A small war: Aden till 1967

[davidbfpo]

Post 6 refers to a forthcoming conference to mark the 50th anniversary of the UK's exit from Aden. Alas I had only short notice it was last week and managed to get a seat. It was a fascinating event, largely as the majority of the audience had served in Aden (a colony), plus the two protectorates or "up country".

One speaker was Jonathan Walker, a military historian, who has written the most recent book, published in 2014, on the 'Aden Insurgency – The Savage War in Yemen 1962 – 67'. His website is:http://www.jonathan-walker.co.uk/por...den-insurgency

Link to UK Amazon (with reviews):https://www.amazon.co.uk/Aden-Insurgency-Savage-Yemen-1962-67/dp/1473827639/ref=sr_1_1?

Amazon shows two other books on the period and one on "Mad Mitch".

Professor Clive Jones gave the opening address and reminded us that when Aden was handed over it was to the NLF, a liberation movement with Communist sympathies and cadres being trained in East Germany for example. It was the only time in the UK's decolonization that this happened (excluding Hong Kong to the PRC).

Five factors contributed to the end of this 'noble endeavour': a failure to create a local elite; the intervention of external powers (notably Egypt); the UK's financial-economic problems; UK defence priorities and a change in the perception of the UK as a great power.

The local and colonial authorities were unaware of the impact of Arab nationalism, Marxism and Socialism - only late on were these factors identified. The local government in Aden did not have popular support; the Protectorates were ruled by local tribal leaders (many fled to Saudi Arabia when the UK left).

Back to Air Policing he remarked this was in the long term a disaster for security. It was an unnecessary level of violence when compared to the problems caused "up country" and led to post-1939 illegal smuggling of weapons into the protectorates from the Yemen. As weapons were used by the colonial authorities as a bribe for good behaviour that didn't help either.

An interesting comment when applied to current use of air power.

Others added that in 1961 Aden was the "Hong Kong" of the region, wealth accelerated by being the second largest fuel bunkering port in the world and a newly built oil refinery - after the one at Abadan, Iran was seized. This prosperity is now forgotten. Aden Colony had a multi-racial population of 285k, a quarter were non-Yemeni (I assume they all left before or after 1967).

There were twenty-two separate intelligence organizations, so operational liaison was virtually impossible, no intelligence was passed on and only in 1965 was an intelligence "supremo" appointed. Complacency and under-estimation of the the Yemenis was rife. One senior experienced police officer remarked when on finding a junior officer was reading a classified report on the lessons from Malaya: 'It was a bloody jungle there..this is not Malaya'.

Forum readers will know all too often 'lessons' are either not learnt, let alone available later.

The insurgency claimed 200 dead British soldiers (not all Army) and 700 wounded. In 1965-67 two infantry brigades were there, so when withdrawal was conducted the numbers are staggering: 120k tonnes of stores removed, 10K dependents and 24k military personnel evacuated.

One session asked why exit from Aden, but within a short time the UK took on a greater, largely covert role in neighbouring Oman? There the campaign had three parts: Counter-Insurgency, Legitimacy and nation-building. It was 'tenacious, calibrated and strategic' and the fight was won!