Outside of a few spectacular successes along Route 1 that have garnered more media hype than had actual effect, the TB aren't very good at targeting the logistical tail. These are not your Daddy's mujahadeen.I pointed at the truck convoy dependency as an indicator for the inability to dodge the road ambush problem entirely. Targets are available for the Taliban in abundance, and they can simply focus on the supply convoys and less on the patrols at will.
And, at least for the USMC, logistical support convoys aren't a drain on combat formations. The CSS guys (and gals) do it themselves.
To get back to the original thrust of this poster's question (and BTW, I think we missed the fact that he has not resurfaced with any more input), if not the MRAP in future war, what is the alternative?
I posed the point a few years back that the IED was a revolution in military affairs, but that was understandably knocked down. I'd like to pose to our scholars here a variation on that question. If the IED, used in future applications similar to how it was in OIF and OEF, drives reactions in wheeled and tracked veh development for the future, can that be considered a RMA?
We don't need MRAP, in my opinion, if we lose tactical mobility as a result. We might as well just walk, in most terrain situations. If you need to patrol in vast expanses where there are no people, then no, you don't need MRAP. The deploy I just returned from proves that.
Geronimo's post, which seemed more like an executive summary of sorts, but was back up by comments I agree with, still stands...Will we need MRAPs for the future?
In the Marine Corps, this is a serious question to address if the amphibious capability has to be retained for future contingencies. MRAP constraints are total game-changers when it comes to planning STS movement and even pre-boating them in the first place.
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