Information Operations

[selil]

Joel, I'd really like to get hold of that book.. PM me or email me I'm easy to find.

[Ken White]

...selil, if you really want to see someone 'do IO' well, look at the Chinese stuff. Tim Thomas wrote an absolutely excellent book on Chinese IW, if you'd like I'll see if I can get you a copy. But beware, it will cause you to question everything you know about IO and will cause you to always be paranoid about anything China ever does or says or... I'm hosting a Chinese IW forum March 4th 2009 here in Washington DC as a part of InfowarCon, be there.

They were great at it 57+ years ago without all the modern tools and capabilities. Lot of patience and long term thinking. Plus they know how impatient we are and know how to leverage that. The Japanese are almost as good.

Thanks for your input. Good stuff.

[joelhar]

Joel, I'd really like to get hold of that book.. PM me or email me I'm easy to find.

e-mail sent!!

[marct]

If you happen to have extra copies lying around, I wouldn't mind a copy either, Joel.

Marc

[joelhar]

If you happen to have extra copies lying around, I wouldn't mind a copy either, Joel.

Marc

I'm going to do the same thing for you that I did for Sam, I'll send an introductory e-mail and Tim will send you one!

Tim is one of the nicest guys I know and completely undervalued and unknown by too many people. He has been recognized as one of the US' top Chinese IW experts and has participated in many of the forums and councils, but I can't, for the life of me, understand why he isn't a highly overpaid consultant. I hereby volunteer to be his agent and when he gets his first $1M contract, I only want 10%.

[marct]

Sounds great, Joel. Having grown up reading Mao, I am really looking forward to reading Tim's book. Thanks, I appreciate it.

Marc

[Ron Humphrey]

I'm going to do the same thing for you that I did for Sam, I'll send an introductory e-mail and Tim will send you one!

Tim is one of the nicest guys I know and completely undervalued and unknown by too many people. He has been recognized as one of the US' top Chinese IW experts and has participated in many of the forums and councils, but I can't, for the life of me, understand why he isn't a highly overpaid consultant. I hereby volunteer to be his agent and when he gets his first $1M contract, I only want 10%.

at a conference and reviewed the aforementioned publication I would have to agree.

One thing I do know is that when he talks on the subject I would definately listen.

[joelhar]

In the Chinese IW forum I'm asking Tim Thomas, James Mulvenon and Charles "Chuck" Hawkins to represent the US. These gentlemen are identifying the appropriate experts from China to attend, we are inviting them to speak in a different session, but hopefully each group of experts will attend the others' lectures. At the end of the day I'm arranging for a social event where we can all rub elbows together and get to know one another.

[Bill Moore]

I thought Chinese IO consisted of re-education camps, stupid propaganda, and thought police sprinkled throughout their society (and now overwatching the web)? I'm not sure that is the route we want to go down.

[Ron Humphrey]

I thought Chinese IO consisted of re-education camps, stupid propaganda, and thought police sprinkled throughout their society (and now overwatching the web)? I'm not sure that is the route we want to go down.

And don't think that the fact we generally make such assumptions and associations is lost on our friends in the PLA

I've read some very informative papers written by those studying in various countries which really start to bring out just how much underestimation / assumption becomes a weakness to be exploited.

Been underestimated quite often in my own experience and thus have seen the opportunities there. Fortunately for me I'm way to nice a guy to ever take advantage of such.

This is definately not the case with everyone

[joelhar]

I have complete read only one of Tim Thomas' books and skimmed two others and I could honestly not put together a coherent sentence that begins to describe what they write, what they believe and what they are actually doing, not in the time and space allowed. From all the things I have read about them through the years and guided by Tim's books, I personally believe they have us beat, in many ways. Chuck Hawkins also co-edited a book, "The New Great Game: Chinese Views on Central Asia", which I just started reading. The complexity of thought and how it is all interwoven boggles my two-celled brain.

[Bill Moore]

Joelhar thanks for the lead on Tim Thomas, I will definitely read his book. I found a review online and will post a few excerpts in hope of generating some interest. Sort of reminds me of "Total War", but obviously their thoughts are evolving rapidly. Also note their focus on the technical aspects of IO initially and while not throwing the baby out with the bath water, they are beginning to look at the influence side.

http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2007/May/oliverMay07.asp

A review of Timothy L. Thomas, Dragon Bytes: Chinese Information-War Theory and Practice (Ft Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, 2004).

The author provides ample evidence that, since that time, the Chinese are diligently transitioning from a mechanized force to an informationized one:

They are developing concepts similar to the United States’ network-centric warfare—integrating sensors and shooters via a network to increase accuracy and pace of operations.
They are cultivating theories and capabilities for attacking and defending military and civilian networks—the author discusses open source accounts of Chinese successes against the United States.
They are creating and leveraging high-technology training and research institutes—the author discusses at least five of them.
They are thinking about how to attack and defend command, control, communications, computer systems, and intelligence (C4I) systems.
They are preparing for electronic warfare.
They are changing their command structures.
They are developing and exercising means of using networks to rapidly mobilize the entire nation.
They are discussing means to target public opinions—both domestic and foreign.

They are pondering approaches to psychological operations.
They are investigating better ways to leverage their reserves’ civilian information technology expertise to support their active forces.
They are securing their “information borders” and reinforcing their “spiritual defense line” against propaganda and other attacks using “false information.”

Chapter four is dedicated to the traditional Chinese concept of ‘stratagems’ and how they can be adapted for IW. One of Mr. Thomas’ quotes from Major General Li Bingyan says it best:

While we are inheritors of our own outstanding cultural tradition, we should be boldly collecting cultural genes from Western military science and its emphasis on technology. We should make traditional strategy merge with modern science and technology and scientific methods, so as to restore the original intent of ‘Sun Tzu strategy.’

