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Thread: All matters MRAP JLTV (merged thread)

  1. #321
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Absolutely not a given...

    Quote Originally Posted by TAH View Post
    #1. Pretty sure the answer is no in many cases. Most likely, it gets "held" at Brigade level or higher.
    Commanders are people and the Personnel system can put an aggressive risk taker at Bde and give him Bn Cdrs who are moderately or highly risk averse -- that and all the permutations in between. He can direct them to be aggressive but short of an OER Driven Relief for Cause or preferring charges (both frowned upon in this modern Yankee Army...) he cannot make them do it his way. There are many ways to ignore or divert the wishes of one's Boss.

    I've seen more than one aggressive Bde Cdr sabotaged by one or more Bn Cdrs. Co Cdrs don't have as much latitude as a LTC must be given but they, too, play that game. Co Cdrs know all theiur Troops and are generally protective of them, they can oput a brake on a Bn Cdrs ideas. Consider also that Bn Cdrs know at least some of their Troops, a good one will know many of his 800 or so bods -- and may be possibly protective of them. Bde Cdrs rarely know many or even any of their 3K or so souls and they know they've got a shot at a star so they tend to be more aggressive.

    Doctrinally, Cdrs at all levels have a responsibility for mission accomplishment and for force protection -- how those two factors are balanced is very much an individual decision and all the METT-TC factors can play into that as well.

    It's all about mission, people and a pot-luck personnel system. Every unit, ever rotation, every war is different. There are never any singular answers...

    As for Yemen, we might have been that abysmally stupid but I'd sure hope not. Iraq, even if poorly done, made a little sense; Yemen would not make an iota. Hunting would be bombers is a LE job, not a military effort...

  2. #322
    Council Member Uboat509's Avatar
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    MRAPs are the end result of a nasty, self-inflicted, vicious circle. In the early days in Iraq, our HMMWVs were underarmored to deal with the IED threat that was faced on the roads. The solution that was applied was to add more armor, and then add some more and then some more and so on. By the time I got there in '07 whatever generation of armor upgrade we were on was obscenely heavy and hard on the vehicle. It was fairly effective against most of the threats we faced on the roads, which was just as well because all the added weight meant that the vehicles were all but incapable of significant off-road travel. Still, there were threats that we could not meet with the armor we had so we added more. Eventually we hit the law of diminishing returns and kept going. When I left Iraq there were plans for a new generation of armor upgrade that was so heavy that turning at faster than thirty miles an hour caused the tires to blow out and I cannot remember what the top speed of the vehicle was but it was ridiculously slow. Interestingly, the idea of bypassing the roads, particularly those roads most prone to being IED'd does not seem to have occurred to a lot of commanders. When we would suggest it to nearby Big Army units they tended to look at us as if we had suggested levitating over the affected areas. IEDs are only effective if you can predict where your enemy will travel through and emplace them there. We made that easier by slavishly sticking to the roads and then we made it so our vehicles couldn't handle off road travel even if we wanted to.

    So now we were road bound with vehicles that can survive most of the threats we faced on the roads, however, none of that mattered because no matter how much armor we added to the sides top, we could not do anything about the underbody IED which was, by far, the deadliest kind. So along came the MRAP. It is GREAT against underbody IEDs because that is what it is designed for. Other than that, it is, at best, a mediocre vehicle and at worst, a liability. Let's examine the pros and cons of this vehicle,

    Pro

    -Protection from underbody IEDs. Note that I say underbody IEDs. As far as I know it is not much more protected from other types of IEDs than vehicles like the Stryker.

    Cons

    -Size. These things are huge. They are as tall as a five ton and wider than a HMMWV. That makes them HUGE targets and also makes it difficult to maneuver in Urban environments especially in the sort of places we are fighting which tend to have fairly narrow roads.

    -Weight. The Cougar is around 16 tons and the RG-33 is between 22 and 37 depending on the version. An M2 Bradley is only 27 tons. That kind of weight, along with its size can only complicate transporting it into theater.

    -Mobility. These were made to counter the threats we face on the roads which is just as well because it isn't very good off of them. It is too heavy and too top heavy to be good at off road travel.

    I imagine that they are also significantly more expensive than either the HMMWV or the Stryker but I don't have a good source on that so I will not include it on the list.

