All matters MRAP JLTV (merged thread)

[M.L.]

Ken:

My reading of his post does not support your contention. His exact words are

"I have no problem using MRAP-class vehicles to 'transport' soldiers to their AOs (say on the first day of their tour), or for moving beans and bullets, or as specialized engineer vehicles. But the MRAP is exactly the wrong way to approach the IED threat. The right way is through intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance, proper patrolling techniques, and deployments that don't require constant commuting."

This suggests to me that MRAP is "wrong" and TTPs are "right." There is nothing in these words that would lead me to your conclusion that he is advocating a balanced approach.

As to the point of leadership. Indeed, leaders often have incentives to do the wrong thing. As to the point that, "poor can be encouraged to do better by tactically sound and sensible equipment choices rather than reacting to media hype and political spin."

I'd simply say that if your subordinate leaders are not getting out of their MRAPs, you have a leadership, not a material issue. You can band aid the symptom by removing MRAPs, but the leadership issue will remain. Or, you can solve the root problem, and have MRAPs too.

This is all too common; remove the ability to make a bad decision rather than teaching Soldiers to make a right decision. Good leaders do the latter.

This discussion seems to be overlooking the fact that the modern BCT is required to project forces over wide areas of real estate. That requires a lot of driving to get where you need to go. It seems that a vehicle with MRAP-like capability would facilitate this. After all, wasn't this the original idea of mechanized infantry? Protect the Soldiers until they reached the obj, where they can then dismount and fight?

[IntelTrooper]

This discussion seems to be overlooking the fact that the modern BCT is required to project forces over wide areas of real estate. That requires a lot of driving to get where you need to go. It seems that a vehicle with MRAP-like capability would facilitate this. After all, wasn't this the original idea of mechanized infantry? Protect the Soldiers until they reached the obj, where they can then dismount and fight?

I don't think anyone is saying that the MRAP has no place in our formations. It certainly has limited utility. And if an entire BCT is having to commute great distances to work... I would say that they are not properly employing our pop-COIN principles. It's hard to "Clear" or "Hold" anything, let alone "Build" when you're having to reclaim the same road every morning.

[M.L.]

IntelTrooper,

I understand what you are saying, however, if you look at Afghanistan, a piece of real estate the size of the southeast US, then look at how many BCTs we have there, it seems reasonable that we can't clear, hold, and build everywhere. Therefore, we need to accept risk in some places, and have a force projection capability to rapidly react to enemy activity in those places.

I agree with you to a point - in an ideal world, we aren't commuting.

In the real world, with a 10 DIV Army, you must have force projection capabilities.

[IntelTrooper]

Therefore, we need to accept risk in some places, and have a force projection capability to rapidly react to enemy activity in those places.

To my knowledge, no helicopter has yet been hit by an IED. That's a start.

[M.L.]

To my knowledge, no helicopter has yet been hit by an IED. That's a start.

Intel Trooper:

You are correct. The problem is that we don't have enough helicopters to support everyone moving by air, and certainly not enough to sustain everyone by air.

Ken:

I'll grant you we have leadership issues at every level, including the shadowy "they" people at the field grade level (e.g. "boy, they really screwed this up...). I still don't think that warrants not putting a tool in the proverbial rucksack. I say give the CDR MRAPs, and if he is good, he'll figure out when to use them and when not to, how to use them etc....

I'll admit I've been playing something of a devil's advocate on this issue. So, I should lay my opinion out there.

While I supported the MRAP purchase for Iraq (large caches of leftover munitions made this conflict unique in terms of IEDs), I don't think we should keep them.

What we should do is incorporate some design elements, such as the V-hull, etc... into a new vehicle that fixes many of the shortcomings in the current MRAP fleet (lack of commonality, limited offroad mobility, not a fighting vehicle, etc...). That is, IF we decide to continue our strategy of fighting long, drawn out counter-insurgency campaigns. The MRAP issue might be solved with a more modest national strategy, but that is another discussion...

