The relationship between the CSA’s message on advising & Key Ldr Development PT 1

[Rob Thornton]

Probably a few ways to get it "mo better" using the BCT as the organization around which to build. I think it starts by defining far enough out where that BCT will be going so they can:

- consider the current conditions and start building information on the environment early

- figure out what their shortfalls are based on who they need to partner with e.g. is a 1:1 BCT to IA BDE partnership, or is it a 1:1 BCT, 10 police stations, some CLC/SoI types, and a National Police BN - along with the need to either fill some slots on the PRT or to provide a senior LNO who can synch ops, and some security for their movement and other life support issues.

-Is their a need build up other parts of the infrastructure such as provide TF 134 type support to help the partner build cases? Are there any prisons which need to be developed in order to support security sector reform and development (this one is often over looked and we've paid for it - most recently at Badush in Iraq 07 and Kandahar this month). How about partnering with local clinics and hospitals - not only a developmental issue, but also a security issue. How about other emergency and public services?

This could make for a very pregnant BCT (vs. a pyramid), but that does not mean we should shy away from it if it supports the mission. Just as we'd planned modularity for other environments, with a good lead in time to figure out what they need, the additional personnel and equipment and the authority and resources to get soldiers the right training, I think a BCT could do it better then sending in an ad-hoc package that arrives at different times. As it goes through its deployment it can help the follow on unit make its assessment as to what it needs next year, and what it does not.

If the BCT does the mission and lays out its capability and capacity gaps - then the various providers can figure out how fill them. It may not be perfect, and they may not get them all, but at least under unity of command the BCT CDR would have a better idea of where he's coming up short and then be able to decide where to accept risk.

Down the road some:

At some point we would not necessarily have to have a centralized TT training site for them either. At the point where those skills became institutionalized at that level - there might be enough "master trainers" and former advisors resident in the BCTs to run their own programs. This was my point about ASIs (Additional Skill Identifiers) that classified what type of training and experience a soldier had so it could be built into the MTO&E at various echelons. MTO&Es are an important part of training and readiness to perform what missions we give to units. The are derived from the same process that drives UMRs, school slots, funding, priorities, CL V allotments. In this case having the ASIs on the MTO&E means that this is an at least semi-permanent feature of the BCT and in line with the issue of future relevancy to land power.


On PME:

We might have a specialized school for advising FSFs that we could send those identified in their units as having the most compatible personal skills, traits and attributes. This is not a pre-deployment school, or a in country academy (although it might accommodate some who needed a crash course), but a 3 month course that was focused on advising FSF - with no time on those skills the unit should develop. In other words none of the pre-deployment which eats up so much time - rather the school would focus on how to build relationships, how to advise on core competencies that were already developed on an individual and unit level, etc. It could be run by the service, or it could be run by the Joint Proponent for SFA.

We already have some other relevant skills for SFA - those that deal with contracting, foreign military sales, etc. for those leaders who will work in those related areas in order to ensure mission success - program those requirements into the MTO&E and expand the existing schools to meet the demand (or send out mobile training teams) - hell send the CHEMO - I jokingly say that - in fact I've known some incredibly competent CHEMOs - however my point is that if we determine the BCT or 2 star HQs needs X amount of SAOs, FAOs, IO, what have you to support the core mission, then change the MTO&E and send them to the schools.

How about partnering with local universities to come into post and teach a variety of languages on a sustained basis. Let DoD pay the bill and send soldiers during the duty day. Extend the program and teach the same languages in on post schools to our soldier's kids - hell open it up to the spouses. Don't make it just straight language proficiency - but like getting a minor in a foreign language in a university - teach the culture, politics, history, literature and art that goes with the language skill so guys can be conversant and build relationships and interests. DoD might even foot the bill for soldiers with doing well in the course to go on a 2 week study abroad with the university and have cultural immersion.

What are we teaching in our BNCOC, ANCOC, SGM ACAD, and the assorted officers courses from the most basic to the War Colleges, to include the BN and BCT level command courses? Some of these courses are in fact offering related electives- but what should be changed in the core curricula? How we consider the nature of the problems we will encounter matters.

In that way I get LTC Nagls point about the "advisor tab". Why do we expect new LTs to show up to a 18th ABN Corps IN BN with a tab? Because its a cultural expectation. Ranger school is an institution in that regard, in the same way that AASLT school is at the 101st, jump master qualification at the 82nd, EIB for all Infantry units, EMB for medics and all the other tabs and badges we place value on - they represent the institutionalization of something. I may not agree with it (remember I got my foundation in the Marines), but I recognize the value of such things to the institution - they represent far more then the cloth or metal and enamel stuck on the uniform.

That is my point about institutionalization - when we see something as a core part of "Land Power" we have institutionalized it. At that point it is woven into the broader tapestry who we believe we need to be in order to meet our institutional obligations to the nation. In my view the CSA's message is pointing us in the direction that our civilian leadership says we must go to meet our commitments to the future security of the country. Nobody said don't still be the Land Power that can compel others to our will by taking and holding ground - that is a part of who we are as well. What I think is being said is that along with what we've always done, we need to make room for "by, with and through" because its both a key part of our future security, and because the size and scope of the mission is such that our GPF land power must take it on to be successful.

