Inside the Taliban jailbreak

[Rex Brynen]

Inside the Taliban jailbreak
GRAEME SMITH
From Wednesday's Globe and Mail
July 2, 2008 at 2:01 AM EDT

The prison cells that once held Taliban sit almost empty, with little remaining except rubbish: plates of rice ready for meals never eaten, and sandals discarded by fugitives who ran away in bare feet. Some of the debris inside Sarpoza prison offer hints about what happened amid the chaos last month when the Taliban accomplished one of the largest jailbreaks in modern history, freeing at least 800 prisoners and rampaging into Kandahar without facing any serious resistance from Canadian troops or the other forces assigned to protect the city.

...Details of the attack show not only why the city defences fell apart; they also illustrate how the notorious problems of the Afghan mission – corruption, poor intelligence, a distrustful population, weak Afghan security forces, a lack of foreign troops – made the ingredients of a disaster.

The Canadian military has not escaped blame. In a private session two days after the attack, Kandahar's provincial council strongly criticized the foreign troops for arriving at Sarpoza roughly two hours after the jailbreak started. They demanded to know why Canadian soldiers watched the prisoners run away and failed to chase them. Witnesses say that hundreds of inmates spent their first night of freedom camping in the fields only a few kilometres south of the prison, within easy reach of the Canadian soldiers sent to investigate.

[Ron Humphrey]

Inside the Taliban jailbreak
GRAEME SMITH
From Wednesday's Globe and Mail
July 2, 2008 at 2:01 AM EDT

It's #@@$% like this:

Brigadier-General Denis Thompson, the top Canadian commander in Kandahar, confirmed that NATO surveillance tracked the fugitives as they fled. But he said it's not Canada's job as part of the International Security Assistance Force to hunt down escaped prisoners.

“You can ask yourself the rhetorical question, what if we find 100 fugitives in the fields?” Gen. Thompson said. “What is ISAF's duty in that circumstance? Is it to go arrest people?”

The commander continued: “We're not policing this country, right? It's not our role to police this country. Our role is to stand behind our Afghan partners and assist them.”

That makes you think.

Yeah your right, so what the hay are you here to do besides look perty?
If thats the mentality a commander has I find it very hard to believe that they would be very effectively practicing any kind of real counter-insurgency.


BTW My answer to his Rhetorical would be simple. You sit yourself right down next to them and if they start shooting shoot back harder, If they offer you toast and jam then go with that.

You can't lead without leading by example.

[Eden]

Many of the NATO countries have caveats specifically prohibiting them from dealing with detainees/prisoners or requiring them to turn over detainees/prisoners within a set period. Without going into any classified details - and strictly based on my recent experience there, as I have no direct knowledge of the incident - I would bet that the unusual circumstances required consultation with national authorities as to what the forces on the ground could or could not do within the constraints of national policy. I would further assume - again, just thinking out loud here - that the commander was told by his political masters that he could track the prisoners but he must allow the Afghans to do the actual apprehension.

Perhaps some of our Commonwealth members could clarify? Knowing the Canadians as I do, I'll bet there was much frustration in their ranks that evening.

[Ron Humphrey]

Many of the NATO countries have caveats specifically prohibiting them from dealing with detainees/prisoners or requiring them to turn over detainees/prisoners within a set period. Without going into any classified details - and strictly based on my recent experience there, as I have no direct knowledge of the incident - I would bet that the unusual circumstances required consultation with national authorities as to what the forces on the ground could or could not do within the constraints of national policy. I would further assume - again, just thinking out loud here - that the commander was told by his political masters that he could track the prisoners but he must allow the Afghans to do the actual apprehension.

Perhaps some of our Commonwealth members could clarify? Knowing the Canadians as I do, I'll bet there was much frustration in their ranks that evening.

Thus my suggestion to sit by them. Once they start attacking you then I think self defense is allowed. I'd be willing to bet too that if that had been the approach one might have seen those local Afghan forces showing up to share in the glory. Folks are always much more inclined to bravery when they have their 6' 11" 350lb cousin with them.

On the Caveats- If they ain't locked up no more would they still be a prisoner/detainee or would they now be a criminal/lawbreaker attempting to avoid justice?

[jcustis]

It's beginning to smell a lot like Mogadishu.

[Ken White]

unarmed, at least initially, the likelihood of them attacking the Canadians and thus triggering a response was probably remote. Had there been an attack by the Canadians, the regional media would have had fun with that; "NATO shoots unarmed father of six arrested for stealing bread for his family..."

I think a NATO non-response was totally correct in this instance. Been my observation that we cannot get most other nationals to be as aggressive as westerners are and that attempts to do so merely lead to said westerners doing all the work and the locals doing little or nothing. The object in FID is to work yourself out of a job...

Found out a long time ago with my kids that the only way for them to grow was to let them do it themselves and screw it up a time or two; if I did it, it got done but they learned nothing -- and they were always more than willing to let me do it...

I'd also suggest that things are not always what they seem -- and that any comparison to Mogadishu is a stretch...

[Eden]

On the Caveats- If they ain't locked up no more would they still be a prisoner/detainee or would they now be a criminal/lawbreaker attempting to avoid justice?

This is part of the problem. Caveats can't cover all contingencies. If clarification is needed - "Are escapees from Afghan custody no longer detainees? If so, do we need to distinguish between those charged with civil crimes and those detained as insurgents?" - there is normally a long delay between seeking and receiving. From our armchairs it is easy to say the commander should have done this or that, but caveats are essentially standing orders from the national command authority; it takes a great deal of moral courage to disregard or act without clarification.