[William F. Owen]

The problem is that we don't have enough helicopters to support everyone moving by air, and certainly not enough to sustain everyone by air.

You could if you wanted to. You just choose not to.

That is, IF we decide to continue our strategy of fighting long, drawn out counter-insurgency campaigns. The MRAP issue might be solved with a more modest national strategy, but that is another discussion...

.....or get more helicopters

[Entropy]

Road travel in Afghanistan is generally not a good idea for any number of reasons. The problem with MRAPs is that they confine you to the roads which causes practical as well as tactical problems.

Practically, my old CSAR unit on its last tour recovered several soldiers who were trapped and drowned inside MRAP's or armored Humvees when the sh&tty Afghan road gave way under the vehicle's weight. Also, MRAPs are slow on these crappy roads.

Tactically, the road network only reaches a small part of Afghanistan which makes the enemy's intelligence and targeting much, much easier. The enemy will know generally where you're going and how long it will take you to get there.

We reportedly spend around $10 billion dollars on MRAPs of various kinds. $10 billion could have bought us 1,600 Blackhawks. Sure, it would have taken longer to get them built, crews trained, and into the field, but had we done that, we'd be in a much better tactical position than we currently are. How much are we spending on JIEDDO? Billions more.

The enemy's anti-air capabilities are marginal compared to what they can do to our soldiers traveling on roads. So I don't understand why we would want to try to brute-force our way through the enemy's advantage instead of fully exploiting their obvious weakness.

Finally, I'm now in the UAV ISR business. We, as a community, spend a lot of time looking for IED's or providing overwatch for convoys traveling on IED-ridden roads. This is a task we can do, but it's not something we're really optimized for. Furthermore, it's fundamentally reactive. With helicopters, we could spend our efforts in much more productive and less reactive areas instead of endless hours looking at spots in roads or trying to determine what some guy digging near a road is really doing.

[Ken White]

..The problem is that we don't have enough helicopters to support everyone moving by air, and certainly not enough to sustain everyone by air.

Don't have enough -- or overdo the flying hour / flight safety and force protection aspects of aerial support to the detriment of that support? All excessive caution is not restricted to ground combat operations...{Note 1}

I'll grant you we have leadership issues at every level..and if he is good, he'll figure out when to use them and when not to, how to use them etc....

True that. My problem is that there was and still is literally national pressure on senior commanders to use the things regardless of mission or merit; they were bought at great expense and they do save lives. However, we are where we are, that's for sure. I'd just hate to see us repeat this massive expenditure for equipment of limited use.{Note 2}

While I supported the MRAP purchase for Iraq (large caches of leftover munitions made this conflict unique in terms of IEDs), I don't think we should keep them.

Iraq was a very different and unusual war so I certainlyagree with that -- to an extent. I do think we bought far more than was desirable in an effort to quell a ground swell of media induced angst. Unfortunately, the normal US reaction is over reaction...

I also think we inadvisably moved or sent many of them to Afghanistan, a still different war. All wars differ and buying specific equipment for specific wars should be an effort in minimalism. Forcing the use of inappropriate equipment simply because it's available is all too common.

What we should do is incorporate some design elements, such as the V-hull, etc... into a new vehicle that fixes many of the shortcomings in the current MRAP fleet (lack of commonality, limited offroad mobility, not a fighting vehicle, etc...).

Totally agree.

That is, IF we decide to continue our strategy of fighting long, drawn out counter-insurgency campaigns. The MRAP issue might be solved with a more modest national strategy, but that is another discussion...

Yes. Sadly. One that hopefully will take place in the corridors of power before arriving at the conclusion that they're not wise, prone to manipulation in process, excessively costly in a great many aspects and rarely deliver desirable result. A simple cost-benefit study...

{All Notes} Just as an aside, the cost of MRAPs was said to be about $17.6B in 2008, (LINK). I suspect we're now looking at about a gross total of over $25B including replacements and the added purchases and the 8K plus M-ATVs at ~$500K each, a 12+ ton vehicle carrying five people albeit with slightly better cross country ability, but still...