    All in all, the MRAP does one thing well and it does that one thing very well but is it worth the cost? This thing is all but useless in a conventional fight against a peer or near peer competitor except as a troop transport behind the FLOT. It is taller than the Abrams and, depending on the version, heavier than the Bradley and has much worse cross country mobility as compared to either. In Iraq or Afghanistan where the primary threat is IEDs, you can get away with that but against a better trained enemy with access to significant numbers of anti-armor weapons, this thing is just a huge target. What future does the MRAP have? Hopefully, it will be reduction to small numbers for use in specific niche missions. Unfortunately it will probably hang around and when the next war comes along we will have to use them because there will be far too many of them not to use them. Eventually someone will end up standing in front of Congress to explain why we sent our soldiers into combat in these giant targets with poor off-road mobility but excellent protection from underbody IEDs when there is far less of an underbody threat than there is an ATGM threat.
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  3. #323
    Council Member Infanteer's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    Commanders are people and the Personnel system can put an aggressive risk taker at Bde and give him Bn Cdrs who are moderately or highly risk averse -- that and all the permutations in between. He can direct them to be aggressive but short of an OER Driven Relief for Cause or preferring charges (both frowned upon in this modern Yankee Army...) he cannot make them do it his way. There are many ways to ignore or divert the wishes of one's Boss.

    That didn't stop General Mattis!

  4. #324
    Council Member TAH's Avatar
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    Default Agreed

    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    Commanders are people and the Personnel system can put an aggressive risk taker at Bde and give him Bn Cdrs who are moderately or highly risk averse -- that and all the permutations in between. He can direct them to be aggressive but short of an OER Driven Relief for Cause or preferring charges (both frowned upon in this modern Yankee Army...) he cannot make them do it his way. There are many ways to ignore or divert the wishes of one's Boss.

    I've seen more than one aggressive Bde Cdr sabotaged by one or more Bn Cdrs. Co Cdrs don't have as much latitude as a LTC must be given but they, too, play that game. Co Cdrs know all theiur Troops and are generally protective of them, they can oput a brake on a Bn Cdrs ideas. Consider also that Bn Cdrs know at least some of their Troops, a good one will know many of his 800 or so bods -- and may be possibly protective of them. Bde Cdrs rarely know many or even any of their 3K or so souls and they know they've got a shot at a star so they tend to be more aggressive.

    Doctrinally, Cdrs at all levels have a responsibility for mission accomplishment and for force protection -- how those two factors are balanced is very much an individual decision and all the METT-TC factors can play into that as well.

    It's all about mission, people and a pot-luck personnel system. Every unit, ever rotation, every war is different. There are never any singular answers...

    As for Yemen, we might have been that abysmally stupid but I'd sure hope not. Iraq, even if poorly done, made a little sense; Yemen would not make an iota. Hunting would be bombers is a LE job, not a military effort...
    At all levels lots boils down to what the specific officer can realistically assume is their overall potential. At the lower levels (Company grade) most have to "draw inside the lines" in order to not stick out too far in a negative way. At Field Grade, each officer should be doing an intraspective look and ask themselves, how far can I still go?

    The attitude I had as a company commander in 1988-1989 was significantly different then the one I had as a Bn (2001-2004) and Group (2004-2005) CDR.

    All Commanders are SUPPOSED to COMMAND. Not been my experince.

    The ability to assess and approve risk is driven alot by the Army's over-emphasis on safety. Was surprised/shocked as a Bn CDR (O5) I could not approve any operations with a "residual risk" of Moderate. Those had to go to to the first O6, the Bde CDR. Tried to get him to delagate to his Bn CRs. No Go.

  5. #325
    Council Member TAH's Avatar
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    Default Agreed Again

    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    As for Yemen, we might have been that abysmally stupid but I'd sure hope not. Iraq, even if poorly done, made a little sense; Yemen would not make an iota. Hunting would be bombers is a LE job, not a military effort...
    Yemen would be.would have been a much tougher fight. About the same size in general terms of geography and population. Lots more mountains, a Huge coastline and an interior border with Saudia thats poorly defined and and patrolled.

    Aso had/has its own home-grown set of internal security problems on top of AQ.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Cavguy View Post
    Not ENTIRELY true. I know we began working it when they first appeared in '03. IEDs are immensely hard to find. We did counter several rounds of IEDs successfully - Remote controlled morphed to command wire morphed to pressure plate morphed to EFP. Each time they became harder to effectively counter.
    It needs to be accepted that the TB using IEDs set the pace of the war and maintained the initiative. Of course you continue to play catch-up if you insist on driving down the same roads and walking down the same routes. The IED has become to modern insurgents what the AK-47 meant to those in the 60s and 70s.

    It seems that only the targeting of HVTs by special forces kept the TB unbalanced if at all.

    That said, our COIN understanding didn't evolve at the same rate as our counter-IED ability. We could defeat the device but not prevent exponentially more from being placed until we changed our methods.
    That is a terrible indictment of the inability of forces on the ground to adapt to local war circumstances. But that said when foot patrols became nothing more than IED sweeps at 1.5km per day then there is/was little time for anything else.