[Ron Humphrey]

unarmed, at least initially, the likelihood of them attacking the Canadians and thus triggering a response was probably remote. Had there been an attack by the Canadians, the regional media would have had fun with that; "NATO shoots unarmed father of six arrested for stealing bread for his family..."

I think a NATO non-response was totally correct in this instance. Been my observation that we cannot get most other nationals to be as aggressive as westerners are and that attempts to do so merely lead to said westerners doing all the work and the locals doing little or nothing. The object in FID is to work yourself out of a job...

Found out a long time ago with my kids that the only way for them to grow was to let them do it themselves and screw it up a time or two; if I did it, it got done but they learned nothing -- and they were always more than willing to let me do it...

I'd also suggest that things are not always what they seem -- and that any comparison to Mogadishu is a stretch...

Just got frustrated. Stepping back in line now waiting for the greenlight

[Ken White]

conventional war is a lot more fun...

Though, of course, it has its own frustrations.

[Norfolk]

Many of the NATO countries have caveats specifically prohibiting them from dealing with detainees/prisoners or requiring them to turn over detainees/prisoners within a set period. Without going into any classified details - and strictly based on my recent experience there, as I have no direct knowledge of the incident - I would bet that the unusual circumstances required consultation with national authorities as to what the forces on the ground could or could not do within the constraints of national policy. I would further assume - again, just thinking out loud here - that the commander was told by his political masters that he could track the prisoners but he must allow the Afghans to do the actual apprehension.

Perhaps some of our Commonwealth members could clarify? Knowing the Canadians as I do, I'll bet there was much frustration in their ranks that evening.

Put it this way:

The Context -

Commonwealth troops are sent into a fight without many critical resources (organic air support especially, and in the Brits' case, armour as well, etc.), and with one hand tied behind their back (or rather, always having to look over their shoulder and take pains to avoid even the potential for controversy for their Governments, who don't have the firm will to win, but who do want to appear to be in line with US policy).

The Result -

The British Army is sending Reservists with a mere 14 weeks' initial entry (all that the Government will fund) training to fill up understrength Regular units. The Canadian Army is likewise relying ever more heavily upon (partially-trained) Reservists to bring understrength Regular units up to strength; the next Battle Group rotation will feature 550 Reservists out of a total strength of 1,000. Although there is no serious deterioration in discipline amongst the Canadians (the Brits are much more overstretched and are having some problems), nevertheless, the Regulars are voting with their feet. Within a couple more years, the Reservists will be too at this rate.

[carl]

All the above comments are valid and perhaps all that could be done within existing constraints was done. But, the Afghans for us weren't impressed and Afghans against us probably weren't much impressed either, so it was a public relations defeat. That's important.

[Norfolk]

All the above comments are valid and perhaps all that could be done within existing constraints was done. But, the Afghans for us weren't impressed and Afghans against us probably weren't much impressed either, so it was a public relations defeat. That's important.

Hi Carl, you're back!

Too true. You can practically hear the people quietly shuffling...in the direction away from us.

[Rex Brynen]

Taliban Gain New Foothold in Afghan City

By CARLOTTA GALL
New York Times
Published: August 26, 2008

The prison break, on June 13, was a spectacular propaganda coup for the Taliban not only in freeing their comrades and flaunting their strength, but also in exposing the catastrophic weakness of the Afghan government, its army and the police, as well as the international forces trying to secure Kandahar.

In the weeks since the prison break, security has further deteriorated in this southern Afghan city, once the de facto capital of the Taliban, that has become a renewed front line in the battle against the radical Islamist movement. The failure of the American-backed Afghan government to protect Kandahar has rippled across the rest of the country and complicated the task of NATO forces, which have suffered more deaths here this year than at any time since the 2001 invasion.

...

The failings make people wonder what the foreign troops are really doing in Afghanistan, said Mr. Daoud, the shopkeeper. “The Canadians are here, but things are getting worse and worse.”

[Jedburgh]

Canadian Army Journal, Summer 08: The Sarposa Prison Break

.....The recent history of insurgency has witnessed prison breaks and attempts will likely continue as insurgents work to free their comrades from facilities the world over. Sarposa may prove to produce some negative effects as time progresses, but there has been a positive aspect in that follow-on operations into Arghandab allowed Afghan troops to prove their competency and were done in a way that avoided a heavy-handed approach in favour of a stance more in tune with good counter-insurgency practice. While no solid tactical recommendations or points for improvement have been made here, a strategic-level shift in detainee policy has been recommended. Such a shift would not only improve the security of such facilities through more competent manning and increased funding for construction and maintenance, but would also help shed many of the human rights concerns that have been recently encountered. Manoeuvre commanders facing insurgencies are presented with and will always be presented with staggering challenges. The detainee issue should be addressed at the strategic level in such a way that they can rely on the matter to be fully resourced and managed by specially trained experts they can trust.

[sapperfitz82]

Art. 42, GPW provides: "The use of weapons against prisoners of war, especially against those who are escaping or attempting to escape, shall constitute an extreme measure, which shall always be preceded by warnings appropriate to the circumstances."

Nothing here about the POW's being armed.

Course they are not POW's, so theoritically they are not even afforded this level of protection.

I hope that there is now a well thought out contengincy plan for prison breaks in a commander's AO. I lean toward AC-130, but...