All matters MRAP JLTV (merged thread)

[Geronimo53]

Let me add my voice to the chorus.

MRAPs do have some utility as specialized niche vehicles. As troop carriers, they represent the bankruptcy of our tactical thinking and the spinelessness of our senior leaders.

Hopefully most of them will end up as targets on our training ranges.

So then how should we transport soldiers to their AO without them getting blown up on the way there? Blackhawks are great for that...when available.


I'm sure its true that some units use them to conduct presence patrols instead of walking, but that falls on unit TTPs and the small unit leaders on the ground. How are MRAPs representative of our spineless senior leaders? What would you have those senior leaders do instead? Should they not utilize the MRAP technology and explain to the American public why soldiers are dying from IEDs?

Obviously MRAPs aren't indestructible. They are being destroyed by IEDs with more ferequency in Afghanistan now. But what's the alternative?

[Eden]

How are MRAPs representative of our spineless senior leaders? What would you have those senior leaders do instead? Should they not utilize the MRAP technology and explain to the American public why soldiers are dying from IEDs?

I have no problem using MRAP-class vehicles to 'transport' soldiers to their AOs (say on the first day of their tour), or for moving beans and bullets, or as specialized engineer vehicles. But the MRAP is exactly the wrong way to approach the IED threat. The right way is through intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance, proper patrolling techniques, and deployments that don't require constant commuting. The MRAP is the same sort of response to a threat that has our soldiers chasing insurgents while weighed down with 100 pounds of gear and body armor. Moreover, MRAPs isolate soldiers from the population and the environment and this extends the war - meaning more casualties in the long run.

I'm sorry, but a brutal fact of war that we sometimes forget is that preservation of our soldier's lives is not the primary objective. Our senior leaders rarely talk about that, and the MRAP is an example of taking the easy way out rather than laying out the often harsh facts of life.

[M.L.]

I have no problem using MRAP-class vehicles to 'transport' soldiers to their AOs (say on the first day of their tour), or for moving beans and bullets, or as specialized engineer vehicles. But the MRAP is exactly the wrong way to approach the IED threat. The right way is through intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance, proper patrolling techniques, and deployments that don't require constant commuting. The MRAP is the same sort of response to a threat that has our soldiers chasing insurgents while weighed down with 100 pounds of gear and body armor. Moreover, MRAPs isolate soldiers from the population and the environment and this extends the war - meaning more casualties in the long run.

I'm sorry, but a brutal fact of war that we sometimes forget is that preservation of our soldier's lives is not the primary objective. Our senior leaders rarely talk about that, and the MRAP is an example of taking the easy way out rather than laying out the often harsh facts of life.

There are a couple of assumptions in this argument. The first is that "intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance, proper patrolling techniques, and deployments" and MRAPs are mutually exclusive. While TTPs are important, why can't they be married with force protection for a greater effect?

The second assumption is that MRAP isolates Soldiers from the environment. MRAP is an inanimate object. MRAPs don't formulate missions, orders, TTPs, or SOPs. That would be the responsibility of commanders and leaders. While I see your point that MRAPs provide an opportunity for Soldiers to avoid engaging with the local populace, staying on the FOB does the same thing. It is a leadership issue, not a force protection issue.

Another issue I have with this comment is the comparison to 100 lbs worth of body armor. Certainly, there is a tipping point where too much force protection inhibits mission accomplishment. Excessive equipment weight would seem to be one of them. On the other hand, suggesting that no force protection is warranted simply because too much may inhibit mission accomplishment seems wrong.

Lastly, I'd be careful about that last argument. While casualties are a part of war, the idea that we shouldn't do anything to mitigate risk is nonsense. Soldiers are combat power. If you lose combat power, you lose your ability to accomplish the mission. Therefore, you must preserve your combat power.

This isn't an emotional appeal for the lives of young men. It is a time-tested tenet of tactics and strategy.

[davidbfpo]

The article's full title is: Room to Live: Why Aren't Armoured Vehicles Surviving the Explosive Threat in Afghanistan?

Link:http://www.defenceiq.com/article.cfm?externalID=3500

On a quick read from my "armchair" it may supplement this thread.

[Johannes U]

Since I am a participant in a NATO C-IED Train-the-trainer course in Croatia, some of the points made are of immediate interest to me.
The principles and techniques we are taught here all stress on the importance of literally having "boots on the ground" when patrolling in an AOO with IEDs as a main threat.
I have no problem with that - even more - I fully concur with that.
The best "weapon" against an IED-network in my view is infantry doing foot patrols, showing presence, not only observing but controlling an AOO ...
But I still have the following question: what is from your point of view the ideal vehicle for supporting those infantry guys doing foot patrols?
x Is it the MRAP? - from what I've read so far, the majority disaggrees
x Is it an uparmored HUMMWV? (i hope i spelled that right) - from what I've heard from our instructors (all retired US Army with multiple tours as adivsors/trainers in Afghanistan and Iraq), because of its small size etc it is not.
Addendum: if the best weapon against IEDs is "boots on the ground", you need more than 2-3 dismounts per vehicle.
x Is it some kind of wheeled APC? Stryker, Fuchs, Pandur to name a few.
x Or is it just some kind of armored truck, like a MAN or UNIMOG with additional armor

I would be interested in your comments and maybe further information, especially since it is my job at home to train soldiers to be squad or platoon leaders at the Austrian Infantry School.

