Information Operations

[Hacksaw]

Ron,

The people you describe are combined the G3 and CoS. Pretty tough jobs, which is why the Div G3 was upgraded from LTC to COL (BDE CMD Designee) and the CoS is generally (BDE CMD complete). No doubt too much to for one man to synchonize, to the required level of fidelity, in his own grey matter.

Sooo.... agree on the required functionality - differ in so far as whether we need another COL to get in the way

Live well and row

[Randy Brown]

I thought I had fired my FPF in my last entry, and that I was going to retrograde out of my position and this thread. However, much like Michael Corleone (and the Mafia) this thread keeps sucking me back in.

Agreed on the strangely compelling nature of this thread. But if you do manage to break contact, remember the following TTP: "Leave the gun. Take the cannoli."

JP 3-13 and other subsequent doctrine lumped the various IO functions together for a reason, one opinion shared between two 4-stars that I was privy to eavesdrop was that the purpose was to get the institution's arms around these functions and put some rigor behind the development of concepts & capabilities. During that same conversation, they agreed that it might be about time to break the function apart again, that the consolidation had served its purpose. IO, CNO, EW, PSYOP, OPSEC all have their own named Army proponents (for a reason).

There is a strong record of anecdotal evidence (at all levels in Iraq - Corps to PLT) that when the leader makes the mental transition that the info aspects of the operational space are so interwoven with the other aspects that he can't seperate it as a matter of convenience, that he has to view that same operational space through the lens of more than just his own, and that if he considers those facets prior to conducting a tactical action he can multiply the effect of the tactical action several fold by anticipating the effect of his tactical action, mitigating the possible negative impact by proactivly putting in place plans to counter adversary propoganda, and actually use that analysis to perhaps posture his unit to take advantage/turn that negative propoganda/tactical response to his own advantage. If that is PSYOPS, ok, but I prefer to just call it ops.

Given your points, as well as Schmedlap's and Bill Moore's anecdote(s) about the messages implicit in making a big bang to impress the locals, I come around to the old "chicken-and-egg" dilemma of "when is a lesson 'learned' at the institutional level"?

In my thinking, doctrine (and the definitions therein) represents an attempt to institutionalize thought, to give it a theoretical framework and structure that should--even as it (slowly) changes and evolves over time--still outlast whatever specific conditions and commanders are present in a given time and place.

Ultimately, isn't doctrine the way we make sure the next guys and gals to walk in our boots continue to focus on the right things, beyond "simple" TTP and lessons? And, if so, doesn't the issue of how to synthesize the various components of IO remain an organizational imperative, rather than become a thought-experiment that has run its useful course?

[wm]

Ron,

The people you describe are combined the G3 and CoS. Pretty tough jobs, which is why the Div G3 was upgraded from LTC to COL (BDE CMD Designee) and the CoS is generally (BDE CMD complete). No doubt too much to for one man to synchonize, to the required level of fidelity, in his own grey matter.

Sooo.... agree on the required functionality - differ in so far as whether we need another COL to get in the way

Live well and row

Hack,

I suspect that the extra eagle is really unnecessary on the Div Staff. Back in my division days, we had another person who played a very large part in this whole situational awareness puzzle as well--a BG called the Assistant Division Commander for Maneuver (I think he was also called the ADC Ops in 101 and 82). How the role was shared among the ADC(M), Chief and -3 was a matter of Division Commander preference.

Interestingly enough, back in the day separate Bdes (1-button commands) also had a deputy commander (O-6) as well as a Chief and 3. I don't believe thecurrent transformed BCTs have a deputy authorized. Please correct me if I'm wrong.

[Ken White]

I don't remember ever saying that H&I achieved its stated purpose. For one's oppponents it primarily serves as a training reinforcement and means of culling the herd. If it has a negative impact on morale, I suspect it does so more on the friendly cannnoneers who have to deliver it at odd hours of the night, sort of like the effect on the unlucky soul who had to pull fire guard in BCT/AIT at 0300.

