I've never heard of a great leader tossing a tool out of his kit. Most that I've read about and met will use anything at their disposal, will disdain very little that might give them an edge.

Consider that the most frequently offered advice on building a better family and enhancing relations between members is to sit down together for dinner. What is a small unit if not a family of sorts?

And if you think it too minor an issue to bother with, I would counter with the wisdom of Earl Wavell and others, who have argued that the daily, mundane things in the life of a soldier -- the "actualities" of the soldier's experience -- are important and should be studied. It's why I settled on the subject, because I had never read a memoir or work on the experience of war that did not discuss the good, the bad, and the ugly of food-related experiences. They gave me the idea that this was important, they pointed out what was valuable and why, and what were huge, terrible mistakes.

If you wonder why I have such a bee in my bonnet over the contractor issue, blame General Washington -- his appointment of one of his best combatant commanders, Nathanael Greene, to the position of QM, and the two hundred years of subsequent history that followed his example, is the reason I question the current system. Greene didn't like the new job -- and he made Washington promise that after a year he could get back into the fight -- but he knew the importance to the war effort of what was being asked of him.

Regards,
Jill

[Steve Blair]

Actually the push for designated cooks began in the US Army in the mid-1800s (if not sooner)...mainly to improve the quality of food and cut down on wastage (as the position used to be rotated among men in a company and as a result quality was uneven at best). It's also worth remembering that one of the most frequently identified reasons for desertion in the Old Army was the number of construction and other work details piled on the troops. Many said they joined to be soldiers, not to build forts or dig ditches. Officers at the time complained loud and long about this, to no result.

Food is, of course, important. I'm surprised no one mentioned Napoleon's maxim about armies marching on their stomachs... At the combat small unit level, units do tend to eat together (unless they have serious internal problems), and those patterns have never shown many changes. Likewise, soldiers will always complain about the food. It's in the contract somewhere....

[Sargent]

Steve Blair wrote:

Likewise, soldiers will always complain about the food. It's in the contract somewhere....

Oh, but they don't always complain -- there is probably more about what they thought was good, valuable, what made a difference at just the right point. Paul Boesch opened his memoir of fighting in the Huertgen Forest with a description of an artillery barrage so intense that the author felt “as if Satan himself urged the gunners on,” and then recalled the following: “From a dirty pocket I pulled a package of Charms, the fruit-flavored candy drops that came with some of our rations. Very slowly and deliberately I unwrapped one and popped it into my mouth – it tasted good.”

I've spent a lot of time thinking about those three little words, "it tasted good." Perhaps more than a normal person ought to, but that is the nature of the dissertation. But if you imagine that war itself is an assault on the senses, then it doesn't seem quite so strange to contemplate the meaning of a positive sensory experience amidst all that.

Jill

[Ken White]

Shifting a general to oversee what were really leadership (not supply) issues is far different than taking an infantryman and making him pump gas.

I think that's what several of us tried to say albeit less eloquently.

Interesting that you mention Nathaniel Greene who was indeed one of Washington's better Generals. I could say that his most successful battle at Guilford Court House was that simply because he copied another of Washington's best generals, Daniel Morgan's (arguably an even better General...) earlier and even more successful tactic at Cowpens. The interesting fact about both battles is that the Generals knew and understood the strengths and weaknesses of their various troops. I think there's a strong message in that...

I'm not a Historian but I am a student of war and an avid reader. History can teach us much, no question but one must be careful of the message one absorbs. One thing stands out over the millenia IMO. It's notable that all the good Generals understood the strengths and weaknesses of their troops and planned accordingly. They also were willing to adapt to the mores and technology of the time.

While there will always be occasional aberrations like the picture below, essentially, the use of the horse in warfare is sorta passé.



I'd be willing to bet big bucks that the guy shown would rebel at being told he had to go turn wrenches in the motor pool.

So, lacking a major war and a draft, is a heavy troop based CSS effort passé. All things considered, that's a good thing because the number of people who want to join the Armed Forces to do that is small and declining. Yes, some changes need to be made in the process -- and some are working; Armies change slowly -- but regression is not a good idea.

Nor is it beneficial. Getting elephants through the Alps today would arouse the Environmentalists...

[Old Eagle]

I think that you, s a historian, would have a difficult time substantiating that the end of the Vietnam War was due to an "outflow of dollars".

