Information Operations

[Ken White]

...Maybe we need a PSYOP TPDD to print up some handbills as part of an awareness campaign. Do a leaflet drop over Leavenworth.

That and move the 'doctrine' writing out of the hands of the Snowbirds and Blackbirds. I kid, Guys, I kid...

Definitions are good but they can also be constricting. In an area of effort that really follows Moore's law with respect to development and major change speed, too much specificity might be a bad thing. Can a generic joint service definition for much of anything really be judged applicable to all services at all echelons in all environments? Perhaps -- but once you get out of hardware, I've never seen it work. Excessive centralization stifles creativity and initiative.

As Bill Moore said, this is operator stuff and it's not all that new, we just bundled some things. Every time we do that -- and we do it about every ten years or so -- it initially creates some confusion. That usually gets sorted out in a few months.

There are a lot of FlagOs getting big bucks and many hassles and they're smart guys with mostly decent staffs; they can work out what they need for their job without a lot of undue precision...

[Bill Moore]

Originally Posted by Schmedlap
...Maybe we need a PSYOP TPDD to print up some handbills as part of an awareness campaign. Do a leaflet drop over Leavenworth.

The real issue is how we organize our staffs and how we task various assets to accomplish it

I didn't see information superiority in the IO definition, but I think information superiority is a great "objective", but it will involve more than the five or so disciplines listed in the IO definition.

I like the term information superiority, simply state it as a goal/objective, and then organize the staff to accomplish it. I think that answers the mail? That allows for maxium flexability based on each unique situation. I'll still argue there is nothing "simple" about this. It is a very complex endeavor, and one that I have rarely seen done well. The "value" of IO and information superiority is its impact on accomplishing the mission, so lets say the definition is simple, that still doesn't equate to success in accomplishing it.

[davidbfpo]

I hesitate to plunge into this sphere of political warfare and my views are of an observer outside.

I see very little sign of Information Operations here in the UK and have my doubts that in Afghanistan what we do is effective. I have assumed there is an IO operation in Helmand.

Given the UK's experience in IO, notably in WW2 with black propaganda etc, once again that appears to be lost. Let alone adapting to the new technology in use; e.g. a poster campaign is used, not using texting / SMS. We know our enemy is web-friendly and appear to do next to nothing about it.

We need different IO for different audiences, leaving aside language; there are certain influential / key targets e.g. travellers to Pakistan (400k p.a. from the UK) and we need to focus on them. University students is another key group.

davidbfpo

[Bill Moore]

David your wet with the rest of us now, welcome.

The challenges remain immense, and in my opinion our doctrine doesn't provide the framework for addressing them when it comes to irregular warfare. We're not as good as we like to think we are when it comes to changing individual perceptions or changing cultures (maybe we shouldn't try). That is graduate level work, and the thesis is still being written.

What we are good at is targeting coventional enemy forces with propaganda, black psyop, deception operations, EW, etc. That was our primary focus, and we became good at. We also learned how to jam their radios, target their radars, probably attack their computer systems, and design appropriate OPSEC programs based on known enemy TTPs for collecting intelligence, not to mention our high tech intelligence capabilities that gave us an incredible information advantage over our conventional foes. In time we may have a military of killer drones that are networked to high tech sensors that can dominate any conventional foe, so in the realm of conventional warfare I think we have achieved information superiority, but I would argue we had that before the development of IO doctrine.

However, those TTPs/doctrine do not readily transfer to the realm of irregular warfare (IW). In IW we do not have information superiority. We are not very effective influencing the population or the insurgents, and our intelligence is generally very limited, but in contrast our enemy's low tech sensor system keeps pretty good tabs on us. The enemy is also pretty good at influencing the population using old school tactics, ones we can't counter unless we learn how to protect the populace from insurgent coercion. It took us a long time to relearn to stop drive by COIN, the years of raids never accomplished anything, but troops on the ground living with the populace did. Is it is IO? I would argue you can't influence or understand the populace without a presence, there is no satellite or UAV that will accomplish this task. Which one of the the five disciplines is it: OPSEC, PSYOP, EW, CNA, or deception operations? You could lump it under PSYOP, but it isn't. It is a supporting task by the new definition, but the reality is it is a decisive action in irregular warfare. In IW IO is mumbo jumbo, we just need to identify the right objectives and task organize to accomplish the objectives. It will be IO heavy, but it won't involve a lot of the five disciplines (except PSYOP) in their true form, but rather it will involve a lot of so called supporting tasks that will ultimately convince the enemy they can't win. Is this really IO or is it just operational art?