Didn't mean to imply that you did; just saw the "H&I" and that 'technique' raises my hackles on a generic basis...

I agreed on the Psyops and disagreed, sort of, on the utility of the M113 and the Bradley -- standard airborne response to clanking tracks -- in other than the cargo toting role...

Hugs!

[wm]

I agreed on the Psyops and disagreed, sort of, on the utility of the M113 and the Bradley -- standard airborne response to clanking tracks -- in other than the cargo toting role...

Hugs!

Your perspective on the Brads and 113s mirrors my feeling about a T-10, not to mention the old G-1 and every other personnel chute in between them.

Once a leg always a leg

[Hacksaw]

Randy,

These are all excellent points, allow me some latitude, I'm not a doctrine writer but I've lived the TRADOC/CAC existance for some time...

Agreed on the strangely compelling nature of this thread. But if you do manage to break contact, remember the following TTP: "Leave the gun. Take the cannoli."





G

The never ending source of great (culturally relevant) quotes for use in any occassion...

Given your points, as well as Schmedlap's and Bill Moore's anecdote(s) about the messages implicit in making a big bang to impress the locals, I come around to the old "chicken-and-egg" dilemma of "when is a lesson 'learned' at the institutional level"?

Wow... Did you turn-over the apple cart. I would submit a lesson is learned (institutionally) when the lesson's considerations are appropriately/adequately represented/integrated into DOTMLPF domains. Note I did not specifiy perfectly, far too few resources to meet that threshold. In the operational domain, the evidence of a lesson learned is the adjustment in behavior/action to reflect the content of the lesson. How about that for speaking TRADOC-ian

In my thinking, doctrine (and the definitions therein) represents an attempt to institutionalize thought, to give it a theoretical framework and structure that should--even as it (slowly) changes and evolves over time--still outlast whatever specific conditions and commanders are present in a given time and place.

Spot on, some pieces of doctrine do that (serve as enduring pillars of thought) better than others. Just because someone signed off on a doctrinal publication doesn't mean it meets those criteria. As you might suspect, those pieces of doctrine, such as FM 1-0, 3-0, 5-0 etc, are more enduring than those manuals closer to tactical application.

Ultimately, isn't doctrine the way we make sure the next guys and gals to walk in our boots continue to focus on the right things, beyond "simple" TTP and lessons? And, if so, doesn't the issue of how to synthesize the various components of IO remain an organizational imperative, rather than become a thought-experiment that has run its useful course?

Hmmm deep thoughts with Stuart Smiley...

In theory the answer is yes, if the doctrine in fact meets the criteria above. I think it is clear that the two officers I mentioned previous weren't sold on that assessment with regard to JP 3-13. The question they and I raise is whether all those facets of IO are really as complimentary as their grouping in doctrine might suggest. It doesn't make them any less important, and I suppose I'm not qualified to answer. However, I am qualified to say that the two gentlemen were exceptionally qualified as operational/strategic commanders to have an informed opinion.

Of course that's never stopped me from disagreeing or being disagreable in the past, but in this case I think I'll follow along and trust we aren't moving towards a cliff

[Bill Moore]

Almost agree, we do have definitions, staff officers, publications, and processes dedicated to synchronizing firepower... Its call the battle staff, MDMP, targeting boards and FM 5-0 etc. Now do we need unique processes for IO... NO! Do we need to make sure that those functionalities are an intimate part of the plans process... YES!

Posted by Hacksaw

I didn't see this earlier as we were posted on top of one another, but I strongly agree with this post. You summed up my argument nicely (I wish I wrote this).

What we do need are the appropriate specialists, Civil Affairs Officers, Psychological Officers (when I write Officers, I also mean NCOs), OPSEC specialists, Computer Network Attack (at the appropriate level), Cultural advisors, maybe anthropologists, Electronic Warfare specialists, and the list goes on. To become a master of any of these different functional areas it takes considerable study and experience, so what exactly is an IO guy? The synchronizer is the Operations Officer and the Commander. Since IO is interwoven in everything, we don't need a sub-level synchronizer.