It also appears to me that you have developed your conclusion and are now looking for data to support it.

[Steve Blair]

Steve Blair wrote:



Oh, but they don't always complain -- there is probably more about what they thought was good, valuable, what made a difference at just the right point. Paul Boesch opened his memoir of fighting in the Huertgen Forest with a description of an artillery barrage so intense that the author felt “as if Satan himself urged the gunners on,” and then recalled the following: “From a dirty pocket I pulled a package of Charms, the fruit-flavored candy drops that came with some of our rations. Very slowly and deliberately I unwrapped one and popped it into my mouth – it tasted good.”

I've spent a lot of time thinking about those three little words, "it tasted good." Perhaps more than a normal person ought to, but that is the nature of the dissertation. But if you imagine that war itself is an assault on the senses, then it doesn't seem quite so strange to contemplate the meaning of a positive sensory experience amidst all that.

Jill

Of course they don't always complain. But if you look back on it, complaining about the food during quiet times has always been an honored passtime.

Perhaps I should explain something...I don't have ANY problem with having soldiers as cooks. Far from it. I think it's a good idea, especially when the cooks are linked to specific units. There used to be a time-honored tradition (or at least a good myth that had more than a small shade of truth to it) about the field kitchens looking after "their boys." Good for morale. Always has been. Problems usually started when the cooking duties were rotated or (as happened in some cases) when they were neglected or contracted out by default (as in local businessmen and women filling in with "pies and delicacies" that they sold for a nice profit when the rationing systems broke down).

Sam, the debate about soldiers being soldiers or laborers has been around in this country for some time. I have to admit I'm mixed on it in some ways. There are certainly functions that SHOULD be performed by soldiers (base guards, critical projects, bunker construction), but there are others that may be better contracted out. Have we gone too far with the contracting? Yes. I really think we have. Vietnam and the standard of living that was considered necessary in the rear areas (although not always in the field...or in all areas of Vietnam) accelerated this trend, along with other organizational changes.

You're quite right to bring up the festering backlash this could all cause. Especially when you have people working 2-3 jobs just to feed their families and keep a roof over their heads. The last thing they want to hear are stories about lobster and steak (that they feel they're paying for) in a combat zone. I actually think that the lack of understanding on the part of many about the actual military has kept a lid on some of this, along with the things you mentioned. How long that lid will stay on is anyone's guess.

[Cavguy]

Well, I'm an historian -- "recently" is last century, especially when there's several thousand years of military history against which the comparison is being made. Many of my colleagues call me a "wonk," because I do 20th century history. So I apologize for the confusion -- you and I just have a way different sense of time.

You can be as inclusive or exclusive as you wish to be in defining the infantryman's job. And throughout history, how that was done never really stopped men from joining the armies of the world. The Roman Legions dug ditches and build roadways when they weren't fighting. You might get a slightly different enlistment mix. That may be a good thing right now -- I could imagine that an enlistment profile that included a degree of increase in interest in such matters might be useful in COIN.

As a historian, I would think you would know better than to compare a 21st century infantryman to a Roman Legionaiire. The number and complexity of skills a modern combat soldier is required to master far outstrips any relevant historical example. It isn't marching in formation and swordplay or even musketry - there's a ton of highly technical, highly perishible skills that must be maintained. You hire an infantryman today to be a highly trained infantryman, not a generalist slave. There's barely time to keep guys proficient in all the core skills required.

Gee, nobody ever complimented me for doing my doctorate.

There's a saying - being a military spouse is the hardest job in the Army (Corps). Somwehat exaggerated, but certainly some major truth.

What I am wondering about is simply best exemplified by the insanity of having steak and lobster on the FOBS when you don't have a decent system for those outside the wire.

Here we disagree. There is a difference between "luxury" and "decent system". We had a decent system in both my tours. Our guys received 1-2quality hot meals, laundry service, mail, and other services daily in the COP. No one was deprived. All it took was a little effort on the part of the chain of command. If someone's not getting that, it's not a logistics/fairness issue, but a leadership issue. We got everything except for the shellfish that the guys on the FOB did.

And the steak and lobster is exaggerated, it happens once every few weeks.

It is a very wierd set of priorities. When you hear from a defense consultant that the bounty on a FOB is excessive, you really have to wonder at what is going on.

