All matters MRAP JLTV (merged thread)

[Fuchs]

That's why I prefer a stationary bush.

[Cavguy]

That's why I prefer a stationary bush.

Like this?

Monty Python's "How not to be seen"

http://video.google.co.uk/videoplay?...01436807568337

[Fuchs]

"...and now something completely different."

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OhUZPBiiunI



Damn, I love BBC's sense for humour.
I need to check with my friends how to get all seasons.

[MattC86]

It likely means that CNN is reporting a decision made by someone with absolutely no experience with MRAPs, or any exposure to feedback reports on just what they are capable of doing (performance-wise). Decisions like this are made all the time in the military, and we wonder why they happen, without ever being able to pinpoint who the Einstein was.

I take it to be more the decision of somebody who said, "well, we need to appear to be doing something. . ."

Shifting how ever many MRAP or other vehicles to Afghanistan may not make an ounce of difference, but it plays well - all you need for proof is CNN's Pentagon correspondent glowing that the MRAPs have "played such an incredible role in drastically reducing US casualties," to know that from a political CYA perspective. . . mission accomplished! If a=b. . .

It's like McCain's speech about how he's going to "take the strategy" and apply it to Afghanistan. Never mind there's a whole host of problems with that statement; it's doing something. (I realize I'm getting way off the subject thread, and onto potentially political ground - I'll shut up soon) [/cynicism]

To try to get back ON the subject, the MRAP and vehicles like it also pose major issues that, particularly for the Marine Corps, cut to the very heart of the Corps' purpose. I recall GEN Conway lamenting last fall that the Corps was losing "its expeditionary flavor." If the Corps needs MRAPs, and MRAPs force the Corps to operate like a 2nd Army, why have the Corps? The MRAP doesn't fit well within the expeditionary concept, particularly maritime deployments; and it doesn't do much for a more deployable Army, either. Having them on hand for contingencies involving proper use - convoy, security, etc. is all well and good, but for the kind of action to be seen in Afghanistan, or in other, more expeditionary roles, forget it.

With my obvious disclaimer here being I've never been in one nor had my life saved by its armor. . .

Regards,

Matt

[MattC86]

Like this?

Monty Python's "How not to be seen"

http://video.google.co.uk/videoplay?...01436807568337?

God, I had forgotten how great a bit that was. . .

[Van]

A friend of mine whose father was retired Gen. McNinney (USMC) told me his father told him, "a moving foxhole attracts attention".

I always heard this credited to Bill Mauldin's Willy and Joe. Upon reflection, Willy and Joe should be required reading for Army LTs.

[Sabre]

I'm interested in seeing where the MRAP's end up, once the bulk of U.S. forces are "back home".

I do recall an interesting article by a U.S. Army officer in a Transportation battalion, which basically advocated permanently constituted security platoons for the logistics units (i.e., on the MTOE), manned by logistics soldiers that received the appropriate additional training. Basically his point was that convoy security wouldn't be such a drain on the available maneuver units, and this would ease some of the headaches...

So, a platoon of MRAPs for, say, every transportation (truck) company, for convoy security. Reminiscent of the ersatz "gun trucks" of Vietnam (I recall seeing a preserved example at the Transportation museum at Ft. Eustis).


Random thought:
I always wondered why, in the ROAD and Army of Excellence division designs, there was a mandate that combat arms MOS's make up no more than 50% of the design...

[Fuchs]

Dedicated security elements are a typical type of unit for peace-time savings.
Peace-time structures almost never have proper security forces for logistics, medical camps, HQs, harbours or airfields.
The consequence is that the proper equipment for such roles does also not exist in peacetime.

[Ken White]

...It's like McCain's speech about how he's going to "take the strategy" and apply it to Afghanistan. Never mind there's a whole host of problems with that statement; it's doing something. (I realize I'm getting way off the subject thread, and onto potentially political ground - I'll shut up soon) [/cynicism]

Yep, you did; you got there, no potential to it. I'd suggest that to avoid that in the future you could be equitable and say -- quite accurately -- that both candidates proposals are foolish and loaded with problems. Or perhaps an even better solution would be to not be cute and skirt the issues and just leave the politics at the door unless they're totally germane to the conversation.