We can already integrate all the required IO capabilities with our MDMP and targeting boards. The question is do we?

My recommended solution:

Educating our officers and senior NCO corp on the various aspects of IO will help ensure it practiced downrange, but it won't do it by itself. If you want your subordinates to plan for and implement IO related tasks the way to do it is put them as "specified" tasks in your orders. Specified tasks must be resourced and planned for. That is the mechanism for integrating IO related tasks into operations.

For example, a specified task is to isolate the population psychologically from the insurgency. Your Commander then tasks his deputy (or XO, or S3) to form a plans group (working group, whatever) to figure out what this means and courses of action for implementing it. This step is absolutely critical, but it is ONLY STEP 1.

Now we need staff and unit systems/processes/SOPs established that allow the unit as a whole to adjust their IO procedures as required to achieve the desired effects. This gets back to the essence of "Eating Soup with a Knife". How do we make the unit a learning organization? I can almost guaruntee you that our first plan won't work, but it will initiate actions that allow us to learn (sort of a recon by fire), if we have the right systems established, we can adjust as necessary to achieve the desired effects and objective.

We all keep coming back to this thread because we know it is critically important and we don't do it well. I don't think we have to wait for changes across DOTMLPF to call it a lesson learned. We just need to start implementing it.

[Hacksaw]

Bill,

Learned being the optimal word...

You can't call something learned, acknowledged maybe but not learned, until it changes behavior. The "Institutional Army/Generating Base/TRADOC and all its satellites" are first and foremost about requirements determination (lesson identified) and DOTMLPF capabilities development/delivery (lesson learned). Our problem historically is we are unparalleled in the identification process, less so with regard to the develop/delivery.

You may have been using the term institution as reference to the corporate whole of the Army... Then I would say its mostly about changes in operational behavior, but caveat that the same change is only transitory (specific to particular time, place & individuals) until the considerations from that lesson learned have made their way into the generating base processes/infrastructure.

In the words of a sage man... TRADOC is a goofy organization.

[wm]

Meanwhile back in the RC, the Guard has two operational Theater IO Groups (TIOG), one in Washington State and the other in Texas. The USAR apparently has a TIOG starting up as well, based out of Fort Totten in NY.
And there's also a National Capital Region IO Center in MD. That is all in addition to the AC's 1st IO Command.
What the heck are all these various organizations supposed to be doing?

[Ron Humphrey]

Meanwhile back in the RC, the Guard has two operational Theater IO Groups (TIOG), one in Washington State and the other in Texas. The USAR apparently has a TIOG starting up as well, based out of Fort Totten in NY.
And there's also a National Capital Region IO Center in MD. That is all in addition to the AC's 1st IO Command.
What the heck are all these various organizations supposed to be doing?

Perhaps it's effectively easier to research and collaborate on certain aspects when not under fire Just a guess but would make sense to me since most seem to want to put it in the Op's and above category.

Regional focused study combined with local operations feedback probably offers immense pluses over trying to be there and knowing let alone remembering what all you need to ask about any given thing while you happen to be in contact. I would hope it's something along those lines.

One would think it might also make some of those trying to track the decisions and lesson's jobs a little easier as well.

[Randy Brown]

(To Bill Moore) You can't call something learned, acknowledged maybe but not learned, until it changes behavior. The "Institutional Army/Generating Base/TRADOC and all its satellites" are first and foremost about requirements determination (lesson identified) and DOTMLPF capabilities development/delivery (lesson learned). Our problem historically is we are unparalleled in the identification process, less so with regard to the develop/delivery.

You may have been using the term institution as reference to the corporate whole of the Army... Then I would say its mostly about changes in operational behavior, but caveat that the same change is only transitory (specific to particular time, place & individuals) until the considerations from that lesson learned have made their way into the generating base processes/infrastructure.