Depends on excessive. Yes, there was some amount of overboard. That said, why live badly if you don't have to? I will also say the "bounty" is greatly appreciated by guys rotating off the line.

I am also concerned at the costs and resource usage of our logistics tail. For how much longer will we be able to be profligate in the use of fuel to truck all of this stuff around? Or how about all of the generators that are running? Something is going to have to give soon, because we won't be able to afford this much longer -- just as Vietnam had to end because we couldn't sustain the dollar outflows anymore. This, though, could be a much bigger shift -- it won't just end a war, it will force a change in the way we do everything.

Separate argument. One can argue the main argument FOR the FCS system is that it will reduce the supply tail requirements immensely - common parts, smaller crews, better engines, and more reliability all will significantly reduce logistics tail if they work as advertised (different thread).

Look, here's the point -- I look at the contractor/cs/css issue, and for a variety of reasons I see a problem. If I haven't hit the nail on the head with a solution, well, forgive me, this isn't my day job. I may be wrong about the solution, but I don't think I'm wrong about the problem.

It's also valid to point out an MCO war in the modern era cannot last beyond a few weeks/months - no one quite simply has a war-sustainable industrial base capable of supplying the munitions and equipment a la WW II, or the density of equipment. Therefore, the Army has assessed it only needs organic food support to sustain a 45-60 day war, and anything longer gets contracted. Almost all army "Class A" field rats are now "heat and serve" and not made from scratch, and the MRE is a constant process improvement.

One can argue no one (organizationally) thought Iraq would last this long, and recruiting extra CSS to support what were envisioned as short term demands would carry higher cost than contracting someone to do it.

Consider that the most frequently offered advice on building a better family and enhancing relations between members is to sit down together for dinner. What is a small unit if not a family of sorts?

Units do eat together at the team/squad level often. Especially in a COP. You also seem to assume that there's a lack of bonding going on - trust me, the main thing soldiers desire is often a little privacy from their unit for awhile. However, operations are ongoing 24/7, so an imagined BN mess all happily passing the gravy is a little dream-worldish.

And if you think it too minor an issue to bother with, I would counter with the wisdom of Earl Wavell and others, who have argued that the daily, mundane things in the life of a soldier -- the "actualities" of the soldier's experience -- are important and should be studied. It's why I settled on the subject, because I had never read a memoir or work on the experience of war that did not discuss the good, the bad, and the ugly of food-related experiences. They gave me the idea that this was important, they pointed out what was valuable and why, and what were huge, terrible mistakes

.

Food is certainly not a minor issue - I could argue it's one of the most key components of morale. That's why I don't agree with your assessment of the problem or the solution - ensuring the guys get the best quaility of food possible in adquate amounts immensely contributes to morale. Nothing saps a deployment worse than constantly eating bad food. I never (organizationally) ate better than I ate while deployed to Kosovo in 2000-2001. Better than most all inclusive resorts. I know it significantly impacted my perceptions of the deployment, and made it much more bearable (back when I thought six months was a long deployment). Having high quality food is a morale multiplier. I wouldn't want to go to Army A's.

If you wonder why I have such a bee in my bonnet over the contractor issue, blame General Washington -- his appointment of one of his best combatant commanders, Nathanael Greene, to the position of QM, and the two hundred years of subsequent history that followed his example, is the reason I question the current system. Greene didn't like the new job -- and he made Washington promise that after a year he could get back into the fight -- but he knew the importance to the war effort of what was being asked of him.

I'm confused why you don't think we have the same ethos today - assigning a combat general to oversee a problem area just happened - look at Walter Reed. They took BG Tucker (a tanker) and made him DCO of WR to clean up the mess, which he did. Now he's headed back to the force that the WTU's and other reforms are underway. Shifting a general to oversee what were really leadership (not supply) issues is far different than taking an infantryman and making him pump gas.

[selil]

Sargent, what ever you do.... DO NOT GIVE UP....

[selil]

As a historian, I would think you would know better than to compare a 21st century infantryman to a Roman Legionaiire. The number and complexity of skills a modern combat soldier is required to master far outstrips any relevant historical example. It isn't marching in formation and swordplay or even musketry - there's a ton of highly technical, highly perishible skills that must be maintained. You hire an infantryman today to be a highly trained infantryman, not a generalist slave. There's barely time to keep guys proficient in all the core skills required.

