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  1. #1
    Council Member Rob Thornton's Avatar
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    Default Security Sector Reform SSR & FID (Catch All)

    Headed to an Inter-Agency conf at the end of the month in Gettysburg on Security Sector Reform and the Rule of Law - wondering if our well traveled and well read members have a "top 3" docs/readings they could recommend?

    Thanks, Rob

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    Rob - The US Institute of Peace has done - and is doing - a lot of work in that regard. I recommend you just run a keyword search on their site and read everything that comes up. In any case, I'm sure you'll run into people affiliated with them at the conference.

    Ted

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    On SSR, you'll also find a useful database of documents here. I realize that hardly helps with the search for the "top three" (although you'll never go wrong looking for stuff by Nicole Ball).

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    Council Member Rob Thornton's Avatar
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    Ted, Rex and Jeff, many thanks for the info - its a start in the right direction - one of the things I want to do is get a good flavor of how the other agencies, NGOs, IOs and think tanks are thinking about it.
    Best, Rob

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    Default USAID SSR material

    Hi Rob,

    A USAID paper entitled "Promoting SSR in Fragile States" outlines what USAID brings to the table and thoughts on how to best coordinate among interagency and other partners. USAID brought in Nicole Ball to do this study in 05. From my understanding, most of the stances stand today. Julie Werbel is USAID SSR point. Let me know if you would like me to put you in touch with her.

    Best, Bronwen


    http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADC778.pdf

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    Council Member davidbfpo's Avatar
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    Default This side of the ocean can help

    SSR and the Rule of Law pops up in the UK too. IISS has recently published an Adelphi Paper on the issues in Afghanistan (they have a DC office). It refers to the experience of Paddy Ashdown, the former "viceroy", sorry SRSG in Bosnia and I know he has published a book recently. He is on the short list for the SRSG role in Afghanistan.

    Might be worth checking a few UK websites and the UK Defence Academy is a place to start.

    Now dated the UK experience in Northern Ireland, at the start of 'The Troubles', in the early 1970's, led to some writing on the issues and much learning. A UK Army colonel wrote a book on the issues, alas details lost.

    SSR & RoL was an issue in the regime change in SW Africa / Namibia and South Africa. There are many books on the later.

    Will PM with a DC contact.

    davidbfpo

  7. #7
    Council Member Rob Thornton's Avatar
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    Default SFA and Defining the Security Sector for reform and/or development

    While we now have a doctrinal definition of Security Force Assistance (SFA) forthcoming in the Army FM 3-07, and we have a Joint Proponent for SFA in U.S. SOCOM, there is still a good deal of discussion about what SFA is and what is the purpose of it. There are still different terms which get used as synonyms but in fact may have degrees of limiting functions based on the object which receives the action, the purpose to which the action was initiated, or the nature of the action itself.

    The policy objective and the requirements derived from realizing it will shape the form of assistance provided. The object of assistance could be any type of security force & the assistance could be provided by the range of Joint, Inter-Agency, Inter-Governmental, and Multi-National Partners.

    The security forces assisted could range from a regional organization, or those belonging to a state. The environment could be permissive, or non-permissive. The type of assistance itself could be broad, it could be minimal, or it could be extensive such as assistance during combat operations. The purposes could range from helping a state extend its ability to govern its defined territorial space, to protect itself from domestic and foreign threats, or to contribute security capacity to a regional security arrangement or organization. What is defining is that the USG conducts SFA in support of a legitimate authority. Titular authorities’ aside, part of what makes SFA comprehensive is a focus on understanding the requirements of the partner and the nature of the partner’s systems.

    SFA as an approach is meant to assist Commanders and Planners in understanding the requirements and consequences of assisting a partner in reforming and/or developing their security forces in depth. It helps them get beyond a “train & equip” approach and into considering the nature of the partner’s environment. Some examples:

    -With regard to a state, it might mean considering how reforming some existing component or developing some new capability within that partner’s security sector may enhance its security.

    -With regard to developing a regional security organization’s capacity it may mean considering the impact on the donor states’ security sectors when those regional organizations are committed to regional purposes – and helping them develop the capabilities and capacities that allow them to more fully participate in that organization.

    SFA’s aim is to assist the partner in reforming capabilities to make them more effective and/or efficient where possible, and to develop new capabilities and capacities where required to help that partner better achieve its security objectives.

    Through this understanding of the partner’s security sector, the requirements and authorities required to realize the policy objectives - be they in time, types of assistance, exemptions or amendments to standing codes, etc. can be better articulated to USG leadership so they can understand and align their expectations. This is important because while by law the military may normally by standing authorities be prevented or limited from engaging with some aspects of a partner’s security sector, the scope of the task, standing commitments elsewhere, lack of capacity in the recognized agency, or the immediacy of the policy may require temporary or permanent changes to accomplish the objective. Having a holistic understanding of the partner’s security sector and its environment help us from learning in and ad-hoc fashion and committing our resources in a piecemeal fashion that is neither effective nor efficient, and risks the policy objective by protracting involvement and possibly exacerbating the problem.

