I agree, the Corps is out in front on this issue - and
also on the full spectrum capability problem...
The ability to tailor forces is critical and the Army needs to be able to do that; I'd like to see the plug 'n play aspect moved down to BCTs, shuffle Bns around.
The Division needs to go IMO because it's a legacy item and thus an inadvertant, unconscious flexibility inhibitor. We just need to fix the log issues. The US Army has really fought by Division in only two cases; North Africa in WW II and the 1991 gulf War -- that due to the Desert where one could maneuver a Division; all the rest of WW II and all subsequent wars have been RCT or Bde battles due to terrain compartmentalization and other factors. The BCTs need a third (or even a fourth) maneuver Bn and the RSTA Sqn needs a lot more thought but it's definitely the way to go. They also need to be called Bdes -- because a BCT was a Battalion Combat Team a long time before some smart guy reinvented the wheel.
The objection to a third or fourth maneuver Bn will be centered around "imbalancing" the personnel system and keeping certain rank spaces (by branch). Gar-bahge; change the system to support the military requirement instead of trying -- foolishly -- to design a TOE to support the personnel system. Bass ackwards...
I thought
That was originally the idea but aside from other things the personnel issues both in higher ranking positions and the requirements for what actually needs to be expanded at BN and below would probably have to be agreed on and implemented before it went much of anywhere.Originally Posted by Ken White
Any man can destroy that which is around him, The rare man is he who can find beauty even in the darkest hours
Cogitationis poenam nemo patitur
Omg
This is the third time I have found myself in 100% agreement with you Ken.also on the full spectrum capability problem...
The ability to tailor forces is critical and the Army needs to be able to do that; I'd like to see the plug 'n play aspect moved down to BCTs, shuffle Bns around.
The Division needs to go IMO because it's a legacy item and thus an inadvertant, unconscious flexibility inhibitor. We just need to fix the log issues. The US Army has really fought by Division in only two cases; North Africa in WW II and the 1991 gulf War -- that due to the Desert where one could maneuver a Division; all the rest of WW II and all subsequent wars have been RCT or Bde battles due to terrain compartmentalization and other factors. The BCTs need a third (or even a fourth
The objection to a third or fourth maneuver Bn will be centered around "imbalancing" the personnel system and keeping certain rank spaces (by branchOne of the suggestion that MacGregor made that I did like was to have a BG lead the upsized BCT. DO you feel the RSTA should stay R-S-T-A focused or be more of a Cav unit, as we currently use cav?
Reed
I think the ARNG has BG command "large" Brigades; I've seen that before, but don't know how common it is. When TF Olympia replaced 101st in Mosul in 2004, it was commanded by then-BG Carter Ham. He had one stryker BDE, plus attachments, but the Stryker BDE had their own Commander, as well. As for me, I am nostaligic about the old regimental system...how cool would that be?This is the third time I have found myself in 100% agreement with you Ken.
I think we've had this discussion in a thread; there are a lot of guys on here with more expertise than me on RSTA, but from what I've seen in Iraq, we generally just use them as Manuever...but the same could be said for FA BNs.DO you feel the RSTA should stay R-S-T-A focused or be more of a Cav unit, as we currently use cav?
I don't see the RSTA changing, I just wish they had more 11Bs and 19Ds assigned to the organizations. MikeF, Cavguy and RTK could probably lend more to this than I can. RSTA has 2 Cav troops (A&B) and one infantry company (C troop) which is basically task organized as 2 scout platoons, IIRC. The RSTAs are commanded by Infantrymen, from what I've seen. I'll look for the thread we had on this all ready...I think it was titled "Transformation" or something.
Sir, what the hell are we doing?
That's dangerous...
You can get accused of mutiny and sedition for that...This is the third time I have found myself in 100% agreement with you Ken.I don't agree with Macgregor on a lot of things, including that -- for the current sized and organized Bdes. IF they were at four maneuver Bns plus a Cav Troop AND a Scout / LRS (Jr) Co AND a STA Co (all separate), an ADA By and a full up FA Bn, which they should be, I'd agree.One of the suggestion that MacGregor made that I did like was to have a BG lead the upsized BCT.
