DO is dead, hail Enhanced Company Operations!

**Baguba** · 07-08-2008

From Vol. 21, No. 27, July 7, 2008 of www.InsideDefense.com’s: Inside the Navy.

"The Marine Corps calls the idea of dispersing Marine companies throughout a battlefield and equipping them to maneuver independently “enhanced company operations” (ECO). The concept was approved by senior service officials in April. It is the next iteration of the distributed operations concept, which called for breaking up units into much smaller groups for the same type of decentralized warfighting. “Our enemies will use large forces if it’s to their benefit in a certain area, but for the most part it’s going to be irregular warfare. And our companies, through enhanced company operations, will be trained and equipped better to fight both,” Murray said. “They can be distributed -- fight in a small, distributed unit -- or they can come together and fight in a more traditional manner.”

I would argue with around $630 million dollars of congressional funds allocated to DO as a concept and its related equipment and training, it is not dead. I doubt the Marine Corps wants to give all that money back.
What has DO influence so far?
1) ALL 36 Battalion T/E's have had a DO/IBEPP increase.
2) There has been an increased throughput at SOI(W), SOI(E) and 3d Marine Regimental Schools for Infantry Squad Leaders Course (ISLC).
3) MTT’s are traveling around the Corps teaching the Bn's leadership T3 so they can run their own Tactical Small Unit Leaders (TSULC) course [read fire team leaders course at Bn level].
4) Combat Hunter is being implemented from all entry level training (TBS, MCRD) to career level Schools in a building block approach.
5) Increase funding for new optics, OTH amphib vehicles, and tilt rotor planes has be allocated.
6) Enhanced Company Operations has been developed as a parallel course for the Marine Corps to get to DO, once technology, training and manpower can catch up.
7) DO is not a unit, it is a capability. This is not the Army's 10th Mountain that doesn't train in the mountains. It is a type of operation, a distributed one.
8) This evolution from the Sea Dragon experiments in the 90’s that have continued to be improved and transformed into DO, to the platoon that tested out some of the capabilities in Afghanistan, to ECO is a natural evolution to a level of proficiency we want our forces to get to in the near term.

So gents, I would argue it is not dead, we are still working on it. However, as administrations, change and CMC change the troughs and peaks of interest for DO vary, but the DO wave is still moving along

**jcustis** · 07-08-2008

It would seem that you happened upon this thread via a google string on your work, or have been lurking all along. What Quantico command might you be out of, and what aspects of DO are you working on? It helps readers put things in context.

And please humor me a bit. Is DO simply a term for employing good common sense across tactics, training, and equipping? I ask because it seemed that in 2006 there was the DO faddishness, as if we had no historians within our ranks anymore. It made me shrug my shoulders and ask "so what?"

**Baguba** · 07-08-2008

I actually did happen upon this thread by a Google search as I was looking for information on ECO. I have been following this concept since I saw Marines running around with PDA in Pendleton in 96' to being immersed in LOE1 from MCWL and following the conferences and papers since.

**COMMAR** · 11-04-2008

Originally Posted by jcustis

I don't know about the whole range of C4ISR limitations, but I do know that until we can squeeze out more bandwidth and satcom channels, we won't be doing DO or too much ECO. Is anybody taking on those problems?

Limitations in C4ISR as in reference to DO, presently, sure there are.

You have to think everything thru to its logical conclusion. When you think about 1 Sqd fr/ 1 Plt dispersed gathering Intel, running simple surveillance, or basic recon maybe taking pics etc etc. Sure simple easily handled for 1.

But KIM 1/3's DO Plt that was in A'stan in '06 said they often split into as many as 9 to 11 seperate elements concealed & miles apart constantly feeding the 10th Mtn Intel (and they were under tight restrictions).

Multiply that by a whole BN of Plts that can go fr/1 to 11 & back at any given time. The Intel pipeline turns fr/a facet to a firehose but still draining out of the same sink.

The proper filters are not in place to syphon off, process, and pass on then feedback all that Info. Thats really where the ECO Concept kicks in, to handle & kickback as much Intel as possible at the Lowest Possible Level.

**Coldstreamer** · 11-12-2009

...my battalion ran Distributed Ops in the Defence against a superior armoured force on a TESEX last year, which worked very well. Distributed, highly dispersed light role infantry operating as small groups of determined men, with cached CSS, autonamous aufragstaktik guidance, clearly delineated & simple battlespace management and C2 redundancy. It was a great success. By the same token, 'multiples' or 3 x fire teams of 4 men (about the same size as an ODA...) can routinely conduct all sorts of useful activity on operations if connected to the right ISTAR enablers. As ever, it all needs to be J2 led, and this pushed down to Company level. Inefficient? Nonsense. What's inefficient is taking a high school graduate, spending hundreds of thousands of dollars training and equipping him, and then employing him like a WW1 doughboy as part of a swarm, or on a front gate doing fatigues when PMCs could stag on and guard the camp for a fraction of the price. With embedded specialists at the right level, you can get a far greater return on your investment by making your operations meaningful (and I don't just mean CT Strike - J2 led ops apply to EVERYTHING).
Tiger and King Tiger analogies are all great sport, but inappropriate for this. J2 specialists are 'inefficient' if you're trying to resource a clanking great industrial age nation-state army. But we're in a different game today, and we need to be able to do it all.

