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Thread: Information Operations

  1. #21
    Council Member davidbfpo's Avatar
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    Default From over the water

    I hesitate to plunge into this sphere of political warfare and my views are of an observer outside.

    I see very little sign of Information Operations here in the UK and have my doubts that in Afghanistan what we do is effective. I have assumed there is an IO operation in Helmand.

    Given the UK's experience in IO, notably in WW2 with black propaganda etc, once again that appears to be lost. Let alone adapting to the new technology in use; e.g. a poster campaign is used, not using texting / SMS. We know our enemy is web-friendly and appear to do next to nothing about it.

    We need different IO for different audiences, leaving aside language; there are certain influential / key targets e.g. travellers to Pakistan (400k p.a. from the UK) and we need to focus on them. University students is another key group.

    davidbfpo

  2. #22
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    Default Who does it

    David your wet with the rest of us now, welcome.

    The challenges remain immense, and in my opinion our doctrine doesn't provide the framework for addressing them when it comes to irregular warfare. We're not as good as we like to think we are when it comes to changing individual perceptions or changing cultures (maybe we shouldn't try). That is graduate level work, and the thesis is still being written.

    What we are good at is targeting coventional enemy forces with propaganda, black psyop, deception operations, EW, etc. That was our primary focus, and we became good at. We also learned how to jam their radios, target their radars, probably attack their computer systems, and design appropriate OPSEC programs based on known enemy TTPs for collecting intelligence, not to mention our high tech intelligence capabilities that gave us an incredible information advantage over our conventional foes. In time we may have a military of killer drones that are networked to high tech sensors that can dominate any conventional foe, so in the realm of conventional warfare I think we have achieved information superiority, but I would argue we had that before the development of IO doctrine.

    However, those TTPs/doctrine do not readily transfer to the realm of irregular warfare (IW). In IW we do not have information superiority. We are not very effective influencing the population or the insurgents, and our intelligence is generally very limited, but in contrast our enemy's low tech sensor system keeps pretty good tabs on us. The enemy is also pretty good at influencing the population using old school tactics, ones we can't counter unless we learn how to protect the populace from insurgent coercion. It took us a long time to relearn to stop drive by COIN, the years of raids never accomplished anything, but troops on the ground living with the populace did. Is it is IO? I would argue you can't influence or understand the populace without a presence, there is no satellite or UAV that will accomplish this task. Which one of the the five disciplines is it: OPSEC, PSYOP, EW, CNA, or deception operations? You could lump it under PSYOP, but it isn't. It is a supporting task by the new definition, but the reality is it is a decisive action in irregular warfare. In IW IO is mumbo jumbo, we just need to identify the right objectives and task organize to accomplish the objectives. It will be IO heavy, but it won't involve a lot of the five disciplines (except PSYOP) in their true form, but rather it will involve a lot of so called supporting tasks that will ultimately convince the enemy they can't win. Is this really IO or is it just operational art?

  3. #23
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    I agree that we need to work within the current definition as defined by JP 3-13. However, we also need to work out the long term implications of the definition and the naming.

    We have a dilemma here; the guys on the ground are making stuff up, hoping the message fits with the overall ‘guidance’ from on high. Unfortunately that guidance does not come from the government. I can’t speak for the UK, but here is how I think the US needs to solve its ‘guidance’ problem.

    The mere term, Information Operations, raises all kinds of concerns and causes much confusion. There is no US Government ‘doctrine’, outside of JP 3-13 for IO.

    Information Warfare implies war, which implies only the Department of Defense is playing; State and all the other government players supposedly stated this was politically incorrect back in the 90s.

    DoD begins to integrate Strategic Communications at the COCOM and OSD level, and the State Department claims it as their domain. DoS has released the doctrine for this; it is quite well done.

    Public Diplomacy may be synonymous with Strategic Communications, but DoD has always been the stick to State’s carrot. I’m not sure that a Public Diplomacy doctrine exists.

    “War of Ideas” is a neat term, it gets at the wetware. A good book on this, which is extremely thought provoking is a book called “Fighting the War of Ideas like a Real War”, by J. Michael Waller. Dr. Waller is involved, at the USG level, with many of these discussions. But the “war of ideas” term still doesn’t encompass the depth and breadth of what we are doing.