[joelhar]

I agree that we need to work within the current definition as defined by JP 3-13. However, we also need to work out the long term implications of the definition and the naming.

We have a dilemma here; the guys on the ground are making stuff up, hoping the message fits with the overall ‘guidance’ from on high. Unfortunately that guidance does not come from the government. I can’t speak for the UK, but here is how I think the US needs to solve its ‘guidance’ problem.

The mere term, Information Operations, raises all kinds of concerns and causes much confusion. There is no US Government ‘doctrine’, outside of JP 3-13 for IO.

Information Warfare implies war, which implies only the Department of Defense is playing; State and all the other government players supposedly stated this was politically incorrect back in the 90s.

DoD begins to integrate Strategic Communications at the COCOM and OSD level, and the State Department claims it as their domain. DoS has released the doctrine for this; it is quite well done.

Public Diplomacy may be synonymous with Strategic Communications, but DoD has always been the stick to State’s carrot. I’m not sure that a Public Diplomacy doctrine exists.

“War of Ideas” is a neat term, it gets at the wetware. A good book on this, which is extremely thought provoking is a book called “Fighting the War of Ideas like a Real War”, by J. Michael Waller. Dr. Waller is involved, at the USG level, with many of these discussions. But the “war of ideas” term still doesn’t encompass the depth and breadth of what we are doing.

Boiling things down to their basic components is probably a wise way to approach this. This is all about information. I choose not to say data; in my opinion data is still incomplete; information pulls things together. I’m saying this very loosely, please bear with me.

The next thing is what we intend to do with this information, and that is to influence. We want to have someone else do something of our choosing, not do something, or not stand in our way.

Someone pointed out to me the other day that the USG does not “do” operations, that is what the military does. The USG has a strategy, normally.

Putting this all together, I would say a common sense phrase for what the USG needs is an “Information and Influence Strategy”.

The problem the USG, given that ‘someone’ can put this together, is that there is no office or agency that could coordinate this message throughout the Government. Please notice, I am not saying ‘control the message’, but coordinate.

State has postulated that they are in the perfect position to do this, as they must coordinate the message our emissaries promulgate throughout the world; they also have liaisons to coordinate this message within each of the other Departments and Agencies. The problem I see with this is that one Department would, de facto, have too much authority over the other Departments, there would be an imbalance. Second, if an office were created within State, there is too much separation between the guidance generated in the White House and this office, too many layers of bureaucracy would exist.

The guidance needs to come from the Executive Branch. The office coordinating this message throughout the government should be as close to the Executive Branch as possible. I haven’t decided if this office should have any authority over subordinates, it might create too many log jams… and mere coordination may prove ineffective. But the National Security Council has the charter to coordinate the USG response, so they should have the mission to coordinate the message coming from the President as well as coordinate his/her speeches to reflect the overall message. The idea is not to create a source for propaganda, but to help put together a deep and comprehensive information and influence strategy, aimed at promoting the US agenda overseas via a unified US message. The message can be shared with the general public: “The United States of America’s position on this issue is this”. In turn this message is passed throughout the Government and posted for all to see, allowing guidance for the embassies and deployed strategic forces to be posted. When this guidance is received a subordinate and supporting strategy can be created. The general public always has the right to disagree but will generally support the position of the President – but it must be presented. This will further create a unified message from the US. Dissension will be encouraged, discussions will be expected, this is how a democracy works, and we could be the living, breathing example.

Now, with the guidance coming from Washington, we can plan an information effect on the ground and decide which ‘tools’ to use to achieve this effect. If we choose to drop leaflets, if we choose to jam a signal, if we chose to attack a network, if we choose to drop a bomb, if we choose to commit conventional forces, if we choose to keep details of our operations security, if we choose to run a deception – these would be things we choose to do to achieve a specific and desired effect.

This needs to be fixed at the top before we can hope to get IO or IW fixed on the ground…

[marct]

Hi Joel,

I agree that we need to work within the current definition as defined by JP 3-13. However, we also need to work out the long term implications of the definition and the naming.

Definitely! One of the crucial points here is that the "name" is not the "thing" (and old point from Alfred Korzybski).

The mere term, Information Operations, raises all kinds of concerns and causes much confusion. There is no US Government ‘doctrine’, outside of JP 3-13 for IO.

And, to make it even worse, JP 3-13 is really a collection of TTPs with no coherent theoretical base.

Boiling things down to their basic components is probably a wise way to approach this. This is all about information. I choose not to say data; in my opinion data is still incomplete; information pulls things together. I’m saying this very loosely, please bear with me.

The next thing is what we intend to do with this information, and that is to influence. We want to have someone else do something of our choosing, not do something, or not stand in our way.