    Perhaps. I haven't served in Afghanistan (yet) but will let you know next summer. I know the unit I am replacing actually allows its soldiers to ride along in the back of Afghan Police Pickup trucks on patrol. Command risk acceptance is highly, highly chain of command driven. Additionally, the unit I will be replacing does a very high amount of dismounted patrols despite being a Stryker element. As will all war accounts, MAJ Waltz (with whom I only partially disagree overall), it reflects his experience in one place at one time, and not the larger picture.
    Going in blind? I raise the not so insignificant matter of operational continuity (once again).

    Secondly, as far as armoured units are concerned. They should only be deployed in their role. If there is no armoured role then leave them at home, or convert them to infantry or disband them.

    Damn! We never thought of that!
    Maybe someone thought of using helicopters but quite obviously that didn't compute into action. Brit commanders still complain that the shortage of helicopter lift restricts them tactically.

    Lets see how much of a joke you see the helicopter shortage issue as when you start losing troops unnecessarily.

    Would be nice if we actually had enough helicopters. Unfortunately we don't, and won't until Iraq is finished. Iraq sucked down most of the army's Aviation asset. Until 2009-10, Iraq consumed 80% of the U.S. Army's combat forces of all kinds, while Afghanistan remained a secondary effort. We are only seeing change now.
    Sorry I don't buy that. You owe it to your men to insist that you get the right tools to do the job. You should be prepared to walk if they don't.

    I don't think so. He is right we need to engage the populace. The as Wilf says above, the vehicles are not the problem. The leadership in such cases is.

    In any Army of 400,000 you're going to get a diversity of outcomes. 25% of your commanders will be brilliant and aggressive. 50% will do mediocre or well. and the bottom 25% will not get it or do poorly. In the aggregate, we're doing much, much better in the the tactics department. Afghanistan is finally getting the Army's full attention, and we are seeing marked improvements in performance as a result.

    My BLUF is that anytime someone chimes in "all we need to do" or "if just" my BS flag goes up. Most of it has been tried. There are real constraints in the real world - equipment, time, resources, etc. that constrain the optimal solution and walks us to the possible. As resources have been added to Afghanistan you are seeing this uptick.

    Ultimately, even if we had the best tactics in the world it really matters little because our strategy is wholly unrealistic. Getting exercised over tactical innovations (which will soon be countered) as "the solution" is silly. People are treating the addition of 14 tanks as some sort of strategic shift? Really? It's a tactical answer to a tactical problem in one region where the tool fits. MAJ Waltz and others are overreacting to their introduction.
    So as you say even though you don't know you are going to oppose him anyway. I'm not sure I follow the mindset.

    There are many ways to improve field command in a war situation. The US has enough of its own experience of this from WW2 and Korea and probably elsewhere to remove any excuses that may be thrown up for Afghanistan.

    Look beyond his few words about the introduction of a few tanks to what he was saying about MRAPs. I don't agree with allowing junior commanders to turn ops into a Toyota war. He too missed the point that there are other possibilities or troop movement and insertion than vehicles and on foot.

  7. #327
    Council Member Cavguy's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    It needs to be accepted that the TB using IEDs set the pace of the war and maintained the initiative. Of course you continue to play catch-up if you insist on driving down the same roads and walking down the same routes. The IED has become to modern insurgents what the AK-47 meant to those in the 60s and 70s.

    It seems that only the targeting of HVTs by special forces kept the TB unbalanced if at all.

    That is a terrible indictment of the inability of forces on the ground to adapt to local war circumstances.

    You're extrapolating greatly here. Plenty of case studies of units influencing the IED fight in their sector using innovative tactics.

    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    Going in blind? I raise the not so insignificant matter of operational continuity (once again).
    Who said we are going in blind? We have been in coordination with our transition unit a year out, and exchange data weekly. We just had elements do (not including myself, I had to mind the store here) a face to face sector recon for two weeks. I'm not going to post details about what we saw or where we're going here on a public internet forum though. My comment was simply meant, that like you, I am also subject to what I read here and am told. I know the platoons in the unit we are replacing does 60-80km of dismounted ops weekly, in conjuction with mounted movements across the AO.

    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    Secondly, as far as armoured units are concerned. They should only be deployed in their role. If there is no armoured role then leave them at home, or convert them to infantry or disband them.
    We essentially have converted many to infantry for the duration, see COL Gentile's many criticisms. The vehicles we have are used in theater.