That unsolicited advice from a far older and far, far more cynical dismisser of ALL politics and ALL political parties as corruption for fun and profit personified.

[MattC86]

Yep, you did; you got there, no potential to it. I'd suggest that to avoid that in the future you could be equitable and say -- quite accurately -- that both candidates proposals are foolish and loaded with problems. Or perhaps an even better solution would be to not be cute and skirt the issues and just leave the politics at the door unless they're totally germane to the conversation.

That unsolicited advice from a far older and far, far more cynical dismisser of ALL politics and ALL political parties as corruption for fun and profit personified.

Fair enough - I go no further. And you're correct - both candidates are playing, well, politics, which tends to be fast and loose with the truth.

Mea culpa, mea maxima culpa. . .

Regards,

Matt

[reed11b]

MRAPS are far too specialized for current Iraq conflict. The exception may be the Israeli Golan which might work as an infantry vehicle. I prefer some of less specialized vehicles that still have strong mine protection like the bushmaster and dingo-2. Less expensive and nearly as well protected as a Stryker, with all the benifits and a lower intial price tag and operating costs. I think units should be supplanted with something like the BVS-10 Viking for non-urban conflicts. When I was in the 1/501st ABN in Alaska we had both hummers and SUSVs. This gives you a full spectrum force easy, and still cheaper then the complex stryker or specialized MRAP.
Reed

[jkm_101_fso]

MRAPS are far too specialized for current Iraq conflict.

Sorry, Reed, I'm not sure what you mean. Never had the chance to ride in or fight from one while in IZ; What's "specialized" (in, on or about it) that makes it not so useful for the tactical situation in IZ?

jkm

[reed11b]

sorry, poor english on my part. I mean that they are specialized FOR the conflict in Iraq, not for over-all utility. They will likely lack the nessary mobility, utility, and/or firepower if the next conflict does not mirror Iraq. Of course when I was in Iraq we rode around in soft skins and I have never been in a MRAP so my opinion should be taken with a grain of salt.
Reed

[William F. Owen]

The exception may be the Israeli Golan which might work as an infantry vehicle. I prefer some of less specialized vehicles that still have strong mine protection like the bushmaster and dingo-2. Less expensive and nearly as well protected as a Stryker, with all the benifits and a lower intial price tag and operating costs.

Golan does not exist any more (long story) Wildcat fits the bill of what you describe

I think units should be supplanted with something like the BVS-10 Viking for non-urban conflicts.

Well I'm not sure you can pick when you'll be urban and when you won't but BVS-10 is a hell of a track!

[Fuchs]

BVS-10 is a specialty low ground pressure AFV. It's not really suitable for lots of movement. You cannot drive daily for some hours in it without horrendous maintenance effort afaik.
It's pretty much a vehicle for swamps, snow and tundra terrain.

[William F. Owen]

BVS-10 is a specialty low ground pressure AFV. It's not really suitable for lots of movement. You cannot drive daily for some hours in it without horrendous maintenance effort afaik.
It's pretty much a vehicle for swamps, snow and tundra terrain.

BVS-10 does 2 week patrols in Afghanistan, where it is operating at 2,000kg over it's design weight. Rumour has it that some vehicles have already exceeded their supposed life time use. Maintenance does not appear to be a factor.

[reed11b]

I used to have the old SUSV in my airborne unit along with Humvees. Humvees actually had a higher time needs for maintanance and we would drive the SUSV's on base roads and downtown and on 2-4 week fieldproblems and breakdowns were very very rare. Hummers on the other hand had at least one vehicle breakdown EVERY field problem. We actually used the SUSVs more often. Now SUSV's are not armored, but I feel that the Viking maintaince issue my be based on the maintance time required by other tracks. The suggestion was for both types of vehicle to be available btw.