Certainly, the latter is how I also meant the term "institution"--pertaining to how the military learns as a "corporate whole." Thanks for your analysis of my earlier points--given that my lessons-learned team tends to focus on the brigade-and-lower levels, we have a tendency toward some of the vulnerabilities you state above: We do well on lesson-identification, we're OK at lesson-learning and -integration throughout our tactical organizations, but we're perhaps less effective at higher levels.

We do casually assign or align our lessons with DOTMLPF implications, but we don't own much more in that fight. We plug into Big Army for that kind of heady stuff. Bottom-line and lesson-learned: Thanks for helping us put our process and our arguments into ... "TRADOC-ian?" "TRADOC-ese?" "TRADOC-eze?" (I vote for the latter--because it looks and sounds like a floor wax, and a tasty dessert topping.)

That said, and at risk of zapping whatever citizen-soldier credibility and goodwill L2I Iowa may enjoy on SWJ, I've got to admit I've got no visibility or knowledge on the "Theater IO Groups" that wm and Ron Humphrey just mentioned. I now have to go make some calls and get some more smarter.

In the meantime, however, I can at least partially answer wm's question regarding deputy commanders in the modular BCT. My IBCT has an 06 commander, an 06 deputy commander, and an 05 executive officer. The deputy, notably given the topics of discussion on SWJ, is quite likely to inherit oversight of major portions of a given BCT mission, such as being named as the unit's MiTT Tzar. Don't know whether this would help or hurt the possibility/efficacy of being named IO Tzar as well.

Until later -- "IO Avengers ... Assemble!"

[dguidry1]

An anecdote from my time in Iraq ... seven "IO Planners" on the HQ working on average 30-odd different planning actys at any one time. Within that seven we had a couple of FA30's, myself, a EW guy, a PSYOPer, a STO weirdo, and a CA guy. It was interesting to see the plans when they came back ... FA30 plans were "full-spectrum" in that they provided direction for all IO task elms. The individual specialists however turned out great plans for their specialty with that other aspects thrown in as an afterthought. It’s the cross-domain planning and coord function that allows a good IO officer to really contribute to the op.

This is an excellent illustration of the role of IO in staff planning efforts – regardless of the level. The IO officer must be a proverbial jack-of-all-trades (and yes, master of none). IO is not equal to any of the “traditional” disciplines or staff functions. Likewise, none are subordinate to IO. IO does not “own” sophisticated technological equipment, have large fully-manned sections, or even have assigned vehicles for that matter. What IO brings (or at least SHOULD bring) to the table are critical thinking skills and an in depth working knowledge of as many available resources and capabilities as possible. IO does not “do” PSYOP, PA, CMO, EW, etc. IO considers the full-spectrum coordination and integration of these without the blinders and constraints of each individual discipline. Which leads into the following by Spud:

...I'm supposed to be writing a paper justifying "IO" as specialist trade that some officers could stream into if they give up all notion of command)

I am also working on a personal paper in an attempt to justify the existence of Information Operations, and one of my most important epiphanies was realizing that the FA30 title is not meant to be one of honor and prestige. I never kid myself into thinking that my blood, sweat, and tears will earn me distinguished recognition or selection for any kind of command position. IO is not on the main stage of any staff. It is, however, one of the most important backstage crew members in any production.

I think we've seen this role before but noone really took offense at it because its known as that of the commander. Difference being that in today’s rapidly changing, and information dense environments it is more often than not more than any one commander could study sufficiently to maintain awareness at a level of comfort for rapid decision making.

Staff lets all welcome the new commander’s executive assistant (not XO). He/She will be part of a consistent collaborative effort between the various specialties in order to maintain a broader picture of daily, weekly and monthly operational environment conditions to include statistical and trends analysis in order to provide the commander with a better overall situational awareness and ability to coordinate actions of all elements of the force.