    A big part of what JCISFA actually does for the commands, offices and agencies it supports is advise them on SFA issues so they can better understand and consider what is relevant and what is not. As such I have attached a 6 step method of framing a security sector. Like the speak of CTCs – it is “a way”, not the only way.

    Like always I wanted to put it up here because as a Community the SWC has allot of folks who are working through the same or related problem sets. Every other week I've been up here in D.C. going to another workshop or experiment where these issues are coming up. I'd be slacking if I did not put up the thoughts so more folks can consider it then just the folks in a single room.

    Best Regards, Rob
    Attached Files Attached Files
    Last edited by Rob Thornton; 06-27-2008 at 01:55 AM.

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    Council Member marct's Avatar
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    Nice brief document, Rob. Just out of interest, you make a point about defining the functions of the security sector (and its component). Are you also including or thinking about including a component to look for functional analogs?

    Marc
    Sic Bisquitus Disintegrat...
    Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.
    Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies,
    Senior Research Fellow,
    The Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, NPSIA
    Carleton University
    http://marctyrrell.com/

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    Default What is the security sector?

    Rob--

    In your doc, I see what appears to me to be some confusion between structure and function. So, my first question would be, "what are the functions of the security sector?" My list would include (but not necessarily be limited to):
    - external defense
    - border control
    - coastal/maritime law enforcement & patrol
    - internal defense
    - foreign intel
    - counterintel
    - riot control
    - traffic policing
    - local policing
    - regional policing
    - national criminal investigation
    - security adjunication
    - imprisonment (and other punishment to include execution)
    My next question would be, "What structures (organizations/institutions) can or should perform these (and other security) functions?" In Panama, we (the US Forces Liaison Group and the Panamanian Ministry of Government and Justice) addressed most of these functions. Panama decided to essentially ignore the external defense function leaving it to the US. It opted for a National Police to deal with local policing, traffic plicing, riot control, border control, etc., a National Maritime Service to perform the functions of a Coast Guard, a National Air Service to provide transport to security forces, a Judicial Technical Police for criminal investigation, and an Institutional Protective Service (SPI) for VIP protection that evolved into a paramilitary force. Note that several functions were not addressed either by Americans or Panamanians. Note too that the SPI evolved in ways that its American sponsors neither desired nor approved of. Point being that the HN and SF being assisted have the decisive votes.

    So, going back to my starting point: SFA needs to assess the security functions required (theoretically) by the HN, those the HN wants or can be convinced are required, those it can perform adequately, and those it needs help on. Then the SFA assessment must address the organizations that perform or could perform those functions. Only then can one design a plan to strengthen/reform current organizations and develop new ones. Oh, yeah, in Panama (and I expect lots of other places) we had to do all of this simulataneously along with designing and adapting USG military and civilian organizations to the SFA role. It is a wonder we did as well as we did! (helped that we had Panamanians as our counterparts.)

    Cheers

    JohnT

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    Council Member Rob Thornton's Avatar
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    Marc,
    I'm going to have to ask if what you mean by functional analogs are those outputs that share similarities with the outputs of of other functions in the system, or in related systems. I think that is one of the things the ongoing assessment has to account for because that is how you get to a point of understanding. The only problem I see is the natural bias we all use when evaluating and assessing. You could even be seeing similar outputs but the purpose they serve could be different then the one you attribute to it and that could lead you to some bad assumptions. This is one of the reasons a good assessment is so difficult and may require a substantially sized element to do.

    Could you send me an example or put one up here - I think it'd help us think more about it.
    Best, Rob

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    Council Member Rob Thornton's Avatar
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    Hi John,
    I think you are right about the sequencing. I was initially using the brief to help articulate the security sector with an understanding that they'd already considered the broader systemic environment e.g. pol/econ/sec in this case and made some thoughts about how the functions of those identified sectors - that is important because they can vary both in function and ratio based on the broader environment. A client state of a powerful neighbor, or one with strong alliances may not require the structures as one that is isolated or is the proximate neighbor to a power unaligned neighbor. The functions you list out should start to emerge as you explore the existing structures - in some cases both the visible and the not so visible ones - a structure may not be only an organization, but a structured relationship

    The second question gets to one of the questions the quality of the assessment brings up (it might not be the assessors fault - there are other factors such as time, etc that impact it). I would add "do" to "can" and "should" with regard to the functions organizations perform. I say that because if you are only looking for the latter you may miss the one that actually is. I think in some cases it may be that the security sector has grown a certain way because it met environmental needs that may still be required, and possibly best performed by that organization. We may not recognize it - and possibly Marc's points about functional analogs is what helps us distinguish and recognize - but reallocating that function to something else - either new, or existing may cause problems (and create work or drain resources). However, it may also be that either the environmental conditions have changed to the point where no amount of reforming an existing institution matters and the value to the sector and to the partner may be much higher to develop something new, or perhaps move a function to some other organization or institution that remains relevant with growth potential - we've done that here on occasion where authorities are amended, reorganized or temporarily modified to meet changes in the environment - in fact that is the ongoing discussion about inter-agency reform With regard to reform -the starting conditions matter - so in Iraq 2003 there may have been greater latitude for reforming or reorganizing then in other places where conditions may be politically constraining and have more adverse consequences.