    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    Maybe someone thought of using helicopters but quite obviously that didn't compute into action. Brit commanders still complain that the shortage of helicopter lift restricts them tactically.
    We're not the Brits.

    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    Lets see how much of a joke you see the helicopter shortage issue as when you start losing troops unnecessarily. Sorry I don't buy that. You owe it to your men to insist that you get the right tools to do the job. You should be prepared to walk if they don't.
    I never said it was a joke, and this isn't my first rodeo. Care to read any of my bio stuff?

    I can't contain the simple fact that the U.S. Army Aviation is fighting two wars and simply doesn't have enough helis in the inventory to support 2 large theaters over a decade of conflict. As a relatively junior officer I have no control over that and see no point on falling on a sword over it when it is you that have made it into this existential issue.

    It's not like units are getting wiped out or anything. By historical standards casualties are low compared against almost any similar conflict. Units are doing better than you allege, that's what I'm saying, and we're not as stupid as you imply.


    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    He too missed the point that there are other possibilities or troop movement and insertion than vehicles and on foot.
    I am sorry we can't all rise to your high standards of ops. Would love to live in the perfect world where I got everything I wanted. Instead I make do with what I have, and do pretty well at it. You're extrapolating from one article and one observation and applying it to an entire country. I'm saying there are many variations of what is being done, some good, some bad. But overall we're doing okay, even excellent in spots.

    I'm not a defender of everything we do. But I do guard against blanket statements and accusations that are not true in the macro.
    Last edited by jcustis; 12-01-2010 at 03:26 AM. Reason: corrected quotes
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    Quote Originally Posted by Cavguy View Post
    You're extrapolating greatly here. Plenty of case studies of units influencing the IED fight in their sector using innovative tactics.
    As long as the vast majority of KIA and WIA are caused by IEDs then ISAF are merely playing catch-up.

    Who said we are going in blind? We have been in coordination with our transition unit a year out, and exchange data weekly. We just had elements do (not including myself, I had to mind the store here) a face to face sector recon for two weeks. I'm not going to post details about what we saw or where we're going here on a public internet forum though. My comment was simply meant, that like you, I am also subject to what I read here and am told. I know the platoons in the unit we are replacing does 60-80km of dismounted ops weekly, in conjuction with mounted movements across the AO.
    The Brits are honest enough to admit that the first two months of each tour (of six months) to settle in. The inherent weakness of such short tours is obvious when compared with the permanent deployment of the main TB players. Time to question that as well and for units to conform to the demands of the war rather than blindly continue with the :this is the way we do it" approach.

    The question that should be asked is what is the best way and with whom to prosecute this war?

    We essentially have converted many to infantry for the duration, see COL Gentile's many criticisms. The vehicles we have are used in theater.
    And you think that by switching from armour to infantry and back again is doing justice to the war effort?

    We're not the Brits.
    By that you mean you don't care about a shortage of helicopter lift capacity or you see no need or use for such?

    I never said it was a joke, and this isn't my first rodeo. Care to read any of my bio stuff?
    I didn't see anything about infantry qualifications there.

    I can't contain the simple fact that the U.S. Army Aviation is fighting two wars and simply doesn't have enough helis in the inventory to support 2 large theaters over a decade of conflict. As a relatively junior officer I have no control over that and see no point on falling on a sword over it when it is you that have made it into this existential issue.
    Maybe you missed it but according to your president and your generals the war is over in Iraq? So what will it take for the US officer corps to make a stand? Currently they just accept that they are issued with a second rate personal weapon (M4) and that there is very limited helicopter support. Perhaps when Burger King and Pizza Hut are closed down there will be an open rebellion?

    It's not like units are getting wiped out or anything. By historical standards casualties are low compared against almost any similar conflict. Units are doing better than you allege, that's what I'm saying, and we're not as stupid as you imply.
    You go tell that to the mothers of the 1500 odd US soldiers killed so far in Afghanistan.

    I am not alleging that anything other than one needs to be thankful the TB are such a sub standard enemy and lament the fact that such a high percentage of KIA and WIA have been caused by IEDs an effective counter against which has yet to be figured out.

    I am sorry we can't all rise to your high standards of ops. Would love to live in the perfect world where I got everything I wanted. Instead I make do with what I have, and do pretty well at it. You're extrapolating from one article and one observation and applying it to an entire country. I'm saying there are many variations of what is being done, some good, some bad. But overall we're doing okay, even excellent in spots.