That money spent more wisely would have purchased over 500 various helicopters at an average cost of $35M (plus ancillaries). The training requirement and O&M are considerations but all in all, Wilf is correct; we simply made -- were forced into -- a bad choice. More birds would have been a better investment. That was pushed by some at the time but the Army caved (I think that might have been part of Eden's "spineless" issue).

In any event, it seems you and I do agree that there are better approaches, that our training and personnel policies could be improved and that the consideration of METT-TC rather than political expediency should drive TTP.

ADDENDUM: Entropy's correct on the tactical aspects, Toyotas will go where no MRAP will go and do it a whole lot faster Those guys are more agile than we and instead of opting to 'out-agile' them, we bought into an even greater lack of mobility and agility than that with which we were already saddled.

Entropy bought all Blackhawks, I bought a mix of Blackhawks, Apaches and Hooks, thus the difference in numbers...

[Fuchs]

Don't forget the logistical side of helicopter operations. You could easily end up replacing half the infantry in-theatre with army aviation people if helicopters would replace MRAPs unless the overall strength is being raised, which creates again logistical overhead....


An alternative would be to accept that wars kill your citizens, and pro/contra war reasoning should take this into consideration - and thus end up saying no to wars of choice. You won't be able to opt out of the KIA/WIA mess simply by throwing several billions at the bureaucracy and more billions at the contractors whose PAC has supported you or your representative.

[jtan163]

While I supported the MRAP purchase for Iraq (large caches of leftover munitions made this conflict unique in terms of IEDs), I don't think we should keep them.

Is this really true?
I suspect that the IED problem is one that has been around for a number of decades in various parts of the world - I was almost going to say -perhaps the fact the US hasn't encountered IEDs a whole lot might be a perception problem.

Except I recall seeing lots of pics of US forces in Vietnam riding on top of APCs, placing sandbags of the floors of their AFVs and trucks etc due to - IEDs.

Then of course you leave the US experience and you get as previously mentioned South Africa, Rhodesia. To which you can add Northern Ireland - where some parts of the province were only patrolled on foot or by air due to - IEDs.

IMO It ain't a new problem nor a unique one.

What we should do is incorporate some design elements, such as the V-hull, etc... into a new vehicle that fixes many of the shortcomings in the current MRAP fleet (lack of commonality, limited offroad mobility, not a fighting vehicle, etc...). That is, IF we decide to continue our strategy of fighting long, drawn out counter-insurgency campaigns. The MRAP issue might be solved with a more modest national strategy, but that is another discussion...

Not sure if you are saying what I think you are saying, but I think I am with you.
I reckon if you do need mine resistance (and I am not really sure how mine and IEDs really differ. I think that an IED used to be called a nuisance minefield, the only real difference being one use a factory made mine and one a home made mine), then it should be incorporated idealy into all of your vehicles - and if now then definitely in your AFVs, whether they be Strykers, LAVs, Bradleys, M113s whatever.

And IMO in the current political era where troop delopyments are unrealistically low (i.e. not enough troops to secure AOs or even routes over night) and the stomach for troop losses quite low (thankfully, compared with past eras), then you want to incorporate them into your B ("soft", perhaps better to say log) vehicles too.

[sullygoarmy]

I'm a day late on this thread but I'll throw my $.02 worth.

We just left as the only maneuver brigade in all of Baghdad. We partnered with 6 Iraqi Divisions (4 IA and 2 FP) and with the district level Iraqi Police. Other than the SF partnerships, we worked with nearly every ISF unit in Baghdad Province. For our Commander to maintain his relationships with the ISF division commanders, we traveled nearly every day. Blackhawk movement was preferred when 1) the weather allowed it, 2) there were secure LZs available at the ISF compound and 3) when birds were available. As the only maneuver Brigade in Baghdad, our Brigade Commander did not have his own dedicated blackhawks so we were never guaranteed a ride.