Actually I strongly disagree with this Cavguy. The human being has not substantially changed and whether we use Maslow or others the basic requirements for the care and feeding of the soldier have not changed. The accessories may have changed (ipods versus harmonicas) but the actual human interactions are pretty stable.

When you add technology that tool or weapon is a metaphor for some technology lower on the ladder of sophistication. A main gun on a tank is only a bigger musket, and a musket is only a better arrow, and an arrow is only a bigger stick.

Sure there is training required and we have changed the window of that training for the military to later and later in life in the Western world. That does not change the human needs. It is quite possible to push much of the training back down the pipe into the k-12 system where it belongs, but the cultural dynamics currently will not allow it. That doesn't make the points of fixing what appears to be a brittle logistics path any less important.

There is another issue too. The political pundits, the military, the social story of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are testaments of doing without. The story of combat is of primal urgency and predation followed by ascetic lifestyle of the soldier. With domestic economic woe, high fuel prices, a country deep in recession (regardless of the media drivel), and national disasters, the stories of lobster thermidor, and movie night in the combat zone will not play well in Peoria.

Associations in the story of combat played out as soldiers staying in the former palaces of Saddam eating luxurious meals and serviced by concierge services will back fire on the military. The conscripted media and tight control of the information from flag draped coffins to embedded reporters clearance for stories will feed a blazing conspiracy. Never mind the current festering debate over contractor malfeasance, profiteering, and the political football of no-bid contracts by politicians with vested interests in the companies.

Some will get their backs all up and get pissed to the gills saying "but it's not that way". To true. But, the information and political motivations in an unpopular war that is tightly controlled feed the furnace of this firestorm. Just wait. I thought Black Water would be the one to tip the balance but it is sounding more like KBR. The USAF/Boeing KC136 tanker deal looked like it might break this open, but it didn't. Every soldier talking about FOBBITS, every story about steak, every story about contractor profiteering, paints a picture that the soldiers are complicit with the contractors using war as an excuse to live high on the hog.

I know let the recriminations begin. I would just point out that a WaPo reporter was hanging out here looking for evidence of malfeasance about the use of funds by soldiers for rebuilding.

How is that for busting the echo chamber?

[Ken White]

Actually I strongly disagree with this Cavguy. The human being has not substantially changed and whether we use Maslow or others the basic requirements for the care and feeding of the soldier have not changed. The accessories may have changed (ipods versus harmonicas) but the actual human interactions are pretty stable.

And I strongly disagree with that -- in one aspect -- while you're correct that the the human hasn't changed, his or her expectations (environmentally dependent) certainly have. That affects the culture and the training as you noted.

That doesn't make the points of fixing what appears to be a brittle logistics path any less important.

I'd say that "appears" is the operative word with the caveat that the log system is a governmental function and our government has become broadly dysfunctional. Which is why this:

...the stories of lobster thermidor, and movie night in the combat zone will not play well in Peoria.

is IMO not a significant problem -- Peoria has other things on its mind right now.

Associations in the story of combat played out as soldiers staying in the former palaces of Saddam eating luxurious meals and serviced by concierge services will back fire on the military.

We can agree on that -- using those Palaces (and former Iraqi Army compounds) was bone stupid.

Some will get their backs all up and get pissed to the gills saying "but it's not that way". To true. But, the information and political motivations in an unpopular war that is tightly controlled feed the furnace of this firestorm. Just wait. I thought Black Water would be the one to tip the balance but it is sounding more like KBR. The USAF/Boeing KC136 tanker deal looked like it might break this open, but it didn't. Every soldier talking about FOBBITS, every story about steak, every story about contractor profiteering, paints a picture that the soldiers are complicit with the contractors using war as an excuse to live high on the hog.

There is a segment of the population that will do that; they would do it no matter what. Fortunately or unfortunately, viewpoint dependent, most will pay little attention to the majority of the things you cite -- that generally dysfunctional government thing again...

I know let the recriminations begin. I would just point out that a WaPo reporter was hanging out here looking for evidence of malfeasance about the use of funds by soldiers for rebuilding.

I think that makes my point about a certain segment...

How is that for busting the echo chamber?

I'll go about four on a scale of ten????

Not at all sure it's an echo chamber; maybe some disagreement on approaches -- and that's good -- and some disconnects about what was then and what is now.