Best, Rob

[jcustis]

A few observations, which may or may not have real relevance to the discussion at hand. The thoughts come from someone who always saw himself as a good and willing candidate for the advisory role. I'll probably volunteer for one someday should the opportunity arise, but just about everyone I've talked to with MiTT experience has recommended I run for the hills.

-It has taken a long, long time for RIPs to get better. In the beginning, and out to about early 2006, they were atrocious for some.

-Personality dynamics on MiTTs/BiTTs can be brutal. Unlike service in a Bn/RCT/BCT/Div where there are natural pressure relief valves, if your MiTT lead is a glory-hound jackass who marked time to his current rank, you can't escape the crap. It's akin to how baboons relate in captivity vs. the wild. In the zoo, baboons fight more often because they can't run away like their wild cousins can. In larger organizations, the pain brought on by a mouth-breather is spread around more easily.

-Those most willing to be placed on a MiTT have already found a way to do it, so incentives only go so far. The danger of careerism now poses the risk of making it easier for marginal performers to pass what vetting there is. Not only do they have the potential to make life a PITA for teamates, they now have the chance to screw up our best chance of leaving OIF/OEF.

-MiTT training still seems to be uneccessarily haphazard, as demonstrated by experiences from at least one of our members. I commented as much a while back, after seeing the holes in a 2006 work-up schedule. I can only hope that the means of staffing, training, and resourcing these efforts has gotten better and become standardized.

-Someone needs to force a cultural change on the reporting requirement, as virtually every after-action and comment I read from MiTT bubbas makes mention of the partner unit and HHQ layering too many reports on them. We have to get our hands around that, whether it be through PME, HHQ staff in briefs, etc. Some of the metrics are indeed important, but we aren't bean counters, so ease up a little. Burn a little bit of gas and do the BUB in person and see firsthand what is being accomplished. Heck, the violence is going down after all...right? I guess that could work against you if you didn't want outside "wisdom" or the glare of the senior flat black club member on you.

-We've made strides in changing the way advisory duty is viewed in the Marine Corps, but I'm not so sure that the influence will stick. The push for us to get back to our conventional and amphibious roots, get back into the tougher fights (OEF vs. OIF), and shape our Corps for tomorrow. Unless the new Vision and Strategy document (pending release next week) lays out something very concrete and new about how we will build and sustain our cultural and language capabilities in support of advisory roles, I'm not sure the culture will shift appreciably.

-The fact that the CSA and Commandant have had to place this emphasis out there already speaks volumes about the darker side of the mission. The guys out there already know, and it doesn't come out too much in AARs...it pops up when you reconnect with your buddy at the O' or staff club.

[jkm_101_fso]

Ok, if you want TTs to be filled with the "best and brightest", you have to make it a job that people desire and are rewarded for. Until all ranks are given proper credit for TT assignments, no one will do it. If TT is "pointy end of the spear"---at least that is what I was told...then "big army" will find a way to make it desirable and beneficial to careers. I considered that maybe it should be an Functional area; when not advising, you are teaching stateside, but not sure the personnel logistics would work out. I bet there are guys who become pros at this that aren't wearing Green Berets.
Anyway, if this is a mission for the forseeable future, then we gotta figure something out. Right now, it is, for the most part, a dreaded assignment. I think that deploying BCTs with "out of hide" TTs maybe the wave of the future, as opposed to RFF...especially if our footprint in Iraq starts to diminish. Instead of an entire BDE, we may just send 5 or 6 TTs w/security PLTs or whatever. It reduces the number of B.O.G., but maintains that relationship with IA, IP, etc. Just a thought. Then there is no "search" or wait for "volunteers" b/c the TT will come out of hide from the BDE and will probably at the discretion and selection of BN and BDE commanders. That is how you get the best and brightest. It is a critical job and our way out, eventually. Not everyone is geared for it. It takes patience, trust me.

[jcustis]

For a large part, "out-of-hide" has been a Marine Corps modus operandi. I have been told the story of at least one point in the rotation timeline when all of the XOs and S-3s from 1 MARDIV units headed over were locked in the Division CP conference room and told to carve out X number of MiTTs, BiTTs, and PiTTs before they could go home.

It proved to be a late night, but those folks tried to do a good job of balancing the requirement of their own unit needs against the mission needs (e.g. not sending marginal performers).

Was it ever this way with the USA?

we may just send 5 or 6 TTs w/security PLTs or whatever. It reduces the number of B.O.G., but maintains that relationship with IA, IP, etc.

Does anyone think that our overall BOG footprint will influence who volunteers? That is, will the prospect of having fewer QRFs that are further away influence some of those otherwise willing few to decline? Do we know if solid reactionary force plans are being put in place, rehearsed, and resourced, to respond to unforeseen threats to these folks?

[John Nagl]

"I think that deploying BCTs with "out of hide" TTs maybe the wave of the future, as opposed to RFF...especially if our footprint in Iraq starts to diminish. Instead of an entire BDE, we may just send 5 or 6 TTs w/security PLTs or whatever."

There are huge advantages to building MTT's from within BCT's--integral chain of command, soldiers who know each other already, and increased operational effectiveness. The Brits and USMC rely on this method to a certain extent for just these reasons.

