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Thread: Ousted Air Force chief cites dissension in Pentagon

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    Council Member Galrahn's Avatar
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    Default Observing the Minot Incident

    Not sure who has been watching, but In From the Cold has been putting together an investigative report on the nuclear weapon mishap at Minot last year. The blog has published two in the three part series. It is a very interesting read and the kind of investigative journalism more common in the new media than in the old.

    I thought it was interesting that today the Air Force blocked the blog. There is a lot talk regarding "new media" of which blogging qualifies. I think it is noteworthy the day after blogs discuss the Air Force declaring war on the other services in the upcoming budget year, the Air Force decides to declare war on what is probably the most popular Air Force blog in the states. It is obviously not a big deal, but I do get the impression it is a sign of the mindset:

    When you hate the message, attack the messengers.

    I have to say I continue to be underwhelmed by the Air Force PR machine. They have some of the best commercial advertisements you can find for recruiting purposes, but the service seems to trip when dealing with domestic criticism and challenges.

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    Default Ousted Air Force chief cites dissension in Pentagon

    The story reads much like you would expect.

    This is classic though, "When you have a difference of philosophy with your boss, he owns the philosophy and you own the difference," Michael Wynne said.

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    I have to admit to some sympathy for the former Air Force Secretary and the Chief of Staff on their point of not risking the U.S. Air Force's Command of the Air.

    Now, I do not believe that Secretary Gates would take an unjustified risk of losing command of the air by holding F-22 procurement to the currently planned 187 aircraft, instead of the figure that the Air Force was seeking (and publicly and aggressively advocating for). It seems beyond doubt that Mr. Gates was correct in insisting upon the resignations of the Air Force's very top leadership, as the Air Force leadership seemed intolerably indifferent to present and foreseeable military and operational needs and requirements, but indeed it failed to address let alone rectify serious institutional problems as well as embarking upon a very consciously zero-sum effort to gain the resources it sought at the complete expense of the other Services.

    But, in so far as Command of the Air may potentially be put at risk in the longer-term by limiting the procurement of the F-22 (and letting the line go cold), the Air Force leadership has a point that this is something that should not be put at even slight risk. Is there a peer competitor now or in the foreseeable future to oppose the Air Force (or Navy) in the Air? The short answer is No. The long answer may not be so comforting. Both Russia and China produce aircraft that are quite the equal or in some cases even the superior of the F-15/-16/-18s, and these aircraft as often as not have much newer airframes. And in the case of PLAAF pilots, 160-180 flying hours in elite fighter regiments and divisions are becoming the norm - approaching or roughly comparable to their U.S. counterparts. Additionally, more advanced aircraft continue in both development and production - and will exceed F-22 production by rather large margins.

    However, the biggest threat to the F-22 may not be so much in the air as on the ground; not only the F-22's unique capabilities but the hand-picked men who fly them should allow the F-22 to dominate the air at least as well as the IDF's F-15s did over Lebanon in the 80's. The problem is, with a relatively modest, even small force of F-22s based at only a relative handful of locations, the F-22 force's vulnerability to missile attack or sabotage is heightened. That vulnerability increases from slight or modest to substantial if the F-22's have to redeploy to forward bases much closer to, or in even inside, an Area of Operations. Attrition is still la bete noir of Airpower, even if it were to take place on the ground instead of in the air. F-15Es (whose aircrew have to split their time between training for bomber and fighter tasks/missions) and F/A-18's (even the SuperHornet) are not necessarily so superior to Su-27/30/35 and J-10/11, etc. as to remove the possibility of an aerial war of attrition between them.

    Furthermore, both the American Way of War, as well as the planning assumptions of both the U.S. and its Allies, tend to take US Air Superiorty for granted, and this has all sorts of consequences and implications all over the place. To paraphrase the old 19th Century ditty about the Maxim Gun, so much of Western military planning at least implicity assumes or relies upon more or less unchallenged American dominance of the sky that said planning assumptions could be characterized by saying, "Whatever happens, We have got, American Airpower, and They have not."

    As such, it is unsettling that F-22 procurement and deployment will be so limited, especially considering both growing doubts over the actual capabilities of the F-35, when it is finally ready for production, and the gfact that the F-22 is barred by U.S. law from export (again, partly the fault of security lapses of some American Allies). Truth is, many (perhaps most) American Allies do not really believe in the F-35, but for them the alternatives are either the Super Hornet, the Typhoon, or the Rafale; put another way, the enthusiasm for the F-35 tends to be less than overwhelming. Especially as the costs may be getting quite out of control. American Allies may be able to stomach the expense and delay (partly their own fault) of the F-35 programme as long as it turns out something along the lines of the how the hi-lo mix of the F-15/F-16 twin track in terms of relative cost and capability; they may just plain drop the entire F-35 programme in dismay and frustration if it turns out to be another F-14/F/A-18, where the ultimate expense and capability of the latter largely negated the point of the two-track effort in the first place.