    So, going back to my starting point: SFA needs to assess the security functions required (theoretically) by the HN, those the HN wants or can be convinced are required, those it can perform adequately, and those it needs help on. Then the SFA assessment must address the organizations that perform or could perform those functions. Only then can one design a plan to strengthen/reform current organizations and develop new ones.
    Spot on and I steal it shamelessly

    Best, Rob

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    Default A Primer on Security Sector Reform in Conflict Countries

    USIP, 1 Sep 08: Securing the Future: A Primer on Security Sector Reform in Conflict Countries

    Moderator adds:the link is defunct and the website does not go back to 2008 (ends)
    Summary

    • Since security is a precondition of sustainable development, security sector reform (SSR) is essential in the transition from war to peace in conflict-affected countries.

    • SSR is the complex task of transforming the “security sector”—those organizations and institutions that safeguard the state and its citizens from security threats—into professional, effective, legitimate, apolitical, and accountable actors.

    • SSR remains an unmet challenge for the United Nations and the international community, despite the growing demand for it in peacekeeping missions around the world. This lack of reform has perpetuated the cycle of violence and prolonged costly peacekeeping missions.

    • Work on SSR remains in its early stages, with most organizations still focusing on common definitions and fundamental concepts and on “mainstreaming” their ideas within the larger international community.

    • There is no U.S. government doctrine, best practices, or even common terminology concerning SSR. This is primarily due to SSR’s recent conceptual development, the inherent difficulty in implementing SSR programs, and the lack of an official interagency policy coordinating committee within the current administration.

    • A comprehensive approach to SSR is needed if the United States plans to effectively support good governance programs in states emerging from hostilities. The United States also needs a formal interagency structure for managing SSR programs.

    • SSR can be an effective instrument for conflict prevention and conflict management in changing threat environments. This report, however, focuses on the post-conflict application of SSR, since this is when comprehensive SSR is most often attempted.
    Last edited by davidbfpo; 12-02-2015 at 03:39 PM. Reason: Add note

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    USIP, Jan 09: The Private Sector in Security Sector Reform: Essential But Not Yet Optimized
    The U.S. experience in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrates the extent to which the U.S. relies upon the private sector in stability operations. The range of services provided by contractors extends from armed security to food service. In SSR, private contractors do everything from build classrooms and train military and police personnel to advise senior defense and interior ministry officials on strategic planning and management. In terms of numbers, contractors make up more than half of the American and international personnel working on behalf of the U.S. government in Iraq and Afghanistan. In terms of cost, the bills for their services run into the tens of billions of dollars. What are the advantages and the downsides of this extensive reliance on the private sector?

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    USIP continues to publish on Security Sector Reform:

    The Role of the Ministerial Advisor in Security Sector Reform: Navigating Institutional Terrains
    International actors in Security Sector Reform (SSR) are increasingly taking on roles as “advisors” to Ministries of Interior, Defense, and Justice. Rather than directly implement changes necessary for SSR, these advisors must persuasively articulate suggestions to their local counterparts. Advisors’ success depends on their ability to convey recommendations in a manner that makes change acceptable to their advisees. Ministerial and governmental advising is not the exclusive purview of any one entity. Rather, advising is undertaken by a diverse range of individuals from U.S. and foreign governments, militaries, NGOs, private contractors, and U.N. agencies. These actors have correspondingly diverse objectives and approaches to SSR; without coordination or consensus on SSR programming, advisors may find themselves working at cross-purposes. Furthermore, the multiplicity of advisors and institutions makes sharing best practices and improving over time and across conflicts extremely difficult.

    What common challenges do foreign advisors face, and how might they pool intellectual resources and “lessons learned” to address these challenges? This question was addressed by a panel of distinguished experts at a recent meeting sponsored by the Institute’s Security Sector Reform Working Group.......