However, there are costs as well. Building MTT's from BCT's removes many of the senior leaders of the unit, essentially leaving it combat ineffective as a BCT for the period of the internal TT deployment. Even after creating robust security units for the MTT's drawn from a BCT, there will still be a pile of soldiers and equipment left over--which, unfortunately, will no longer be configured in a deployable formation with their senior leadership. Thus, creating MTT's from BCT's is very effective, but not very efficient--and we need all the BCT's we can find to help with the fight in Afghanistan.

This is why I've recommended the creation of standing Advisor units, which would be more effective than our current manning technique for TT's, but would be far less costly for the Army as a whole. Centrally selecting TT leadership is a huge step in the same direction--that is, creating more effective TT teams at a relatively low cost in a resource constrained environment.

As the war in Iraq becomes increasingly an advisor-based effort for us (see the great NYT front-page story on increasingly effective Iraqi units today), the importance of advisors will only increase as the number of deployed US BCT's diminishes. Anything we can do to build the Army we need for today's wars--an Army that fights "by, with, and through" our allies rather than doing the heavy lifting ourselves--will shorten the wars and make success more likely. I applaud GEN Casey's recent decision as being likely to do just those things.

[MikeF]

Was it ever this way with the USA?

jcurtis

Last year, I worked with four different Army battalions throughout the Diyala Province. Additionally, when an IA Battalion was sent from Ramadi to reinforce the Diyala River Valley, the Marine MTT followed.

The Marines were exceptional, hand-selected. The LT working directly for me was post PL/XO enroute to Force Recon.

On the Army side, I observed a mixture. The Officers coming "outta hide" from the BCT's were typically post-command captains who had excelled in command. The RFF guys varied- I met many young motivated captains/majors and NCO's. In one odd situation, the MTT major was an Apache pilot who did a phenominal job. Whenever I worked a new area, I would establish contact with them to build relationships- just like anything else in the Army.

The majority of the time, they simply wanted to know that they would be supported. Once we established that we were on the same team, everything flowed.

I had nothing but respect for 70% of the MTTs that I worked with.

Once relationships were established, all was well. To me, it was very simple.

The few that I met with that were disgruntled were typically not supported by a parent unit and felt isolated. Regardless, it's all about attitude. In any job, you can decide to make the best of it and complete the mission, or feel sorry for yourself and sulk.

Does anyone think that our overall BOG footprint will influence who volunteers?

JCURTIS

I'll volunteer as an advisor, but I certainly don't want to be the last man standing in Baghdad.

Regards,

Mike

[Rob Thornton]

John Nagl said,

However, there are costs as well. Building MTT's from BCT's removes many of the senior leaders of the unit, essentially leaving it combat ineffective as a BCT for the period of the internal TT deployment. Even after creating robust security units for the MTT's drawn from a BCT, there will still be a pile of soldiers and equipment left over--which, unfortunately, will no longer be configured in a deployable formation with their senior leadership. Thus, creating MTT's from BCT's is very effective, but not very efficient--and we need all the BCT's we can find to help with the fight in Afghanistan.

This is why I've recommended the creation of standing Advisor units, which would be more effective than our current manning technique for TT's, but would be far less costly for the Army as a whole. Centrally selecting TT leadership is a huge step in the same direction--that is, creating more effective TT teams at a relatively low cost in a resource constrained environment.

Sir, thanks for contributing. I think you bring up some valid points we must consider not only as they apply to Iraq and Afghanistan, but beyond toward the context of what is relevant "Land Power" - and what are the required capabilities and capacities we need now and in the future. Both Iraq and Afghanistan must be addressed first as they constitute not only important policy objectives for the moment, but I believe are of a nature that many other existing and future policy objectives are contingent on how we go about pursuing those policies.

One of the things we are considering as we reduce our presence in Iraq in terms of units and the supporting infrastructure, what is required to sustain, and even increase our advisory effort there? There is still allot of the Iraq security forces whose development is critical to sustainable security and is contingent on external advisory assistance. We were providing support to a DoD agency recently for an exercise who thought we only had to put DIV level type TTs and below into their exercise in order to achieve the policy goal.

They had not considered all the things that are currently present in Iraq which took us the last 5 years to build, or which were already there as a result of Iraq being relatively developed in comparison to other locations in the world. They had not considered the cumulative effect of our ad-hoc development, from the support infrastructure we'd built inside Iraq, to the regional infrastructure we'd built over decades, to our use of surplus or "in theater" equipment we'd built up both before 2003 and as a result of operations post 2003. They'd not taken into account the ad-hoc nature of how MNF-I, MNC-I, MNSTC-I, IAG, CPAT or the various 2 star MND CMDs had grown or changed to keep pace with their responsibilities. They had not considered the depth and breadth of the security sector and how it worked – which is something we are really just now starting to understand in Iraq and Afghanistan. From the need to grow the supporting institutions such as the ministries which regulate the DOTMLPF functions or the laws which govern how a HN employs its forces and to what end. There was little thought given to the issues of oversight and accountability which need to be built into those ministries in order to sustain them. There was only vague understanding about how uneven development disrupts the broader security sector and the HN’s legitimacy and credibility – such as the role the corrections system plays in being able to accept various types of criminals and terrorists and how it facilitates reintegration of that population – or how if done in a slip shod manner might perpetuate or exacerbate social problems by allowing inmate populations to socialize and extend their networks.