    Boiling things down to their basic components is probably a wise way to approach this. This is all about information. I choose not to say data; in my opinion data is still incomplete; information pulls things together. I’m saying this very loosely, please bear with me.

    The next thing is what we intend to do with this information, and that is to influence. We want to have someone else do something of our choosing, not do something, or not stand in our way.

    Someone pointed out to me the other day that the USG does not “do” operations, that is what the military does. The USG has a strategy, normally.

    Putting this all together, I would say a common sense phrase for what the USG needs is an “Information and Influence Strategy”.

    The problem the USG, given that ‘someone’ can put this together, is that there is no office or agency that could coordinate this message throughout the Government. Please notice, I am not saying ‘control the message’, but coordinate.

    State has postulated that they are in the perfect position to do this, as they must coordinate the message our emissaries promulgate throughout the world; they also have liaisons to coordinate this message within each of the other Departments and Agencies. The problem I see with this is that one Department would, de facto, have too much authority over the other Departments, there would be an imbalance. Second, if an office were created within State, there is too much separation between the guidance generated in the White House and this office, too many layers of bureaucracy would exist.

    The guidance needs to come from the Executive Branch. The office coordinating this message throughout the government should be as close to the Executive Branch as possible. I haven’t decided if this office should have any authority over subordinates, it might create too many log jams… and mere coordination may prove ineffective. But the National Security Council has the charter to coordinate the USG response, so they should have the mission to coordinate the message coming from the President as well as coordinate his/her speeches to reflect the overall message. The idea is not to create a source for propaganda, but to help put together a deep and comprehensive information and influence strategy, aimed at promoting the US agenda overseas via a unified US message. The message can be shared with the general public: “The United States of America’s position on this issue is this”. In turn this message is passed throughout the Government and posted for all to see, allowing guidance for the embassies and deployed strategic forces to be posted. When this guidance is received a subordinate and supporting strategy can be created. The general public always has the right to disagree but will generally support the position of the President – but it must be presented. This will further create a unified message from the US. Dissension will be encouraged, discussions will be expected, this is how a democracy works, and we could be the living, breathing example.

    Now, with the guidance coming from Washington, we can plan an information effect on the ground and decide which ‘tools’ to use to achieve this effect. If we choose to drop leaflets, if we choose to jam a signal, if we chose to attack a network, if we choose to drop a bomb, if we choose to commit conventional forces, if we choose to keep details of our operations security, if we choose to run a deception – these would be things we choose to do to achieve a specific and desired effect.

    This needs to be fixed at the top before we can hope to get IO or IW fixed on the ground…
    Last edited by joelhar; 06-27-2008 at 02:22 PM.

  4. #24
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    Quote Originally Posted by MAJHefner View Post
    I know what follows is not perfectly in line with the official FM/JP 3-13 definitions. Any time your definition requires a definition (who knows what information superiority is, anyway?) there is a real problem. It seems to me that the official definitions are sooo Cold War.

    We talk about the art of war and we send folks to SAMS to make the proficient in the art of maneuver. IO is nothing more complicated than the art of influence.

    Mao TseTong (sp?), if I may paraphrase, said the population is to the guerilla (insurgent) as water is to fish. Our initial efforts in COIN were something like standing on a riverbank with a fishing pole, congratulating ourselves on every catch and thinking somehow we would eradicate all fishes from the water. To eliminate fish (insurgents) you must make the water (population) untenable for them.

    To achieve that we attempt to control information. The official definition of information superiorty speaks to controlling a greater quantity of information than the opponent. In my opinion, that is irrelevant. We need only to control the right information. All of the original 13 elements of IO play a part. IO (influence) cannot be net-centric because the population we are trying to influence is not net-centric. Regardless of how many hours you spend a day on the internet, you still, at some point, talk to actual people. You still are influenced by your culture, your nation, etc. First we must understand the influences on that population, then focus on what we can affect. While I don't like this terminology, the population, not the insurgent, is the target because the population is the insurgents center of gravity. First identify what it will take to influence the target, then bring that to bear. Just like you would not shoot a T72 with an M16, don't send PSYOP out to a village without water - send the resources to get them water that the insurgent cannot provide. I have heard of Vulnerability Assessment Teams (network stuff) going out to areas with a 30% literacy rate in support of below BDE ops. That reeks of "Sprinkle a little IO on it, the generals will be happy and we can go back to killing bad guys." Bad guys are like potato chips, kill all you want, they'll make more.