What's REALLY inefficient is when deterrence fails because assymetric actors feel invulnerable to clumsy retaliation. If we (the West) had grasped this and adapted to the emerging AQ/non state threat in the 90s (numerous clarion Agency warnings, all unheeded), rather than configuring for Desert Storm Ultra, perhaps we'd be a few pages ahead in history than we are today.

Price of preparing for what you want to, rather than what you need to. Perhaps I should write a book....

**Ken White** · 11-12-2009

Originally Posted by Coldstreamer

...Inefficient? Nonsense. What's inefficient is taking a high school graduate, spending hundreds of thousands of dollars training and equipping him, and then employing him like a WW1 doughboy as part of a swarm...But we're in a different game today, and we need to be able to do it all...What's REALLY inefficient is when deterrence fails because assymetric actors feel invulnerable to clumsy retaliation.

Price of preparing for what you want to, rather than what you need to. Perhaps I should write a book....

Yes -- but please do it before you're promoted to Brigadier or above -- they seem to often lose the bubble...

My belief is that's due to having carpets on the floor in their offices. There's something about carpet fibers...

Excellent points all.

**PhilR** · 11-12-2009

At the battle of Waterloo, Colonel Clement, an infantry commander, fought with the most conspicuous bravery; but unfortunately was shot through the head. Napoleon, hearing of his gallantry and misfortune, gave instructions for him to be carried to a farm where Larrey the surgeon-general was operating. One glance convinced Larrey that his case was desperate, so taking a saw he removed the top of his skull and placed his brains on the table. Just as he had finished, in rushed an aide-de-camp, shouting - 'Is General Clement here?' Clement, hearing him, sat up and exclaimed: 'No! but Colonel Clement is.' 'Oh, mon general' cried the aide-de-camp, embracing him, 'the Emperor was overwhelmed when we heard of your gallantry, and has promoted you on the field of battle to the rank of General.' Clement rubbed his eyes, got off the table, clapped the top of his skull on his head and was about to leave the farm, when Larrey shouted after him: 'Mon general - your brains!' To which the gallant Frenchman, increasing his speed, shouted back: 'Now that I am a general I shall no longer require them!'

From Major-General J.F.C. Fuller, Generalship: Its Diseases and Their Cure

**Coldstreamer** · 11-12-2009

Originally Posted by Ken White

Yes -- but please do it before you're promoted to Brigadier or above -- they seem to often lose the bubble...

.

Little danger of that!

**Xenophon** · 11-13-2009

I was under the impression that DO was not dead, it just became ECO. The only difference being that the Company level gets the equipment and manpower to run an operations center and an intelligence cell. I believe independent fire team operations is still a mainstay.

**tankersteve** · 01-17-2010

Any new developments on this thread? I am very interested in the 6-man fire team as a basis of any maneuver unit.

Just curious how this is developing.

Tankersteve

**jcustis** · 01-17-2010

TS, did you catch the SW Blog post about new company experimentation here: http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/200...eriments-with/

A recent Marine Corps Gazette article in .pdf form is at the Potomac Institute link and lays out the structural changes envisioned.

**William F. Owen** · 01-17-2010

Originally Posted by tankersteve

Any new developments on this thread? I am very interested in the 6-man fire team as a basis of any maneuver unit.

I don't know about DO, but 6-man fire team has been done and works well. - it's about as big as a so-called "fire team" can get.
More important is it usually depends how many 6-man fire teams you have, and what they do rather than it being 3,4,5 or 6 men in the team.

**jmm99** · 01-17-2010

which shall reside in that part of my harddrive titled "New USMC Concepts".

Many years ago, a futurist (joking a bit) said that the key to future miniturization of machines was to create a machine that would make clones of itself in the next smaller scale - and so on, until the desired degree of miniturization was reached.

So, now we (it seems) have a new level in the MAGTF, from:

1. Extra-Large (the Corps)

2. Large (GCE - Div)

3. Medium (GCE - Regt)

4. Small (GCE - Bn)

5. Mini (GCE - Coy)

All dependent on the individual Marines who compose the units.

Regards

Mike

**jcustis** · 01-17-2010

All dependent on the individual Marines who compose the units.

Absolutely!

All of the re-org is great...to a point. Even given the most optimized and efficient setup, I have become increasingly convinced that without an incredibly strong training and professional military education roadmap that develops leaders at the section leader, platoon sergeant, and platoon commander level, it means absolutely nothing.

We haven't gotten there yet, though the efforts put forward ARE helping.

**Ken White** · 01-17-2010

Well trained leaders, NCO and Officer, will successfully adjust the organization according to METT-TC. The untrained cannot do that and thus will wrongly use organizations designed for one mission for another with quite predictable results...

**Fuchs** · 06-08-2012

Does any<body remember the other titles and acronyms used for distributed operations and similar concepts?

I remember there were at least some titled experiments, but cannot remember the titles. "dragon something" or so (not the Dragonfire auto mortar).

TT · 06-08-2012

I believe you are thinking of the USMC Warfighting Laboratory's series of experiments. The overarching process of experimentation, named ‘Sea Dragon’, was a Five-Year Plan of advanced concept-based war-fighting experiments.

The principal Advanced Warfighting Experiments (AWE) were Hunter Warrior (1996), Urban Warrior (1999), and Capable Warrior (2001). Hunter Warrior was the AWE that first experimented with the concept of distributed operations.