    I'm not a defender of everything we do. But I do guard against blanket statements and accusations that are not true in the macro.
    As I say there should be a block booking for seats on every flight out of Afghanistan to take the failures and the non performers home. There is no sane reason to condone mediocrity (when soldiers lives are at risk). If only half the company commanders are competent then let the cream of the crop command 6 platoon companies in theatre... and if you can't find 6 platoon commanders who are competent to command the 6 platoons then make up the shortage with sergeants. (If you can't do that then best you pack up and go home.)

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    Quote Originally Posted by M.L. View Post

    While I supported the MRAP purchase for Iraq (large caches of leftover munitions made this conflict unique in terms of IEDs), I don't think we should keep them.
    Is this really true?
    I suspect that the IED problem is one that has been around for a number of decades in various parts of the world - I was almost going to say -perhaps the fact the US hasn't encountered IEDs a whole lot might be a perception problem.

    Except I recall seeing lots of pics of US forces in Vietnam riding on top of APCs, placing sandbags of the floors of their AFVs and trucks etc due to - IEDs.

    Then of course you leave the US experience and you get as previously mentioned South Africa, Rhodesia. To which you can add Northern Ireland - where some parts of the province were only patrolled on foot or by air due to - IEDs.

    IMO It ain't a new problem nor a unique one.
    Quote Originally Posted by M.L. View Post
    What we should do is incorporate some design elements, such as the V-hull, etc... into a new vehicle that fixes many of the shortcomings in the current MRAP fleet (lack of commonality, limited offroad mobility, not a fighting vehicle, etc...). That is, IF we decide to continue our strategy of fighting long, drawn out counter-insurgency campaigns. The MRAP issue might be solved with a more modest national strategy, but that is another discussion...
    Not sure if you are saying what I think you are saying, but I think I am with you.
    I reckon if you do need mine resistance (and I am not really sure how mine and IEDs really differ. I think that an IED used to be called a nuisance minefield, the only real difference being one use a factory made mine and one a home made mine), then it should be incorporated idealy into all of your vehicles - and if now then definitely in your AFVs, whether they be Strykers, LAVs, Bradleys, M113s whatever.

    And IMO in the current political era where troop delopyments are unrealistically low (i.e. not enough troops to secure AOs or even routes over night) and the stomach for troop losses quite low (thankfully, compared with past eras), then you want to incorporate them into your B ("soft", perhaps better to say log) vehicles too.

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    I'm a day late on this thread but I'll throw my $.02 worth.

    We just left as the only maneuver brigade in all of Baghdad. We partnered with 6 Iraqi Divisions (4 IA and 2 FP) and with the district level Iraqi Police. Other than the SF partnerships, we worked with nearly every ISF unit in Baghdad Province. For our Commander to maintain his relationships with the ISF division commanders, we traveled nearly every day. Blackhawk movement was preferred when 1) the weather allowed it, 2) there were secure LZs available at the ISF compound and 3) when birds were available. As the only maneuver Brigade in Baghdad, our Brigade Commander did not have his own dedicated blackhawks so we were never guaranteed a ride.

    We therefore spent a good deal to time on the road moving from FOB to JSS to ISF division HQs. Our vehicle composition depended on the route and threat. We had both up-armored HMMWVs and MRAPs available and we used both sets during the deployment.

    While I agree with all the tenets through this thread about having boots on the ground, the importance of dismounted patrolling and securing key areas to ensure IEDs are minimized, how do you do that when you do not own the battlespace? The ISF owned the battlespace - we were their supporting partners. The funny thing was the Iraqi division commanders started acting like two-star generals and owning their own areas of operation. We could not conduct unilateral operations - everything was partnered. We could not send a US only dismounted patrol to look for IEDs, and with all the roadways in Baghdad, that would be impossible. Instead we had to coordinate our C-IED efforts with our Iraqi partners and did everything we could to conduct combined patrols, operations, raids and intelligence collection to ensure we were integrated with the land owners: the Iraqi Divisions.

    Our battalions/squadron maintained relations with all the Iraqi Divisions and most of the Iraqi Brigade HQs. In order to maintain freedom of movement, the MRAPs were critical assets to maintain our partnership with the ISF. We could not fly everywhere, we could not walk across Baghdad: our Soldiers had to drive.

    As I mentioned before, the vehicle type depended on the route. MRAPs were not pratical going through the Mulhallahs or along the canal roads. The damage they caused to the fledgling infrastructure along with their lack of maneuverability in the tight streets limited their uses for those missions. However, moving along better roads or from base to base, MRAPs were the preferred choice. I saw countless Soldiers walk away from IED hits which would have destroyed up-armored HMMWVs and kill those inside.

