I broadly concur. Having read and corresponded extensively on DO, I saw nothing in DO that conceptually ruled out the use of Squad, Platoon, or Company. It just wasn't a very well thought out idea in the first place, and it was further challenged (at least in what was written) by seemingly flawed execution.Originally Posted by Norfolk
https://www.mccdc.usmc.mil/FeatureTo...igned%20co.pdf
Considering how many things there are wrong with that statement, it's incredible the idea ever got as far as it did!!Distributed Operations constitutes a form of maneuver warfare. Small, highly capable units spread across a large area of operations will provide the spatial advantage commonly sought in maneuver warfare, in that they will be able to sense an expanded battlespace, and can use close combat or supporting arms, including Joint fires, to disrupt the enemy’s access to key terrain and avenues of approach.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
The traditional infantry could be used for dispersed forms of infantry combat, but changes in equipment and training would be necessary and organizational changes would enhance the effectiveness a lot.
DO kept confusing me because the statements about it were quite contradictory.
Sometimes it was about 6-man teams, in other documents it was about platoons covering huge gaps between each other with indirect support fires.
From what I've heard, the DO platoon in Afghanistan was very successful. I doubt our capability to field more than one or two of these platoons per battalion, however. For one, the DO concept calls for a JTAC per squad. That's 27 JTACs per battalion, not including the air shop in the S-3. The EWTGs can't meet that sort of demand for trained JTACs.
I think the Marine Corps is making the right call to focus on developing company-level operations. We've trained for years to fight as battalions, and only as independent companies as absolutely necessary. Now we move to "Enhanced Companies". I'll be interested to see what capabilities develop out of this, and how exactly my company will be enhanced.
Either way, it looks to be an exciting time for me to take command of a company of Marines.
I'm rather clueless about all those acronyms, but I remember that the USA raised a multi-million men army out of a tiny army in World War II in about three years.
DO has been around as DO and as predecessor forms for more than ten years now.
Any training bottlenecks are wrong excuses imho.
Interestingly enough, there is a certain appeal to me regarding DO, but an almost equal aversion, because I am in the USMC's LAR community, where we have coys of 25 vehicles apiece. Each vehicle, regardless of variant, is crewed by less than 8 Marines, yet the company commander has two forms of high power VHF communications to the vehicle.
If I remember correctly, the structure of DO elements was based around a team riding inside of some JLTV-esque vehicle, which no doubt had the requisite communications and could move about nimbly acoss the battlefield in a mobile role, or presumable slow down to 3.5 mph when dismounted tactics were required.
LAR platoons are currently operating with great depth and width between themselves, and even during the "march up" we did not always operate in mutually supporting (by means of direct fire) elements. The LAV-25's greatest asset is it's sensors, whether it be the stabilized thermal sight, or a vehicle commander with a set of binoculars. I remember being slightly caught off guard during my first field exercise, when I had communication with every one of the other 24 vehicles, and out to a great range. Compare that to my days when the platoon HQ had one VHF radio, and my surprise comes into context.
I think DO has merits, but it was thought out by folks who didn't have any practical experience in any distributed operations outside of the historical constructs they used to explain DO. I am probably wrong and will gladly stand corrected if someone from the Marine Corps comes aboard and sets the record straight. As a result, I think DO bankrupted itself with the gear requirements, and became tough to swallow.
These initiatives often die hard, because during the xperimentation phases, a lot of gucci gear is procured and pushed down - and used well in most cases - for employment because it is just how we do it. Then when it comes time to look at pushing gear sets across the Marine Corps, tough bedgetary choices have to be made. This may be an oversimplification, but I am always ready to eat a little crow.
Without breaking any confidences I can say that I was informally consulted as to my opinions of DO by one of the men responsible for the concept. As outline to me at the time, it seemed to make sense.
About a year later I got to talk to one of the men involved in actually making it happen and it then made very little sense compared to what I had discussed and the written papers did not impress me.
I think DO became "new and clever". - and the more I work on and study this area, the more I believe we need to keep things "iron-bar-simple."