Very nicely put! In my post yesterday I said that I would put together a blog post on this and I just finished it (here). One of the key points in it was all about intentionality. You just managed to make the same point in much plainer English .

Putting this all together, I would say a common sense phrase for what the USG needs is an “Information and Influence Strategy”.

The problem the USG, given that ‘someone’ can put this together, is that there is no office or agency that could coordinate this message throughout the Government. Please notice, I am not saying ‘control the message’, but coordinate.

Hmmm, well, I would definitely agree that you folks do need such a strategy but, I suspect, that any such strategy will only be relatively short term, especially if it is established by your executive branch since that changes every 4-8 years.

Marc

[Rockbridge]

Joel -- Good points across the board. Most of our problems with IO remain in the policy / permission / "lanes in the road" arena (what we may do) versus in the technology / TTP arena (what we can do). Because the first impacts so heavily on the second, it's policy that we really need to fix.

The concept of IO is simple: Control the other guys' view of reality, and don't let him do that to you. It's the execution where things really get tough.

[Hacksaw]

All,
It seems we are all in violent agreement regarding a need for a coherent national narrative, that is reflected in actions (an expression of a consistent foreign policy), consistent with priorities and interests as expressed in resourcing. Certainly this is possible, just not probable (at least not yet) because we have a hard time gaining consensus on the simplest of issues much less the trajectory and azimuth of foreign policy. Another of the pesky greatest strengths-greatest weaknesses dichotomy. About the only thing even vaguely capable of realistically driving this type of coherent national-level activity is a threat to a national survival (note I didn't use another 9/11 and caveated that it wasn't a given). We have, however, done far better in the past (think cold war apparatus) and can/should do better than we are today.

OK enough policy wonk "stuff"... too much of the tilting at windmills...

At the tactical and operational level, IMHO it is far more productive to think of IO/IE in terms of the information content of my operations. Just one example:

If I as PLT LDR/CO CDR stop to buy a soda at a vendor, remove my sunglasses/headgear and engage in a conversation that asks nothing of the vendor than how life is treating him and his family... there is whole number of messages and impressions I am communicating
a. Populations: He respects our property and us in general, want/open to contact
b. My Soldiers: We can't paint everyone not in uniform as the same, even when we can't differentiate good from bad
c. Enemy: I ain't going anywhere and you have a sliver of doubt regarding what the vendor is telling me. (psychologically isolates insurgent)

Now think of a cordon and search, a mounted vs dis-mounted patrol, all have their place depending on the intended info content of the action.

At the operational level... the difference is more nuanced, I like to think of it as turning traditional operations on its head...

Conventional: You shape the environment to enable operations
Unconventional: You conduct operations to shape the environment

Its all about purpose/intent

The five tools are "amplifiers" to my actions (tactical or operational) not the driver of my actions. IO/IE exists only to serve my mission as opposed to being my mission.

perhaps a whole bunch of simple minded babble, but the shift in how we view operations to consider the info content, is perhaps the single most important shift in mindset necessary to succeed in the operational environment of the next quarter century.

[Randy Brown]

perhaps a whole bunch of simple minded babble, but the shift in how we view operations to consider the info content, is perhaps the single most important shift in mindset necessary to succeed in the operational environment of the next quarter century.

"So say we all."

I really liked your soldier-vendor vignette. Also, kudos on your distinction between conventional-unconventional. I'm stealing both.

[Schmedlap]

At the tactical and operational level, IMHO it is far more productive to think of IO/IE in terms of the information content of my operations... The five tools are "amplifiers" to my actions (tactical or operational) not the driver of my actions. IO/IE exists only to serve my mission as opposed to being my mission.

That is perhaps the best and most accessible explanation that I have seen - especially your soda-purchase example. That basic idea was something that I continually tried (in vain) to convey to the battalion when I was an IO planner for a mercifully short period of time.

One of the weaknesses that I observed in how we do business is that we expect the IO planner to be source of all IO plans. He cannot and should not be. He coordinates their amplification, as you noted. If we want the IO guy to be the planner, then he needs to be at the company or platoon level. And we really do not need another officer or senior NCO at those levels, so it makes more sense to just instill leaders with a greater awareness of what information superiority means and the resources at their disposal if they need their IO efforts amplified. That was my recommendation when I was an IO planner and it obviously went nowhere. Some people thought that I was just trying to scam my way into getting back into the fight. They were correct. But there was also a less sinister motive: having the IO guy making all of the IO plans makes as much sense as having the battalion commander writing platoon FRAGOs.