We therefore spent a good deal to time on the road moving from FOB to JSS to ISF division HQs. Our vehicle composition depended on the route and threat. We had both up-armored HMMWVs and MRAPs available and we used both sets during the deployment.

While I agree with all the tenets through this thread about having boots on the ground, the importance of dismounted patrolling and securing key areas to ensure IEDs are minimized, how do you do that when you do not own the battlespace? The ISF owned the battlespace - we were their supporting partners. The funny thing was the Iraqi division commanders started acting like two-star generals and owning their own areas of operation. We could not conduct unilateral operations - everything was partnered. We could not send a US only dismounted patrol to look for IEDs, and with all the roadways in Baghdad, that would be impossible. Instead we had to coordinate our C-IED efforts with our Iraqi partners and did everything we could to conduct combined patrols, operations, raids and intelligence collection to ensure we were integrated with the land owners: the Iraqi Divisions.

Our battalions/squadron maintained relations with all the Iraqi Divisions and most of the Iraqi Brigade HQs. In order to maintain freedom of movement, the MRAPs were critical assets to maintain our partnership with the ISF. We could not fly everywhere, we could not walk across Baghdad: our Soldiers had to drive.

As I mentioned before, the vehicle type depended on the route. MRAPs were not pratical going through the Mulhallahs or along the canal roads. The damage they caused to the fledgling infrastructure along with their lack of maneuverability in the tight streets limited their uses for those missions. However, moving along better roads or from base to base, MRAPs were the preferred choice. I saw countless Soldiers walk away from IED hits which would have destroyed up-armored HMMWVs and kill those inside.

We worked with our ISF partners to conducted intel-driven raids to mitigate the IED networks. The sad part is, however, the politically established safe havens within Baghdad itself (Sadr City, Shulla, etc) severely limited conventional partnered operations. Even the SF guys had a hard time getting access since the ISF divisions owned the battlespace and started to crack down on Special Operations missions in their OE. If the SF wanted access, they had to work through us to work through our partners. Again, the Iraqis were in the lead, not us. Obviously this is not the case with Afghanistan and the ANA...but that should be the goal.

Of course I've only talked about our maneuver battalions. Everyone from our Transition Teams, Route Clearance Teams, logistic convoys and escorts ran MRAPs a majority of the time as well.

I'd offer to JMA that he's obviously not familiar with U.S. forces. While we would always request helicopter lift assets, the sad fact of the matter is there is never enough resources, even for the U.S. military. Iraq has switched roles with Afghanistan as the "forgotten war" resulting in a shortage of assets. Even in the land of plenty, there will never be enough lift assets to support all the movement requests needed. Air is the best option, but often is the most unpredictable.

Additionally, I'd offer that you can no longer tell the difference (for good or worse) between an infantryman or tanker, especially in the heavy brigades. Our Soldiers and leaders performed the same missions regardless of their occupational specialty. At the battalion level, we no longer have pure armor or mech infantry anymore. 10 years of combat has blurred the lines between combat arms troopers.

Not sure how much time you have deployed but I'd offer Cav Guy has a heck of a lot of time and experience having "been there and done that" and recently.

The MRAP is a valuable tool in our kitbag and should not be discounted. The need for increased MRAPs in the states for drivers training is critical - we suffered from a shortage of properly licensed drivers due to the limited training opportunities and it plagued us through most of the deployment. Everything is METT-T dependent but the need for MRAPs will not go away. It is another tool in the kitbag both leaders and Soldiers need to maintain proficiency with.

Sully Out!

[Ken White]

My reading of his post does not support your contention. His exact words are

"I have no problem using MRAP-class vehicles ... The right way is through intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance, proper patrolling techniques, and deployments that don't require constant commuting.

This suggests to me that MRAP is "wrong" and TTPs are "right." There is nothing in these words that would lead me to your conclusion that he is advocating a balanced approach.

Balance was my word and perhaps a bad one. What I meant was that he seemed to want to do it right but did not totally reject the force protection aspect -- merely stating that the MRAP was and is a poor force protection equipage and there were better ways to do it...