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
William Owen (and anyone else),
Do you have recommendations for further reading on why it failed? Specifically, what effect did the use of 6man squads have on the overall outcome?
Use of 6man teams and 12man "heavy" teams have been used extensively by some Army units during OIF rotations. Some say that this set up is "advanced math" but with good SOPs, detailed mission planning and understanding of C&C it can be made very simple. The system worked well to cover a larger area with fewer resources than traditional platoon sized assets.
What is almost amazing, considering how much time and effort was put into DO, starting with Project METROPOLIS, and through the various "Hunter"-series of experiments, and finally to DO itself, is that DO was even "killed-off" at all. It might have turned into another V-22; too good a concept to give up on, but too hard to get just right, yet still dragging on year after year, decade after decade.
DO as originally envisaged is indeed too good to let go of; but DO as it mutated into a sort of shiny-kit monster in reality was a beast that had to be slain. Otherwise, at the very least it would have placed intolerable pressures upon budgets, resources, and training, and have produced something that might not have been terribly applicable outside of an LIC environment - at least for some of the roles in which it was being proposed or implied - except of course for reconnaissance and certain other special units. It may well be organizationally and technologically possible to equip regular infantry as DO. It might even be argued that DO was more or less duplicating what some specialist units already do, just with the latest technology; but we do not normally expect said specialist units to perform regular infantry tasks. So, for other than reconnaissance and certain other missions and tasks, how practical is DO outside of an LIC environment?
It seems that the original DO gave way to something like conceptual and technological hubris; whatever its reputed effectiveness on the COIN battlefield, it seemed to try to go too far too fast, and for practical purposes may not be applicable to the ground force as a whole. But like I said, DO in principle is too good conceptually to completely let go of. If it is not preserved in some limited form somewhere, it will almost certainly return in the future in another guise.
Ranger94 wrote:
Without going into details, it is my (and very possibly poorly informed) understanding that non-DO units resorted to the 6-man "team/squad" out of practical necessity as the 4-man Fire Teams just weren't cutting it (for different reasons), and that in certain instances such teams were also employed in a sort of ad hoc DO manner for certain purposes. It seems it may have worked well enough that DO itself seemed unnecessary, even excessive, by comparison. Probably the right decision to give DO the axe, then, at least for the foreseeable future.William Owen (and anyone else),
Do you have recommendations for further reading on why it failed? Specifically, what effect did the use of 6man squads have on the overall outcome?
Use of 6man teams and 12man "heavy" teams have been used extensively by some Army units during OIF rotations. Some say that this set up is "advanced math" but with good SOPs, detailed mission planning and understanding of C&C it can be made very simple. The system worked well to cover a larger area with fewer resources than traditional platoon sized assets.
Well Norfolk, you know my take on DO. I believe that a familiar concept would make a great niche force, an economy of force screening/delaying force that would be in one league with other specialist light units like mountain, airborne, marine (actually, I think airborne and mountain should be one branch, but that's another topic).
The technological challenges for Do can't be too great - most necessary equipment will be/was developed for the U.S.Army (FCS subsystems) anyways.
I believe that the personnel selection, training & morale effort is much more a problem.
But I'm pretty sure that this didn't "kill" DO either.
I remember very well the report about how an entire 4-man sniper detachment was found slain in Iraq.
DO is probably politically not feasible.
Well I'm not sure I am more qualified than anyone else on this matter, and no, I can't site anything written that specifically relates to the decision to abandon DO. ...but.
a.) I don't think the USMC ever really wanted to do it. With Rumsfeld gone, they got let off the hook, so jumped. - and as a concept it was poorly explained and reasoned - at least is some material. The USMC wanted to avoid saying "we need to be better infantry," - and all armies are avoiding grasping this nettle.
b.) I don't think the concept writers had any idea of how much support 6-8-12 men need. Look at what happened with Op Anaconda and Redwing. Even in Northern Ireland, a very benign environment, a 4-man covert O.P. needed an entire Platoon on QRF.