In China, as in the United States, IW is a very broadly defined term, but Mr. Thomas’ book does an exceptional job of collecting all the various interpretations and activities that correlate to the Chinese IW effort

Should generate some interesting discussion, but don't be fooled by senior officers writing down ideas. The proof is in the pudding, what can they actually do? I think it is way premature to say they beat us in the IO arena, I definitely don't think they feel that way.

[dguidry1]

In regards to the international IO community:

Earlier in the thread there was some comment from another member that this was not the case. Do you have anything more substantial that would make the case. I have to be honest I haven't seen any current nation-state that has done IO very well. The ability to manage message in the age of bloggers for a nation is like a bear in a mess of killer bees. Not to damaging but while swatting the painful buggers the honey is still sitting in the tree. No country seems to be doing IO well. I'd really like to see some detailed information on any country that is succeeding.

Here is a link to the Information Operations Europe 2008 Conference (it was held in June).

http://www.iqpcevents.com/ShowEvent.aspx?id=39780

Here are a few other links referencing the MNIOE - Multi-National Information Operations Experiment and other Multinational IO initiatives:

http://gmr.mapn.ro/Engleza/Ultimul_n...-p.107-114.pdf

http://www.dodccrp.org/events/11th_I...papers/157.pdf

http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfa...8_micbrief.ppt

[Eden]

I would say, having worked in a NATO headquarters for three years, the last one in Afghanistan, that European thinkers have embraced the concept of Information Operations to a level that at least matches the US, that their theoretical literature is at least as sophisticated as ours, and that they have made a greater effort to restructure staffs to apply its tenets.

However, they may be less capable practitioners in some ways. Some examples:

* The ISAF Public Information Officer (equivalent to the US PAO) was bright and talented. However, he had zero experience in either Public Affairs or Information Operations. The Chief, Information Operations had no previous experience with IO - though as an armor officer, could be expected to do all things well. The Chief, Joint Effects, had to be educated on EBO after his assignment to the HQ. So, there is a great unevenness in the exposure to IO and EBO and IW, etc., even among senior officers.

* Many European nations boast deep thinkers on IO, but they have few or no PSYOPs, CNO, CMO, etc. units and very little institutional knowledge to draw on.

* On the other hand they did some things very well. For instance, our headquarters put together a Priority Engagement Team that prepared the commander for all his meetings with high-priority 'targets' - sheiks, pols, media, UN, etc. They armed him with themes, messages, and facts all integrated into the overall IO plan. Even this effort caused problems, however, in that it began to dominate the staff effort and became a huge information vacuum.

In summary, the Europeans have embraced IO because it fits with their overall approach to COIN and stability operations; however, they are not handling the practicalities particularly well. In part, this is because they have made the incorrect assumption - one shared by many in the US - that IO is cheap and non-resource-intensive. An analogy would be with European armored theorists in the '30s: lots of brilliant insights but little investment and less practical success.

[selil]

In regards to the international IO community:

Thank you very much. Still trying to tease my silo of interest out of the mix.

[dguidry1]

I would say, having worked in a NATO headquarters for three years, the last one in Afghanistan, that European thinkers have embraced the concept of Information Operations to a level that at least matches the US, that their theoretical literature is at least as sophisticated as ours, and that they have made a greater effort to restructure staffs to apply its tenets.

However, they may be less capable practitioners in some ways.

I see your point I must agree with you. I think my appreciation is of the European thought process. They tend be able to understand cultural aspects of the human dimension much better than many Americans. I've travelled extensively and have become more open-minded and knowledgeable about influencing factors in different countries and cultures. But as you stated, application is much different beast.

[Ron Humphrey]

Thank you very much. Still trying to tease my silo of interest out of the mix.

Considering how much your silo helps to enable the coordination, integration, analysis, etc for the other silos

But GLWT

[Ken White]

and are strong porponents and users of the technique of diminished expectations.

...they are beginning to look at the influence side.

I disagree, they've been playing that field for centuries and, watching their total performance during the Korean War -- both in the field and in the media -- they are quite good at it. Subtle, very subtle. So subtle that people do not realize they're being manipulated -- which is after all the goal.

Should generate some interesting discussion, but don't be fooled by senior officers writing down ideas. The proof is in the pudding, what can they actually do? I think it is way premature to say they beat us in the IO arena, I definitely don't think they feel that way.

As Ron Humphrey said, they want you to think they don't feel that way that way.

Remember in that environment, unlike our own, senior officers don't write down things that (a) are not approved on high; and (b) give away anything that might remotely give any prospective opponent either an advantage or an insight into what China is really doing or intends. You can almost bet the fact that they write something that is allowed to go clear is in itself an IO of sorts.

These are the people that spawned Zhou En Lai, arguably one of the most effective diplomats of the 20th Century and who said when asked about the impact of the French Revolution of 1789: "It is too soon to say." They have their shortcomings and can be tripped up and beaten but they are not amateurs by any stretch. They're way ahead of the west in manipulating influence and are apparently catching up rapidly in other areas of IO.

[selil]

Considering how much your silo helps to enable the coordination, integration, analysis, etc for the other silos

But GLWT

Well you start with a picture that looks kind of like this

Oh and that is just a draft

[marct]

Well you start with a picture that looks kind of like this

Don't know iof it will help or not, but Matt Armstrong and I have been batting stuff around on our bogs. Matt's is here, and mine response to it is here.