I'd simply say that if your subordinate leaders are not getting out of their MRAPs, you have a leadership, not a material issue. You can band aid the symptom by removing MRAPs, but the leadership issue will remain. Or, you can solve the root problem, and have MRAPs too.

Again I was perhaps unclear -- subordinate leaders are not my concern; as you say they'll do pretty much what they're told. The senior people are the concern; they have been issued expensive pieces of equipment that provide some protective features and are handy for moving people about. Thus they will use them and direct their use by subordinates. The problem is at the field grade and higher level, not with junior leaders.

If the units did not have the MRAPs, they'd have to work a bit harder and smarter. Easier to use the MRAPs...

This is all too common; remove the ability to make a bad decision rather than teaching Soldiers to make a right decision. Good leaders do the latter.

No question. However, by definition half the leaders in the Army are good and the other half less so. Percentiles rule this Army. The current personnel system says that all LTCs are equal -- they are not. Not by a long shot.

Having said that, philosophically, I agree with you but I'm not really advocating removing the ability to make a bad decision, I'm advocating removing a piece of equipment that encourages bad decisions. In doing so I pointed out that the MRAP was a politically derived solution to a perceived problem; that the Army sensibly resisted buying the monsters until media and political pressure became too great to resist and that now we're stuck with them -- I understand that but believe any suggestion about keeping them is an invitation to future problems.

You are correct that we often use equipment selection to compensate for training shortfalls. We are only marginally trained due to a number of factors, not least that the Congress pushes a lot of ill conceived ideas on all the services and the budget process is so flawed that training is denigrated in order to fund equipment purchase because training dollars benefit only a few Congroid districts; equipment procurements invariably flow funds to numerous districts.

However, in the case of the well intentioned but flawed MRAP we do not have a case where anyone tried to substitute equipment for a training shortfall, we have a situation where a set of equipment was provided by ill informed people with good intentions at huge cost and with much publicity to enhance force protection. No training issue involved. They were provided, they do provide some protection ergo they will be used -- by direction (real or implied) and that's the problem -- the 'employ' outweighs the reasons to use or not use...

This discussion seems to be overlooking the fact that the modern BCT is required to project forces over wide areas of real estate. That requires a lot of driving to get where you need to go. It seems that a vehicle with MRAP-like capability would facilitate this.

I doubt anyone's overlooked that, most of the commenters have been there and have seen a fight or two somewhere. Aside from the fact that huge AOs in geographic terms are not at all new. Bns in Viet Nam often had of 1K Km² or more and Bdes often had entire Provinces. That the "modern BCT" is ill designed for its job is a factor (though my spies tell me the mounted Cav Trps are little used. Odd, that...) but you seem to be advocating commuting to work. Why not lift out to an AO, spend a few days or two or three weeks foot mobile and then lift to another after a short break?

I know why but we have deliberately chosen not to do that even though it would be far more effective. The MRAP is part of the reason we have made that choice; a a capability exists and it will be -- must be -- used even though it's one that the Army, left alone would likely not have chosen.

You're of course correct that we need to improve training but we also need to be careful what equipment we provide because if a a capability exists, it is going to be used -- even if it should not be. Sergeants, Lieutenants and Captains are NOT the problem with that syndrome...

After all, wasn't this the original idea of mechanized infantry? Protect the Soldiers until they reached the obj, where they can then dismount and fight?

Good idea and I totally agree. The Stryker is a marginal vehicle, the Pandur is better but any good wheeled APC is great and we could use more -- we should not use more MRAPs because MRAPs are not combat vehicles, their x-country cape is pathetic and their height makes them iconic targets on any halfway modern battlefield. Heh, they're iconic targets on the far from modern Afghan battlefield...

Still, even with wheeled combat vehicles as Tom Odom noted above, for this kind of war, Blackhawks are better. I'd add that combining the birds with lengthy patrolling (as opposed to a day or two) on foot is also better. Way better...