[Sargent]

As a historian, I would think you would know better than to compare a 21st century infantryman to a Roman Legionaiire. The number and complexity of skills a modern combat soldier is required to master far outstrips any relevant historical example. It isn't marching in formation and swordplay or even musketry - there's a ton of highly technical, highly perishible skills that must be maintained. You hire an infantryman today to be a highly trained infantryman, not a generalist slave. There's barely time to keep guys proficient in all the core skills required.

I didn't compare anything. I simply offered an example of an alternate model where infantrymen were expected to do more than just the infantry tasks.

However, I do agree with Selil and think you're giving short shrift to what was expected of the Roman Legions as compared to what they had.

Here we disagree. There is a difference between "luxury" and "decent system". We had a decent system in both my tours. Our guys received 1-2quality hot meals, laundry service, mail, and other services daily in the COP. No one was deprived. All it took was a little effort on the part of the chain of command. If someone's not getting that, it's not a logistics/fairness issue, but a leadership issue. We got everything except for the shellfish that the guys on the FOB did.

Sometimes it's a systemic problem, as in, there is not a system in place to deal with the folks outside the wire.

Depends on excessive. Yes, there was some amount of overboard. That said, why live badly if you don't have to? I will also say the "bounty" is greatly appreciated by guys rotating off the line.

And it should be there for the folks rotating off the line. But nobody has touched the subject of the folks for whom this is the daily experience.

Separate argument. One can argue the main argument FOR the FCS system is that it will reduce the supply tail requirements immensely - common parts, smaller crews, better engines, and more reliability all will significantly reduce logistics tail if they work as advertised (different thread).

Same argument. You create a set of requirements and you incur a set of costs. Even if the system works as well as it can, should we be spending resources to run generators to maintain significant ice cream stores?

One can argue no one (organizationally) thought Iraq would last this long, and recruiting extra CSS to support what were envisioned as short term demands would carry higher cost than contracting someone to do it.

It doesn't make me feel any better to know that military planning starts from the premise that everything will work out just as we want it to. I'm sorry, I just don't have a lot of sympathy or patience for that argument. It suggests that there is a large deficit in professional competence in those running things. So, why should I feel particularly good about the ancillary decisions they've made?

On the other hand, it seems that there was always an intention to maintain a significant military presence in Iraq. So I'm not sure that I buy the argument that this was "just how it worked out when it had to be settled on the fly."

Units do eat together at the team/squad level often. Especially in a COP. You also seem to assume that there's a lack of bonding going on - trust me, the main thing soldiers desire is often a little privacy from their unit for awhile. However, operations are ongoing 24/7, so an imagined BN mess all happily passing the gravy is a little dream-worldish.

I understand that both needs - for together time and for privacy -- must be managed. My original response was to an example where only one side of the equation was potentially being addressed. Elsewhere, I've pointed out that one can use MREs and hot chow alternately, to give space when needed, and bring the group together when needed.

As I've never said anything approaching what you describe in the last sentence, it seems rather unfair to characterize my position in that way. That being said, while it might not be the norm for the BN to get together for a meal, there is certainly a value to doing just that on occasion. Call it a Warrior Mess Night.

Food is certainly not a minor issue - I could argue it's one of the most key components of morale. That's why I don't agree with your assessment of the problem or the solution - ensuring the guys get the best quaility of food possible in adquate amounts immensely contributes to morale. Nothing saps a deployment worse than constantly eating bad food. I never (organizationally) ate better than I ate while deployed to Kosovo in 2000-2001. Better than most all inclusive resorts. I know it significantly impacted my perceptions of the deployment, and made it much more bearable (back when I thought six months was a long deployment). Having high quality food is a morale multiplier. I wouldn't want to go to Army A's.

1. Yes, food (and dining) are important to morale -- that's the whole point of my dissertation. How it works is where it gets very interesting. I've got my President Bush Thanksgiving 2003 action figure to remind me of that.

2. Based on that, the gaps in the system concern me. You can shrug them off, and maybe it is personal to me, but I doubt that it was a one-off occurrence, and based on WHY it happened, it's liable to happen more in the future, and certainly in any future where we can't rely on getting most of our folks onto large bases.

3. Given the COIN objectives in Iraq, and given what my research has suggested insofar as disparity between groups is concerned, we are doing ourselves a strategic disservice with some of these quality of life systems. I may be a fan of gastronomy for morale, but I know that the biggest morale boost comes from being mission effective.

