All matters MRAP JLTV (merged thread)

[William F. Owen]

It may be counterintuitive, but we actually need less armor, and we need to be more flexible and unpredictable. Instead of dictating that no unit can leave its base unless in an MRAP or MATV, we must allow them to use Humvees, all-terrain vehicles, snowmobiles, and ruggedized pickup trucks when appropriate. Knowing their movements are being watched at all times, units need to use deception, such as varying the time of day and night they move, their routes of travel, and the types of vehicles in which they conduct missions, to keep the insurgents constantly guessing.

This is just nonsensical and a poor defence of FM3-24 bad ideas. Tanks are a tool. They require skill to be used well, just as do any other vehicle. Use tanks, use Hummers, use Snowmobiles.

The Soviets were a 3rd rate army so discard their example.

Better to have a tank and not need it, than not have one. If this is not well understood, then there is a massive training problem in the US Army and apparently within the SF community.

When the article says "and we need to be more flexible and unpredictable" what he is really saying is "we need to be less stupid badly trained." Vehicles alone, regardless of type, will not help that problem.

[Rex Brynen]

This is just nonsensical and a poor defence of FM3-24 bad ideas. Tanks are a tool. They require skill to be used well, just as do any other vehicle. Use tanks, use Hummers, use Snowmobiles.

Wilf:

I think you are misreading to a degree the thrust of the article, which is not really about tanks at all (despite the misleading title): it is about letting the mission (whether cast in FM3-24 terms or otherwise) determine the tactical employment of assets, rather than allowing the mission be determined by the provision of technological fixes ("widgets") and risk aversion.

JMA:

Ditto. Presumably if a Taliban troop concentration or sanctuary isn't MRAP-reachable (MRAPable?) that shouldn't put it out of reach if other possible methods can be found (whether helicopter insertion, other vehicles/routes, or on foot) that achieve the operational objective.

[William F. Owen]

Wilf:

I think you are misreading to a degree the thrust of the article, which is not really about tanks at all (despite the misleading title): it is about letting the mission (whether cast in FM3-24 terms or otherwise) determine the tactical employment of assets, rather than allowing the mission be determined by the provision of technological fixes ("widgets") and risk aversion.

That was exactly my reading. When did any good army, not require such a degree of judgement?

[JMA]

JMA:

Ditto. Presumably if a Taliban troop concentration or sanctuary isn't MRAP-reachable (MRAPable?) that shouldn't put it out of reach if other possible methods can be found (whether helicopter insertion, other vehicles/routes, or on foot) that achieve the operational objective.

To start with I believe this article has some merit (in the broadest terms).

By grouping tanks with MRAP vehicles it becomes somewhat unsuck. The Marines have indicated a requirement for 14 tanks. Yes this may just be the thin edge of the edge but one must assume there are good, solid operational reasons behind their stated need for a handful of tanks.

(My first response to the tank deployment was surprise that tanks would be preferred over additional helicopter gunship effort. On reflection my thinking was that tanks were a means of defeating the ROE limitations on the use of CAS. And good to see some debate on this matter.)

The word helicopter was never mentioned in the article. He said:

"we must allow them to use Humvees, all-terrain vehicles, snowmobiles, and ruggedized pickup trucks when appropriate."

When I went on and on about the IED threat some months back my position was that when faced with a "road-side bomb" threat then stay away from the road-side as far as possible. Despite the Brits having largely neutralised the Northern Ireland IED (road-side bomb) threat through the intelligent use of helicopters they did not carry this success over to Afghanistan and them and the US seemed in a state of tactical paralysis as they sat back and took alarming and largely unnecessary casualties. I included IEDs aimed at foot patrols then but they do not fall under of the subject of this thread.

He gets a little further off course when he writes:

"When I raised such points in planning meetings, my coalition colleagues often asked how then I proposed to "defeat" the IED. My initial response was that the question was wrong: We should not be trying to defeat the IED. Rather, we should be working to defeat the insurgency that plants them."

Sure the "well how would you do it?" is the first response from those who haven't got the faintest idea of how to deal with the IED threat both to vehicles and foot patrols. (The same question was asked of me here by the equally clueless.)

His answer was clever in a sense but did not address the then current tactical threat if IEDs. So he really needed to supply his answer as the long term goal but be prepared to provide some idea of a solution in the immediate term. He may not have in the meeting he speaks of but he ends his article as follows:

We may not be able to "defeat" the IED, but we can make it irrelevant. To do so will require us to rely upon the ingenuity and resourcefulness of the junior leaders who are most in tune with the local dynamics and terrain, not on technology or defensive-minded mandates designed to prevent casualties at all costs. Marginalizing the IED will also require higher commanders to accept greater risk and allow their subordinates to sometimes make mistakes -- even deadly ones. But that's the only way to start connecting with the Afghan people, who are the ones who will defeat the Taliban in the end. It's time to start playing to win instead of trying to avoid losing.

To make IEDs irrelevant you avoid them. To avoid "road-side bombs" you avoid roads (as far as possible and when faced with no other alternative use MRAP vehicles with the necessary support to respond aggressively to any ambush.)

I learned during officer training that if during an assault of an enemy objective you find your platoon crossing a mine field (of the 1 mine per metre of frontage type) you continue to press on with your assault and accept 10% casualties. Now the Brits believe in many areas of Afghanistan they are in fact patrolling in a "medium minefield". My response is well then don't do it... avoid such areas.

How to avoid IEDs while still getting the job done? Well ask these junior commanders what they believe will do the trick. If he can't give you an answer put him on the next flight home (not reassigned... OUT!) Force these often complaining junior commanders to use their initiative or get lost.

[Cavguy]

How to avoid IEDs while still getting the job done? Well ask these junior commanders what they believe will do the trick. If he can't give you an answer put him on the next flight home (not reassigned... OUT!) Force these often complaining junior commanders to use their initiative or get lost.

I would say armchair generals need to put up or get lost, and provide me the evidence of these "complaining junior leaders". I work with a lot of them who give it their all every day and do quite well, thank you very much.

[JMA]

I would say armchair generals need to put up or get lost, and provide me the evidence of these "complaining junior leaders". I work with a lot of them who give it their all every day and do quite well, thank you very much.

Did you read the article?

[Cavguy]

Better to have a tank and not need it, than not have one. If this is not well understood, then there is a massive training problem in the US Army and apparently within the SF community.

Amen. There's a whole bunch of grunts alive because someone had a few tanks available. Alternately, there's a whole bunch of Rangers dead because the US didn't have any tanks available when needed. METT-TC dictates, but there is no tactical reason tanks can't be employed successfully in RC-S, the Canadians and Dutch have been doing it for awhile. The bigger strategic question is whether the increased logistics demand incurs greater vulnerabilities in other areas. (more convoys)

A little simplistic, but I've seen it over and over. When you're in deep doo doo, nothing ends a fight like a tank showing up. (see sig)

[davidbfpo]

The Royal Danish Army has a mechanised infantry battalion in Helmand, with attached Leopard tanks. IIRC they were supporting the USMC at one point, maybe at Marjah, although the Danes are part of the UK brigade.

Overwatch has been cited before, I think by 'Red Rat'.

[Pete]

I can't imagine why Cavguy might suggest this thread is getting divorced from reality.

The Royal Danish Army has a mechanised infantry battalion in Helmand ...

There is nothing like a Dane
Nothing in the world
There is nothing you can name
That is anything like a Dane