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    Default Security Sector Reform in Palestine, Lebanon, and Yemen

    CEIP, Oct 09: “Fixing Broken Windows”: Security Sector Reform in Palestine, Lebanon, and Yemen
    As they emerge from confl ict, states can rarely commence the arduous task of reconstruction and consolidate their governments until they undertake extensive restructuring of their security forces. Palestine, Lebanon, and Yemen are all fractured, quasi-democratic states with divided societies, and deep disagreement over what constitutes the national interest. Successful reform in each will require security institutions that answer to democratically-elected civilian leaders, but the U.S. and European approach has thus far focused largely on providing military training and equipment, targeted toward counterterrorist capabilities.

    To enable real reform, the West must adopt a comprehensive approach which treats security reform as only one part of a broader political strategy, and encourage governments and security commanders in Palestine, Lebanon, and Yemen to buy into such a strategy. Donor states should invest resources commensurate with their declared objectives, improve coordination, and standardize practices. Above all, they should make it a priority to build the institutions and procedures that are essential for democratic governance of the security sector, without which reforms become bogged down in internal power struggles. Pursuing counterterrorism in the absence of the rule of law perpetuates the undemocratic governance of the security sector and undermines state building and post-conflict reconstruction.

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    Default Same old, same old...

    If I had a penny/dime for every report, speech, project I have read suggesting broad reform of the governance structure of Middle East States I'd have a tidy sum (perhaps even enough for law school!). COIN, military-to military and other non-conditional or politically entangling (domestically speaking) processes are often more cost effective and politically suitable stratgies for short term social engineering or problem solving. But as soon as we start "getting holistic" we enter the realms of fantasy. I remember opening the local English language paper upon first arriving in Yemen and reading that the Italian interior minister was in town giving the Salah government a lecture on how to reduce corruption! (Yes, you read that right).

    Credibility issues aside I never stop being amazed at the political naivete of Western intellectuals, liberals and other similar do-gooders who think that foreign governments, and especially foreign Muslim governments, are about to agree to hand over their governance structures to foriegn inspection, oversight and control (which, in effect, is the logical outcome). It doesn't work when the IAEA does it (i.e., Iraq, Iran, North Korea) is a purely circumscribed issue area and it has barely, just barely, worked in Bosnia (due more to economic-geographical contiguity than anything else) and is a recipe for disaster in Lebanon, Yemen and Palestine. Essentialy such thinking is nothing more than a thinly veiled liberal internationalism/imperialism/interventionism assuming that a system of like (democratic) units will lead to greater stability, co-operation and human progress (and other similarly fuzzy-wuzzy goals). It won't. A democratic Palestine is as much likely to elect Hamas as Fatah or even someone even worse. A democratic Yemen, a truely representative yemen, will bring to power the Yemeni Islah (Muslim Borterhood style) party which will make Saudi Arabia look like Disney Land. In Lebanon introducing efficiency, representation and true democratic proceduralism will first have to dismantle the system of quotas constitutionally set aside for each of the confessions (such as who can be Prime Minister, Presdient, etc.). To do that you are going to have to go up against entrenched political movements (and their military arms, defunct but re-bootable) as well as the immense social upheaval that could lead to (i.e., another civil war).
    Last edited by Tukhachevskii; 11-03-2009 at 04:27 PM.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Tukhachevskii View Post
    Credibility issues aside I never stop being amazed at the political naivete of Western intellectuals, liberals and other similar do-gooders who think that foreign governments, and especially foreign Muslim governments, are about to agree to hand over their governance structures to foriegn inspection, oversight and control (which, in effect, is the logical outcome).
    If you actually read the report--written, it should be said, by a Palestinian scholar with an intimate knowledge of the Palestinian security forces (Yezid wrote the seminal book on the evolution of Palestinian armed struggle, was a negotiator/advisor for the PA/PLO, and has a long history of working on Palestinian reform efforts)--it says nothing of the sort.

    Rather, it is a critique of donor-driven reform and poor donor coordination.
    They mostly come at night. Mostly.


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    Default Clarification of my position

    Quote Originally Posted by Rex Brynen View Post
    Rather, it is a critique of donor-driven reform and poor donor coordination.
    Sir, I did read the report and was, in the above post, making a general observation. Specifically, the problem of donor-co-ordination inevitably means having to take sides and backing one group against another which then also brings to the fore the issues of oversight etc. to which I was alluding. My point is/was that as soon as western backers do that they become an integral part of the problem (rather than being peripheral they now come to the fore) as was evinced in Vietnam by America and which the US and NATO has had to learn the hard way in Afghanistan and Iraq with their efforts at mobilising pro-reform/Allied forces on side. Furthermore, I do not think that the author of the article is any more reliable an authority on the matter than any other former PLO representative, ally or fellow traveller given their past track record (i.e., Camp David, Oslo, et al although, granted, Israel is as much to blame, but not, IMO, by that much).

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    Default Quietly Raising an Army: Security Sector Reform in Liberia

    Quietly Raising an Army: Security Sector Reform in Liberia

    Entry Excerpt:



    --------
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