The one problem with a GO commander is that unless carefully selected, hidebound and excess caution to protect the institution can creep in; COLs will generally be more flexible. With the Bde as large as I think it should be, the Bde Cdr will have to do what the CG of the 1st Bde of the 101st in 1966 did -- in sharp contrast to most of his contemporaries -- and tell the TOC when he sacks out "Wake me if ALL the battalions are in heavy contact."Since my opinion is that we do not nowadays do the Cav thing well and since you need both mounted and dismounted recon elements -- and never the twain shall meet or work together well -- plus a Svlnc / TA element (also a separate and different thing which doesn't get along well with the other two), all three should be separate Co sized units I think. We need to get Cav back to be being Cav instead of a light and frequently misused maneuver force.DO you feel the RSTA should stay R-S-T-A focused or be more of a Cav unit, as we currently use cav?
Dismounted Scouts need extra training and time to do their job properly and they need time to do the mission without being rushed (or asked if they're sure when they report something...) and the STA thing is tech heavy. Three very different philosophies and techniques at work that mesh poorly in training and in operation except at the level where the information they produce is collated and analyzed.
I could make a case for a Cav Sqn in a heavy Bde but I think light, medium and heavy Bdes all need all three types of intel gatherers, the light and medium guys only need a Cav Troop IMO (and the heavy can get by with a Scout Platoon which should still be separate). The Cav element should not be considered another maneuver element except in rare cases. In any case, the missions and techniques are so different that to combine them in one Sqn really makes little sense except for peacetime admin purposes -- and that should NOT be the organizational determinant.
Snipers are both a combat and an intel asset, are needed and both the Cav and Scout elements should have some; the Cav probably with .50s and the Scouts with .338 (or .300 Win magnum, a much better anti personnel round).
The fighting organization should be the TOE, the ad-hoc stuff should be for peacetime support. We do that backwards because it makes it easy on the Per folks so instead of the Per system supporting the force, the force is supporting the Per system...
I have a sneaking suspicion that your comment
exemplifies what's wrong with the system today...
Why "agreed?" I know that's the way we work today, committees and consensus -- and look where that's gotten us.
IMO, agreement should not be required; an assessment of the combat -- not peace time, combat -- requirements should be made and a decision announced and implemented. We have ceded too much day to day running of the Army to Congress, DoD, POMs, PBACs, branch parochialism, GO steering committees and to Councils of Colonels. Not one of those things is in sight when combat occurs...
Peacetime, ideally, should be the norm for Armies -- but they absolutely should not organize and operate as peacetime entities. You do indeed go to war with the Army you've got -- and if it is totally peacetime oriented, you are going to have problems.
We kill people unnecessarily due to that crass stupidity.
But then what would all of the MGs do?
You are obviously lacking in institutional pride. The US military can put the cart before the horse better than anyone else in the world.
I think a lot of the resistance stems from the loss of control. BCT and even battalion commanders sometimes have a difficult time accepting that the decentralized nature of the current fight removes them from the "warfighting", so to speak. Modularity contributes to that.
Be reduced in number to a sensible figure?
We have the same number of flag officers we had in 1946 for a 12 plus million person force. That high and excess number is retained -- wrongly IMO -- to provide flags in event of a required mobiliztion. I agree with the need, disagree with the method.But then what would all of the MGs do?
Secondly, that number helps the up or out and DOPMA regimens to work. Both of those have their flaws.
Still, unlikely to change, I know. They ought to be able to find something for them to do; we've invented several jobs for three and four stars; how hard can it be to develop other jobs?Roger that -- but one of our many strengths.You are obviously lacking in institutional pride. The US military can put the cart before the horse better than anyone else in the world.Absolutely, though I'm not as sure it's so much being removed as it is a fear of loss of control. That and a lack of trust of subordinates which IMO is partly control-freakitis and partly a bona fide lack of trust due to tacit knowledge or at least a gnawing fear that we do not train people as well as we should. Some favorable exceptions, I know -- and more every day; which is one of several good things that's come out of all thisI think a lot of the resistance stems from the loss of control. BCT and even battalion commanders sometimes have a difficult time accepting that the decentralized nature of the current fight removes them from the "warfighting", so to speak. Modularity contributes to that.
On the training issue, the Corps does a better job with the Basic School but the Army initial entry training, while better than its ever been, is still inadequate due to false time and money pressures. LTs need about a year, peons about six months...
