I'm a day late on this thread but I'll throw my $.02 worth.

We just left as the only maneuver brigade in all of Baghdad. We partnered with 6 Iraqi Divisions (4 IA and 2 FP) and with the district level Iraqi Police. Other than the SF partnerships, we worked with nearly every ISF unit in Baghdad Province. For our Commander to maintain his relationships with the ISF division commanders, we traveled nearly every day. Blackhawk movement was preferred when 1) the weather allowed it, 2) there were secure LZs available at the ISF compound and 3) when birds were available. As the only maneuver Brigade in Baghdad, our Brigade Commander did not have his own dedicated blackhawks so we were never guaranteed a ride.

We therefore spent a good deal to time on the road moving from FOB to JSS to ISF division HQs. Our vehicle composition depended on the route and threat. We had both up-armored HMMWVs and MRAPs available and we used both sets during the deployment.

While I agree with all the tenets through this thread about having boots on the ground, the importance of dismounted patrolling and securing key areas to ensure IEDs are minimized, how do you do that when you do not own the battlespace? The ISF owned the battlespace - we were their supporting partners. The funny thing was the Iraqi division commanders started acting like two-star generals and owning their own areas of operation. We could not conduct unilateral operations - everything was partnered. We could not send a US only dismounted patrol to look for IEDs, and with all the roadways in Baghdad, that would be impossible. Instead we had to coordinate our C-IED efforts with our Iraqi partners and did everything we could to conduct combined patrols, operations, raids and intelligence collection to ensure we were integrated with the land owners: the Iraqi Divisions.

Our battalions/squadron maintained relations with all the Iraqi Divisions and most of the Iraqi Brigade HQs. In order to maintain freedom of movement, the MRAPs were critical assets to maintain our partnership with the ISF. We could not fly everywhere, we could not walk across Baghdad: our Soldiers had to drive.

As I mentioned before, the vehicle type depended on the route. MRAPs were not pratical going through the Mulhallahs or along the canal roads. The damage they caused to the fledgling infrastructure along with their lack of maneuverability in the tight streets limited their uses for those missions. However, moving along better roads or from base to base, MRAPs were the preferred choice. I saw countless Soldiers walk away from IED hits which would have destroyed up-armored HMMWVs and kill those inside.

We worked with our ISF partners to conducted intel-driven raids to mitigate the IED networks. The sad part is, however, the politically established safe havens within Baghdad itself (Sadr City, Shulla, etc) severely limited conventional partnered operations. Even the SF guys had a hard time getting access since the ISF divisions owned the battlespace and started to crack down on Special Operations missions in their OE. If the SF wanted access, they had to work through us to work through our partners. Again, the Iraqis were in the lead, not us. Obviously this is not the case with Afghanistan and the ANA...but that should be the goal.

Of course I've only talked about our maneuver battalions. Everyone from our Transition Teams, Route Clearance Teams, logistic convoys and escorts ran MRAPs a majority of the time as well.

I'd offer to JMA that he's obviously not familiar with U.S. forces. While we would always request helicopter lift assets, the sad fact of the matter is there is never enough resources, even for the U.S. military. Iraq has switched roles with Afghanistan as the "forgotten war" resulting in a shortage of assets. Even in the land of plenty, there will never be enough lift assets to support all the movement requests needed. Air is the best option, but often is the most unpredictable.

Additionally, I'd offer that you can no longer tell the difference (for good or worse) between an infantryman or tanker, especially in the heavy brigades. Our Soldiers and leaders performed the same missions regardless of their occupational specialty. At the battalion level, we no longer have pure armor or mech infantry anymore. 10 years of combat has blurred the lines between combat arms troopers.

Not sure how much time you have deployed but I'd offer Cav Guy has a heck of a lot of time and experience having "been there and done that" and recently.

The MRAP is a valuable tool in our kitbag and should not be discounted. The need for increased MRAPs in the states for drivers training is critical - we suffered from a shortage of properly licensed drivers due to the limited training opportunities and it plagued us through most of the deployment. Everything is METT-T dependent but the need for MRAPs will not go away. It is another tool in the kitbag both leaders and Soldiers need to maintain proficiency with.

Sully Out!