    If conditions within the US Air Force in particular, and resource constraints within DoD in general, have forced the SECDEF to make a decision to place at even slight or modest risk beyond the foreseeable future the American Command of the Air, then conditions must be fairly serious indeed.

    Edited to Add:

    Sorry for the long post, but this is something that's been bugging me for a while now, and I hadn't really gotten the words to express my concerns. Not sure that I have even now. My apologies.
    Last edited by Norfolk; 06-22-2008 at 08:47 PM.

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    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    Norfolk, don't worry to much Uncle Bob (SEDEF Robert Gates) was a Missile man when he was in the Air Force so he understands what is going on. Air power is guided missiles!!! launched from airframes (any will do) until we get something better. With that in mind it is a bad move to put alot of money in Super Dupper Airframes. Like I have said many times before all you need is a platform to launch a missile. Only the warhead needs to get to the target not the entire airframe Even if we had the money to spend it is a poor choice to risk airframe and pilot over hostile area or air space when all you need is a missile. Many in the Air Force understand this and if Uncle Bob hangs around long enough you may see some of them come to power and you will see a more powerful Air Force that is more useful and costs less. Aviation Week article from 2002 with quotes from Colonel Warden on how Air Force will become 90% Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles....http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/gener...s/aw070854.xml
    Last edited by slapout9; 06-22-2008 at 11:40 PM. Reason: add stuff

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    Air superiority won't nearly mean as much in the future as in the past.

    You can destroy a bridge or an airfield up to 300 km deep with guided missiles.
    You can interdict railway or road movements with killer drones a.k.a. loitering munitions.
    You can do meaningful reconnaissance and ECM missions up to 50 km deep using cheap, quantity-produced drones.

    Some air forces try to adapt to the TBM threat at least against the upper end, but Western armies seem to fail to prepare against heavy MRL and small drone threats (not the least because of small wars attract much of their energy, budget and imagination away from conventional wars).

    An F-22 would probably be helpless like a raptor in a bee swarm.

    The missile/drone technology will not address all requirements and it's not completely new, but it will be able to fulfill a wide range of air power roles even against enemy so-called air supremacy.

    If I was head of the U.S.A.F., I'd much less care about the F-22 than about new, low munition cost (lower than a Stinger shot) battlefield air defenses.

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    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
    If I was head of the U.S.A.F., I'd much less care about the F-22 than about new, low munition cost (lower than a Stinger shot) battlefield air defenses.
    Hi Fuchs, that is a very good point!!

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    Council Member wm's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
    Air superiority won't nearly mean as much in the future as in the past.

    You can destroy a bridge or an airfield up to 300 km deep with guided missiles.
    You can interdict railway or road movements with killer drones a.k.a. loitering munitions.
    You can do meaningful reconnaissance and ECM missions up to 50 km deep using cheap, quantity-produced drones.

    Some air forces try to adapt to the TBM threat at least against the upper end, but Western armies seem to fail to prepare against heavy MRL and small drone threats (not the least because of small wars attract much of their energy, budget and imagination away from conventional wars).

    An F-22 would probably be helpless like a raptor in a bee swarm.

    The missile/drone technology will not address all requirements and it's not completely new, but it will be able to fulfill a wide range of air power roles even against enemy so-called air supremacy.

    If I was head of the U.S.A.F., I'd much less care about the F-22 than about new, low munition cost (lower than a Stinger shot) battlefield air defenses.
    When I think of F22s and F35s, why do I have visions of French knights struggling against a hail of English arrows at Crecy, Poitiers or Agincourt? Sometimes the best tech is not hi-tech.
    Vir prudens non contra ventum mingit
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    Moderator Steve Blair's Avatar
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    It doesn't even have to be a missile threat....

    People forget sometimes that the majority of aircraft lost over NVN were knocked down by anti-aircraft guns. SAMs drew a great deal of attention, but AA was impossible to jam and could be harder to knock out. And in CAS you can spend a fair amount of time down in the AA zone (unless you're using expensive standoff munitions...something that might not always be possible). While an A-10 can survive multiple hits, I don't think it's really clear that an inherently unstable fly by wire aircraft like the F-22 or F-35 could. And if not, will the AF (and other services) be willing to risk those high-dollar assets for a mission that they're not too crazy about to begin with?