    Influence is an art, something not subject to algorithms and cold logic. The current definition simply does not fit into current operations. IO will continue to be nothing more than a point of confusion until a relevant, current definition is provided.
    Absolutely 100% spot on.
    Joel
    Alexandria, VA

  5. #25
    Council Member marct's Avatar
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    Default

    Hi Joel,

    Quote Originally Posted by joelhar View Post
    I agree that we need to work within the current definition as defined by JP 3-13. However, we also need to work out the long term implications of the definition and the naming.
    Definitely! One of the crucial points here is that the "name" is not the "thing" (and old point from Alfred Korzybski).

    Quote Originally Posted by joelhar View Post
    The mere term, Information Operations, raises all kinds of concerns and causes much confusion. There is no US Government ‘doctrine’, outside of JP 3-13 for IO.
    And, to make it even worse, JP 3-13 is really a collection of TTPs with no coherent theoretical base.

    Quote Originally Posted by joelhar View Post
    Boiling things down to their basic components is probably a wise way to approach this. This is all about information. I choose not to say data; in my opinion data is still incomplete; information pulls things together. I’m saying this very loosely, please bear with me.

    The next thing is what we intend to do with this information, and that is to influence. We want to have someone else do something of our choosing, not do something, or not stand in our way.
    Very nicely put! In my post yesterday I said that I would put together a blog post on this and I just finished it (here). One of the key points in it was all about intentionality. You just managed to make the same point in much plainer English .

    Quote Originally Posted by joelhar View Post
    Putting this all together, I would say a common sense phrase for what the USG needs is an “Information and Influence Strategy”.

    The problem the USG, given that ‘someone’ can put this together, is that there is no office or agency that could coordinate this message throughout the Government. Please notice, I am not saying ‘control the message’, but coordinate.
    Hmmm, well, I would definitely agree that you folks do need such a strategy but, I suspect, that any such strategy will only be relatively short term, especially if it is established by your executive branch since that changes every 4-8 years.

    Marc
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    Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.
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    The Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, NPSIA
    Carleton University
    http://marctyrrell.com/

  6. #26
    Council Member Rockbridge's Avatar
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    Default Policy is our biggest problem

    Joel -- Good points across the board. Most of our problems with IO remain in the policy / permission / "lanes in the road" arena (what we may do) versus in the technology / TTP arena (what we can do). Because the first impacts so heavily on the second, it's policy that we really need to fix.

    The concept of IO is simple: Control the other guys' view of reality, and don't let him do that to you. It's the execution where things really get tough.
    You can get more with a kind word and a gun than you can with a kind word alone

  7. #27
    Council Member Hacksaw's Avatar
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    Default Stray voltage...

    All,
    It seems we are all in violent agreement regarding a need for a coherent national narrative, that is reflected in actions (an expression of a consistent foreign policy), consistent with priorities and interests as expressed in resourcing. Certainly this is possible, just not probable (at least not yet) because we have a hard time gaining consensus on the simplest of issues much less the trajectory and azimuth of foreign policy. Another of the pesky greatest strengths-greatest weaknesses dichotomy. About the only thing even vaguely capable of realistically driving this type of coherent national-level activity is a threat to a national survival (note I didn't use another 9/11 and caveated that it wasn't a given). We have, however, done far better in the past (think cold war apparatus) and can/should do better than we are today.

    OK enough policy wonk "stuff"... too much of the tilting at windmills...

    At the tactical and operational level, IMHO it is far more productive to think of IO/IE in terms of the information content of my operations. Just one example:

    If I as PLT LDR/CO CDR stop to buy a soda at a vendor, remove my sunglasses/headgear and engage in a conversation that asks nothing of the vendor than how life is treating him and his family... there is whole number of messages and impressions I am communicating
    a. Populations: He respects our property and us in general, want/open to contact
    b. My Soldiers: We can't paint everyone not in uniform as the same, even when we can't differentiate good from bad
    c. Enemy: I ain't going anywhere and you have a sliver of doubt regarding what the vendor is telling me. (psychologically isolates insurgent)

    Now think of a cordon and search, a mounted vs dis-mounted patrol, all have their place depending on the intended info content of the action.

