Leading infantry tactics theoreticians/experts today

[Fuchs]

The key problem is that the fighting ability of the sperate squad may lack enough depth of manpower to survive a short and violent direct encounter. In Afghanistan the difficult terrain, the small manpower, the lack of helicopters, the burden of the infantry, the casuality awerness and the watchful eyes of the enemy and his supporters seem all to make the good coordination of a distributed operation difficult.

Firn

A platoon in a trap is simply a richer target than a squad in a trap.

DO went for very small teams - good for area observation, not so good for assault. A counter-ambush assault (instead of just a team in a position to chase the enemy away with firepower) would be necessary, so DO (as I understood it) would have gone too far in regard to the present problem (unless the distributed, not fixed teams unite quickly for a combined assault).

I would want the enemy on the run, not just attempt to shoot him into pieces. The latter is quite difficult.

A rout usually infects previously not discovered positions while aimed fire doesn't.


The key in the specific restrictions of AFG mountain terrain should be the adherence to a tactic known even by Xenophon: Don't march through valleys before you control the mountain tops around it.

The infantry needs to be fit and lightly loaded, so it can move along ridge lines and from top to top at least in the most dangerous area.

That's again one such point at which I doubt that heavy plate armour is a wise choice.


Oh, and most important: You shall not break contact against irregulars. Instead, you should press for their destruction once they drop their disguise and open fire. Such an aggressiveness might eradicate the small arms ambush problem in short notice.


The irregulars have the advantage of civilian disguise 99.999% of the time, but it should nevertheless be possible to defeat them without helicopter and CAS support once they drop their disguise.
More resources may be an answer to a problem, but it's no tactic. More resources is a primitive brute force approach. We assert that we're superior, so we should demonstrate it. That would improve our conventional deterrence and therefore our national security in general.

[Firn]

To get a bit more down to earth I post this video and a some very armchairish comments to it. Perhaps others with experience in Afghanistan can join in. I was out of the military before my country comitted to operations in Afghanistan.

Afghanistans Gray Line: The Education of "Combat Platoon"

I will focus on tactics used in the first encounter but will add later some comments on the rest.


Terrain and Weather

Here we have a typical landscape:

a) Satellite

b) Relief

Mostly sunny, mild or cool days and cold nights.


The outpost

On a hill overlooking the rather narrow valley. Most visible population centers are in or along the valley which is partly covered by terraced fields. The nearby forests and hills are used for pasture and forestry. Mountain tops and ridges dominate the landscape, the vegetation is sparse with thin forests, meadows and rocky ground.

It is fortified with makeshift stone walls, protected by wire and has a mortar. I do not see any observation point or equipment, but that doesn't mean that they aren't there.


The mission

Meeting the locals to implement the overall startegy. The surprise character of the visit should reduce the likelyhood of a premediated ambush.

The enemy

Unknown amounts of enemy fighters and suppoter in unknown locations. Some in the villages, some in the countryside. Some armed and ready to fight, others observing or doing something else. Light weapons only, with the spport of RPGs and possibly mortars and recoilless rifles.

Troops and support available

Looks like about a platoon of American soldiers on the ground supported by Afghan forces. Some of them will have to guard the outpost and provide mortar support. Scout helicopter and Apache helicopter seemingly available for a specific time frame as well as a air assault group.

Time available

Not hard time restrictions. A long movement to the objective. Time constraints due to the sparse allocation of specific assets (UAV?, helicopters? Air assault team?). The preferred start to the mission would be at night to reach the village very early in the day.


Civilian considerations

Any civilian casualities must be avoided and the villagers should not be affronted by the operation. Some friction with military considerations is however almost inevitable, like the choice to send no notice of the operation to the village. Prior contact with civilians will most likey compromise the element of surprise.



The operation

The approach is be later in the day than the commander hoped.

a) The MGs and the sniper team? form a base of fire and observation on dominating terrain in the south.

b) The tea-party elements move down the mountain. On a single path or distributed?

c) When the enemy initiate the combat the Apache is called in which was possibly replaced by a Kiowa later on.

d) The enemy runs away with possible casualities. Perhaps some melt into the population of the village.

e) After some consideration an air assault gets launched. AFVs may have been part in the push into a suspected hiding place.

f) The elusive enemy can not be found or identified as such.

The end is unknown.

Firn

[davidbfpo]

Firn,

A "good catch" the news report from Kunar Province. I noted that alongside the US Army were ANA, ANP and ABP. Plus the FOB was on high ground, not the highest.