Policy is our biggest problem
Joel -- Good points across the board. Most of our problems with IO remain in the policy / permission / "lanes in the road" arena (what we may do) versus in the technology / TTP arena (what we can do). Because the first impacts so heavily on the second, it's policy that we really need to fix.
The concept of IO is simple: Control the other guys' view of reality, and don't let him do that to you. It's the execution where things really get tough.
You can get more with a kind word and a gun than you can with a kind word alone
Stray voltage...
All,
It seems we are all in violent agreement regarding a need for a coherent national narrative, that is reflected in actions (an expression of a consistent foreign policy), consistent with priorities and interests as expressed in resourcing. Certainly this is possible, just not probable (at least not yet) because we have a hard time gaining consensus on the simplest of issues much less the trajectory and azimuth of foreign policy. Another of the pesky greatest strengths-greatest weaknesses dichotomy. About the only thing even vaguely capable of realistically driving this type of coherent national-level activity is a threat to a national survival (note I didn't use another 9/11 and caveated that it wasn't a given). We have, however, done far better in the past (think cold war apparatus) and can/should do better than we are today.
OK enough policy wonk "stuff"... too much of the tilting at windmills...
At the tactical and operational level, IMHO it is far more productive to think of IO/IE in terms of the information content of my operations. Just one example:
If I as PLT LDR/CO CDR stop to buy a soda at a vendor, remove my sunglasses/headgear and engage in a conversation that asks nothing of the vendor than how life is treating him and his family... there is whole number of messages and impressions I am communicating
a. Populations: He respects our property and us in general, want/open to contact
b. My Soldiers: We can't paint everyone not in uniform as the same, even when we can't differentiate good from bad
c. Enemy: I ain't going anywhere and you have a sliver of doubt regarding what the vendor is telling me. (psychologically isolates insurgent)
Now think of a cordon and search, a mounted vs dis-mounted patrol, all have their place depending on the intended info content of the action.
At the operational level... the difference is more nuanced, I like to think of it as turning traditional operations on its head...
Conventional: You shape the environment to enable operations
Unconventional: You conduct operations to shape the environment
Its all about purpose/intent
The five tools are "amplifiers" to my actions (tactical or operational) not the driver of my actions. IO/IE exists only to serve my mission as opposed to being my mission.
perhaps a whole bunch of simple minded babble, but the shift in how we view operations to consider the info content, is perhaps the single most important shift in mindset necessary to succeed in the operational environment of the next quarter century.
Hacksaw
Say hello to my 2 x 4
And they have a plan ...
"So say we all."Originally Posted by Hacksaw
I really liked your soldier-vendor vignette. Also, kudos on your distinction between conventional-unconventional. I'm stealing both.
L2I is "Lessons-Learned Integration."
-- A lesson is knowledge gained through experience.
-- A lesson is not "learned" until it results in organizational or behavioral change.
-- A lesson-learned is not "integrated" until shared successfully with others.
That is perhaps the best and most accessible explanation that I have seen - especially your soda-purchase example. That basic idea was something that I continually tried (in vain) to convey to the battalion when I was an IO planner for a mercifully short period of time.
One of the weaknesses that I observed in how we do business is that we expect the IO planner to be source of all IO plans. He cannot and should not be. He coordinates their amplification, as you noted. If we want the IO guy to be the planner, then he needs to be at the company or platoon level. And we really do not need another officer or senior NCO at those levels, so it makes more sense to just instill leaders with a greater awareness of what information superiority means and the resources at their disposal if they need their IO efforts amplified. That was my recommendation when I was an IO planner and it obviously went nowhere. Some people thought that I was just trying to scam my way into getting back into the fight. They were correct. But there was also a less sinister motive: having the IO guy making all of the IO plans makes as much sense as having the battalion commander writing platoon FRAGOs.
Exactly
I agree we don't need an IO planner at Bn, we need information objectives that enable Co's and below to shape their AO's accordingly based on the local situation and the unit's capabilities (one size doesn't fit all). The information objectives provide an umbrella strategy that everyone can support to the best of their ability.One of the weaknesses that I observed in how we do business is that we expect the IO planner to be source of all IO plans. He cannot and should not be. He coordinates their amplification, as you noted. Schmedlap
The example that Hacksaw gave,is PSYOP, but of course the PSYOP bureaucrats will tell you it isn't because it isn't an approved theme, etc. ad naseum. First we build a relationship (supporting activity), then we slip in a few talking points when appropriate (PSYOP). OPSEC, EW, Deception don't necessarily amplifiy this, I think that is a stretch. That would require synchronization at a higher level, and we know that it won't happen, something will get lost between the brain fart at Bde and execution at squad level.If I as PLT LDR/CO CDR stop to buy a soda at a vendor, remove my sunglasses/headgear and engage in a conversation that asks nothing of the vendor than how life is treating him and his family... there is whole number of messages and impressions I am communicating
Some guys understand the importance of PSYOP in irregular warfare (IW) and instinctively know how to shape people's thoughts, while others don't don't. What's new?