    At the operational level... the difference is more nuanced, I like to think of it as turning traditional operations on its head...

    Conventional: You shape the environment to enable operations
    Unconventional: You conduct operations to shape the environment

    Its all about purpose/intent

    The five tools are "amplifiers" to my actions (tactical or operational) not the driver of my actions. IO/IE exists only to serve my mission as opposed to being my mission.

    perhaps a whole bunch of simple minded babble, but the shift in how we view operations to consider the info content, is perhaps the single most important shift in mindset necessary to succeed in the operational environment of the next quarter century.
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  8. #28
    Council Member Randy Brown's Avatar
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    Default And they have a plan ...

    Quote Originally Posted by Hacksaw View Post
    perhaps a whole bunch of simple minded babble, but the shift in how we view operations to consider the info content, is perhaps the single most important shift in mindset necessary to succeed in the operational environment of the next quarter century.
    "So say we all."

    I really liked your soldier-vendor vignette. Also, kudos on your distinction between conventional-unconventional. I'm stealing both.
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    Quote Originally Posted by Hacksaw View Post
    At the tactical and operational level, IMHO it is far more productive to think of IO/IE in terms of the information content of my operations... The five tools are "amplifiers" to my actions (tactical or operational) not the driver of my actions. IO/IE exists only to serve my mission as opposed to being my mission.
    That is perhaps the best and most accessible explanation that I have seen - especially your soda-purchase example. That basic idea was something that I continually tried (in vain) to convey to the battalion when I was an IO planner for a mercifully short period of time.

    One of the weaknesses that I observed in how we do business is that we expect the IO planner to be source of all IO plans. He cannot and should not be. He coordinates their amplification, as you noted. If we want the IO guy to be the planner, then he needs to be at the company or platoon level. And we really do not need another officer or senior NCO at those levels, so it makes more sense to just instill leaders with a greater awareness of what information superiority means and the resources at their disposal if they need their IO efforts amplified. That was my recommendation when I was an IO planner and it obviously went nowhere. Some people thought that I was just trying to scam my way into getting back into the fight. They were correct. But there was also a less sinister motive: having the IO guy making all of the IO plans makes as much sense as having the battalion commander writing platoon FRAGOs.

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    Default Exactly

    One of the weaknesses that I observed in how we do business is that we expect the IO planner to be source of all IO plans. He cannot and should not be. He coordinates their amplification, as you noted. Schmedlap
    I agree we don't need an IO planner at Bn, we need information objectives that enable Co's and below to shape their AO's accordingly based on the local situation and the unit's capabilities (one size doesn't fit all). The information objectives provide an umbrella strategy that everyone can support to the best of their ability.

    The example that Hacksaw gave,
    If I as PLT LDR/CO CDR stop to buy a soda at a vendor, remove my sunglasses/headgear and engage in a conversation that asks nothing of the vendor than how life is treating him and his family... there is whole number of messages and impressions I am communicating
    is PSYOP, but of course the PSYOP bureaucrats will tell you it isn't because it isn't an approved theme, etc. ad naseum. First we build a relationship (supporting activity), then we slip in a few talking points when appropriate (PSYOP). OPSEC, EW, Deception don't necessarily amplifiy this, I think that is a stretch. That would require synchronization at a higher level, and we know that it won't happen, something will get lost between the brain fart at Bde and execution at squad level.

    Some guys understand the importance of PSYOP in irregular warfare (IW) and instinctively know how to shape people's thoughts, while others don't don't. What's new?

    After thinking about it, I don't think our so called IO activities will actually lead to information superiority. That is an unrealistic objective for IW. It simply the nature of an insurgency, that the insurgents will generally have better intelligence/information about us, then we do about them. We need to develop realistic information (or PSYOP) objectives for IW that allow the Soldiers to understand them, thus take appropriate actions to pursue them, versus some lofty idea end state.