[Bill Moore]

One of the weaknesses that I observed in how we do business is that we expect the IO planner to be source of all IO plans. He cannot and should not be. He coordinates their amplification, as you noted. Schmedlap

I agree we don't need an IO planner at Bn, we need information objectives that enable Co's and below to shape their AO's accordingly based on the local situation and the unit's capabilities (one size doesn't fit all). The information objectives provide an umbrella strategy that everyone can support to the best of their ability.

The example that Hacksaw gave,

If I as PLT LDR/CO CDR stop to buy a soda at a vendor, remove my sunglasses/headgear and engage in a conversation that asks nothing of the vendor than how life is treating him and his family... there is whole number of messages and impressions I am communicating

is PSYOP, but of course the PSYOP bureaucrats will tell you it isn't because it isn't an approved theme, etc. ad naseum. First we build a relationship (supporting activity), then we slip in a few talking points when appropriate (PSYOP). OPSEC, EW, Deception don't necessarily amplifiy this, I think that is a stretch. That would require synchronization at a higher level, and we know that it won't happen, something will get lost between the brain fart at Bde and execution at squad level.

Some guys understand the importance of PSYOP in irregular warfare (IW) and instinctively know how to shape people's thoughts, while others don't don't. What's new?

After thinking about it, I don't think our so called IO activities will actually lead to information superiority. That is an unrealistic objective for IW. It simply the nature of an insurgency, that the insurgents will generally have better intelligence/information about us, then we do about them. We need to develop realistic information (or PSYOP) objectives for IW that allow the Soldiers to understand them, thus take appropriate actions to pursue them, versus some lofty idea end state.

If we can agree on that, or at least get a unit to agree on it this concept, then the next step is education and training to enable the staff and ground pounders to implement the concept.

I recommend we stop calling it IO, because we'll default to the lazy man's doctrine where we simply lumped a much of stuff together and called it IO. We have been conducting these types of operation throughout our history, so I'm not sure why we are calling it a revolution in military affairs? The RMA was we got away from the basics, and once again it didn't work too well.

[slapout9]

All,

If I as PLT LDR/CO CDR stop to buy a soda at a vendor, remove my sunglasses/headgear and engage in a conversation that asks nothing of the vendor than how life is treating him and his family... there is whole number of messages and impressions I am communicating
a. Populations: He respects our property and us in general, want/open to contact

This perhaps one of the greatest things I learned in LE. Unless there was some tactical reason not to I was taught to take of my hat (no helmet) and sunglasses off. I always tried to stop by as many businesses as possible and just talk to them. I always accepted a free cup of coffee but I paid for everything else! Free coffee to cops was such a custom that saying no was an insult or it meant you were a suspect. Building relationships like this would pay huge rewards.....but not right away, it takes time and trust. Once you develop these relationships these are the people who will call you with a tip or work extra hard to get you information when you need it. You will also meet a lot of nice people that you may have had a very different opinion of when you first met them.

[selil]

This perhaps one of the greatest things I learned in LE. Unless there was some tactical reason not to I was taught to take of my hat (no helmet) and sunglasses off. I always tried to stop by as many businesses as possible and just talk to them. I always accepted a free cup of coffee but I paid for everything else! Free coffee to cops was such a custom that saying no was an insult or it meant you were a suspect. Building relationships like this would pay huge rewards.....but not right away, it takes time and trust. Once you develop these relationships these are the people who will call you with a tip or work extra hard to get you information when you need it. You will also meet a lot of nice people that you may have had a very different opinion of when you first met them.

Slap I always got the impression you didn't like community oriented policing. I would say that community oriented policing is a big IO campaign that attempts to change behaviors through positive interaction and resource mobilization. It is way more than just talk and a lot less than para-militarization of the civilian police force.

[William F. Owen]

To quote from the document concerned:

My challenge for this website’s readers, then, is the following: what do we, as counter-insurgency theorists and practitioners, mean when we use the term “information operations?” Do we use IO as shorthand for psychological operations and message management?

I don't think anybody really knows. IO is another definition/content free idea, as in EBO and a few others.

It stems from the thinking that information is frightfully important, therefore we should be doing operations concerned with it. The above quote is right on the nail.

Information is mostly useless until it has been turned into intelligence by being subject to analysis and judgement. As IO seems to be nothing to do G2 functions, I have always assumed that IO meant transmitting a message to the enemy, and target populations, by a variety of means. This would seem to be merely matching actions with stated intent.

I would further submit, that unless there is an enemy whose will to fight must be broken, then it's not a military problem. Unless IO helps "break the will of the enemy," - including securing the freedom moral and political freedom of action to do so, we should have nothing to do with it.