I've talked to Doug a great deal about his "super groups" as I dubbed them. One of the biggest problems I have with BG/BGD (unit/formation) organisation debates is that the vital supporting structure is rarely taken into account. EG:You can get accused of mutiny and sedition for that...
.
A Coy or 100 or 200 men has one CSM. In a 200 man company he has double the work load, then it comes to administration. or:-
A BG of 4-5 sub units requires far more logistics, and admin than one of 3. It also has poorer traffic-ability, and greater problems when static. Bigger deployed organisations may be more "efficient," but I don't see how they can be as "effective". Yes they save money, but I can't see many other benefits.
The more I study, read, and talk (and SWC is a vastly important resource) the more I am concluding that small iron-bar simple organisations are the ones that triumph. Adding capability means adding complexity and than is not always good. In fact it seems that it is rarely is ever good.
Just an opinion, only slightly supported by data...
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
I dare to revive this because of a lasting interest in hints at modern infantry theory.
Let me be the first to bite then.
Just reread Wilf’s last post here and think he makes some good points which can be reinforced with some Falklands history. Brigadier Thompson was very appreciative of the additional combat capabilities that the two attached Para battalions brought to his three-battalion commando brigade. However, he also stated quite clearly in some of his writings that his HQ was stretched to the limit, partly for logistical reasons. There was no way he could have added another battalion to it, even if it would have been available.
When 5 brigade came with another three battalions, a division HQ came with it, and 5 brigade took one of the two Para battalions off Thompson’s hands.
Nothing that results in human progress is achieved with unanimous consent. (Christopher Columbus)
All great truth passes through three stages: first it is ridiculed, second it is violently opposed. Third, it is accepted as being self-evident.
(Arthur Schopenhauer)
ONWARD
So I just read back a bit further and can add two points to my last post:
1.) Ken’s post 61 can be seen as an interesting counter to my last.
2.) We have been off topic for a number of posts here as Fuchs named the thread:
‘Leading infantry tactics theoreticians/experts today’
Nothing that results in human progress is achieved with unanimous consent. (Christopher Columbus)
All great truth passes through three stages: first it is ridiculed, second it is violently opposed. Third, it is accepted as being self-evident.
(Arthur Schopenhauer)
ONWARD
Grrrr, OK, let's discuss such organizational stuff for a while.
I see absolutely no reason why you couldn't attach 10 battalions to a single brigade.
The reason is simple; I think in great war terms.
The brigade would simply enter the battlefield with four or five battalions and keep the others in garrison. The units could rotate.
Disadvantages:
No short-term maximum combat power available.
'Few staff slots for officers'.
Advantages:
An initial relative weakness would enforce efficient use of force from day one, keep the losses moderate and lure the enemy into an exhausting offensive behaviour.
THEN, later on, the brigades would rotate out exhausted battalions for reforming them in garrison (or more closely to the hot zones on easy rear security missions) - the strength could be maintained, the brigade would not burn out quickly.
- - - - -
About modern infantry tactics:
I see/hear more and more outraged voices in the context of Afghanistan battle reports.
- Outposts in the valley, surrounded by dominating and not secured heights.
- Overloaded infantry unable to move faster than walking pace and unable to negotiate altitude differences in a useful time span.
- Predictable movements/routes
- Infantry inability to fix, flank or counterambush the enemy.
- Apparently pointless missions (like defending an outpost that shall be given up just days later)
I'm quite sure that the publicly discussed combat reports are not representative (the bad news advantage over good news), but they seem to reveal weak spots that should nevertheless concern us.
I recall a remark about combat in some "green zone" somewhere - infantry was supposedly barely able to clear the area because it offers so much concealment to the enemy.
Such remarks provoke always the same thought in me:
WTF? These troops are supposed to be able to do the job while carrying anti-tank munitions, fearing competent (tank) counterattacks, fighting an enemy who could call for accurate mortar/artillery fire and who's supplied with adequate AP cartridges.
No matter how much is being talked about the quality of the Taliban; battles against them are supposed to be a very simple kind of tactical combat.
It is comparable to stragglers of crushed enemy formations. Combat against such irregulars is akin to mopping up the remains of an enemy force after the real battle.
So if this enemy causes that many tactical problems (on top of the interstellar-sized problem of target identification during the sitting war), then it should be a LOUD WAKE-UP CALL.
My bet is that modern infantry tactics kept pace with other developments about as well as infantry tactics did in 1890-1914.