    If we can agree on that, or at least get a unit to agree on it this concept, then the next step is education and training to enable the staff and ground pounders to implement the concept.

    I recommend we stop calling it IO, because we'll default to the lazy man's doctrine where we simply lumped a much of stuff together and called it IO. We have been conducting these types of operation throughout our history, so I'm not sure why we are calling it a revolution in military affairs? The RMA was we got away from the basics, and once again it didn't work too well.

  11. #31
    Council Member Randy Brown's Avatar
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    Default Film at 11

    Quote Originally Posted by Bill Moore View Post
    The (soda purchase vignette) example that Hacksaw gave, is PSYOP, but of course the PSYOP bureaucrats will tell you it isn't because it isn't an approved theme, etc. ad naseum. First we build a relationship (supporting activity), then we slip in a few talking points when appropriate (PSYOP). OPSEC, EW, Deception don't necessarily amplifiy this, I think that is a stretch. That would require synchronization at a higher level, and we know that it won't happen, something will get lost between the brain fart at Bde and execution at squad level.

    Some guys understand the importance of PSYOP in irregular warfare (IW) and instinctively know how to shape people's thoughts, while others don't don't. What's new?
    Agreed on most points, but I don't think you have to be a PSYOP guy to argue that Hacksaw's soda-purchase vignette isn't PSYOP. Yes, you can place messages into your conversation--and it takes skill, talent, and practice to pull it off smoothly--and that is PSYOP, to my crude understanding. (Caveat: I'm not a PSYOP guy, I just play one on TV. Or rather, when wearing one of my citizen-soldier-cowboy hats, I'm sometimes a "non-military media practitioner.")

    Hacksaw's proposed storyline, however, seemed more basic and nuanced than that: The interaction itself was communicative, regardless of the conversation's verbal content. The medium was the message, to borrow a phrase.

    As a lessons-learned guy in uniform, I recently observed a large-scale joint Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) operation in which senior leaders were armed with talking points, but not the Joes and Janes on the (very wet) ground. That was an unfortunate oversight. What was even more basic, however, was that the soldiers and airmen weren't coached on the "actions speak louder than words" and "when in Rome" memes, and ended up stepping on the very cultures of the populations they were trying to help--and those of the organizations with whom they were working alongside.

    So, bottom-line and lesson-learned (and, I hope, coming to parallel conclusions to yours): Joe Snuffy has to be trained to act on IO, but not necessarily to think on it, or to talk on it. And that, I think, is a practical and achievable objective.
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  12. #32
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default That's true.

    Quote Originally Posted by Randy Brown View Post
    So, bottom-line and lesson-learned (and, I hope, coming to parallel conclusions to yours): Joe Snuffy has to be trained to act on IO, but not necessarily to think on it, or to talk on it. And that, I think, is a practical and achievable objective.
    If you train your NCOs right, it's even easy. Most will surprise you by how well they talk on it...

  13. #33
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    Quote Originally Posted by Hacksaw View Post
    All,

    If I as PLT LDR/CO CDR stop to buy a soda at a vendor, remove my sunglasses/headgear and engage in a conversation that asks nothing of the vendor than how life is treating him and his family... there is whole number of messages and impressions I am communicating
    a. Populations: He respects our property and us in general, want/open to contact
    This perhaps one of the greatest things I learned in LE. Unless there was some tactical reason not to I was taught to take of my hat (no helmet) and sunglasses off. I always tried to stop by as many businesses as possible and just talk to them. I always accepted a free cup of coffee but I paid for everything else! Free coffee to cops was such a custom that saying no was an insult or it meant you were a suspect. Building relationships like this would pay huge rewards.....but not right away, it takes time and trust. Once you develop these relationships these are the people who will call you with a tip or work extra hard to get you information when you need it. You will also meet a lot of nice people that you may have had a very different opinion of when you first met them.