All of these types of things that have taken us 5 years to understand were assumed away in their first look because they were treated as if they had always been there. The things which sustain our campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan today were treated as if they would come with the initial wave of our assistance. The 1206 and 1207 and all the other funding & authorities were treated as if they would come already available and synchronized with the tools which we might send to do the physical organizing, training, equipping, rebuilding and advising. The possibility that the security situation could change and require greater flexibility in terms of full spectrum operations was not at first considered.

All of this needs to be considered in terms of efficiencies and effectiveness. What is one is not necessarily the other, and there is a difference between preparation for war and its execution. Any solution we put forward must not only consider on, but both. If we unduly sacrifice one for the other because we did not fully account for the scope of the task in a variety of environments, or the range of potential outcomes that may come as a result of our involvement and interaction, then we may unduly risk the policy objective. Whatever efficiencies we may have gained in one area by not acknowledging the nature of the environment and providing a commander with the breadth of tools and unity of command a good assessment calls for may create the ad-hoc conditions which creates sustained inefficiencies as well as marginal effectiveness. The form is subservient to the function, but if the form is not able to accommodate the range of functions required then we get neither effectiveness nor efficiency. That is something we have to account for in the discussion.
Best Regards, Rob

[jcustis]

All of this needs to be considered in terms of efficiencies and effectiveness. What is one is not necessarily the other, and there is a difference between preparation for war and its execution. Any solution we put forward must not only consider on, but both. If we unduly sacrifice one for the other because we did not fully account for the scope of the task in a variety of environments, or the range of potential outcomes that may come as a result of our involvement and interaction, then we may unduly risk the policy objective. Whatever efficiencies we may have gained in one area by not acknowledging the nature of the environment and providing a commander with the breadth of tools and unity of command a good assessment calls for may create the ad-hoc conditions which creates sustained inefficiencies as well as marginal effectiveness. The form is subservient to the function, but if the form is not able to accommodate the range of functions required then we get neither effectiveness nor efficiency. That is something we have to account for in the discussion.

This is all precisly why I hope the executors (military) and policy planners are thinking long and hard about the OIF efforts of 2012-2020, where this will be absolutely crucial.

Makes me think of Ray Bradbury and "A Sound of Thunder". Who is collaborating and thinking about the butterfly effect and intersection of variables in the Iraqi environment?

Sounds like it's time for a massive TDG!

[MikeF]

Rob- Forgot to begin my last several posts with "good work." I appreciate the thought that you've put into this discussion, and I think you're spot on.

JCUSTIS- Concur with all. From my limited perspective, unfortunately, I would submit that it would take 2-3 "strong" tours actually on the ground in Iraq outside of the FOB IOT have the proper perspective to properly plan long term strategy and efficiences/effectiveness. I do not believe that we're there yet in that regard.

Another COA would be a collaborative study- a SWJ Blog could facilitate that one. A open discussion of experiences and best practices coupled with NGO/academic advice could potentially produce a better product for a working long-term solution than a mere MDMP in a windowless room.

Key discussion points would possibly entail:

1. Security Gap for NGOs. How do you facilitate reconstruction (PRT, NGOs, UN) with proper security?

2. Denied Areas. As CF withdrawals, how do we minimize/curtail "enemy" from regaining denied areas and developing counter-states?

3. Force Protection for Advisors. What QRF/ISR/CAS/AWT assets are required to assists. An assumed planning factor would be a 15 minute reaction time.

4. Political Process. What is our role as GOI assumes more autonomy?

Just some thoughts.

v/r

Mike

[jcustis]

Mike,

Your mention of the Blog was something I was kicking around, but then I thought long and hard and wondered...so what?

Where does this brainstorming happen? Is it happening at State right now, or at AEI seminars and JFK Center conferences?

It frustrates me to a great degree because I fear that as we make this discernable shift from kinetic to non-kinetic/governance/infrastructure efforts, we are going to see the influence of players who don't have credible experience on the ground. Maybe I'm overly pessimistic, but I will indeed be pissed if we see a repeat of the 2003 CPA drama that fails to spend time thinking about the law of unintended consequences and 2nd-3rd order effects.

We need to start thinking about 2012-2020 right now, so that we can refine and smooth out the various COAs, sequels, and branch plans, and try to break this terribly complex matter down into manageable parts. Call it a QDR of sorts. We also need to be very careful to nest it in with ops next door, because if we cannot get a handle on Afghanistan and move forward with Iran, there will be a definite and significant impact of how Iraq moves forward.

[MikeF]

Wow, what a great sunday.

I remember being a tank platoon leader in Feb 2003. After the OPORD, I asked the stupid question of what do we do when we actually get to Baghdad?

I was told to quit thinking too much.

Shame on me.

Unfortunately, it is probably not being considered.

An open discussion on this blog would probably be particularly helpful.

From my perspective, it's all about the children now. The secondary and tertiary effects of our occupation could haunt their future. Imagine the recrutiing scheme for transnational terrorist if we inadvertently pulled out or haphazardly continued to occupy.