    Fuchs, the lack of attention by the AF to drones has more to do with the pilot culture than it does a focus on small wars. They don't like the idea that they could be replaced by some guy in a trailer with a joystick. It's been a fairly long haul for them to get where they are now, which is arguably below where they should or could be.
    "On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
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    Council Member Fuchs's Avatar
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    I know such statements about pilot-dominated culture, but somehow I doubt them.

    Instead, I see rather a case of "last-war-itis". They never experienced cruise missiles and long-range artillery against themselves (after 1945). They seem to be moderately open to the abilities of drones as friendly tools, but seem to degrade possible opposing drones to PR jokes and stuff for civilian scaremongers (remember the "Saddam's MiG-23-turned-into-drones-with-WMD" story?

    Imho drones and unmanned systems in general have their most obvious advantages in very small vehicles.
    Fighter fleets like F-22's might dominate the sky, but does this matter whether 20 F-22 are on CAP with 80 AIM-120 when a wave of 100 TBMs, 500 loitering munitions and 200 short-range photo recce drones are launched by 200 enemy trucks and parked truck trailers?
    An AIM-120 will probably cost more than most of its targets.

    That's why I call for low ammunition cost air defenses.
    That would in fact be rather an army than an air force job - but our armies focus (somewhat) on small wars today, where our enemies aren't even capable enough to fire with a D-30 against us.

    These small wars a.k.a. adventures/expeditions can ruin our conventional war preparedness, and I believe we are in a similar situation as in early 20th century. We had no modern war for decades and don't know #### about how modern conventional war looks like. Our tactics, training & equipment lack the necessary experience base.

    Those USAF guys were right to insist on modern conventional war capabilities - I only disagree because of their their last-war-itis.

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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Heh. What visions do you have when you

    Quote Originally Posted by wm View Post
    When I think of F22s and F35s, why do I have visions of French knights struggling against a hail of English arrows at Crecy, Poitiers or Agincourt? Sometimes the best tech is not hi-tech.
    think of A-10s and Apaches? Or M1A2s in movement to contact? Or a column of infantry moving to another position?

    Low, lower and lowest tech -- and all subject to interdiction by SU-25s (~ 600 + serviceable worldwide) or other even simpler aircraft. To make sure they can mess with your day, there are about 400 SU-27 / SU-30 variants out there or on order.

    Having been bombed and strafed, I'm all for air superiority -- easier to keep your coffee hot...

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    Council Member wm's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    think of A-10s and Apaches? Or M1A2s in movement to contact? Or a column of infantry moving to another position?

    Low, lower and lowest tech -- and all subject to interdiction by SU-25s (~ 600 + serviceable worldwide) or other even simpler aircraft. To make sure they can mess with your day, there are about 400 SU-27 / SU-30 variants out there or on order.

    Having been bombed and strafed, I'm all for air superiority -- easier to keep your coffee hot...
    I am not disputing the desirabilty of air superiority. However, a "one trick pony" is unlikely to win in the long run. At Poiters, Edward the Black Prince need a detachment of mounted forces to complete the victory and cover the archers when they ran out of arrows.

    As to M1A2s in a movement to contact, I can see Hannibal's elephants at Zama being easily avoided by Scipio's flexibile formation; or Rommel's ability to be quickly establish local superiority against the British during Operations Battle Axe and Crusader but his inability to win due to logistics shortages; or more recently, the Israeli armored counterattack against dug-in Egyptians with AT-3s in the Sinai on 8 October 1973. And, during the same 1973 period, Egyptians with SA-7s remind me of what could happen to our A-10s and Apaches. Consider 11th AHR during its 23 Mar 2003 raid on the Medina Division:
    Neither of the regiment’s battalions had any appreciable effect on the Medina Division before they withdrew in the face of withering ground fire, and they both suffered significant damage. All 30 Apaches were hit, with one battalion’s helicopters “[o]n average . . . sporting 15-20 bullet holes each.” One Apache was lost in action and its crew captured.http://rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG405.1.pdf
    The point I was making with my references to the British victories during the Hundred Years War is that technology, in and of itself is not decisive. The British won because of skilled leadership and tactics.
    In 1940, the French Somua S35 and Hotchkiss H39 were probably at least as good as the German Mk I and II's and the British A9 and A10 cruisers were probably better--but Gamelin, Weygand and Lord Gort were no match for Guderian, von Manstein, von Rundstedt, et. al., and the Germans always seemed to have the numbers at the right time and place.
    Last edited by wm; 06-23-2008 at 07:26 PM.
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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Talking Thanks for the great tutorial. You are of course correct,

    one trick ponies do not win in the long run. Thus the desirability of having a "detachment of mounted forces," "Scipio's flexible formations" or such like as well as avoiding the ill conceived and stupid attacks like that of the 11th AHR in 2003. As you aptly illustrate, one trick fighting is not ever a good plan.

