Security Sector Reform SSR & FID (Catch All)

[John T. Fishel]

Rob--

In your doc, I see what appears to me to be some confusion between structure and function. So, my first question would be, "what are the functions of the security sector?" My list would include (but not necessarily be limited to):
- external defense
- border control
- coastal/maritime law enforcement & patrol
- internal defense
- foreign intel
- counterintel
- riot control
- traffic policing
- local policing
- regional policing
- national criminal investigation
- security adjunication
- imprisonment (and other punishment to include execution)
My next question would be, "What structures (organizations/institutions) can or should perform these (and other security) functions?" In Panama, we (the US Forces Liaison Group and the Panamanian Ministry of Government and Justice) addressed most of these functions. Panama decided to essentially ignore the external defense function leaving it to the US. It opted for a National Police to deal with local policing, traffic plicing, riot control, border control, etc., a National Maritime Service to perform the functions of a Coast Guard, a National Air Service to provide transport to security forces, a Judicial Technical Police for criminal investigation, and an Institutional Protective Service (SPI) for VIP protection that evolved into a paramilitary force. Note that several functions were not addressed either by Americans or Panamanians. Note too that the SPI evolved in ways that its American sponsors neither desired nor approved of. Point being that the HN and SF being assisted have the decisive votes.

So, going back to my starting point: SFA needs to assess the security functions required (theoretically) by the HN, those the HN wants or can be convinced are required, those it can perform adequately, and those it needs help on. Then the SFA assessment must address the organizations that perform or could perform those functions. Only then can one design a plan to strengthen/reform current organizations and develop new ones. Oh, yeah, in Panama (and I expect lots of other places) we had to do all of this simulataneously along with designing and adapting USG military and civilian organizations to the SFA role. It is a wonder we did as well as we did! (helped that we had Panamanians as our counterparts.)

Cheers

JohnT

[Rob Thornton]

Marc,
I'm going to have to ask if what you mean by functional analogs are those outputs that share similarities with the outputs of of other functions in the system, or in related systems. I think that is one of the things the ongoing assessment has to account for because that is how you get to a point of understanding. The only problem I see is the natural bias we all use when evaluating and assessing. You could even be seeing similar outputs but the purpose they serve could be different then the one you attribute to it and that could lead you to some bad assumptions. This is one of the reasons a good assessment is so difficult and may require a substantially sized element to do.

Could you send me an example or put one up here - I think it'd help us think more about it.
Best, Rob

[Rob Thornton]

Hi John,
I think you are right about the sequencing. I was initially using the brief to help articulate the security sector with an understanding that they'd already considered the broader systemic environment e.g. pol/econ/sec in this case and made some thoughts about how the functions of those identified sectors - that is important because they can vary both in function and ratio based on the broader environment. A client state of a powerful neighbor, or one with strong alliances may not require the structures as one that is isolated or is the proximate neighbor to a power unaligned neighbor. The functions you list out should start to emerge as you explore the existing structures - in some cases both the visible and the not so visible ones - a structure may not be only an organization, but a structured relationship

The second question gets to one of the questions the quality of the assessment brings up (it might not be the assessors fault - there are other factors such as time, etc that impact it). I would add "do" to "can" and "should" with regard to the functions organizations perform. I say that because if you are only looking for the latter you may miss the one that actually is. I think in some cases it may be that the security sector has grown a certain way because it met environmental needs that may still be required, and possibly best performed by that organization. We may not recognize it - and possibly Marc's points about functional analogs is what helps us distinguish and recognize - but reallocating that function to something else - either new, or existing may cause problems (and create work or drain resources). However, it may also be that either the environmental conditions have changed to the point where no amount of reforming an existing institution matters and the value to the sector and to the partner may be much higher to develop something new, or perhaps move a function to some other organization or institution that remains relevant with growth potential - we've done that here on occasion where authorities are amended, reorganized or temporarily modified to meet changes in the environment - in fact that is the ongoing discussion about inter-agency reform With regard to reform -the starting conditions matter - so in Iraq 2003 there may have been greater latitude for reforming or reorganizing then in other places where conditions may be politically constraining and have more adverse consequences.

So, going back to my starting point: SFA needs to assess the security functions required (theoretically) by the HN, those the HN wants or can be convinced are required, those it can perform adequately, and those it needs help on. Then the SFA assessment must address the organizations that perform or could perform those functions. Only then can one design a plan to strengthen/reform current organizations and develop new ones.

Spot on and I steal it shamelessly

Best, Rob

[John T. Fishel]

Steal at will

[marct]

Hi Rob,

John and I are saying the same thing in a slightly different way. A "functional analog" is some institution (structure) that performs all or part of a function where you would not expect it even if that function is not formally recognized in the culture. Malinowski's Coral Gardens and their Magic is the classic example of such an analysis (Amazon, Google), and probably explains why we (Anthropologists) adopted the concept but don't do our analyses that way .