  14. #34
    i pwnd ur ooda loop selil's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by slapout9 View Post
    This perhaps one of the greatest things I learned in LE. Unless there was some tactical reason not to I was taught to take of my hat (no helmet) and sunglasses off. I always tried to stop by as many businesses as possible and just talk to them. I always accepted a free cup of coffee but I paid for everything else! Free coffee to cops was such a custom that saying no was an insult or it meant you were a suspect. Building relationships like this would pay huge rewards.....but not right away, it takes time and trust. Once you develop these relationships these are the people who will call you with a tip or work extra hard to get you information when you need it. You will also meet a lot of nice people that you may have had a very different opinion of when you first met them.
    Slap I always got the impression you didn't like community oriented policing. I would say that community oriented policing is a big IO campaign that attempts to change behaviors through positive interaction and resource mobilization. It is way more than just talk and a lot less than para-militarization of the civilian police force.
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    Default The key here was that you knew the message and were empowered

    The key to what you just wrote, in my opinion, is that you were aware of the message and that you felt empowered to give that message.

    You were aware of the implications of taking off your hat and glasses as opposed to keeping them on and distancing yourself from the vendor. It was customary to accept a free cup of coffee, you didn't violate local traditions. You opened yourself up to local input by actually conversing with the locals. You actually listened to them, what they said mattered and probably had an effect.

    What you did, as a Law Enforcement Officer, is almost exactly like what our troops face on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan. Yes, they don't speak a common language and quite a few of them would love to shoot us, we don't share a common history and we invaded their territory... But we work hard at neutralizing these and many other 'negatives'.

    If the guys on the ground know the Commander's Guidance and are encouraged to display initiative in unknown situations, this will go a long way in solving our problems on the ground. If the guidance is to promote self-help initiatives while negating the AQ, this broad guidance will help the NCO on the ground see a ditch-digging effort, help with security planning assistance, and he will seek to 'talk up' their efforts. I believe it was Marc Tyrrell, on his blog, that wrote about the initiative being taken away by arm-chair generals playing platoon leader, I think it's all interrelated. Passing the guidance down to the lowest level is key. Trust is a big factor and keeping the big guys out of the boots-on-the-ground leader's knickers.

    Simultaneous planning at every level is also key. The briefback is most important. The leader passes his/her guidance down and, in return, will receive a briefback from subordinate leaders on how their plan dovetails and supports the senior guidance and plan. In return, this leader will give a briefback to her/her leaders, and so on. If a little tweaking is required, that's fine, but each and every leader must be aware of how their plan interacts with the overall strategy. Every leader must be flexible, lockstep plans are only sometimes good, trying new ways to portray a message must be not only encouraged, but supported. Every situation is new, there is no "same old, same old", therefore - even though the same message is being sent and/or reinforced, it must be made clear that we are still trying to do the same thing and we're trying to find the way that best satisfies both the guidance and meets the needs of the locals.

    Guidance, empowerment, trust, initiative.
    Joel
    Alexandria, VA

  16. #36
    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by selil View Post
    Slap I always got the impression you didn't like community oriented policing. I would say that community oriented policing is a big IO campaign that attempts to change behaviors through positive interaction and resource mobilization. It is way more than just talk and a lot less than para-militarization of the civilian police force.
    selil, I don't like community policing not because it is bad but because it costs to much to reinvent the wheel its an old concept, nothing but a PR Camapign. I believe in beat cops backed up by mobile units both land and air and sometimes water (river,lake patrols). In between that I believe in Problem Oriented Policing which is nothing more than a task force for special problems. Strangely this is becoming a big deal in Alabama lately. With the rise in gas prices departments are combining more bike patrols with fewer cars. The cars are kept at HQ and are deployed as back up if needed for emergencies.

    joelhar, the term "Dragnet" is nothing but quadrillage, another old COIN concept that has been around for a long time. And you need to be good at it because most of the people you stop at a checkpoint are just regular folks doing normal business but you must always be alert for the bad guy.

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    Council Member marct's Avatar
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    Hi Joel,

    Quote Originally Posted by joelhar View Post
    The key to what you just wrote, in my opinion, is that you were aware of the message and that you felt empowered to give that message.
    I would add in two other points since, as Slap noted, community based policing is pretty well worked out. First, he also felt comfortable with the message. This is often something left out, but when we are talking about face-to-face communications, there is a lot of body language that will act as clues for the listener as to whether or not the speaker "believes" the message they are saying. The second point is that Slap is taking advantage of a particular social cue system - taking off some of the paraphernalia of an official role moves you slightly out of that role. I do this when I am conducting semi-structured interviews - "put the interview schedule down and don't look at it" is a cue that "we're just two people chatting".

