Leading infantry tactics theoreticians/experts today

[Fuchs]

It's actually even worse.

Credit cards are very uncommon in Germany (just as cheques), I couldn't even pay for I have none.

We pay by paypal or money transfer from account to account.


Well, judging by his article titles and my memory of his articles he has no answer for the problem of infantry being pinned (fixed) and no mortar SMK available?

That's the #1 infantry tactical problem in my area of interest.

[jcustis]

http://2ndbn5thmar.com/

Although he is not widely cited. McBreen has written profusely on the matter of suppression and night fighting, and might have some material on smoke employment.

The bulk of his writing came at a time, when there wasn't much going on except training and unit deployment program rotations to Okinawa, so it was detailed and very well-thought out. Much was common sense that we simply were not applying.

if we get pinned, however, we simply call in an airstrike to break the fight.

[Fuchs]

http://2ndbn5thmar.com/

Although he is not widely cited. McBreen has written profusely on the matter of suppression and night fighting, and might have some material on smoke employment.

The bulk of his writing came at a time, when there wasn't much going on except training and unit deployment program rotations to Okinawa, so it was detailed and very well-thought out. Much was common sense that we simply were not applying.

Interesting, but he oversimplifies a bit.

His infantry defence would fail against a good or his own infantry attack, for example; the defence plan is only a defence against an assault element - a mere ambush.

His attack pattern is an attack on a point defence. This is a logical follow-up to his incomplete infantry defence pattern.


A more complete defence plan would attempt to counter suppressive fires either by smoke or by having a separate team that covers probable suppressing fire base locations from an advantageous position.

That in turn leads to a requirement for additional security in the attack pattern. The assault team isn't the only one that may be in great danger. The suppressive fires team may be flanked. It requires security measures.

And of course you may always encounter a defence that's not a point defence, but a network of defences.

He is furthermore not much into advising for dispersion to reduce the effectiveness of enemy support fires.


Overall, he seems to be quite orthodox, close to standard doctrine.

[jcustis]

In McBreen's defense, simplification is precisely his point, and it is woven throughout his writing, especially if you grind through this document that was at one time published for every junior NCO and SNCO distance education program package. he spent the majority of his time, from what I can tell, focusing on those weaker areas of our training and doctrine, not the ones he felt were sufficient.

http://www.2ndbn5thmar.com/dm/CCMWor...cBreen2002.pdf

And with regard to your concern about a network defence, I am reminded of something a wise Major said relating to infantry attacks: "At some point, every attack at the company level and below becomes a frontal assault. It's just a matter of orientation."