The absolutely scary problem is that in the above mentioned period we had a rally for infantry tactics modernization based on Boer War experiences.
This should HORRIFY us for two reasons;
* the Boer Wars on very open terrain with low force density were terribly misleading, as are potentially the Bush wars as well.
* we don't even have that much infantry tactics modernization.
We modernize the infantry equipment instead - that's akin to the introduction of Grey and Brownish uniforms post-1900 at best.
So I'm basically going to panic if we cannot come up with good modern infantry theories/theorists/reform movements.
(Just in case that you don't want to tell about someone or something for OPSEC reasons; just drop a number or a line about your confidence in modernization.)
Well let's talk about that though. What if, through modernization and weight savings, an OICW-type weapon with an integrated 20 - 25mm airbust HE munition COULDbe developed and deployed? Assuming a trajectory that supports 500 - 700m engagements with near-pinpoint air burst accuracy, that could be a potential fight-breaker in a lot of situations where an enemy may be behind hasty cover, or light concealment.We modernize the infantry equipment instead - that's akin to the introduction of Grey and Brownish uniforms post-1900 at best.
How would infantry tactics change if that capability were to come into use, and troops carried a combat load of 60 - 120 rds of 5.56mm, and 24 rds (4 magazines of 6 each) HE or flechette rounds?
I've been a naysayer of the concept for a long time, like many others, because developments so far are just too big.
Perhaps we do not need as precise an effect as a laser range finder and adjacent air burst results, but rather effects like the PAW-20 (where terrain permits):
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eu87AxzBf3Y
jcustis,man that hing is wicked. How come they put the pistol grip on the side of the weapon? Does it add to it somehow?
Although the weapon is ambidextrous, the pistol grip location is awkward for that reason, as well as being so high in relation to the bore. Seems accurate enough though.
You want to talk about suppression, that thing looks like it puts it down well! I can only imagine what it feels like to be within the effective casualty radius of that 20mm round. There's a ton of history behind use of 20mm HE against enemy in bush wars, where impacts against hard surfaces like a boulder could increase the casualty effect of the fragmentation.
]The Koreans actually introduced an OICW-type weapon (no automatic for the 20mm, that's the sole relevant difference) this year, which is obviously being ignored because the South Korean Army isn't the U.S.Army.
Such a weapon may be advantageous in certain situations, disadvantageous in others - but it's still only about firepower. Firepower hasn't been in short supply since '44.
- - - - -
Survivability, Mobility, sustainability and leadership are the other key areas:
Survivability - camouflage, concealment, deception, cover/armour, ability to detect a contact in time
Mobillity - fitness, over-snow equipment, equipment weight, ability to leave a kill zone
Sustainability - water&food reserves/supply/generation, ammunition reserves/supply, energy reserves/supply (electrical power!)
- - - - -
The small war lessons ruin the attitude towards camouflage/concealment.
The optimal armour compromise in small wars is very different than the optimal compromise for great wars.
Ability to detect a contact in time - still not satisfactory despite thermals, air support.
ability to leave a kill zone (=break being fixed) = marginal due to a casualty aversion that would be excessive in great wars.
equipment weight - medieval full plate knights would qualify as today's light infantry
So overall I think we need a new way of how to solve tactical infantry problems. New tactics, different compromises (equipment, loss aversion, organization), different expectations.
Last edited by jcustis; 11-22-2009 at 10:19 PM. Reason: an attempt to reply resulted in an erroneous edit to this post. Apologies to you Fuchs!
Then could the USMC expeditionary brigade template be good to emulate? It's broken down into command, ground, aviation, and logistics elements. This allows for a regimental combat team commander (colonel) between the brigadier and the the manuever battalion commanders (ground element).
"Pick up a rifle and you change instantly from a subject to a citizen." - Jeff Cooper
Based off of a comparative weight slide, the K11 is slightly lighter than a M4 / M203 combo.