Johannes

[William F. Owen]

But I still have the following question: what is from your point of view the ideal vehicle for supporting those infantry guys doing foot patrols?

"It depends," and what you need the "support" to do.

What's the threat? What's the terrain? How good is your training? Do you have helicopters - which was what defeated the IRA's IED threat. A well trained foot patrol can stay out for days, being re-supplied either by caches or helicopter drops. Re-supply can even be "dropped" from "civilian vehicles."

Training, risk and competence solves 95% of the problem. It's not a "vehicle" issue. It's a competence issue.

[Ken White]

In order of your list, I'd vote for:

No -- MRAPs are the worst choice. Logistically, tactically and mobility-wise unsound in all aspects
No -- Poor vehicle; tries to be all things to all people and fails. Number of troops issue is secondary but does have the benefit of fewer casualties in event of a catastrophic hit.
Yes -- best choice, multi-task capable and designed as a combat vehicle for ANYTHING less than high intensity armored combat. Pandur or the Patria AMV would be my current choices as both offer many advantages over the Stryker.
No -- MRAP by another name; only saving grace is logistic commonality which the MRAP doesn't have.

And Wilf is right, the old METT-TC factors rule. Ignoring those factors is always perilous and the MRAP problems are that Troops Available will misuse them and the Enemy will find way to negate their already limited value.

As long as I'm here...

M.L.

I don't think that's what he wrote...

There are a couple of assumptions in this argument. The first is that "intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance, proper patrolling techniques, and deployments" and MRAPs are mutually exclusive...While I see your point that MRAPs provide an opportunity for Soldiers to avoid engaging with the local populace, staying on the FOB does the same thing. It is a leadership issue, not a force protection issue...On the other hand, suggesting that no force protection is warranted simply because too much may inhibit mission accomplishment seems wrong...While casualties are a part of war,

the idea that we shouldn't do anything to mitigate risk is nonsense...

I think his point was that balance should be sought between the competing demands of mission and protection and the MRAP stacks the deck toward the latter at possibly excessive cost to the former. He also addressed the fact that we consistently and IMO wrongly downplay the harsh and unforgiving aspects of the job that is soldiering for some unfathomable reason. Among other flaws, that leads (or allows...) politicians to think wars can be successfully waged and concluded on the cheap. They cannot. Such an approach also deludes prospective entrants to the Armed Forces. A better approach is that old Marine recruiting poster below.

Poor leaders will not do what you correctly say is required and the presence of the MRAP provides not only an excuse but an incentive to do wrong. Good leaders won't have the problem but not all leaders are good -- some are atrocious -- and the poor can be encouraged to do better by tactically sound and sensible equipment choices rather than reacting to media hype and political spin. No one has a problem with force protection, the question is how to best balance that with mission parameters. The MRAP was a poor solution, politically forced and does not merit defense -- or retention in the inventory.

[M.L.]

Ken:

My reading of his post does not support your contention. His exact words are

"I have no problem using MRAP-class vehicles to 'transport' soldiers to their AOs (say on the first day of their tour), or for moving beans and bullets, or as specialized engineer vehicles. But the MRAP is exactly the wrong way to approach the IED threat. The right way is through intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance, proper patrolling techniques, and deployments that don't require constant commuting."

This suggests to me that MRAP is "wrong" and TTPs are "right." There is nothing in these words that would lead me to your conclusion that he is advocating a balanced approach.

As to the point of leadership. Indeed, leaders often have incentives to do the wrong thing. As to the point that, "poor can be encouraged to do better by tactically sound and sensible equipment choices rather than reacting to media hype and political spin."

I'd simply say that if your subordinate leaders are not getting out of their MRAPs, you have a leadership, not a material issue. You can band aid the symptom by removing MRAPs, but the leadership issue will remain. Or, you can solve the root problem, and have MRAPs too.

This is all too common; remove the ability to make a bad decision rather than teaching Soldiers to make a right decision. Good leaders do the latter.

This discussion seems to be overlooking the fact that the modern BCT is required to project forces over wide areas of real estate. That requires a lot of driving to get where you need to go. It seems that a vehicle with MRAP-like capability would facilitate this. After all, wasn't this the original idea of mechanized infantry? Protect the Soldiers until they reached the obj, where they can then dismount and fight?