    That's probably why the AF needs F-22s for air superiority AND some strike ability, F-35s for strike missions AND the ability to swing to air to air, A-10s for tight, heavy combat CAS and C17s and C130s for hauling people and things and why the Army and the AF need C-27s for the same thing. Not to mention why the Army needs Apaches AND M1A2s AND Infantry. All to avoid the one-trick bit and all suitably and sensibly employed. I think, BTW, that the latter point may be the real rub as it was in your examples.

    I'm always appreciative when someone with whom I'm discussing anything corroborates my points, particularly when they use well known to us all historical examples...

    Thanks...

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    Council Member wm's Avatar
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    Wink "Equine-imity"

    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    one trick ponies do not win in the long run. Thus the desirability of having a "detachment of mounted forces," "Scipio's flexible formations" or such like as well as avoiding the ill conceived and stupid attacks like that of the 11th AHR in 2003. As you aptly illustrate, one trick fighting is not ever a good plan.

    That's probably why the AF needs F-22s for air superiority AND some strike ability, F-35s for strike missions AND the ability to swing to air to air, A-10s for tight, heavy combat CAS and C17s and C130s for hauling people and things and why the Army and the AF need C-27s for the same thing. Not to mention why the Army needs Apaches AND M1A2s AND Infantry. All to avoid the one-trick bit and all suitably and sensibly employed. I think, BTW, that the latter point may be the real rub as it was in your examples.

    I'm always appreciative when someone with whom I'm discussing anything corroborates my points, particularly when they use well known to us all historical examples...

    Thanks...
    I suspect we may have beaten this horse about as much as we have a right to. My parting point is that the closest thing to an Affirmed or a Seattle Slew that we can deploy is a force composed of competent troops with extremely capable leadership--and that comes from spending a lot more on effective training and development than we have for a lot of years. But I know I'm preaching to the choir with this point. Too bad that we find too many in positions of authority who have the characteristics of what one find's under a ponytail
    Vir prudens non contra ventum mingit
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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Thumbs up Always been a Man O' War and Secretariat fan myself

    But then, I'm old...

    We an agree on all that last post of thine...

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    slap wrote:

    Norfolk, don't worry to much Uncle Bob (SEDEF Robert Gates) was a Missile man when he was in the Air Force so he understands what is going on.
    Verily, Uncle Bob must be the most popp-yue-larr man on every ACC base these days.

    Air power is guided missiles!!! launched from airframes (any will do) until we get something better. With that in mind it is a bad move to put alot of money in Super Dupper Airframes. Like I have said many times before all you need is a platform to launch a missile. Only the warhead needs to get to the target not the entire airframe
    I am reliably informed that pilots exhibit a rather strong aversion towards that last bit...

    If I was head of the U.S.A.F., I'd much less care about the F-22 than about new, low munition cost (lower than a Stinger shot) battlefield air defenses.
    Indeed Sven; sadly though, you're not head of the USAF, and your Luftwaffe roots might just serve as the spark for a little nostalgia in certain quarters about the way it was back in the day when the USAAF actually had to face a more or less peer competitor. As you and Wayne point out, the Air Force has allowed tech to more or less eclipse leadership and tactics.

    Having been bombed and strafed, I'm all for air superiority -- easier to keep your coffee hot...
    Ken! Your Toad origins are showing here! (there's already far too many of them here as it is, and I just don't have enough mix for enough Molotovs to, uh, handle them all...)

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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Norfolk View Post
    ...Ken! Your Toad origins are showing here! (there's already far too many of them here as it is, and I just don't have enough mix for enough Molotovs to, uh, handle them all...)
    Actually, I came from the Newt side...

    That, BTW, was not a brag -- it was a complaint. Us old guys do that a lot; complain, that is (see Paragraph 3-41.a (11) (c) of the Curmudgeon Position description).

    Recall also that I tried to tell you; you cannot drink all the Vodka the Bronfmans produce to empty the bottles and have enough go-line to fill 'em all. Not at today's prices. Revert to your store of Gammon Grenades.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    Actually, I came from the Newt side...

    That, BTW, was not a brag -- it was a complaint. Us old guys do that a lot; complain, that is (see Paragraph 3-41.a (11) (c) of the Curmudgeon Position description).

