The relationship between the CSA’s message on advising & Key Ldr Development PT 1

[Rob Thornton]

Given the thrust of the CSA’s recent message about advising FSFs, and the emphasis placed on it by the Commandant of the Marine Corps, the CJCS, and the Secretary of Defense, its worth considering how we assign value to “key” leadership developmental assignments. When we think of the path to command what comes to mind? Why do we hold command above all else? These are not easy questions; nor are they accusatory. They simply are. It might be said we hold command highest because it is the recognizable manifestation of value to one’s efforts and professional life. It is recognition in a way that is far beyond increased prestige and financial worth, it is a recognition founded on the trust of lives, acumen of skill, worth to a cause greater then one’s self. Even though we know that the majority of time for most will be spent in some other job besides command, command at its various levels is still the apex for most. Undoubtedly there is also a darker human side to command, the attraction of authority, the sublime energy that accompanies it, the need for recognition, etc. – but publicly and privately we fight to eschew those darker qualities and emphasize & reinforce those positive qualities. How is the CSA’s message the first positive step toward the Army institutionalizing SFA and the advisory mission? How does it relate to what we value most? Why was the CSA explicit in his reference to the future of relevant Land Power? First we need to consider what we assign value to and why.

Developing our Sense of Value

We seek to promote based on demonstrated potential and suitability for increased responsibility and authority? However, because those are somewhat subjective, we have a value system that takes the form of evaluations and assignments. This is a personal history that indicates why that person should be advanced as someone whose character espouses what we value. The two go hand in hand, and drive current performance and future assignments. At an early age in their professional career a LT learns that among the most sought after jobs he or she competes for amongst their peers in their first assignment is to specialty platoon leader – for a Combat Arms officer, those goals are along the lines of Scout PL, Mortar PL, and Support PL(before modularity). The first – Scout or Recon PL comes with a healthy amount of independence and trust – the perception is your platoon is providing the basis of the intelligence which will drive the BN’s operations. The Mortar Platoon is the BN CDR’s organic fire support – slightly less sexy then the Scout PL, but still a specialty platoon with a healthy part of the BC’s combat power – your range gives you a different perspective and impact on the course of operations. The Support Platoon (and I understand that with modularity we’ve changed the MTO&E but stay with me because this is just as much about those leaders who grew up under that MTO&E as those who are growing up modular) was less sexy still, but among the most important functions as it was the BN CDR’s logistics and sustainment lifeline. From there, these LTs would become company XOs (if they were not already) or an “A” in the staff – “S3A” being among the most important to them as it was about operations.

It is worth considering our perception of how we advance, and what are the other things that occur as a result? How many times do we hear a higher echelon CDR refer to when they were a “this” or when they were “that”? There is also the consideration of what development occurred within that LT as a result of what assignments he was given. How does that shape their perception of what to assign value? These are not qualifications of good or bad, just of relevance. However it does get to the issue of how we institutionalize value. As a LT you learn that there are some jobs that have more value then others, and you start to understand why and what qualities make the assignment of those jobs or missions more likely. You also begin to notice things about the leaders above and around you, and you begin to enquire about what jobs they had, and construct a theory about how they advanced. You make decisions about what kind of leader you intend to be and construct a plan on how to get there. There are variables and ripples that occur before and after, but it is usually not too far off the mark.

As a CPT we yearn for command (for us Army types it’s usually the first time we get to put commander in our job description). Usually we are assigned to a staff position first – probably on either a BN or BCT staff, but it is not unheard of to get “stuck” on a higher echelon staff. This gives us time to season, but also time to be evaluated by those BN and BCT commanders who want to ensure they put round pegs in round holes and don’t place a guy in command before they’ve done all they can to develop that leader. In rare cases, it may be that the doubts are so high as to that CPTs ability, the higher echelon commander wants to see if the faults are such that they are unsuitable for command – but this is unusual as the developmental experiences have developed the CPT’s abilities as to do good enough.