The IO officer is (in simplest terms) an advisor to the commander…again, SHOULD be… EVERYTHING the IO officer does or produces MUST support the commander’s intent and objectives. Yes, that what a staff is for. And yes, that’s why there is such a thing as MDMP. But there are some differences when it comes to IO. The initial IO Estimate for any operation should ideally be near complete (focusing 6-18 months out) by the time the WARNO is published and BEFORE the MDMP begins. I won’t go into the nuances but there is a parallel MDMP process that the FA30 conducts simultaneous with the normal staff MDMP – again, maintaining at least a 6-18 month lead/buffer – using the working knowledge of all the other staff functions and capabilities to advise the commander on the information environment relative to full-spectrum ops. Also, in advising commanders the FA30 must have the mental agility and courage to play the devil’s advocate, presenting the good, bad, AND ugly --- not just tell the commander what you think he WANTS to hear. And I know much of this does not necessarily lend to defining IO, but I think it’s necessary to help frame some of the concepts of the discussion.

But the question remains --- what IS Information Operations??? There are currently several doctrinal publications on the street that attempt to define, explain, clarify, and/or quantify IO, and not all explain it the same way. So it’s no surprise that there is a LOT of confusion about this illusive discipline.

Spot on, some pieces of doctrine do that (serve as enduring pillars of thought) better than others. Just because someone signed off on a doctrinal publication doesn't mean it meets those criteria. As you might suspect, those pieces of doctrine, such as FM 1-0, 3-0, 5-0 etc, are more enduring than those manuals closer to tactical application.

IO doctrine is currently undergoing yet another transformation at Ft. Leavenworth, and there is much infighting among the FA30 community of IO practitioners about what that doctrine should look like. In my observation it continues to change in order to water it down to something without a lot of controversy attached…but I digress. I will, however, invite all of you to take a look at some of the earliest contemporary IO doctrine – specifically FM 100-6 (dtd. Aug 1996). The current contemporary perceptions (misperceptions) of IO are not what were intended in the beginning.

This is a very difficult and complex discussion, but it is one that is needed for IO practitioners to hopefully one day achieve acceptable resolution.

[William F. Owen]

Wilf... Amazingly, must be a blue moon, we might agree. It is about winning and breaking wills (well sort of). Breaking the will of the population that allows the adversary the legitimacy to control/rule. I know that isn't what you explicitly stated, but I think we do share the sentiment that we need to bring each element to bear to serve that purpose of our operation. Sometimes its killing and breaking things, sometimes it is buying a coke, most the time its somewhere in between. However, what matters most is what we do as opposed to what we say. That is so long as the two aren't at the opposite ends of the spectrum.

May well be a blue moon. I am howling all night!! - and you are both succinct and accurate in your appraisal of what I left unsaid.

...furthermore, this subject, as demonstrated by this thread, has much to say about the differing ways we all view military science, yet most of us, all seem in agreement as concerns the basics.

[William F. Owen]

In my thinking, doctrine (and the definitions therein) represents an attempt to institutionalize thought, to give it a theoretical framework and structure that should--even as it (slowly) changes and evolves over time--still outlast whatever specific conditions and commanders are present in a given time and place.

Sorry to sound like a stuck record, and not to focus on you Randy, but Doctrine is what is taught. That is what the word means. Teaching has many forms and methods, but in military terms, the end state should always be increased understanding to enable more effective action. People generally understand simpler concepts, rather than complicated ones.

[Eden]

Setting aside the question of what IO is and whether it is a useful construct, my own observation is that the status and position of the IO staff has a profound effect on the orientation of the headquarters.

I was intimately involved with two higher staffs in Afghanistan, one NATO, one American. In both, the commanders emphasized the importance of information operations in their commader's intent. The NATO commander went so far as to say he considered Afghanistan as primarily an 'information operation' and that all physical actions must support IO objectives.

On the NATO staff, there was a colonel labeled 'Chief, Information Operations' who worked directly for a brigadier called 'Chief, Joint Effects'. The brigadier outranked all other primary staff. As a result, the rest of the staff was oriented to think in terms of IO and effects to a greater extent than they might have been; even those like myself who were less than enthusiastic supporters were obligated to feed the beast, and the IO community had a heavyweight advocate at the commander's table - for good or ill.