4. This is the least important, but I do wonder how it will play out -- what becomes of a treat, of a morale booster, if it becomes the norm? I AM NOT MAKING A COMPARISON, but this is the problem with spoiled children. Can we afford hyper-inflation of expectations? I also think there is a difference between feeding the troops well -- good, wholesome, healthy foods -- and giving them special treats. In that way both needs are met without blunting the edge of the gastronomy for morale tool.

I'm confused why you don't think we have the same ethos today - assigning a combat general to oversee a problem area just happened - look at Walter Reed. They took BG Tucker (a tanker) and made him DCO of WR to clean up the mess, which he did. Now he's headed back to the force that the WTU's and other reforms are underway. Shifting a general to oversee what were really leadership (not supply) issues is far different than taking an infantryman and making him pump gas.

It was not that there was a problem of leadership in the supply and logistics system during the Revolutionary War. It was that it was being handled by the private sector, it wasn't working, and General Washington realized that the only way to make sure it did was to make it a military responsibility -- and as such, he wanted his best man in the job.

Regards,
Jill

[Schmedlap]

This is the least important, but I do wonder how it will play out -- what becomes of a treat, of a morale booster, if it becomes the norm? I AM NOT MAKING A COMPARISON, but this is the problem with spoiled children. Can we afford hyper-inflation of expectations?

That could be a question not only about food, but just about anything in this war...
- Inflated awards (Bronze Stars for everyone!)
- Cushy accomodations (air conditioned huts with actual beds and mattresses)
- Outlandish amenities (PX, restaurants, movie theaters, KBR DFAC with Baskin Robbins sundaes made to order, etc)
- Misusing the supply system to order "nice to haves" rather than necessities (take a look at what you can order in a GSA catalog; it's insane, but many units order the stuff)
- Misappropriation (building bus stops, party patios, and saloons have become the standard uses for lumber in Iraq - lumber that we purchase and ship there at a heavy premium)
- Umpteen gazillion other examples

I just figured I'd toss that out there, in case you're looking for more research material. There is a vast, fruitful plain of fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement deserving attention.

Back to the original thread, I still say that the solution is not to revamp the logistics system that delivers food. The solution is to reinvent MREs, or MRE-like meals, that are designed for long-term consumption. The delivery of MREs is highly efficient for the logistician and makes life very simple for the company level folks.

[Ski]

I was one of those few Combat Arms officers lucky enough to become a Support Platoon Leader in an Armor Battalion. It was one of the most difficult - and rewarding- jobs I;ve had in uniform. I learnt how logistics works at the BN and BDE level, and have become a much better officer because of it.

Now - getting to the issue at hand - there are too many contractors in the military today. I agree with those that use the post-Cold War declining endstrength as a factor. The Army leadership wanted to keep the same culture associated with a large standing Army in place, so the easiest way was to hire contractors to perform certain services. Whether that was wise or not is a discussion for another time.

Where my beef comes in is that we have contractors in all theaters performing duties that should be allocated to the uniformed services. Case in point - there was a retired 06 working in the Future Ops cell in the command I was in Afghanistan - at the strategic level. Was he competent? Certainly. Would it have been better for an Army or Marine Officer to be in his position and gain the knowledge and experience required for professional development? IMO, yes indeed.

I was stunned when I deployed to Afghanistan - lobster and steak on Friday's? Jesus Christ, I ate better there than I do in CONUS. I do not expect that kind of treatment, nor do I want it. I enjoy the Spartan experience associated with military service, and the chow halls in theater were so over the top and disassociated with reality it blew my mind. Did it help morale? I suppose so at an individual level. But it became a very sore point to me travelling through certain sections of Afghanistan, and seeing people who could barely scratch out an existance, and there we were getting effing steak, crab legs and lobster every Friday. It made me ashamed to be quite frank.

[Cavguy]

Sometimes it's a systemic problem, as in, there is not a system in place to deal with the folks outside the wire.

Can't disagree more. It's called LOGPAC. It is simply not possible (or wise) to supply a guy on the line to the same level that is possible in the rear. You can arbitrairly reduce what is available in the rear to the same level, but to what end? Also, rear areas are for refit. If you're talking about Transition Teams, they are a special case, and may be embedded far away from coalition largesse. Comes with the territory.