These concerns haunt my sleep. Despite 4 tours and a TBI, I'll probably redeploy as an advisor to make it right.

Good call, jcustis.

[Rob Thornton]

that MNC-I, CENTCOM, and others are thinking that far out about the types of questions we bring up regularly here on SWJ, many of those thinking about it exchange ideas ere and in other places - also cool because it allows us to leverage each other. The school houses are also thinking about it - we recently sent one of our folks up who'd served as a LOG advisor to the school house to partner with a BSB SPO who'd done some great work in Ninewa province supporting two IA DIV's worth of TTs, the ISF partner units and the host of other folks up there. They were helping big Army LOG look at the way ahead. PKSOI is also doing some great work in trying to consider what the future footprint will require.

However, I think the questions that Mike F brings up are spot on, and we can all benefit by thinking about it. While the many supporting organizations have the will to help, they may not understand all the issues or challenges. Each area has some unique challenges and may require a different footprint and capabilities then another based on the conditions. A BCT that goes into Ninewa probably looks not only a little different from year to year based on progression of ISF and development in the provincial economy and political areas, and it also probably looks different based on the nature of the province. This is one reason why the MA of the unit going into an area must include the ongoing assessment by units already there - where are things now, where are they anticipated to be 6, 12 and 18 month out? Another challenge is getting the many "onsies and twosies" involved with SFA linked up early on to get synchronized with the MSC. One of our SWC members has a daughter going to Iraq in a ARNG MP unit that has gotten the mission to support IP development, but getting them in synch with the BCT from receipt of mission so they can start understanding the OE and adjust their training is part of the challenge. We (big purple all of us we) are making progress in ensuring service and IA advisor training centers and the folks who man them know what the others are doing and can talk (big hat tip MSG M.B. on his hard work) and share, but identifying who all touches SFA, helping them understand how they touch it, and helping them better prepare to do it are all part of the challenge.

The training and mission prep of the many types of units and individuals involved with SFA mission is only part of the challenge. Ensuring they are supported and sustained is key to helping us get the most out of the time they spend deployed advising, and includes not only MEDEVAC, QRF, Survivability, Maintenance, and other key sustainment issues, but also includes getting the equipment to ISF, authorities to do contracts, etc. Just like any combat operation, this one has a tooth to tail that is critical to the mission and it varies with the environment and over time.

Best Regards, Rob

[MikeF]

Unfortunately Rob, I served a limited time in MNC-I. Despite their best intentions and enthusiams, they seem to be working on the latest memo.

I've learned more from SWJ than any staff every taught me.

“Mike, I must warn you to believe only half of what I tell you. If you cannot find two independent sources to verify what I told you, then you must discard it. This is Iraq. You must learn our ways.” Sheik Adnon Al-Tamimi, Feast of Ramadan 2006

"Some problems are so complex that you have to be highly intelligent and well informed just to be undecided about them." Laurence J. Peter

“The significant problems we face cannot be solved at the same level of thinking we were at when we created them." Albert Einstein


You can't learn this on a staff. It takes multiple tours and a lot of additonal reading. Unless you understand the way the Iraqi system actual works (in inputs, processes, function, and outputs) then you will have no regard.

"In Dialogue Mapping: Building Shared Understanding of Wicked Problem," Dr. Jeff Conklin suggests ten symptoms that can potential identify wicked problem territory.
1. There is no definitive formulation of a wicked problem.
2. Wicked problems have no stopping rule.
3. Solutions to wicked problems are not true-false, but good-bad.
4. There is no immediate and no ultimate test of a solution to a wicked problem.
5. Every solution to a wicked problem is a "one-shot operation"; because there is no opportunity to learn by trial-and-error, every attempt counts significantly.
6. Wicked problems do not have an enumerable (or an exhaustively describable) set of potential solutions, nor is there a well-described set of permissible operations that maybe incorporated into the plan.
7. Every wicked problem is essentially unique.
8. Every wicked problem can be considered to be a symptom of another problem.
9. The existence of a discrepancy representing a wicked problem can be explained in numerous ways. The choice of explanation determines the nature of the problem's resolution.
10. The planner has no right to be wrong.

It is what it is.

I sincerely hope that I haven't spoken outside of my rank or position. I'm a mere captain in grad school; however, my life has been absorbed in this war. I simply want to see it to completion. I want to see a reasonable solution for our children.


v/r

Mike

[Rob Thornton]

Hi Mike,
I don't think you are out of bounds. They are some big staffs, while we (JCISFA) are the gang of 25. The reason I brought it up is because we recently sent somebody over to help facilitate a discussion between some of the participants on what happens further down the pike. That said, hard to say how much energy is put toward the task, but it is nice to know that within the various "-I" commands they are thinking beyond the 75 meter some. My feeling is the community (supporting commands and agencies) is being leveraged some because I'm starting to hear the questions come up in different ways - which is good.

That said, SWJ is a great place to help out because it gets others thinking about problems, and because we can leverage a wide base of experience (consider Ken White who has seen the good and the bad on a range of issues (sometimes more then once). The folks on those staffs, and within a range of other commands, agencies, organizations, etc. get to leverage that experience for free and see where it fits.