As a staff CPT we learn about the personalities in the organization and we further refine our values that we began as a LT. We consider the advice of our immediate boss, that of the BN CDR, and to varying degrees, that of serving commanders. I say that because at this point we usually are critiquing the guys whose jobs we want, and our perspectives are subject to staff and self bias – it always looks easier until you have to actually go out and do it while hewing on the responsibility that comes with it. We are further planning out how things will go. We know which commanders are rotating when, we learn about their companies, sit through their QTBs, hear about the things they did right and the things they did wrong and we convince ourselves that it can be done better. We also assign value to those over us, some of which is based on where they come from, what they have done, and how they are to work for. We associate and infer – often inaccurately attributing a flaw or strength to an assignment vs. the character of the leader.

As commanders, we learn the value of a second command – in much the same way we leaned the value of specialty PL or trusted XO. However this time, we associate more “command time” with future potential for command at higher level. It may be as an HHC/HHT/HHD, or it may be in the Old Guard, or some other formation – the important thing is it’s a “command”. Again, it is neither good nor bad, just a matter of relevance.

Following command there are several options. However we learned some important things from command. We learned the BDE S3 job is the “king maker” so to speak (we also learned its allot of hard work and a family time killer – as well as often pissing off damn near everybody because there is no way to make everyone happy) – we learn that just by observing. We may not like the BDE 3, but we generally respect the position and the potential it brings. We also get exposed to the BCT CDR as our senior rater. We start to ponder how he does his job, and how did he get his job? What is his background? What did he do? How well did he do it? We learn about the relevancy of resident war college, SAMS and a host of other developmental schools and assignments. Not good or bad, but relevant here in that we have to make decisions about our viability for future command. Hopefully the BN and BCT CDR come forward, and tell you during your OER counseling (and informal or formal periodic counseling throughout). This is where guys and gals need to make life changing decisions, there will be other factors – family, age, ambition, competing priorities, interests, etc.- but most folks I know make significant decisions here.

The years between command and a KD job as a FG also matter. One of the best jobs to prepare you for doing well as an “S3” or “XO” was to go and be a CTC OC (Observer Controller). There you could benefit by the experiences of many units and leaders who came to the CTCs in preparation for deployment - or before the war as an indicator of that unit’s readiness to deploy (I list both because our point of reference for how we use the CTCs varies with our age and experience). As company commanders we knew many BN & BDE S3s and BN and BDE CDRs who at some point had been an OC at a CTC. In our OER counseling we were often gratified to hear our rater or SR tell us they’d like to see us at a CTC as it would improve our ability to be good BN and BDE CDRs. As an OC (most of us have done OC duty somewhere either at home station, as an OC augmentee, or at a CTC) you get immersed in tactics, a chance to consider how doctrine works, and most importantly the chance benefit from “observing” and thinking about how a multitude of leaders and units conducted their selves under a variety of conditions. You get to do this without having to take on the responsibilities associated with those positions.

It is another “key developmental” experience afforded by the Army because the need for useful feedback to the unit is combined with the opportunity to step outside and look from a unique perspective. That “value” is demonstrated down the road because as “3”, “XO” or “CDR” that experience can be leveraged to make better decisions. Since not everyone can or should be an OC at a CTC, the value is increased. The same is true with other assignments or experiences we assign the value of “key developmental” experience to.

part 2 posted below

[Rob Thornton]

The “Value” assigned to Advising

This gets to the question of where does an assignment as an “advisor” fall out in terms of being ascribed as “key developmental” or KD toward future assignment and promotion. This is a question as to if the “value” is such that it has persistent and future value, vs. its being just an assignment that must be endured temporarily or tolerated until such time as we can return to what we have institutionalized and demonstrated as having value through our actions. It gets beyond the CSA’s making it a KD assignment and giving CSL credit; it is about how we perceive its worth.