Same argument. You create a set of requirements and you incur a set of costs. Even if the system works as well as it can, should we be spending resources to run generators to maintain significant ice cream stores?

I agree that some of the level is a bit much, and could be reduced. But I disagree that it's an argument against using contractors or that soldiers should go back to pulling KP. All that requires is a re-write of the contract as to what food is provided. There are valid arguments against contractors, but in the end they provide the food requirement that is contracted for. That's not their fault, it's DoD's.

I understand that both needs - for together time and for privacy -- must be managed. My original response was to an example where only one side of the equation was potentially being addressed. Elsewhere, I've pointed out that one can use MREs and hot chow alternately, to give space when needed, and bring the group together when needed.

I still fail to see where you think cohesion has been impacted in the current environment by food issues. Where is the basis behind the assertion that there is a cohesion issue in the force due to either KBR chow or MRE's? Some examples so I understand where your position comes from?

As I've never said anything approaching what you describe in the last sentence, it seems rather unfair to characterize my position in that way. That being said, while it might not be the norm for the BN to get together for a meal, there is certainly a value to doing just that on occasion. Call it a Warrior Mess Night.

Which is done regularly by units, at the end of field exercises and our formal occasions.

I guess I am primairly confounded as to what is driving your problem assessment and some of the assertions that have been made, along Old Eagle's comment. It seems you have an opinion and are looking for evidence that fits it.

For example:

1) MRE's and KBR hurt unit cohesion because of lack of shared meals
2) There is no "system" for supplying the line with hot chow.
3) That it is reasonably possible, in the security environment, to provide equal access to services/chow for all soldiers, wherever stationed.
4) There is a leadership problem in the Army specifically regarding this
5) That using combat arms troopers in CSS roles provides benefits that outweigh the opportunity costs, and would preform at a level equal to or above those with the specific MOS
6) That our supply system leadership is wanting and requires combat arms guys to run it.
7) That having unequal access to service/chow measurably impacts combat force morale, and decreases performance of CSS types who do have access to it.

Each point can be argued, but you argue with enough vigor that I am curious to the data backing your arguments. My data comes from my experiences at varying levels in the army for 11 years.

2. Based on that, the gaps in the system concern me. You can shrug them off, and maybe it is personal to me, but I doubt that it was a one-off occurrence, and based on WHY it happened, it's liable to happen more in the future, and certainly in any future where we can't rely on getting most of our folks onto large bases.

We have plenty of MRE and UGR-A support, especially heat and serve. So there isn't a "gap", the army has solutions. I also want to know why MRE's are sustainable long term. We ate MMM and MMA for the first five months of OIF without health or nutrition issues. When it became possible, the larger DFACS were set up. Contracting is usually cheaper than the long term costs of carrying the infrastructure. However, I haven't seen a cost/benefit data from a reliable source comparing the cost to the Army (short and long) of reestablishing its food service corps to do what contractors are doing now. I'm prepared to be persuaded on the economic cost.

3. Given the COIN objectives in Iraq, and given what my research has suggested insofar as disparity between groups is concerned, we are doing ourselves a strategic disservice with some of these quality of life systems. I may be a fan of gastronomy for morale, but I know that the biggest morale boost comes from being mission effective.

Show me how having steak and lobster on large FOB's affects mission effectiveness? Again, I'm looking for evidence (not anecdote) that combat performance or service support has been affected because of having an abundance of food. Or that having Baskin Robbins in the DFAC with the CSS creates a decrease on the performance or morale of line troops. Some complaining about REMF's, maybe, but I'm talking measurable impact. You can make an entirely reasonable argument that large FOB's are not helpful in COIN from an attitude standpoint, but that is not what is being argued.

4. This is the least important, but I do wonder how it will play out -- what becomes of a treat, of a morale booster, if it becomes the norm? I AM NOT MAKING A COMPARISON, but this is the problem with spoiled children. Can we afford hyper-inflation of expectations? I also think there is a difference between feeding the troops well -- good, wholesome, healthy foods -- and giving them special treats. In that way both needs are met without blunting the edge of the gastronomy for morale tool.

No real disagreement here - but soldiers adapt. In 2003, we ate crappy food over and over for months. We got over it. We liked it when KBR became available. Yay. Combat effect as long as bellies were full = zero.