After thinking about it, I don't think our so called IO activities will actually lead to information superiority. That is an unrealistic objective for IW. It simply the nature of an insurgency, that the insurgents will generally have better intelligence/information about us, then we do about them. We need to develop realistic information (or PSYOP) objectives for IW that allow the Soldiers to understand them, thus take appropriate actions to pursue them, versus some lofty idea end state.
If we can agree on that, or at least get a unit to agree on it this concept, then the next step is education and training to enable the staff and ground pounders to implement the concept.
I recommend we stop calling it IO, because we'll default to the lazy man's doctrine where we simply lumped a much of stuff together and called it IO. We have been conducting these types of operation throughout our history, so I'm not sure why we are calling it a revolution in military affairs? The RMA was we got away from the basics, and once again it didn't work too well.
Film at 11
Agreed on most points, but I don't think you have to be a PSYOP guy to argue that Hacksaw's soda-purchase vignette isn't PSYOP. Yes, you can place messages into your conversation--and it takes skill, talent, and practice to pull it off smoothly--and that is PSYOP, to my crude understanding. (Caveat: I'm not a PSYOP guy, I just play one on TV. Or rather, when wearing one of my citizen-soldier-cowboy hats, I'm sometimes a "non-military media practitioner.")
Hacksaw's proposed storyline, however, seemed more basic and nuanced than that: The interaction itself was communicative, regardless of the conversation's verbal content. The medium was the message, to borrow a phrase.
As a lessons-learned guy in uniform, I recently observed a large-scale joint Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) operation in which senior leaders were armed with talking points, but not the Joes and Janes on the (very wet) ground. That was an unfortunate oversight. What was even more basic, however, was that the soldiers and airmen weren't coached on the "actions speak louder than words" and "when in Rome" memes, and ended up stepping on the very cultures of the populations they were trying to help--and those of the organizations with whom they were working alongside.
So, bottom-line and lesson-learned (and, I hope, coming to parallel conclusions to yours): Joe Snuffy has to be trained to act on IO, but not necessarily to think on it, or to talk on it. And that, I think, is a practical and achievable objective.
L2I is "Lessons-Learned Integration."
-- A lesson is knowledge gained through experience.
-- A lesson is not "learned" until it results in organizational or behavioral change.
-- A lesson-learned is not "integrated" until shared successfully with others.
That's true.
If you train your NCOs right, it's even easy. Most will surprise you by how well they talk on it...
This perhaps one of the greatest things I learned in LE. Unless there was some tactical reason not to I was taught to take of my hat (no helmet) and sunglasses off. I always tried to stop by as many businesses as possible and just talk to them. I always accepted a free cup of coffee but I paid for everything else! Free coffee to cops was such a custom that saying no was an insult or it meant you were a suspect. Building relationships like this would pay huge rewards.....but not right away, it takes time and trust. Once you develop these relationships these are the people who will call you with a tip or work extra hard to get you information when you need it. You will also meet a lot of nice people that you may have had a very different opinion of when you first met them.
Slap I always got the impression you didn't like community oriented policing. I would say that community oriented policing is a big IO campaign that attempts to change behaviors through positive interaction and resource mobilization. It is way more than just talk and a lot less than para-militarization of the civilian police force.
Sam Liles
Selil Blog
Don't forget to duck Secret Squirrel
The scholarship of teaching and learning results in equal hatred from latte leftists and cappuccino conservatives.
All opinions are mine and may or may not reflect those of my employer depending on the chance it might affect funding, politics, or the setting of the sun. As such these are my opinions you can get your own.
The key here was that you knew the message and were empowered
The key to what you just wrote, in my opinion, is that you were aware of the message and that you felt empowered to give that message.
You were aware of the implications of taking off your hat and glasses as opposed to keeping them on and distancing yourself from the vendor. It was customary to accept a free cup of coffee, you didn't violate local traditions. You opened yourself up to local input by actually conversing with the locals. You actually listened to them, what they said mattered and probably had an effect.
What you did, as a Law Enforcement Officer, is almost exactly like what our troops face on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan. Yes, they don't speak a common language and quite a few of them would love to shoot us, we don't share a common history and we invaded their territory... But we work hard at neutralizing these and many other 'negatives'.