On the American staff, there was a colonel IO, but his title was "Chief, non-lethal effects". His career was nearing its end, unlike the J2, J3, and even J4, who were command-designees. His little organization was stuck in about two levels below the decision-making level and was not well integrated. He did not have the energy or personality to overcome these organizational handicaps. As a result, he had less influence on the commander, staff, or operations than some of the brilliant young majors in the planning cell.

My point is that integrating lessons learned - about IO or anything else - at the operational level requires appropriate organization of the staff. In the US case, segregating IO into a functional area handled by specialists relegates that particular skill to the same level as, say, the ADAO: an expert who can be taken out of his box when required but is otherwise largely ignored.

[Randy Brown]

Setting aside the question of what IO is and whether it is a useful construct, my own observation is that the status and position of the IO staff has a profound effect on the orientation of the headquarters.

...

On the American staff, there was a colonel IO, but his title was "Chief, non-lethal effects". His career was nearing its end, unlike the J2, J3, and even J4, who were command-designees. His little organization was stuck in about two levels below the decision-making level and was not well integrated. He did not have the energy or personality to overcome these organizational handicaps. As a result, he had less influence on the commander, staff, or operations than some of the brilliant young majors in the planning cell.

My point is that integrating lessons learned - about IO or anything else - at the operational level requires appropriate organization of the staff. In the US case, segregating IO into a functional area handled by specialists relegates that particular skill to the same level as, say, the ADAO: an expert who can be taken out of his box when required but is otherwise largely ignored.

I find your insights very compelling, particularly in that they speak to my life as a lessons-learned integrator, as well as an amateur/armchair IO guy. Working with our Big Army colleagues at the Center for Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth, we've informally tried to figure out, capture and share how/why our little rag-tag lessons-learned team has been successful.

(More disclosure/background/context: We work for a G3-level green-suiter, but increasingly find ourselves working with blue-suiters on DSCA stuff; M-day side, I work in an IBCT staff environment.)

Some of our L2I talking points include explicit instructions from our boss:

• 80 percent of our targets are self-identified and self-initiated.
• Double-O meeting-taker status: "Invite yourself to any meeting you want."

Others have been identified through experience:

• Have enough rank on the team to be perceived as an asset, not as a threat.
• Have enough experience on the team to know how organizational/staff functions interconnect. ("Who else needs to know this piece of information?")
• Hire individuals that respect the chain of command and military tradition, but also have enough longevity (or confidence or personality ... or "civilian-earnings potential") that they aren't afraid for their jobs. ("What are they going to do, fire me?")

So, like you, I see on-staff status and position as being part of the IO-as-a-construct-and-as-an-application discussions, but I also think you've identified some "softer," less measurable factors in successful instilling and implementing an IO-friendly command culture. Factors, I suppose, like personality and a willingness/ability to walk through (organizational) walls.

Final vignette, one that I hope both illustrates the old-Nike-ad "Just Do It" mentality and speaks to your IO-and-ADA comparison:

A junior-enlisted airman/soldier assigned to an Army unit downrange as a FAC/FAO can't get the time of day from the brass--until he stops wearing rank. Suddenly, everyone starts calling him "Mister," and his opnion starts to be taken seriously within the organization. He didn't really break the rules (other than, perhaps, AR 670-1) or its Air Force equivalent, but he definitely bent them to his will, given that he never aggressively disabused anyone of the notion that he might be a Warrant Officer. Not necessarily a recommended technique, but one that worked for him, an Air Force or Army of One.

[dguidry1]

On the NATO staff, there was a colonel labeled 'Chief, Information Operations' who worked directly for a brigadier called 'Chief, Joint Effects'. The brigadier outranked all other primary staff. As a result, the rest of the staff was oriented to think in terms of IO and effects to a greater extent than they might have been; even those like myself who were less than enthusiastic supporters were obligated to feed the beast, and the IO community had a heavyweight advocate at the commander's table - for good or ill.