There are three parts to this I think. The first part is recognition and acceptance by the institutional leadership that there is a persistent requirement for both quality and quantity. In this case OIF and OEF have changed our (the USG’s) thinking to include accepting and expressing that working by, with and through FSFs is an undeniable and critical part of our strategy. I say that because while many may have expressed it for some time, it was not until it physically manifested itself and exposed our gaps in capabilities and capacities that we were forced to address it – preparation for war, and the conduct of war were and will remain different. The institution has officially recognized and accepted this need in the form of the CSA’s, CMC’s and SECDEF’s verbal and written communications. This sets the conditions for the second part, reconciling recognition with actions.

How the institutions go from articulating value to demonstrating it matters. To borrow from Dave Kilcullen (first place I heard it) – it is about matching our actions to our narrative. If the Army does what is laid out in CSA’s note in spirit as well as in letter by advancing those who have taken on his guidance in the next round, it will demonstrate immediate value. Two other actions the Army might take is to:

- One, follow the Joint lead and designate an Army proponent for SFA (Security Force Assistance) that reflects its value to big Army – not just a special slice. That is not a swipe at Army Special Forces – but it’s a recognition that when you make something “special” you may also isolate its level of institutionalization – since this as much a capacity issue as a capability issue it is a GPF issue, and if institutionalization in the GPF is what is required then designating a proponent that only affects a special slice or creating a specialized corps of advisors jeopardizes that. At its heart this is about how we perceive and view the employment of “Land Power” which why I think the CSA is explicit in mentioning it in his email.

- Two provide commanders a powerful tool for organizing their formations to the tasks associated with working with FSFs, we need to assign some type of ASL or personnel code to all soldiers, not just officers. We have many soldiers working in some advisory capacity who not only should get some credit for their work, but whose skill sets might get lost. These soldiers could become unit trainers, etc. and when the unit gets assigned the mission may prove invaluable in an advisory position vs. their primary MOS. This is not about identifying them for unit taskings, its about empowering commanders with critical tools to the benefit of the mission.

The third part and I think the most institutionally enduring, and also the most difficult is how its value translates to big Army. When a LT or CPT looks to a successful BN or BDE S3, or his BN CDR or BCT CDR and attributes that leader’s success to a tour as an advisor, it is truly institutionalized. When that BCT CDR pulls off something and that CO CDR says, “Damn Sir – where did you learn that?”, and the BCT CDR says “I picked it up advising foreign security forces in ……” and then follows with, “ you know Bill, you should consider a tour as an advisor when you leave command, it will round you out in ways no other job can.” we’ll have made it a part of our culture. When its recognized as part of the path to higher command because its value to the challenges of command at those levels is not only viewed as enhancing, but is undeniable it will be part of our culture. At that point value is established because its credibility is manifested in what we value most. At that point it is not a painful forcing function which must be endured, but it is an attractive function which is desired. We resist those things which take us away from our goals, but we find ways to those things which lead us to our goals.

It is also worth discussing the issue of making some advisory positions “KD” and thus on par with other relevant jobs. While the job of S3 or XO has value in preparation for command, what of the comparative value of the Advisor if a guy or gal can only do one or the other? I think here it comes down to two things. First, we need to get beyond valuing the quality of the assignment to the exclusion of the quality of the man. An assignment does not qualify someone for increased responsibility and authority – I’ve known at least one FG who served as both a BN 3 and a BN XO, and got BN CMD only to fail – a good guy, but we all knew he should not have been a BN CDR even if the Army did not. I’ve also known a few folks that did not have the resume but their actions could not be more in keeping with increased responsibility and authority – the Army missed them to our detriment. We’ve got to get more invested in how we assess those we advance. Second we need to consider what we think we’re going to be doing in the future, since nobody can do everything, maybe having a balanced team vs. a one size fits all is healthier for our organization. If having relevant land power in the future is at least partially contingent on our ability to work by, with and through, then having that experience resident in the BN and BCT senior leadership would seem critical. I’d argue that there are things you will learn as an advisor that you will not learn elsewhere – so maybe its value to the future of land power was worth making it a KD job. However, if we have leaders that when a guy shows up the first question out of their mouth is not oriented on finding out what do they bring to the table, but where were they an S3 or XO, then we really did not institutionalize it as “KD”, we just gave it a wink and a nod, and we failed.