WilF! Just looked up the IMI Wildcat, while maybe a touch larger then I like, it looks almost perfect in any other regard. I would like to see the drivers seat and see if it drives like a car (Then it could be operated by one of the squad) or if it is more complex and should be operated by a dedicated MOS.

For those of you that do n ot know me, I feel that bradleys and other IFV's should be manned by a dedicated IFV MOS and not by the infantry squad it carriers. I feel this is a source of major drain on the mechanized infantry manpower and training in there infantry role. The exception is commercial vehicle based systems that drive like a car.

[Randy Brown]

Wired.com's Danger Room correspondent Noah Shactman reports today that the U.S. Army Materiel Command has issued a request for information for regarding industrial capabilities to produce a "lighter more agile, maneuverable, mobile vehicle with MRAP protection level capabilities." This effort is apparently unrelated to the current(?) Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) program, according to Shactman.

Thought this news might be of interest in this SWJ.com thread, at least for archival purposes.

Excerpt follows:

So the Army and Marines are looking for a next-gen MRAP, that combines the "agility, maneuverability and mobility" of a Humvee, with the protection of the brawny new vehicles.

Such a vehicle should not only be able to stop militants' most advanced bombs and rocket-propelled grenades, the services noted in a request for information, issued late last week. It should also to climb a "60% forward slope," beat a maximum speed of 65 miles per hour, and be able to "maneuver off-road and on narrow roads in rural mountainous terrain and desert sand."

The 10-ton vehicle must be transportable on a C-130 cargo plane. It should have a minimum range of 300 miles, and a turning diameter of 49 feet, And the crew has to be able to get out quickly, in case of a rollover.

[sapperfitz82]

MRAPs in Afghanistan will add little to improve our situation. It’s been a couple years, but we did mostly air mobile and ground pounding for two weeks. Second time over was less air b/c Iraq sucked up some of the assets. Basically, to slow the flow at the border, a Hilux is a about the most one can rely on. Really need to be dismounted and have a couple choppers move you around. The problem all along has been that we carry too much weight and do not move fast enough. MRAPs don’t solve that when we are talking that type of terrain. The M1114’s couldn’t get in there in ‘06, and we broke the few M998’s we took out in ’02-’03.
Another thing about this vehicle platform. I never learned to fight from a vehicle, so maybe it occurs to me more than others, but we are becoming so platform centric that our dismounted maneuver is stymied. I mean to say that our being tied to the vehicle has reduced our aggressiveness when we are actually in contact. This is similar to getting so wrapped up in IED defeat that the best we can do is put a glow plug in front of our vehicle. We need to realign our thinking entirely here, not fashion new trinkets. The IEDs of today are simply a nuisance minefield. Our current M21 mine with a SFF device could, I am nearly sure, penetrate the MRAP, Stryker, M1, what have you. That mine has been around a while. A well built EFP goes through all the above as well.
Point is, did we totally redesign the M1 because shape charges evolved? Or did we adapt our tactics to defeat the minefield? Our vulnerability to IEDs is a sign that we are being out-maneuvered and a new vehicle is not the answer to that.

I think that money we are spending on MRAPs is better spent on new CH-47's.

[William F. Owen]

Another thing about this vehicle platform. I never learned to fight from a vehicle, so maybe it occurs to me more than others, but we are becoming so platform centric that our dismounted maneuver is stymied. I mean to say that our being tied to the vehicle has reduced our aggressiveness when we are actually in contact.

I agree. Dismounted operations is the core of the infantry. However, you still require operational mobility.

I think that money we are spending on MRAPs is better spent on new CH-47's.

OK, so around what parameters are you going to have that discussion. It may well be one worth having, but as Simpkin showed, there are conditions and circumstances were road moves are quicker and more effective than airmobile moves, so the context of the debate has to be very carefully framed.