c.) I think the number of men in a "team" is a distraction. It's who is on the end of the radio and who close enough to help, that makes the difference.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
The more I look at DO, the more I agree with what you said here. I remember getting a hold of a PDF or PowerPoint from MCCDC about a year ago when I first heard of the DO concept, and the amount of kit they were hauling, as well as how expensive it looked, made the whole thing look very outlandish, like the British LRDG on steroids. Or maybe "Starship Troopers" (the Heinlein version). It also looked very cool, and I remember thinking how much I wanted to be a part of that, but I didn't even consider how much it would cost the taxpayers to have even one of those units running around (of course, if we could scrap a few F-22s it might all even out). Having a JTAC to coordinate fires from the air means adding even more sophisticated and sensitive gadgetry. And as was pointed out earlier, a unit that small operating with that degree of "autonomy" still requires a great degree of logistical backing, not to mention a QRF or something on standby in case something bad goes down. Not to mention the experienced officers and NCOs you would have to pull from other units that might need them, and the extensive schooling and training they would need to operative effectively. Like all brand new toys and concepts that sparkle and shine, DO just seemed way too expensive, and was definitely blurring the line between conventional units and spec ops (not that that's necessarily a bad thing).
Maybe once ECO starts to put boots on the ground, MCCDC can start looking for ways to streamline those earlier DO concepts, maybe by not pushing as much gucci gear. Either way, I want to see life breathed back into this beast, partly for the sake of my own fantasies about being a part of it, as well as for the sake of seeing its effects on the battlefield.
I think it may have been pushing a little too hard too fast, but I think it was more an of operational decision to shift more emphasis towards Enhancing Company level Operations.
You have to remember DO was not only designed to enhance the squad giving it Plt level influence, but to raise the Plt to Comp-BN level and the Comp to BN to Brigade level influence. But DO was designed to work chain reaction like from the Squad up.
I think the speed of that change was too fast for Old School 3-4 Stars to accept under their tenure. Which is exactly why I think the emphasis has shifted fr/ the Sqd/Plt to the Company.
I think you really understand the extent DO was pushing the USMC towards. I think many you understand the Gadgets & Techs, but I mean the Operational Level the Corps was considering was far beyond simply pushing beyond the traditional front lines.
The Extent that DO was being Developed was pushing more along the lines of self deploying Expeditionary Squads & Platoons. Reinforced Squads & Plts deploying on Navy, Coast Guard, & MPF Shipping & to foreign countries.
The experiments that were conducted showed the Marines could handle the Mission but that the Marine Corps was not Structured to handle it, and that the Generals weren't comfortable with the structural changes that would need to be made to put the emphasis that low.
One of the Experiments, that wrapped earlier this year, involved a Marine Rifle Squad Deployed on a Coast Guard Cutter that Deployed to the Caribbean. They conducted Bi-lateral training w/host nations and Maritime Security w/ the CG.
The change in structure in a short amount of time would've been radical. So I believe the emphasis on the Sqd/Plt was shifted to the Company. A more gradual and logical shift.
Keep In Mind that DO as a tactical capability has gone nowhere its being absorbed and institutionalized and all the gear is still been issued to the BN's.
All the gear that was slated for the DO Plts in a DO trained BN is still planned to be handed out to the BNs. Its part of the IBEP, Infantry Battalion Enhancement Program, at a cost of an additional $19mil per BN.
All the DO Training courses; Combat Hunter, TSULC, T3, etc. are becoming foundational training of all BNs.
Squad Leaders are still being trained to Call in everything up to & including Type II CAS. The training pipeline for JTACs is still being expanded to include Infantry Plt Commanders & Plt Sgts.
If you look at the SC MAGTF construct you'll see that Platoons are still planned on being independently deployed to various countries just under the guidance of there Companies.
Tactically DO is still alive, Operationally its dead and been replaced by a Company centric Mindset. But I believe only temporarily until the Marine Corps can structurally support the full extent Planned for DO.
When it does I believe the USMC will transist fr/ Expeditionary DO Sqd/Plt Operations to Exped. Enhanced Company Ops to Higher as fluidly as it does Comp/SPMAGTF to BN/MEU to MEB operations of today; which is using the capability that best suits the mission.