Conclusion (what it means more broadly)

I think this is one of the reasons why I think BCTs should be the basis for a good chunk of our Army SFA efforts. Not only do we require full spectrum forces in order meet the commitment to our national security, and not only do we have some incredibly talented folks in the BCT, but to really effect cultural change we must change some part of what we value most, not create an alternative value structure which is in competition. When we do the latter we weaken one at the expense of the other. I think we can in fact leverage existing structures such as the BCT and the JTF to meet most of our needs. While the BCT does in fact have a ceiling with regards to its functionality, we might consider building a CJIATF around something like a TMAAG, but inclusive of a heavy JIIM (Joint Inter-Agency, Inter- Governmental and Multi-National) assessment team, and then based on the initial assessment and follow on re-assessments build the capabilities and capacities required to meet the policy goal.

I bring this up in the conclusion because in my view it’s a related issue. Creating new permanent organizations does not necessarily change the organizational culture. It is really about relevance and perspective to a frame of reference. We have assigned both relevance and value to the BCT and to the JTF; where possible we should show the increased value with respect to established frames of reference. In the case of using the CJIATF structure on which to build the means for sustained engagement, it would require a CJIATF CDR who understood how to work with foreign security forces. To get there we need to institutionalize the value at the lower echelons first. The CSA’s directive may not in and of itself assign the level of value that gets instant institutionalization, but its an important first step, and one we can build on.

Best, Rob

[selil]

This should be on the SWJ Blog. Good stuff sir.

[Ken White]

Well said.....

[Shek]

Rob,

Great post. As I thought about the following excerpt from GEN Casey's message, my first take was that it was placing a TT position into the "soft" KD.

I am directing that the Major's positions on these teams be immediately designated and codified in DA PAM 600-3, for all branches, as Key and Developmental (KD). Any officer holding one of these positions will be considered "KD" for his or her branch as a Major. Additionally, these officers will be afforded the opportunity, should they desire, to hold an additional 12/24 months of a branch specific KD position (e.g. XO, S-3, etc).

However, after thinking about it some more, I think it was the right initial step. First, if an S-3/XO position weren't explicitly guaranteed, then you'd simply create a larger incentive to avoid a TT assignment. With this guarantee, it will create more of an incentive to serve on a TT assignment since it won't prevent you from getting the "hard" KD jobs, and your performance in your BN S-3/XO job will drive whether you continue on the "Iron Major" path to the coveted BDE S-3 job.

My question would be how do we provide additional incentives that demonstrate seriousness about TT time in the interim before you have a generation of officers who can mentor captains as BN CDRs and BDE CDRs and state through their own experience that it helps your career?

Do we change the ORB to make TT, IA, and joint time more explicit than what the job assignment section may be able to do? Is there a way to create some nominative assignments so that we can 1) direct talent to where it's needed the most within the effort, 2) identify officers who might not otherwise admit that they wouldn't mind doing a TT job and 3) create the perception that it really can be a job where you can set yourself apart from the field for promotions/selections since the selection can't be considered a fog on the mirror = you're hired! selection. I think that may draw some of the pool of talented officers who do "more of the same" in a second command, which isn't necessarily bad, but it certainly doesn't broaden one's experience as much as some other opportunities.

[MikeF]

Here's one suggestion on incentives:

We'll call it a fellowship.

Combat Company Commanders compete for a 30 month tour to Monterey, CA. 18 months acquiring masters degree in defense analysis at NPS followed with 12 months in DLI for training in arabic, farsi, etc.

Immediately following, newly promoted majors deploy for twelve months as advisors- preferably in the AOR they commanded in so they can foster established relationships. Families can opt to stay in monterey.

After deployment, off to leavenworth.

Everyone wins. The Army invests heavily in it's upcoming leaders, and the families get a much needed break in one of the best places to live in the US.