    Quote Originally Posted by joelhar View Post
    If the guys on the ground know the Commander's Guidance and are encouraged to display initiative in unknown situations, this will go a long way in solving our problems on the ground. If the guidance is to promote self-help initiatives while negating the AQ, this broad guidance will help the NCO on the ground see a ditch-digging effort, help with security planning assistance, and he will seek to 'talk up' their efforts. I believe it was Marc Tyrrell, on his blog, that wrote about the initiative being taken away by arm-chair generals playing platoon leader, I think it's all interrelated. Passing the guidance down to the lowest level is key. Trust is a big factor and keeping the big guys out of the boots-on-the-ground leader's knickers.
    Actually, I think that comes from Frontier 6's SWJ blog, not from mine . OTOH, I am worried about "leaders", of whatever stripe, trying to script what is essentially an piece of improvisational theatre. Even the crafting and dissemination of talking points needs to be carefully thought out - especially in a military context. Personally, I think that the best way to do this is to use a modified form of the old Maoist Gung Ho system - call everyone together and talk each of the points through. This goes back to the body language point I was making earlier; basically it's getting emotional buy-in for broad message concepts - memes if you will.
    Sic Bisquitus Disintegrat...
    Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.
    Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies,
    Senior Research Fellow,
    The Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, NPSIA
    Carleton University
    http://marctyrrell.com/

  18. #38
    i pwnd ur ooda loop selil's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by slapout9 View Post
    selil, I don't like community policing not because it is bad but because it costs to much to reinvent the wheel its an old concept, nothing but a PR Camapign. I believe in beat cops backed up by mobile units both land and air and sometimes water (river,lake patrols).
    I like COP because it at least gives a framework, but as you likely know it requires diligence, dedication, and enthusiasm by the officers. Officers of today get all cranky when you start taking away their shiny patrol units (which I've often said are harmful to police image and community). Beyond the scope of COIN but within the scope of the discussion I've said many times that we swing between COP and SWAT as the model of policing. Neither by themselves are silver bullets for policing, but you have to get leadership to listen to reason rather than manage by crisis.

    The beat cop walking day/night/rain/shine and involved with the community is the only effective long term solution to rampant crime. Empty the headquarters of those administrators and transition the payroll line items to multiple new officers to get the density. Too many police departments have large overhead in administration that is totally unnecessary to the problem. Like the Montessori school teaching philosophy everybody teaches, and for law enforcement everybody polices.
    Sam Liles
    Selil Blog
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    The scholarship of teaching and learning results in equal hatred from latte leftists and cappuccino conservatives.
    All opinions are mine and may or may not reflect those of my employer depending on the chance it might affect funding, politics, or the setting of the sun. As such these are my opinions you can get your own.

  19. #39
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Well, COP and variants work well in the

    3% of the US land area that is urban; less well in the 4% that is semi rural suburban and not at all well in the remaining 93% of the nation. Admittedly, that 7% of urban and near urban land is home to ~80% of the population but there are still >60M Americans outside the practical range of COP...

    I would really dislike having to be on Bike Patrol in southern or northern Kitsap County...

  20. #40
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    Talking

    Check out this weekend's Financial Times story on Camp Bucca and USMC MG Stone. A couple excerpts...

    ... Stone was working towards a doctorate in public administration at the University of Southern California. His dissertation is a study of international non-government networks, which he said would wield power by relying on “information operations and perception management ... to attract rather than coerce”. By then a Lieutenant Colonel in the Marine Corps reserves, Stone received his doctorate two weeks before September 11. In the wake of those attacks, many American pundits stressed the importance of winning the “war of ideas”. The “terror war” would be fought “on the plane of theories, arguments, books, magazines, conferences, and lectures”, wrote the social historian and neo-conservative Paul Berman. “It was going to be a war about the ‘cultural influences’ that penetrate the Islamic mind ... it was going to be, in the end, a war of persuasion.”
    This one seems particularly timely and relevant to this thread...

    Better detainee treatment is by itself good information operations, just as mistreatment at Abu Ghraib was bad information operations that provided ideological ammo for a young insurgency.

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