It was not that there was a problem of leadership in the supply and logistics system during the Revolutionary War. It was that it was being handled by the private sector, it wasn't working, and General Washington realized that the only way to make sure it did was to make it a military responsibility -- and as such, he wanted his best man in the job.

And that is different from my WR example how? Mostly contractors were failing their job, the military assigned to support was also failing, and the SecDef/Chief of Staff appointed a high quality combat leader to fix the issue. Also, we were creating an army from scratch then, so I think the comparison may be weak when infering the performance of KBR to the performance of the private revolutionary contractors. What I resented was the implication that our leaders are somehow not measuring up, and the constant barbs on the "quality of our leadership" as if it's some monolith. We have good and bad leaders, and I wouldn't say any of the above is representative of anything culturally relevant to the force. We have much bigger fish to fry than food sevice, IMO.

[Schmedlap]

Jill,

Earlier, I wrote this...

My company was tasked with providing 2 Soldiers to help the support platoon prepare food. We raised hell over that because we were only getting 2 hots meals per week, but were losing 2 men everyday for the tasking while we were were grossly undermanned and overtasked (neither of those attributes are unique to my situation - every unit in Iraq is undermanned and overtasked, particularly as Soldiers rotate to and from mid-tour leave). The XO threatened to cut off the food for LOGPAC if we didn't pony up. We said fine - we need men, not the brown lettuce. Eventually either the LTC or CSM put an end to the foolishness and we got our men back. The lesson here is that units are overtasked, overstretched, and having enough men is more important than having green eggs instead of poundcake.

And then you responded...

I could read this and say that the problem is that the contractor system is not meeting the needs and the units are not really well-prepared to deal with it. I would venture to say that such episodes will become more frequent and more ridiculous. Again, I may not have hit upon the right solution, but I think the problem is there. You can fight with me over tactics, but that doesn't change the strategic situation.

Your first sentence there seems to ignore almost everything written on this thread. The problem was fixed, so I am not sure what problem you referred to. We got our KP's back.

My only other guess for what problem you referred to would be that you see a problem in that we are eating lots of MREs? That's not a problem either, so it doesn't need fixing. I know that you have pointed out that MREs are not intended for long-term consumption. Perhaps the objective should be to make MREs that are intended for long-term consumption. Because the simplicity and ease of shipping MREs to a PB/COP is pretty sweet.

[Sargent]

Steve Blair wrote:

It's also worth remembering that one of the most frequently identified reasons for desertion in the Old Army was the number of construction and other work details piled on the troops. Many said they joined to be soldiers, not to build forts or dig ditches. Officers at the time complained loud and long about this, to no result.

They also weren't be clothed, fed, or paid with any sort of reliability -- and by the 1830s, the Army had eliminated the alcohol ration. So sure, maybe the soldiers said they were quitting because of the fort building, but I'd venture to say that it was more a case of that being the straw that broke the camel's back.

When all else was equal, commanders didn't have such a hard time getting the soldiers to build forts -- offer up a few jugs of whiskey as a bounty and the job got done post haste.

Regards,
Jill

[Steve Blair]

Steve Blair wrote: They also weren't be clothed, fed, or paid with any sort of reliability -- and by the 1830s, the Army had eliminated the alcohol ration. So sure, maybe the soldiers said they were quitting because of the fort building, but I'd venture to say that it was more a case of that being the straw that broke the camel's back.

When all else was equal, commanders didn't have such a hard time getting the soldiers to build forts -- offer up a few jugs of whiskey as a bounty and the job got done post haste.

Regards,
Jill

Sorry...but there's way too much out there to suggest that especially after the Civil War the fatigue duties had a major impact on retention. It's a concern that you see echoed constantly both in Congressional testimony at the time and in the pages of The Army and Navy Journal, which wasn't known for pulling punches. You saw a huge spike in desertions when Congress reduced base pay in about 1870, but I don't think that eliminating the whiskey ration drove many over the hill. Sutlers still sold whiskey on post (and continued to do so until the 1880s).

I'd also submit that the threat of being bucked and gagged or standing the barrel had much more to do with motivating soldiers to build posts than the possible promise of whiskey. Besides, there's a good chance that the officers themselves would have consumed the whiskey before it ever made it to the laborers. Troops would suffer a great deal if they thought there was an objective behind it (just witness the trials that anyone who served with Crook went through...), but most didn't see the point in building quarters for officers (or certainly didn't seem to).

Anyhow...we're off track now.