    We worked with our ISF partners to conducted intel-driven raids to mitigate the IED networks. The sad part is, however, the politically established safe havens within Baghdad itself (Sadr City, Shulla, etc) severely limited conventional partnered operations. Even the SF guys had a hard time getting access since the ISF divisions owned the battlespace and started to crack down on Special Operations missions in their OE. If the SF wanted access, they had to work through us to work through our partners. Again, the Iraqis were in the lead, not us. Obviously this is not the case with Afghanistan and the ANA...but that should be the goal.

    Of course I've only talked about our maneuver battalions. Everyone from our Transition Teams, Route Clearance Teams, logistic convoys and escorts ran MRAPs a majority of the time as well.

    I'd offer to JMA that he's obviously not familiar with U.S. forces. While we would always request helicopter lift assets, the sad fact of the matter is there is never enough resources, even for the U.S. military. Iraq has switched roles with Afghanistan as the "forgotten war" resulting in a shortage of assets. Even in the land of plenty, there will never be enough lift assets to support all the movement requests needed. Air is the best option, but often is the most unpredictable.

    Additionally, I'd offer that you can no longer tell the difference (for good or worse) between an infantryman or tanker, especially in the heavy brigades. Our Soldiers and leaders performed the same missions regardless of their occupational specialty. At the battalion level, we no longer have pure armor or mech infantry anymore. 10 years of combat has blurred the lines between combat arms troopers.

    Not sure how much time you have deployed but I'd offer Cav Guy has a heck of a lot of time and experience having "been there and done that" and recently.

    The MRAP is a valuable tool in our kitbag and should not be discounted. The need for increased MRAPs in the states for drivers training is critical - we suffered from a shortage of properly licensed drivers due to the limited training opportunities and it plagued us through most of the deployment. Everything is METT-T dependent but the need for MRAPs will not go away. It is another tool in the kitbag both leaders and Soldiers need to maintain proficiency with.

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    Default MRAP Future Discussion Paper

    MRAP Future Discussion Paper

    Entry Excerpt:

    MRAP Future Discussion Paper
    by Ryan T. Kranc

    Download The Full Article: MRAP Future Discussion Paper

    Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected Vehicle (MRAP) is a broad term encompassing three main vehicle categories with 28 specific types of vehicle. The vehicle family was procured and acquired in mass as a result of a growing improvised explosive device (IED) threat encountered in Iraq in 2004. Though there is no doubt that the MRAP family of vehicles has saved hundreds, if not thousands, of lives since it was first fielded and placed into operation in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, the MRAP should not be incorporated into the US Army operational structure for a number of reasons. It offers protection against a specific threat type and does not lend well to the higher intensity realm of full spectrum operations. The MRAP incorporation into current brigade combat team structures is as infeasible as it is impractical. Finally, further evaluation and analysis is needed in terms of DOTMLPF in order to more fully understand the long term impacts of MRAP inclusion and fusion into the force. Until those issues are resolved it would be irresponsible, costly, and infeasible to incorporate the MRAP into the operational structure of the US Army.

    Download The Full Article: MRAP Future Discussion Paper

    MAJ Ryan T. Kranc is currently a student at the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.



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    Default The Impact of Incorporating MRAPs into BCT’s

    The Impact of Incorporating MRAPs into BCT’s

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    The Impact of Incorporating MRAPs into BCTs
    by Joe Parker

    Download the Full Article: The Impact of Incorporating MRAPs into BCT’s

    The Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle had a highly publicized entry into the military ranks of vehicles, first with the Marines in 2004, and then eventually filling requirements with the Army to provide a dramatic increase in IED and blast protection than the ill-suited HMMVW for combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Rushed in to production by as many as nine separate contractors , the endstate resulted in an accelerated production of multiple variations of the MRAP, with the types roughly categorized as Category I, II, and III and based on number of occupants and mission specific mine/IED clearance operations Now, as the combat mission in Iraq has completed and leaders begin to discuss life beyond Afghanistan, the MRAPs usefulness is in question. The Department of Defense is actively pursuing a replacement for the HMMVW with the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle program , and the MRAP is facing an identity crisis. Is it a troop transporter or a combat system? What capability beyond the blast protection does it bring and how does that translate into future utilization? It would appear that the MRAP does have a future beyond our current conflicts as Defense Secretary Robert Gates instructed the military to incorporate it into the Army Brigade Combat Team Modernization (BCTMOD) plan. What is yet to be seen is how well the MRAP incorporates itself into the BCTMOD plan, what role and capability it fills in the Brigade Combat Team, and what additional requirements it places on existing force structure.

    Download the Full Article: The Impact of Incorporating MRAPs into BCT’s

    MAJ Joe Parker is currently a student at the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He has served three years in Iraq as a platoon leader, brigade maintenance officer, and company commander. He holds a BA in Communications from Wake Forest University, and is a graduate of the Quartermaster Officer Basic Course and the Combined Logistics Captains Career Course. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.



