Ousted Air Force chief cites dissension in Pentagon

[Norfolk]

I have to admit to some sympathy for the former Air Force Secretary and the Chief of Staff on their point of not risking the U.S. Air Force's Command of the Air.

Now, I do not believe that Secretary Gates would take an unjustified risk of losing command of the air by holding F-22 procurement to the currently planned 187 aircraft, instead of the figure that the Air Force was seeking (and publicly and aggressively advocating for). It seems beyond doubt that Mr. Gates was correct in insisting upon the resignations of the Air Force's very top leadership, as the Air Force leadership seemed intolerably indifferent to present and foreseeable military and operational needs and requirements, but indeed it failed to address let alone rectify serious institutional problems as well as embarking upon a very consciously zero-sum effort to gain the resources it sought at the complete expense of the other Services.

But, in so far as Command of the Air may potentially be put at risk in the longer-term by limiting the procurement of the F-22 (and letting the line go cold), the Air Force leadership has a point that this is something that should not be put at even slight risk. Is there a peer competitor now or in the foreseeable future to oppose the Air Force (or Navy) in the Air? The short answer is No. The long answer may not be so comforting. Both Russia and China produce aircraft that are quite the equal or in some cases even the superior of the F-15/-16/-18s, and these aircraft as often as not have much newer airframes. And in the case of PLAAF pilots, 160-180 flying hours in elite fighter regiments and divisions are becoming the norm - approaching or roughly comparable to their U.S. counterparts. Additionally, more advanced aircraft continue in both development and production - and will exceed F-22 production by rather large margins.

However, the biggest threat to the F-22 may not be so much in the air as on the ground; not only the F-22's unique capabilities but the hand-picked men who fly them should allow the F-22 to dominate the air at least as well as the IDF's F-15s did over Lebanon in the 80's. The problem is, with a relatively modest, even small force of F-22s based at only a relative handful of locations, the F-22 force's vulnerability to missile attack or sabotage is heightened. That vulnerability increases from slight or modest to substantial if the F-22's have to redeploy to forward bases much closer to, or in even inside, an Area of Operations. Attrition is still la bete noir of Airpower, even if it were to take place on the ground instead of in the air. F-15Es (whose aircrew have to split their time between training for bomber and fighter tasks/missions) and F/A-18's (even the SuperHornet) are not necessarily so superior to Su-27/30/35 and J-10/11, etc. as to remove the possibility of an aerial war of attrition between them.

Furthermore, both the American Way of War, as well as the planning assumptions of both the U.S. and its Allies, tend to take US Air Superiorty for granted, and this has all sorts of consequences and implications all over the place. To paraphrase the old 19th Century ditty about the Maxim Gun, so much of Western military planning at least implicity assumes or relies upon more or less unchallenged American dominance of the sky that said planning assumptions could be characterized by saying, "Whatever happens, We have got, American Airpower, and They have not."

As such, it is unsettling that F-22 procurement and deployment will be so limited, especially considering both growing doubts over the actual capabilities of the F-35, when it is finally ready for production, and the gfact that the F-22 is barred by U.S. law from export (again, partly the fault of security lapses of some American Allies). Truth is, many (perhaps most) American Allies do not really believe in the F-35, but for them the alternatives are either the Super Hornet, the Typhoon, or the Rafale; put another way, the enthusiasm for the F-35 tends to be less than overwhelming. Especially as the costs may be getting quite out of control. American Allies may be able to stomach the expense and delay (partly their own fault) of the F-35 programme as long as it turns out something along the lines of the how the hi-lo mix of the F-15/F-16 twin track in terms of relative cost and capability; they may just plain drop the entire F-35 programme in dismay and frustration if it turns out to be another F-14/F/A-18, where the ultimate expense and capability of the latter largely negated the point of the two-track effort in the first place.

If conditions within the US Air Force in particular, and resource constraints within DoD in general, have forced the SECDEF to make a decision to place at even slight or modest risk beyond the foreseeable future the American Command of the Air, then conditions must be fairly serious indeed.

Edited to Add:

Sorry for the long post, but this is something that's been bugging me for a while now, and I hadn't really gotten the words to express my concerns. Not sure that I have even now. My apologies.