All matters MRAP JLTV (merged thread)

[Randy Brown]

Wired.com's Danger Room correspondent Noah Shactman reports today that the U.S. Army Materiel Command has issued a request for information for regarding industrial capabilities to produce a "lighter more agile, maneuverable, mobile vehicle with MRAP protection level capabilities." This effort is apparently unrelated to the current(?) Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) program, according to Shactman.

Thought this news might be of interest in this SWJ.com thread, at least for archival purposes.

Excerpt follows:

So the Army and Marines are looking for a next-gen MRAP, that combines the "agility, maneuverability and mobility" of a Humvee, with the protection of the brawny new vehicles.

Such a vehicle should not only be able to stop militants' most advanced bombs and rocket-propelled grenades, the services noted in a request for information, issued late last week. It should also to climb a "60% forward slope," beat a maximum speed of 65 miles per hour, and be able to "maneuver off-road and on narrow roads in rural mountainous terrain and desert sand."

The 10-ton vehicle must be transportable on a C-130 cargo plane. It should have a minimum range of 300 miles, and a turning diameter of 49 feet, And the crew has to be able to get out quickly, in case of a rollover.

[sapperfitz82]

MRAPs in Afghanistan will add little to improve our situation. It’s been a couple years, but we did mostly air mobile and ground pounding for two weeks. Second time over was less air b/c Iraq sucked up some of the assets. Basically, to slow the flow at the border, a Hilux is a about the most one can rely on. Really need to be dismounted and have a couple choppers move you around. The problem all along has been that we carry too much weight and do not move fast enough. MRAPs don’t solve that when we are talking that type of terrain. The M1114’s couldn’t get in there in ‘06, and we broke the few M998’s we took out in ’02-’03.
Another thing about this vehicle platform. I never learned to fight from a vehicle, so maybe it occurs to me more than others, but we are becoming so platform centric that our dismounted maneuver is stymied. I mean to say that our being tied to the vehicle has reduced our aggressiveness when we are actually in contact. This is similar to getting so wrapped up in IED defeat that the best we can do is put a glow plug in front of our vehicle. We need to realign our thinking entirely here, not fashion new trinkets. The IEDs of today are simply a nuisance minefield. Our current M21 mine with a SFF device could, I am nearly sure, penetrate the MRAP, Stryker, M1, what have you. That mine has been around a while. A well built EFP goes through all the above as well.
Point is, did we totally redesign the M1 because shape charges evolved? Or did we adapt our tactics to defeat the minefield? Our vulnerability to IEDs is a sign that we are being out-maneuvered and a new vehicle is not the answer to that.

I think that money we are spending on MRAPs is better spent on new CH-47's.

[William F. Owen]

Another thing about this vehicle platform. I never learned to fight from a vehicle, so maybe it occurs to me more than others, but we are becoming so platform centric that our dismounted maneuver is stymied. I mean to say that our being tied to the vehicle has reduced our aggressiveness when we are actually in contact.

I agree. Dismounted operations is the core of the infantry. However, you still require operational mobility.

I think that money we are spending on MRAPs is better spent on new CH-47's.

OK, so around what parameters are you going to have that discussion. It may well be one worth having, but as Simpkin showed, there are conditions and circumstances were road moves are quicker and more effective than airmobile moves, so the context of the debate has to be very carefully framed.

[jcustis]

Excellent observation SF, and similar ones that i have kicked around with some compadres.

I got to enjoy a ride in and MRAP, on a paved (but not to US Hwy standards) road the other day. They are not good for much beyond either terribly low speeds on unimproved roads, or being restricted to paved roads.

It is, in my mind now, clearly not a fighting vehicle, but a force protection vehicle. I'd rather not adapt my tactics to fit the gear.

[sapperfitz82]

I offer the CH-47 line more as a throw away than anything else.

I suppose that I am worried we are travelling down a dangerous garden path when we start making force protection the primary or even a qualifying characteristic of our vehicle selection.