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  13. #333
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    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    May I offer that the first difference is whether these vehicles are for the use of motorised or mechanised infantry.

    To motorised infantry (I suggest) for the purpose of getting from A to B and not fighting from.

    I recommend that one attempts to sidestep the procurement system associated with such equipment development. (How many soldiers must die before the clowns involved with the process get their act together?)

    As I mentioned in another thread the modifications to existing vehicle configurations can be carried out in theatre (or in a friendly neighbouring state - not Pakistan) on an as and when required basis. In fact as these vehicles will probably not have any application outside the current theatre all the work can be carried out in this factory on commercially available chassis. After the war they can be handed to the ANA or scrapped.

    In Rhodesia a total of some 2,500 landmines were detonated. (No figures for which were military/police or civilian vehicles.) 650 deaths and 4,500 injured. Had a number of drivers who had detonated 3 mines with only some hearing damage.

    The photos below represent some of the cheap but effective methods used to protect troops from landmines. The Pookie detected mines and was built on a VW Beetle chassis. The Puma and Crocodile were built on a Isuzu or Nissan 5 ton chassis. The Pig was built on the Unimog 2.5 chassis. All (except the Pookie which used low pressure tyres) had water in the tyres.

    Note: correction to my above post, it was the drive train of the VW Combi that was used for the Pookie. And the tyres for the Pookie were worn out Formula 1 racing tyres sourced from the scrap heap at Kyalami Race Track in Johannesburg, South Africa.

    There have been a number of instances where the issue of urgent on the fly modifications or at least bypassing the normal (long and labourious) procurement could have been (or at least should have been) carried out to provide protection for troops traveling on vehicles in Iraq and Afghanistan.

    This problem is incapsulated in the 2008 Study: Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicle Case Study by Franz J Gayl

    It chronicles the horror story of a procurement bureaucracy gone mad at an unacceptable cost of life and limb to those fighting the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

    Worse still it highlights how virtually all serving officers and enlisted men have been numbed into accepting that there is no solution to the problem. See quote below:

    It is noteworthy that during the conduct of his 2002-2003 thesis research Maj McGriff continuously encountered push-back from operators at all levels, both enlisted and officer, when presented with the MRAP idea. As if conditioned with a sense of futility, his audiences shared a common first response that 1) the MRAP idea was unrealistic because the Marine Corps would not nor could not afford it and 2) the acquisition system would certainly reject MRAPs because it was something new that differed from/was outside of established Programs of Record (PORs). This same sense of procurement and process futility persisted even while their warfighter audiences agreed that the MRAP made operational common sense.
    My experience here in SWC and reinforced by two recent conversations with long serving US soldiers finds the same. That is that the US soldier has been conditioned to accept that his country will send him into harms way without taking the necessary action to provide them with the necessary (and deserved) protection.

    I sense that the mindset in the US (and probably also the British) military leadership has developed the belief that the best way to protect soldiers is to not expose them to risk in the first place rather than provide them with the best equipment and support available while insisting that closing with and killing the enemy still remains the primary role of the infantry and continues to be their daily operational duty.

    The conclusion should be of grave concern:

    The MRAP case study has demonstrated that Marine Corps combat development organizations are not optimized to provide responsive, flexible, and relevant solutions to commanders in the field.
    Anyone freak out over this when it was published? ... or with a shrug was it just treated as a normal day at the office?

    The following article remains essential reading in relation to landmine detection systems:


    The Pookie - A History of the World's first successful Landmine Detector Carrier by Dr J.R.T. Wood

  14. #334
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    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    ...blah blah blah
    "...during the conduct of his 2002-2003 thesis research..."
    blah blah blah...
    The listed information is invalidated by its date, and invalidates any conclusions drawn from it- there was little reason to worry about this in 2002-2003. I deployed in JAN 04, and given the choice between Up-Armored HMMVWs and soft skins, we chose softskins- they were more flexible, easier to mount/dismount, offered better visibility, etc, etc. My brigade suffered no casualties to IEDs during its previous deployment to Afghanistan (as best I can recall), and our only IED casualties in Iraq were to dismounted troops. I realize that this is an anecdote and not representative. It does show, however, that there was contrary information that inhibited the decisions that appear so obvious in hindsight.

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    I recall that South Africa sold some of those 70's/80's design MRAPs to IIRC India (Casspirs).

    Quick google search told me they did indeed buy 165 refurbished Casspirs around '99-'01.

