Results 1 to 20 of 34

Thread: Security Sector Reform SSR & FID (Catch All)

Hybrid View

Previous Post Previous Post   Next Post Next Post
  1. #1
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Oct 2005
    Posts
    3,099

    Default Security Sector Reform in Palestine, Lebanon, and Yemen

    CEIP, Oct 09: “Fixing Broken Windows”: Security Sector Reform in Palestine, Lebanon, and Yemen
    As they emerge from confl ict, states can rarely commence the arduous task of reconstruction and consolidate their governments until they undertake extensive restructuring of their security forces. Palestine, Lebanon, and Yemen are all fractured, quasi-democratic states with divided societies, and deep disagreement over what constitutes the national interest. Successful reform in each will require security institutions that answer to democratically-elected civilian leaders, but the U.S. and European approach has thus far focused largely on providing military training and equipment, targeted toward counterterrorist capabilities.

    To enable real reform, the West must adopt a comprehensive approach which treats security reform as only one part of a broader political strategy, and encourage governments and security commanders in Palestine, Lebanon, and Yemen to buy into such a strategy. Donor states should invest resources commensurate with their declared objectives, improve coordination, and standardize practices. Above all, they should make it a priority to build the institutions and procedures that are essential for democratic governance of the security sector, without which reforms become bogged down in internal power struggles. Pursuing counterterrorism in the absence of the rule of law perpetuates the undemocratic governance of the security sector and undermines state building and post-conflict reconstruction.

  2. #2
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Jul 2009
    Posts
    589

    Default Same old, same old...

    If I had a penny/dime for every report, speech, project I have read suggesting broad reform of the governance structure of Middle East States I'd have a tidy sum (perhaps even enough for law school!). COIN, military-to military and other non-conditional or politically entangling (domestically speaking) processes are often more cost effective and politically suitable stratgies for short term social engineering or problem solving. But as soon as we start "getting holistic" we enter the realms of fantasy. I remember opening the local English language paper upon first arriving in Yemen and reading that the Italian interior minister was in town giving the Salah government a lecture on how to reduce corruption! (Yes, you read that right).

    Credibility issues aside I never stop being amazed at the political naivete of Western intellectuals, liberals and other similar do-gooders who think that foreign governments, and especially foreign Muslim governments, are about to agree to hand over their governance structures to foriegn inspection, oversight and control (which, in effect, is the logical outcome). It doesn't work when the IAEA does it (i.e., Iraq, Iran, North Korea) is a purely circumscribed issue area and it has barely, just barely, worked in Bosnia (due more to economic-geographical contiguity than anything else) and is a recipe for disaster in Lebanon, Yemen and Palestine. Essentialy such thinking is nothing more than a thinly veiled liberal internationalism/imperialism/interventionism assuming that a system of like (democratic) units will lead to greater stability, co-operation and human progress (and other similarly fuzzy-wuzzy goals). It won't. A democratic Palestine is as much likely to elect Hamas as Fatah or even someone even worse. A democratic Yemen, a truely representative yemen, will bring to power the Yemeni Islah (Muslim Borterhood style) party which will make Saudi Arabia look like Disney Land. In Lebanon introducing efficiency, representation and true democratic proceduralism will first have to dismantle the system of quotas constitutionally set aside for each of the confessions (such as who can be Prime Minister, Presdient, etc.). To do that you are going to have to go up against entrenched political movements (and their military arms, defunct but re-bootable) as well as the immense social upheaval that could lead to (i.e., another civil war).
    Last edited by Tukhachevskii; 11-03-2009 at 04:27 PM.

  3. #3
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Aug 2007
    Location
    Montreal
    Posts
    1,602

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Tukhachevskii View Post
    Credibility issues aside I never stop being amazed at the political naivete of Western intellectuals, liberals and other similar do-gooders who think that foreign governments, and especially foreign Muslim governments, are about to agree to hand over their governance structures to foriegn inspection, oversight and control (which, in effect, is the logical outcome).
    If you actually read the report--written, it should be said, by a Palestinian scholar with an intimate knowledge of the Palestinian security forces (Yezid wrote the seminal book on the evolution of Palestinian armed struggle, was a negotiator/advisor for the PA/PLO, and has a long history of working on Palestinian reform efforts)--it says nothing of the sort.

    Rather, it is a critique of donor-driven reform and poor donor coordination.
    They mostly come at night. Mostly.


  4. #4
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Jul 2009
    Posts
    589

    Default Clarification of my position

    Quote Originally Posted by Rex Brynen View Post
    Rather, it is a critique of donor-driven reform and poor donor coordination.
    Sir, I did read the report and was, in the above post, making a general observation. Specifically, the problem of donor-co-ordination inevitably means having to take sides and backing one group against another which then also brings to the fore the issues of oversight etc. to which I was alluding. My point is/was that as soon as western backers do that they become an integral part of the problem (rather than being peripheral they now come to the fore) as was evinced in Vietnam by America and which the US and NATO has had to learn the hard way in Afghanistan and Iraq with their efforts at mobilising pro-reform/Allied forces on side. Furthermore, I do not think that the author of the article is any more reliable an authority on the matter than any other former PLO representative, ally or fellow traveller given their past track record (i.e., Camp David, Oslo, et al although, granted, Israel is as much to blame, but not, IMO, by that much).

Similar Threads

  1. UK military problems & policies
    By SWJED in forum Europe
    Replies: 267
    Last Post: 01-15-2019, 05:09 PM
  2. The Marine Corps and the FID Mission?
    By Xenophon in forum FID & Working With Indigenous Forces
    Replies: 27
    Last Post: 02-25-2018, 07:14 PM
  3. Diplomatic security after terrorists kill US Ambassador in Benghazi, Libya
    By Peter Dow in forum Government Agencies & Officials
    Replies: 48
    Last Post: 01-19-2014, 07:11 PM
  4. Toward Sustainable Security in Iraq and the Endgame
    By Rob Thornton in forum US Policy, Interest, and Endgame
    Replies: 26
    Last Post: 06-30-2008, 12:24 PM
  5. Election Day in Iraq
    By DDilegge in forum Iraqi Governance
    Replies: 11
    Last Post: 12-27-2005, 08:42 AM

Bookmarks

Posting Permissions

  • You may not post new threads
  • You may not post replies
  • You may not post attachments
  • You may not edit your posts
  •