I believe the ultimate goal will be to have Infantry Squads w/a Reborn CAP, Combined Action Platoon like ability, but on an Expeditionary Scale. Giving the USMC the ability to conduct Expeditionary Operations on all levels.
You reference a lack of proper structural support, but I'm not sure I follow what support is required.
As for the new courses, call me a doubting Thomas, but they are just making up for years of willfully ignoring basics and not structuring training well IMO.
I'm not hopeful that we will take proper care of the new gear. Repair/replace is going to be an interesting headache in short time.
For those unfamiliar w/ the CAP Program or what the Plts were capable of or why I believe the USMC's ultimate goal is for CAP like Expeditionary Squads, here's some background info.
The CAP was one of the most successful programs of the Vietnam war. It consisted of a Reinforced 15 man Marine Rifle Squad lead by an E5/Sgt. They were attached to 1 or more S. Vietnamese Villages and Hamlets & a PF Army Plt.
What made these Reinforced Squads unique was not only were they charged w/raising and training the local Militia & giving guidance to the PF's Army Plt, similar to an ETT, but they were given Company like Responsibility over their assigned AO.
They conducted Offensive Operations, developed Intelligence networks, & conducted their own Humanitarian Ops independent of, but under the Guidance of their HHQ.
Its this type of Independent Operating ability I believe the USMC is looking into eventually Creating in its Expeditionary Rifle Squads which is the ultimate goal of DO. Independent in ability but ultimately part of a larger construct able to fluid move fr/ one Expeditionary MAGTF Construct to the next depending on the need.
Also the creator and architect of the DO concept as well as Combat Hunter & other programs, Gen Jim Mattis, is a huge fan the CAP Plt concept of Vietnam and has always found ways to incorporate their capabilities into Marine Infantry.
He is presently Commander of Joint Forces Command, but is rumored to be 1st in line to be the 35th Commandant if he chooses to accept and not retire.
If so he will be in the driver's seat of the Transformation that he initiated. Transformation that he says began in his mind after he led the first Marine forces into A'stan in 2001.
Interesting points COMMAR. I will say that the concept of the small unit leader is maturing, but I still say DO simply overshot its landing a bit. Would you be so kind as to post an intro in the introductions thread?
Logistics for one, not to mention C4ISR support that would need to be brought to the Sqd/Plt level to make DO work at the extent planned.
Running a few Squads or Plts from a MEU construct fr/ ship 100mi out thats possible today. However Running a few Expeditionary Platoons or Squads thru-out a Theater fr/ a Home base in say Rota, Spain or Sao Tome is a different matter.
Thats the extent DO was being pushed. Giving Plts OpCon of whichever areas they were sent. Under the Guidance of an overall command. That would have called for alot of assets that can't be brought down to the Plt level at this time.
Thats not what the ECO concept provides, it puts OpCon the the hands of the Company. And in the SC MAGTF construct the Company has OpCon but is under the Guidance of the SC MAGTF Command.
The ECO Construct puts the C4ISR, Logistics, & Support at the Company level. The Company has Operational Control over the various AO's the Plts & Sqds will operate in.
Like Company Level Intel Cells, UAV, Engineering, Data Networks, Resupply all at the Company Level w/the ECO. Under DO's Exp. Sqd/Plt alot of that would reside in the Exp. Plt which is not possible at this time.
The Squad sized Deployment w/the CG thru the Caribbean showed the Squads if trained can operate on their own in various cases the problem would be supporting X-number of Squads & Plts operating Independently and Dispersed thru-out a whole Theater.
Presently it can't be done, but a halfway solution is to deploy Independently Operating Companies under the Guidance of HHQ & place the support w/ them. You let them design the missions & disperse the Support as necessary, 'Enhanced Company Operations'.
Last edited by COMMAR; 07-07-2008 at 11:03 PM. Reason: typing error
Whats that?
Most folks here write a brief
resume of sorts -- you can go to this LINK, scroll up and see what some others have written. Then add your own intro.
I don't know about the whole range of C4ISR limitations, but I do know that until we can squeeze out more bandwidth and satcom channels, we won't be doing DO or too much ECO. Is anybody taking on those problems?
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