To take a really simple example, in most strongly clan based societies of, say, 50-100 years ago (and to a lesser extent now), classic Western "Police" functions were conducted by the members of the kinship group, while inter-group conflicts (sub-state) were functionally controlled by an institution of feuding and whatever specific rituals were designed to end feuds (often marriages).

Functional analogs, specifically recognizing where hey are and what structures and institutions they are associated with, has some pretty serious implications for SFA. For example, let's take the concept of "border security". Is a state border even recognized, or is the functional analog for the majority of the population based on kinship network? As an example, most of the African states were carved out by the colonial powers and have almost nothing to do with the ethnic boundaries. In this case, "border security" is probably understood as fluid and based on kin group (ethnicity) and not on state boundary. Given this, could border security be handled by creating an institution that drew on kin groups to "police" their own ethnic borders? They will certainly let their own kin cross, but all other groups would be stopped. State level policy "permissions" could easily be created to match the reality of kin-group cross-border movement.

Marc

[Surferbeetle]

Rob,

Interesting post, and a good start. I note that you have identified that Security Forces do operate within a broader environment/greater governmental framework, however the necessary legal framework which directs and supports a Security Force should perhaps be examined in more detail.

Training, standing up, and supporting or 'improving' an existing Judiciary is a key component of the Security Force development effort. If one does not want extra-judicial punishment, meted out by 'Security Forces', to be the norm, then an acceptable (to the populace in question) rule of law needs to be agreed upon and followed.

My observations in Iraq were that the folks and facilities who operated/supported in/ the 'judicial' arm of the government were targeted by the insurgency. As a result of this targeting, the local populace was unable to work within the 'rule of law' in order to resolve disputes about criminal conduct, contracts, real & personal property, negotiable instruments (banking, credit, etc.) and other vital points of law that I am not mentioning or aware of.

During my tour we worked to build the infrastructure and capability of the local Judiciary so that there was a hand off from the Security Forces to the 'State'. While this building effort went on there was a simultaneous effort to build infrastructure and capability of the various Security Forces in our A.O. These efforts were two sides of the same coin, IMHO.

Regards,

Steve

[John T. Fishel]

"Six months ago, I couldn't even spell injuneer - now I are one!" So, formerly, I never hear of functional analogs, now I uses em!

Steve, Rob's slides do show the judicial system, but you are spot on to point out that if the legal and judicial systems don't work, then curing the security forces may be worse than the disease. In both El Salvador and Panama, the legal/judicial systems were the weakest link in the chain. And, remember, these were/are western legal and judicial systems, albeit based on the Napoleonic Code and its structures/procedures.

What I believe Rob is trying to get at is that SFA requires a holistic approach to complex systems by equally (or more) complex systems. If that is correct, it really represents a potential paradigm shift.

Cheers

JohnT

[Rob Thornton]

Hey Steve,
The story that with went one of the questions on the last slide is an interesting one and one worth going over.

When I first got to Mosul the IA was really just starting to transition from junior partner to equal. The IA had primarily been in a MSR (Main Supply Route) security role and the IP were just starting get some organization that allowed it to do more then control their stations. Most of the detainees were not processed through the Iraqi system. Badush Prison just outside of Mosul on the road to Tal-Afar was just at that time mostly detainees that had been moved from somewhere else. As time progressed and the IA and IP got better, new challenges in the security sector were exposed as that sector was stressed by the increase in proficiency of the host nation forces.

Talking to a couple of folks that had worked DoJ corrections (one at Badush and one who'd been involved with Iraqi prisons since 2003)assistance I found out a couple of interesting things. We all know that pre-invasion Saddam had issued a legal pardon of all the incarcerated folks and pretty much disbanded the prison system - that made the news. What everyone does not consider is how difficult it has been to put that back together. One friend of mine said that when they got to the prison there was no cell doors or locks in most cases, and there certainly were no records. Under Saddam there was nothing like the prison system that comes to mind here. If inmates were to be fed - their families pretty much had to make it happen - remember we're talking about a regime that reportedly charged the families the cost of the rounds used in the execution. There were no rehab programs designed to rehabilitate and reintegrate reformed criminals back into the system - because the purpose of the system was not to reform, but strictly to punish those who the regime could not use or who stood against it. It was not used to punish in the way we think of as punish, it was used to isolate, remove and serve as an example of Rule by Dictator - more like a gulag in some respects. Hence cell doors and locks were not necessarily needed because if an inmate stepped across the line the response was to often to beat or shoot them. If they died as a result, then that was the price.