Like you and J.C. brought up, maybe we consider a working thread on the challenges of sustaining TTs (generic - of any flavor)& PRTs (where they have not transitioned to an AID effort over time) in the future. I think such a discussion can help folks in the "-I" staffs, as well as those back here in support who have to forecast resources. If you only help the number of people who come to SWJ or who leverage someone who does, then its worth the effort.

Maybe we take it from the angle of what is being provided currently by the scope of the U.S. presence in terms of the WFFs (war fighting functions for out non-mil folks), what is not being provided - but could be to make the mission more effective. We can consider what will happen as those pieces are withdrawn, contracts run out, etc. A valid concern I think is that you don't always know how critical something was until you need it, or until its gone. An example might be the various level of medical care in sufficient capacity to meet the surge demand. The HN medical infrastructure has along way to go to be able support an environment where a MASCAL is less frequent but still possible (and in some cases probable) - not only from war related incidents, but from natural disasters, etc. The question is not just about supporting our remaining forces then, but the support required to assist Iraq with continuing to move forward so we don't put the policy objectives at increased risk.

From sustainment BDEs to the Intel and C4 functions architecture that make it all possible - we've built an Ad-Hoc structure where new things have been built over the top of existing ones, if you just remove something without knowing what it touches you may not know you have a problem until its too late. This is just the nature of what we do I think, new commands come in and they take the work that has already been done and they make it better if they can. Systems get built on the top of systems then handed off - the problem is that some of the original pieces get lost over time, and the chain of continuity gets broken - people may not know what the original reason for doing something or doing it a certain way was.

As we go forward we've got ensure that the critical links are exposed as being critical, and then preserved, and in some cases strengthened as some of the supporting ad-hoc stuff that has been built around it and currently helps support the weight its taken on over the years is peeled away. The weight on those critical pieces may not diminish, it may actually increase - particularly if you remove the ancillary things that may have been indirectly providing some support. We have to got to do a thorough by province "self-assessment" that looks at not only the units, but the environment.

We've got to take time to learn about the house we've built so to speak because we've done it relatively fast and more then a few builders have had their hands on it at different levels each with a slightly different understanding of what they thought it should look like. My guess is that has created a house where everything functions OK, but you can't say take th door from one end of the hallway and put it at the other, it just won't fit. It may be that the door had to be built that way based on how the ground sat at that end of the property, but that still does not change the physics at the other end. Being 76" tall (at least I used to be) I've got some good stories about Iraqi buildings.

One of the things we're looking at is the need for robust CIV-MIL assessment teams who can over a year's time get out and look across the breadth and depth of the OE (wherever it may be) and come back with recommendations that look up to 5 years out (Surfer Beetle sent me a link to a Rand study that a pretty good model - Steve if you are out there you might put up th link). There would certainly be a degradation of quality in the assessment the further out they'd look, but by doing so you might not only help feed the future requirements on the ground with a more suitable / tailored force better in tune with the needs of the OE, but you might also feed force development (think GDF) and help programming an budget analysis to better anticipate and keep pace. Just understanding ourselves is often a challenge, understanding how we will interact with the OE adds great complexity.

I like Conklin's list - thanks for putting it up.

Best, Rob

[Schmedlap]

The more that I think about it, the more I agree that a standing advisory corps of some type is appropriate. The reason being is that our current professional education system and the informal professional development within units is not geared towards fostering the skills and knowledge appropriate for a MiTT. It is geared towards creating commanders and staff officers who have lots of Soldiers who all speak the same doctrinal language, share the same SOPs, exist within the same bureaucratic mold, and are subject to the same UCMJ. Nothing could be more different from serving in a maneuver battalion than to serve as an advisor. It should come as no surprise that not only do many Soldiers not desire to serve on a MiTT, but that it is also highly unlikely that commanders can even identify which Soldiers would best fit the role of an advisor. It does not fit neatly into the organizational culture of the BN that officers are raised in (but, perhaps, fits a little neater into a BCT where there is more of a melting pot of MOS's).

From a personal perspective, I enjoyed working with Iraqis when my infantry battalion was standing up and training an Iraqi battalion in OIF III. Eventually we had a MiTT (and a "SPTT" too?) who lived with them and it appeared to be a good experience for all involved. I would have had no problems with living with those Iraqis, but only if I could have picked my MiTT members or if I felt reassured that they were not duds. But upon redeployment, when I pondered my next PCS, I did not volunteer to serve on a MiTT simply because I knew that many individuals being assigned to them were not volunteers and I suspected that they did not have great attitudes about doing it. There were lots of stories about Captains being plucked from their career course for MiTT duty. I also keenly recalled that were it not for me and my supply sergeant going out of our way to help our attached MiTT logistically, then they would have been extremely ineffective, since they had no DODAAC, class II or IX accounts, or other basic admin and logistics necessities.

I hope that my perception of the general motivation of individuals tagged for MiTT duty was completely inaccurate - and in hindsight it was probably a bit pessimistic - but nonetheless that perception did not arise out of thin air. I did not want to attempt to train and mentor an Iraqi unit with Soldiers who were no more motivated than the Iraqis were. That, again, reinforces my belief that a standing advisory corps is worthwhile. If such an organization were setup, and its ranks were filled with individuals who clearly wanted to do the job, then it would be much more desirable. And, on somewhat of a sidenote, I think it would be wise to forego the combat advisor tab. Keeping it a small a group of quiet professionals who need no distinctive uniform accessories would help to underscore that they are motivated by professional ideals of selfless service. It could help in assuring that the right people are drawn, rather than people who like to smother their uniform with Clothing & Sales novelties.