If the guys on the ground know the Commander's Guidance and are encouraged to display initiative in unknown situations, this will go a long way in solving our problems on the ground. If the guidance is to promote self-help initiatives while negating the AQ, this broad guidance will help the NCO on the ground see a ditch-digging effort, help with security planning assistance, and he will seek to 'talk up' their efforts. I believe it was Marc Tyrrell, on his blog, that wrote about the initiative being taken away by arm-chair generals playing platoon leader, I think it's all interrelated. Passing the guidance down to the lowest level is key. Trust is a big factor and keeping the big guys out of the boots-on-the-ground leader's knickers.
Simultaneous planning at every level is also key. The briefback is most important. The leader passes his/her guidance down and, in return, will receive a briefback from subordinate leaders on how their plan dovetails and supports the senior guidance and plan. In return, this leader will give a briefback to her/her leaders, and so on. If a little tweaking is required, that's fine, but each and every leader must be aware of how their plan interacts with the overall strategy. Every leader must be flexible, lockstep plans are only sometimes good, trying new ways to portray a message must be not only encouraged, but supported. Every situation is new, there is no "same old, same old", therefore - even though the same message is being sent and/or reinforced, it must be made clear that we are still trying to do the same thing and we're trying to find the way that best satisfies both the guidance and meets the needs of the locals.
Guidance, empowerment, trust, initiative.
Joel
Alexandria, VA
Hi Joel,
I would add in two other points since, as Slap noted, community based policing is pretty well worked out. First, he also felt comfortable with the message. This is often something left out, but when we are talking about face-to-face communications, there is a lot of body language that will act as clues for the listener as to whether or not the speaker "believes" the message they are saying. The second point is that Slap is taking advantage of a particular social cue system - taking off some of the paraphernalia of an official role moves you slightly out of that role. I do this when I am conducting semi-structured interviews - "put the interview schedule down and don't look at it" is a cue that "we're just two people chatting".
Actually, I think that comes from Frontier 6's SWJ blog, not from mine. OTOH, I am worried about "leaders", of whatever stripe, trying to script what is essentially an piece of improvisational theatre. Even the crafting and dissemination of talking points needs to be carefully thought out - especially in a military context. Personally, I think that the best way to do this is to use a modified form of the old Maoist Gung Ho system - call everyone together and talk each of the points through. This goes back to the body language point I was making earlier; basically it's getting emotional buy-in for broad message concepts - memes if you will.
Sic Bisquitus Disintegrat...
Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.
Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies,
Senior Research Fellow,
The Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, NPSIA
Carleton University
http://marctyrrell.com/
selil, I don't like community policing not because it is bad but because it costs to much to reinvent the wheel its an old concept, nothing but a PR Camapign. I believe in beat cops backed up by mobile units both land and air and sometimes water (river,lake patrols). In between that I believe in Problem Oriented Policing which is nothing more than a task force for special problems. Strangely this is becoming a big deal in Alabama lately. With the rise in gas prices departments are combining more bike patrols with fewer cars. The cars are kept at HQ and are deployed as back up if needed for emergencies.
joelhar, the term "Dragnet" is nothing but quadrillage, another old COIN concept that has been around for a long time. And you need to be good at it because most of the people you stop at a checkpoint are just regular folks doing normal business but you must always be alert for the bad guy.
I like COP because it at least gives a framework, but as you likely know it requires diligence, dedication, and enthusiasm by the officers. Officers of today get all cranky when you start taking away their shiny patrol units (which I've often said are harmful to police image and community). Beyond the scope of COIN but within the scope of the discussion I've said many times that we swing between COP and SWAT as the model of policing. Neither by themselves are silver bullets for policing, but you have to get leadership to listen to reason rather than manage by crisis.
The beat cop walking day/night/rain/shine and involved with the community is the only effective long term solution to rampant crime. Empty the headquarters of those administrators and transition the payroll line items to multiple new officers to get the density. Too many police departments have large overhead in administration that is totally unnecessary to the problem. Like the Montessori school teaching philosophy everybody teaches, and for law enforcement everybody polices.
Sam Liles
Selil Blog
Don't forget to duck Secret Squirrel
The scholarship of teaching and learning results in equal hatred from latte leftists and cappuccino conservatives.
All opinions are mine and may or may not reflect those of my employer depending on the chance it might affect funding, politics, or the setting of the sun. As such these are my opinions you can get your own.
Well, COP and variants work well in the
3% of the US land area that is urban; less well in the 4% that is semi rural suburban and not at all well in the remaining 93% of the nation. Admittedly, that 7% of urban and near urban land is home to ~80% of the population but there are still >60M Americans outside the practical range of COP...
I would really dislike having to be on Bike Patrol in southern or northern Kitsap County...
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