Our prisons go to great lengths to provide medical care, ensure prisoners have basic rights, and even to provide reform programs. Here we have some expectation that a convict will reenter society after serving all or some part of their sentence, it is not always so elsewhere. Under Saddam the prison system served a very different purpose.

Also true with the judiciary. By law we separate the executive, the legislative and the judiciary. In many places the judiciary works for the executive. Good or bad, this means the idea that the judiciary can come to an independent conclusion on sentencing or on other legal questions is invalid where there is no separation - the judiciary gets its marching orders from the executive.

Badush was evaluated as better then most other prisons in 2003. It does not mean it was a model, just that under the conditions it was better then the worst. As such many detainees from outside Ninewa Province were transferred to Badush. This created an interesting dynamic - for example we have multiple types of prisons here where we separate different types of convicts - we do this for a number of reasons such as ensuring the safety of the population, the amount of resources required to house particularly dangerous felons, the ability to reform those who have deviated from the norms of society too much, we separate by age, by gender, etc. If you mix types of inmate populations, we have found that you create new problems. However, we have a very developed (for the amount of resources we put toward it) prison and corrections system. In addition to infrastructure we have hiring standards, training standards, parole boards, parole officers, etc. that many systems don't. This not only reflects our values, but a system that is more able to handle the role its tasked to do, and as an institution its more able to sustain itself. This is true throughout the security sector be it the development of the judiciary, the prisons, the security services themselves or even the amount and diversity of competent litigators to represent suspects, assist with appeals or the host of other things lawyers do in our system.

So in Iraq you had a security sector that had been bent to serve a dictatorship, but you had a war in which the demands on that security sector were such that it could not be developed evenly across the board even if we'd had the resources because some things just take a minimal amount of time before there is sufficient progress.

So in Mosul you had a security sector that was trying to grow as fast as it could not only to meet the needs of its environment but had to also account for our domestic political concerns - e.g. one of the most visible sign of measurable progress our administration could point to was the number of IPs and IA units who had assumed "the lead" and were demonstratively doing those things which might demonstrate progress.

However as we started producing more capability and capacity in the IPs and IA we began to increase the burden on other parts of the security sector. TF 134 (and many JAG officers from the BCTs and DIVs had to work closely with the PRTs and Iraqi lawyers and judges to teach them how to build and process cases under Iraqi law. Throughout they ran into all kids of roadblocks from judges who were either intimidated or unduly influenced, to lawyers who had to get over apathy, to illiterate IPs or those impatient and ignorant of the system. These folks developed work-arounds such as bringing in judges from elsewhere to try cases until the provincial system could catch up, or the BCTs bringing in more resources to assist ministries that could not meet the needs of the IA or IP because they themselves were growing. This was all very ad-hoc in nature, and given the conditions perhaps there was not other way around it. However even as progress was made in the "visible" spectrum - there were challenges developing in other parts of the system.

Jails and Prisons were now exceeding the capacity they could deal with.
This was not just a matter of space, but also the number of qualified
personnel who could work corrections. As we've seen a real success story is developing in Bucca, but it has taken us awhile to understand the value of this. A friend of mine who was an advisor out at Badush had some real challenges just trying to get uniforms and training ammo back in 2006. The relationship between the prison guards and the Mosul IP and Mosul IA was strained both by inter-interoperability issues and service personalities. Soon there was bound to a breach in the system and in early 2007 a significant escape occurred from Badush.

Like I said there are other factors which drive the resources we apply , and all in all given the scope of the task I think our ad-hoc measures have been as effective as they could be. In some cases there were things that were as contingent on other parts of the sector be it political, economic - or the ability to produce literate human capital so regardless of the amount of energy we'd put into it - time was required. Getting back to full-spectrum planning though, what if we'd looked to understand the environment better - we might not have been able to fix everything, but at least we'd have been able to anticipate a few things better, recognize a few things better, and maybe avoid the more serious consequences of our actions and inactions. For the most part we don't go into a situation where we rebuild from the ground up - however even in this case understanding it and being able to articulate it can reduce the number of unknowns and manage fears and expectations better.

From a planner point of view it also allows me to better understand what the requirements are going to be, and what challenges I'm going to have in lining them up. While title law may say one thing, its not set in stone if the Congress can understand why we need an amendment or a change. So if the requirement to train host nation police clearly out paces the ability of the more appropriate titular authority, but the policy objective says it must be done beginning at a certain time, and with a certain amount of capacity by a certain time, then they may be willing to amend it so the agency with the capacity can make it happen. This way everybody goes in with a better understanding of what they are going to be required to do to meet the objective, vs. discovery learning.

Best, Rob