  16. #336
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    Quote Originally Posted by jcustis View Post
    After operating in them almost exclusively for the past four months (to my chagrin since I so do miss an LAV), I have gained a greater appreciation for the M-ATV, but also higher frustration with the procurement program.

    Here are some issues I have with the platform:

    -Visibility forward of the driver and vehicle commander sucks because of the size, and angle of the thick windows. The side windows are even worse, and only allow a passenger to peek out and see what is directly abreast of the vehicle. No way to conduct a "5 and 25" check of the ground without opening the suicide door. I know this limitation has to do with the blast resistance, but c'mon, can the engineering design take into account some functionality requirements too?

    -There is no IR flood lamp on the vehicle. IR lamps have prooved indispensible on about every tactical vehicle we already use, because it facilitates the use of night vision devices, so why nothing on the M-ATV as a basic piece of equipment? The driver has a driver's viewer enhancer (DVE) that matches the thermal devices employed on tanks and LAVs to allow drivers to drive in all light conditions, but the vehicle commander does not have a similar capability. That means that under zero moonlight situations, it is very difficult to see through the thick windows, and try to guide a driver using a blackout drive light only.

    -There are no AC electrical outlets in the vehicle. MRAPs have them, but the M-ATV is oddly left out. It is almost as if Oshkosh is saying, "well gents, we don't have that option on this model, but if you take the hallway past custromer service and go to our custom shop, you should be able to find that add-on." Huh? Was anyone at Oshkosh looking at how we employ massive amounts of devices (biometric, battery chargers, laptops, etc.) in the current environment?

    It's like we went forward and back at the same time, and it is just so odd that these basic things are absent.
    The last part seems to be typical for organizations, projects and humans in general. Something can be seen widely as basic and logic, but that doesn't mean that the project addresses and includes that.

    Said that I really wonder why Power take-offs are not more often found in military vehicles. Electric "PTOs" really should be standard with all that electronic stuff you have to power, especially as it so easy to provide. You have already a generator and a big battery in your vehicle powering all sorts of things, so why shoud you not make that energy source available by a simple standard outlet?

    Hydraulic PTOs should also be standard for light and medium trucks, as it adds just little in cost and weight but gives potentially very wide utility for each vehicle with a very wide array of COTS available. With every member of that (transport) truck familiy provided like that you have at little cost a lot of redundancy.

    On a side note: Independent suspensions have become better and better and although they will never match a live axle for simplicity and for specific uses like extreme rock crawling they are rightly becoming more popular even for offroad use. There are very rugged and proven designs, from the swing axle of the Kuebelwagens, Tatras and Steyrs to the more modern incarnations. Nowadays actively managed suspensions can greatly adjust their response automatically and according to the input of the driver, although it remains to be seen how they perform under difficult situations in the field.

    Certainly for advancing at a moderate or rapid pace over bad roads or riverbeds an IS is the much more comfortable and less fatiguing option.
    Last edited by Firn; 12-15-2011 at 06:44 PM.

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    I have to ask what is difference between MRAP and wheeled APC? Because despite googling I am still a little puzzled.

  18. #338
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    To Korte....

    I believe the primary difference between wheeled APCs and MRAPs is the former is designed to protect troops from shrapnel and small arms fire (SAF) while the latter does that PLUS protects from IEDs (up to a point).

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    Quote Originally Posted by PsJK Korte View Post
    I have to ask what is difference between MRAP and wheeled APC? Because despite googling I am still a little puzzled.
    Plus a major difference in tactical mobility. The wheeled APC is designed to provide a blend of mobility and protection generally for 8 to 15 troops and tilted toward mobility while the MRAP is designed to provide protection, period. Mobility is almost an afterthought for most of them. Most MRAPs also carry fewer people, 4 to 10 being the norm with the mean hovering at about 6. They do provide slightly better situational awareness by having more windows than do wheeled APCs...

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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    A General Concept of Infantry Mobility

    I would be interested in the board’s opinions as to MRAP and JLTV “type” vehicles as a base line for general (not all) infantry mobility.
    Perhaps a better concept for "general infantry mobility" might be the humble HMMWV. It has the following benefits:

    * It comes in a wide variety of unarmored, semi-armored, or armored configurations.
    * It can go places that MRAPS don't dare.
    * It has a lower life-cycle cost than any APC or MRAP.
    * It has a much lower logistics footprint than an APC or MRAP.
    * It has a much lower deployment footprint than an APC or MRAP.

    Yes, the HMMWV is not well protected vs IEDs, mines or HMG fire (or really anything). But that's what APCs and IFVs are for right?
    Last edited by B.Smitty; 12-20-2011 at 09:38 PM.

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