[Schmedlap]

I remember being a tank platoon leader in Feb 2003. After the OPORD, I asked the stupid question of what do we do when we actually get to Baghdad?

I was an Infantry PL at that time. I was even more naive. Rather than asking what we would do, I just assumed that we were going to make a smooth transition into SOSO. But maybe that is because I had just done a deployment to Bosnia 10 months prior. Stupid me.

I usually managed to sneak to our battalion HQ in Baghdad on the days that they were doing their BUB/C&S meetings. I usually sat behind the CA guy. He was a smart guy who had the right idea, but had no resources or guidance to go on and basically did what he could. I remember looking over his shoulder at his notepad during one meeting and the only thing written on it was:

"CMO Plan: no plan."

That basically summed up the whole time that we spent in Baghdad from late April 03, onward. It was small unit leaders doing what they could, with zero guidance or support, while the Division built a Burger King and MWR building at the airport, the BDE worked overtime to set up mini-internet cafes to email home, and BN tried to strike a balance between dealing with the absurdity going on at BDE and above and trying, in vain, to leverage small units who meant well but had no resources. If I had $50,000 in 2003, my AO in the Rusafa district would have been salvagable. But we can't trust people with that much money. They might waste it. Better to spend it on a KBR DFAC. Instead, everyday, I informed my CO and S-2 that our neighborhoods were getting worse, that we could do little more than slow the inflow of armed gangs from surrounding neighborhoods and that we needed money and some assistance. Sorry - all available troops are playing soccer and tag football at the Olympic Stadium. Rather than reinforce us, they just pulled us out and sent us to do route security outside the airport so that shipments of Doritos and twinkies would not get ambushed on Route Irish. Our 1990s safety-first, train-later, risk-averse, mission-neutral mindset paid some real big dividends in 2003.

I'm not saying that anyone was playing the fiddle while Baghdad burned, but they were eating their fair share of ho-hos and watching a lot of VCDs, oblivious to the inferno gathering around them.

[Eden]

I don't believe an advisory corps would be as effective as hoped for two reasons.

1. Like FAO - which many would find fascinating, fulfilling work - a standing advisory corps would have trouble attracting the kind of people you want because they will be unlikely to forego a shot at command down the line. And I don't see the brass ring of command losing its allure any time soon.

2. Unlike FAO, the role of advisors is likely to become less important in the long run. The strategic environment and the nature of the threat have a pesky habit of changing over the space of a decade or so. Do we want to spend ten years creating all the infrastructure and overhead that goes with a 'corps' of advisors, when in fifteen years the need for them is reduced to insignificance. Or, and perhaps more likely, the armed forces are reduced to the point that a separate advisory corps becomes too much of a luxury?

Can anyone comment on the Vietnam experience? Did we have trouble 'attracting' qualified men to the advisory positions? Or did that become a problem only after we had significant combat forces in-country and the best and brightest wanted to operate with our own units and not the South Vietnamese?

In other words, was the allure of advisor slots higher when it was the only way to get involved ina shooting war?

[Ken White]

in my observation, it was sort of a mixed bag. My overall impression was that the pipeline just did its thing; thus you got everything from stellar to cellar. The post-1969 CORDS period was after my time but knowing some folks that were advisers at the time, I don't think the process had changed much.

In the early days, a lot of upper half folks volunteered, it was the only war in town. After US troop commitments rose, that dropped due to the Command possibility in a unit but my impression was that unit advisers were generally pretty sharp, the Provincial advisory team guys less so though obviously there were exceptions to both sides of that.

There were undoubtedly a lot of folks who might not ordinarily have gone to Viet Nam in any capacity or who might have had only one tour due to a low number of branch requirements in country who went and / or got second (or more) tours by volunteering or getting tapped to serve as Advisers. I can think of an MP, an Ordnance and an Armor guy who fit in that category -- all Majors at the time and all served on Provincial rather than unit advisory Teams. IMO, the MP was average (non-vol), the Armor guy above (vol) and the Ord guy (non-vol) below so it was sort of a mixed bag post 69, I think. I'll ask around.

[Tom Odom]

I don't believe an advisory corps would be as effective as hoped for two reasons.

1. Like FAO - which many would find fascinating, fulfilling work - a standing advisory corps would have trouble attracting the kind of people you want because they will be unlikely to forego a shot at command down the line. And I don't see the brass ring of command losing its allure any time soon.

2. Unlike FAO, the role of advisors is likely to become less important in the long run. The strategic environment and the nature of the threat have a pesky habit of changing over the space of a decade or so. Do we want to spend ten years creating all the infrastructure and overhead that goes with a 'corps' of advisors, when in fifteen years the need for them is reduced to insignificance. Or, and perhaps more likely, the armed forces are reduced to the point that a separate advisory corps becomes too much of a luxury?

Can anyone comment on the Vietnam experience? Did we have trouble 'attracting' qualified men to the advisory positions? Or did that become a problem only after we had significant combat forces in-country and the best and brightest wanted to operate with our own units and not the South Vietnamese?