I am aware of a movement in the doctrine writing community of a push to have force protection seen in a more holistic light which focuses much more the arrival of the force on the objective in such a manner that it is able to accomplish its mission and perhaps be readily prepared for a follow-on than as a litmus for vehicle protection against specific threats (blast/direct fire etc.).

When we start comparing center of gravity and hull angle, I wonder if we are missing the forest for the trees. The Stryker concept goes far beyond the vehicle itself, and would not be nearly as impressive or capable if the vehicle were simply offered as a replacement for the M113/Bradley.

With the MRAP/Cougar/M1151/what-have-you, we are readily accepting a substantially different platform that does in fact change how we execute our tactics without really giving much regard to that fact. Again, I was born and raised outside a vehicle so I may be super-sensitive to this, and probably the mech side of the house is adapting a great deal better.

Short response, in your list of pros/cons, perhaps we should include "significantly alters the method of employment and will require retraining (and so is not suitable for first time use while in theatre)" or "method of employment similar enough to current platforms that no particular retraining/reorganization is needed."

[William F. Owen]

Short response, in your list of pros/cons, perhaps we should include "significantly alters the method of employment and will require retraining (and so is not suitable for first time use while in theatre)" or "method of employment similar enough to current platforms that no particular retraining/reorganization is needed."

I agree. There is a very valid argument to be had about vehicle design versus doctrine and training. IMO, the M2 is an example of failure. No one vehicle can address all needs, but we need a structure in which to discuss the compromises. Personally I would see that as a balance between security operations and combat operations.

[ODB]

Think in a tactical sense. I am a cell leader or want to make a name for myself who or what would I hit?

A: The unit traveling down the road all buttoned up, with only passive security measures.

B: The unit traveling down the road with guns pointed in all directions, people actively looking and searching for me or my devices.

Just my perspective on the debate. Uparmored vehicles have there place as do GMVs and everything in between. What we are losing is our flexiblity and allowing those Monday morning quarterbacks and disenfranchised to dictate what we do and what we use to do it.

[Uboat509]

Think in a tactical sense. I am a cell leader or want to make a name for myself who or what would I hit?

A: The unit traveling down the road all buttoned up, with only passive security measures.

B: The unit traveling down the road with guns pointed in all directions, people actively looking and searching for me or my devices.

Just my perspective on the debate. Uparmored vehicles have there place as do GMVs and everything in between. What we are losing is our flexiblity and allowing those Monday morning quarterbacks and disenfranchised to dictate what we do and what we use to do it.

I absolutely hated to see the trucks with the remote control turrets on them when I was in Iraq. Many times even on the trucks with manned turrets the gunners would be sitting so far down in the turret that all he could see would be through the the gap between the chicken plate and the sides of the turret. Great for force protection, not so great for situational awareness. One of our resident tankers correct me if I am wrong, but don't they teach that the TC should be heads up until they are actually in the fight? I know that that is how we operate. The gunner is never still. He is up and he is constantly moving, both the turret and his head. There's nothing wrong with force protection but at a certain point it becomes counter-productive.

SFC W

[Vojnik]

Excellent observation SF, and similar ones that i have kicked around with some compadres.

I got to enjoy a ride in and MRAP, on a paved (but not to US Hwy standards) road the other day. They are not good for much beyond either terribly low speeds on unimproved roads, or being restricted to paved roads.

It is, in my mind now, clearly not a fighting vehicle, but a force protection vehicle. I'd rather not adapt my tactics to fit the gear.

I believe the MRAP was fielded to address the tactics used by units in OIF.
So the idea was to fit the gear to the tactics, not vice versa.

I have not used MRAPs, nor CROWS, nor am I privy to any sort of advanced testing and acquisition process. I am simplying stating that in this case it "looks" like the Pentagon was addressing a need stated by the in-country Commanders.