My boss is currently working to shift the emphasis that our vehicle's Program Manager organization has placed on survivability, in the aim to gain better lethality. Our community has always proposed that speed and our weapons system are prime components to security, but then again we gained over 3,500 lbs of armor with virtually zero gain in horsepower, torque, etc. to stay fast and agile. The cycle began with the first casualties from IEDs, and hasn't seen an end in sight. So beginning there, we used technology to beat the threat, when we probably should have spent a lot more time walking...and walking...and walking, along those stretches of terrain that warranted that TTP. Perhaps it start with a look at the definition of patrolling. We haven't discussed it here at the SWC from what I can tell, but what is presence patrolling? One of the most significant complaints concerning OIF that I had and saw was the fact we commuted to work and ran patrols that accomplished very little outside of putting eyes on a certain patch of dirt for that particular period of time. We lost way too many good men and women while they drove to work.Survivability, Mobility, sustainability and leadership are the other key areas:
Survivability - camouflage, concealment, deception, cover/armour, ability to detect a contact in time
We have adequate battle drills in these areas, but we often fail to employ them well. We see it in youtube videos of troops reacting to contact and showing terrible fire discipline and lack of movement, of overloaded Marines conducting aerial envelopment into Taliban territory (which speaks to your area of concern below), and patrols who break contact AWAY from an apparently limited enemy attack.Mobillity - fitness, over-snow equipment, equipment weight, ability to leave a kill zone
I think I remember a photo essay about Operation Khanjar where plenty of canals were around and water was reasonably available. Assuming we made the rational decision to draw water from those sources AND use the in-line filters that we are issued along with our hydration bladders/carriers, water shouldn't be much of a problem, but it is...and lessons learned in Iraq and past conflicts have long been forgotten. As a case in point, we could freeze a lot of water and get it into the fight, as proposed here: http://www.captainsjournal.com/category/logistics/ but unless someone does something with it once it arrives (as opposed to letting it lie in the sun), the water will get back to coffee pot temps very quick. Anyone remember water bags? They used to be mandatory for survival at CAX rotation in 29 Palms...were is the modern water bag?Sustainability - water&food reserves/supply/generation, ammunition reserves/supply, energy reserves/supply (electrical power!)
Perhaps this will be where the next revolution in thinking has to come from, and until we get back to finding this balance we won't progress further. Ken, as I know you will likely read this, what were the METT-T considerations your experienced about body armor in your various campaigns? I have seen photos of Marines at Khe Sanh with flak jackets, but Soldiers sans flak jackets at LZ X-Ray. We fought that conflict with apparent different choices in wear and use available armor (USMC M-1955 vs. M-1952 and M-1969 vests), so I scratch my head along with you Fuchs and wonder what the hell happened that we would risk heat casualties and combat fatigue over improving our capability. I know the answer lies in many more variables than can be discussed in this thread alone, but until we vanquish risk aversion, we are going to be saddled with some sort of armor package and its wear and use will be controlled at 4-star general officer levels.The small war lessons ruin the attitude towards camouflage/concealment.
The optimal armour compromise in small wars is very different than the optimal compromise for great wars.
We typically fail to integrate these enabling assets into maneuver effectively. As a case in point, who controls unmanned aerial systems? In the Marine Corps, through either previous training or familiarization, the intelligence folks are predominantly involved in their employment, tasking, routing, etc. I have never seen a period of instruction for the commanders, regarding integration of UAS into maneuver. UAS usage isn't rocket science, nor is vertical envelopment, yet infantry commanders don't get smart based off of what the helo pilots alone tell them. Why is it any different with UAVs?Ability to detect a contact in time - still not satisfactory despite thermals, air support.
I'm not certain I follow your point here Fuchs. Are you saying we've grown less inclined to go full-tilt bozo against an ambush because we are currently trying to practice more restraint in OIF/OEF?ability to leave a kill zone (=break being fixed) = marginal due to a casualty aversion that would be excessive in great wars.
I will always prefer to die on my feet or at least at a full charge while in the saddle, than from the overpressure impinging on a box I find myself cocooned in, or from heat stroke due to wearing body armor that will save me in X number of circumstances, or from the IED I might have spotted if I lived right beside the farmhouse, as opposed to some distance from it because it might be the traditional answer in terms of defense.So overall I think we need a new way of how to solve tactical infantry problems. New tactics, different compromises (equipment, loss aversion, organization), different expectations.
I meant that troops get too easily pinned (fixed) by the enemy. The enemy doesn't seem to suppress counterfire, but he seems to suppress movements.
The minimal casualties attitude seems to be the cause for troops seeking cover and then only returning fire / calling in for fire. (I cannot prove that with data, but it's the picture that formed itself based on many small sources.)
It doesn't need to be like that.
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