    Recall also that I tried to tell you; you cannot drink all the Vodka the Bronfmans produce to empty the bottles and have enough go-line to fill 'em all. Not at today's prices. Revert to your store of Gammon Grenades.
    !!!

    Sniff...Snuffle...[Norfolk procedes to drown his sorrows in bourbon - and saves the empty bottle for "future" use ].

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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Hmm. That didn't work. Back to the drawing board

    for Plan C...

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    Quote Originally Posted by wm View Post
    I am not disputing the desirabilty of air superiority. However, a "one trick pony" is unlikely to win in the long run. At Poiters, Edward the Black Prince need a detachment of mounted forces to complete the victory and cover the archers when they ran out of arrows.

    As to M1A2s in a movement to contact, I can see Hannibal's elephants at Zama being easily avoided by Scipio's flexibile formation; or Rommel's ability to be quickly establish local superiority against the British during Operations Battle Axe and Crusader but his inability to win due to logistics shortages; or more recently, the Israeli armored counterattack against dug-in Egyptians with AT-3s in the Sinai on 8 October 1973. And, during the same 1973 period, Egyptians with SA-7s remind me of what could happen to our A-10s and Apaches. Consider 11th AHR during its 23 Mar 2003 raid on the Medina Division:


    The point I was making with my references to the British victories during the Hundred Years War is that technology, in and of itself is not decisive. The British won because of skilled leadership and tactics.
    In 1940, the French Somua S35 and Hotchkiss H39 were probably at least as good as the German Mk I and II's and the British A9 and A10 cruisers were probably better--but Gamelin, Weygand and Lord Gort were no match for Guderian, von Manstein, von Rundstedt, et. al., and the Germans always seemed to have the numbers at the right time and place.
    It would be good to remind everybody, I think, that 5 of the 6 examples of tactical excellence listed above were displayed by the side that eventually lost the war. And even Hannibal's defeat at Zama came at the end of a long and desperate war that left him bereft of any meaningful tactical, operational, or strategic choices.

    More important, the point is that combined arms wins battles. I don't believe in the ultimate demise of the manned air superiority fighter any more than I believe in the obsolescence of the tank, which has been on its death-bed since at least 1973. Cheap, man-packed AT missles were supposed to make it go the way of the buffalo, but it hasn't happened yet. Just as the Israelis learned (very quickly) in 1973, proper use of the supporting arms restored the utility of armor. I believe that similar intelligent development of technology and tactics will allow the fighter to retain a useful - if not dominant - place on the battlefield.

    I'm no air historian, but haven't folks been predicitng the end of the fighter for four decades or so? Or has it been longer? I seem to remember the old mantra "the bomber will always get through". And didn't we have to re-install machine guns on fighters in the early days of Vietnam when we discovered that air-to-air missles hadn't actually ended the dogfight?

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    Council Member wm's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Eden View Post
    It would be good to remind everybody, I think, that 5 of the 6 examples of tactical excellence listed above were displayed by the side that eventually lost the war. And even Hannibal's defeat at Zama came at the end of a long and desperate war that left him bereft of any meaningful tactical, operational, or strategic choices.

    More important, the point is that combined arms wins battles. I don't believe in the ultimate demise of the manned air superiority fighter any more than I believe in the obsolescence of the tank, which has been on its death-bed since at least 1973. Cheap, man-packed AT missles were supposed to make it go the way of the buffalo, but it hasn't happened yet. Just as the Israelis learned (very quickly) in 1973, proper use of the supporting arms restored the utility of armor. I believe that similar intelligent development of technology and tactics will allow the fighter to retain a useful - if not dominant - place on the battlefield.

    I'm no air historian, but haven't folks been predicitng the end of the fighter for four decades or so? Or has it been longer? I seem to remember the old mantra "the bomber will always get through". And didn't we have to re-install machine guns on fighters in the early days of Vietnam when we discovered that air-to-air missles hadn't actually ended the dogfight?
    I would not disagree with anything said above. However, it is instructive to ask why the Carthaginians, English, Germans, and Egyptians ended up losing. Part of my point was that we are making a mistake to look for a silver bullet from technology. Another part was that having great machines is not much use without having well-trained people to use them and quality leaders to direct their use. And, finally, the logistics support for any military must be robust enough to meet the demands of combat in a timely manner. Without all of the above, one may view any armed force and ask Pinkley's great question from The Dirty Dozen: "Very pretty Colonel, but can they fight?"
    Last edited by wm; 06-24-2008 at 02:56 PM.
    Vir prudens non contra ventum mingit
    The greatest educational dogma is also its greatest fallacy: the belief that what must be learned can necessarily be taught. — Sydney J. Harris

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