In other words, was the allure of advisor slots higher when it was the only way to get involved ina shooting war?

Excellent historical sources on this issue are the two companion papers done by LTC (ret) Bob Ramsey at CSI. I used them in a history lesson in 2006:

"In advisory and counterinsurgency efforts, Thomas Carlyle’s warning that “nothing is more terrible than activity without insight” is particularly appropriate. As a former MILGROUP commander wrote, “the problem is, and has always been, to get the analysis right before prescribing cures.”8 Analysis requires situational understanding, not awareness. Even in peacetime, under normal conditions, situational understanding can prove fleeting. In wartime, for an advisor in a foreign country, it is almost impossible. At a minimum, an advisor needs to understand the local language, the local culture and values, the local military institutional ethos and how it works, his counterpart as a person in that foreign culture and constrained by that military institution, the local capabilities and limitations, and the specific local situation to comprehend what is going on around him and to preclude misunderstandings. Then, it may be possible to offer advice suitable to the situation; acceptable both to his counterpart and to his US superiors; and feasible given time, resources, and the capabilities and limi¬tations of host nation forces."

This installment of the JRTC BiWeekly History Lessons deals with a topic that does not pop up on the screen when the subject of military history is "googled" on the web. Even inside US military circles, military advisors and advisory efforts--as in the study of military history--is not a subject of common interest.

That is rapidly changing, driven by operational needs. In the past few months, I have briefed several times on counter-insurgency operations. Every time, I have asked the question, "how many of you have served on a transition team....yet? My pause in asking that question was deliberate: given the needs of our efforts in operational theaters, many if not most career soldiers--active duty, reserve, or National Guard--will face the challenges of an advisory tour.

For this lesson I offer the Combat Studies Institute's Occasional Paper # 18, Advising Indigenous Forces: American Advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and El Salvador, by Mr, Robert D. Ramsey, III. Bob Ramsey is a friend and colleague. He surveys three relatively high profile advisory efforts and measures their successes and failures as individual case studies. Most importantly, Ramsey draws the three examples together, extracting the salient lessons in his concluding chapter, entitled simply, "Observations." The following essay offers some of those conclusions and my own thoughts introducing them to you.

The second is:
Advice for Advisors: Suggestions and Observations from Lawrence to the Present, Robert D. Ramsey III. Paper #19

That is probably more history than you ask for but they are worth looking at.
As for who wanted to be an advisor and who did not, my read was the same dynamic applied in that the main stream route was through duty with US forces while lesser beings served as advisors. That was driven by a promotion system that rewarded duty with US forces over advisors. As you put it "attracting the kind of people you want" remains in play;indeed I would say that mindset was likely the main driver for the CSA message in the first place.

In this regard, I would say the Army needs to heed what the SecDef told the US Air Force: focus on the fight we are in and do what is necessary. I think the CSA's message speaks to that.

Tom

[jkm_101_fso]

[QUOTE=John Nagl;50499
However, there are costs as well. Building MTT's from BCT's removes many of the senior leaders of the unit, essentially leaving it combat ineffective as a BCT for the period of the internal TT deployment. Even after creating robust security units for the MTT's drawn from a BCT, there will still be a pile of soldiers and equipment left over--which, unfortunately, will no longer be configured in a deployable formation with their senior leadership. Thus, creating MTT's from BCT's is very effective, but not very efficient--and we need all the BCT's we can find to help with the fight in Afghanistan.[/QUOTE]

Sir,
I certainly see your point and concede it. What about "choosing" a BN from a BCT for this mission? A perfect unit to conduct this would be the Fires BN; of course, the first choice would be IN, AR or RSTA, but they could be better utilized for the Afghanistan fight. The BN could Troop to Task itself into TTs and utilize the rest of the BN for security, log, med, etc. That way, the BCT is still eligible for deployment to Afghanistan, just minus one of its' BNs. By utilizing the Fires BN, the BCT still has all of its manuever BNs available. Just an idea. I did read your article in the FA Journal (July 06), which essentially recommends the same thing...not sure the FA brach should be the key proponet for all TTs...but we are a great asset for that mission. By the way, the photo in your article is of MAJ Mike Oeschger, who was my TT chief at the time in Tuz Kharmatu with 3-2-4 IA. I'm sure I was on the ground somewhere when the picture was snapped!!! Small world!!! The 'terp in the picture was "Jack"...an awesome Kurd and Iraqi.
The TT question is a hard one to answer. I don't think RFF is the best way to go, compared to the "out of hide" option. Eventually, as BCTs drawn down in Iraq, the TTs will remain, I think that is a foregone conclusion. Gen Casey took the right step in making TT a KD job for MAJs, but what about junior officers and NCOs? As we refine this process, we have to make TT a desirable and rewarding assignment. I'd argue it's already rewarding, professionally and personally, but "big Army" has to make it a competetive environment; how that will happen, I don't know. But making it KD for MAJ is certainly a step in the right direction.
I enjoyed "soup with a knife" very much, sir. I'm still in the long process of getting through the COIN FM. I'm sorry to see the Army is losing you to CNAS. I was hoping to see you in command of a BDE at some point. Best of luck at CNAS.