The international community of IO practitioners outside the United States - especially in Europe - have a very good grasp of IO with a high degree of common understanding of its application in both military and civilian environments.

[Ken White]

The international community of IO practitioners outside the United States - especially in Europe - have a very good grasp of IO with a high degree of common understanding of its application in both military and civilian environments.

in that case -- but, of course, that wouldn't pass the 'Not invented here' test...

[selil]

The international community of IO practitioners outside the United States - especially in Europe - have a very good grasp of IO with a high degree of common understanding of its application in both military and civilian environments.

Earlier in the thread there was some comment from another member that this was not the case. Do you have anything more substantial that would make the case. I have to be honest I haven't seen any current nation-state that has done IO very well. The ability to manage message in the age of bloggers for a nation is like a bear in a mess of killer bees. Not to damaging but while swatting the painful buggers the honey is still sitting in the tree. No country seems to be doing IO well. I'd really like to see some detailed information on any country that is succeeding.

[joelhar]

I was drug (kicking and screaming) into IO before FA-30 was invented when I was working on the Joint Staff, in the J2, the only Army guy in the office. I wasn't tainted by preconceptions, not school trained and couldn't even spell IW/IO. Later I was the IO LNO to the CIA, NSA, FBI, and DISA, and technically assigned to DIA, so I had a very different perspective. Anytime anyone mentioned IO it was synonymous with CNO, specifically protecting from state-sponsored hackers. I grew restless and began inviting SMEs from all the Services to brief us on more full-spectrum IO. I began inviting in folks from other countries to teach the Joint Staff and the office that began forming around me (they were taking pity on me, I suppose). Eventually, by the time IO began reducing from 13 elements in the USAF doctrine, we began to relax, the doctrine was not as complicated.

Fast forward to 2008 and I am talking with almost all the same folks as i was in the mid-90s, except now they are all in positions of authority, major influencers of doctrine and policy at the USG, Joint, Combined and Service levels and almost to a person they miss the 13 elements of IO. What they miss is that IO was the principal doctrine and everything was considered to have some effect on the targeted audience. Folks have actually said it here and Eden described how the NATO command executed that as a staff element in what I consider the proper perspective: everything must be evaluated for its information effect, so having a Brigadier as the Chief, Joint Effects:

Originally Posted by Eden View Post
On the NATO staff, there was a colonel labeled 'Chief, Information Operations' who worked directly for a brigadier called 'Chief, Joint Effects'. The brigadier outranked all other primary staff. As a result, the rest of the staff was oriented to think in terms of IO and effects to a greater extent than they might have been; even those like myself who were less than enthusiastic supporters were obligated to feed the beast, and the IO community had a heavyweight advocate at the commander's table - for good or ill.

serves that purpose well.

I was asked to describe the future of EW the other day, and define its relationship with CNO in context with the new 'Cyber' discussions. I do NOT want to hijack this thread, but this is pertinent because of some folks asking how to view this divide. I've been explaining to folks for years that IO has a soft side and a hard side. The 'hard side' deals with electrons and is EW and CNO and all that cyber stuff. It was suggested we call this spectrum warfare. I don't disagree but I don't necessarily agree. Then there was the 'soft side' of IO: PSYOP, OPSEC and MILDEC. I called this Information Warfare, but someone here suggested Influence Operations and I tend to agree.

Ken White, you hit the nail on the head, the "not invented here" syndrome has killed more great ideas than anything else of which I am aware.

selil, if you really want to see someone 'do IO' well, look at the Chinese stuff. Tim Thomas wrote an absolutely excellent book on Chinese IW, if you'd like I'll see if I can get you a copy. But beware, it will cause you to question everything you know about IO and will cause you to always be paranoid about anything China ever does or says or... I'm hosting a Chinese IW forum March 4th 2009 here in Washington DC as a part of InfowarCon, be there.