All matters MRAP JLTV (merged thread)

[William F. Owen]

You do realize that the Taliban could simply cut your base off the supply by blocking/ambushing the road and thus force you to fight along roads, even move on roads with vehicles again?

Sigh.... That's not the point is it.
a.) Can you substantially reduce and in some cases eliminate road movement by using helicopters? Yes or no?
b.) Can you bias your helicopter support on a selective basis, weather, operations, and enemy action dependant? Yes or no?

[Fuchs]

I don't get "bias as a verb, but I'll use another approach anyway.

Wilf, I respect you in tactical matters, but you need to think farther.

Keep in mind the enemy reacts. How will he react to helicopter-mobile(/-dependent) occupation infantry?


I pointed at the truck convoy dependency as an indicator for the inability to dodge the road ambush problem entirely. Targets are available for the Taliban in abundance, and they can simply focus on the supply convoys and less on the patrols at will.


Remember the IED effect on patrols, especially in cases where no MRAPs/helicopters are available (or practical): The mere threat suffices at times to restrict the troops actions. It may be a subconscious influence, but it's there. Especially the less zealous contingents and troops might even consider to minimize patrol activity.

Such a restriction success could also be attempted in regard to fuel supplies. The less fuel transports reach the base, the less helicopter sorties.
The counter-counter-measure? Convoy escorts. There we are again, vehicles running the gauntlet. Except that this time there hasn't been much effort directed at road control and sweeps as would have been if road movement was still standard.


Meanwhile, the civilian populace knows the foreign troops only from helicopters and foot patrols while the Taliban move at will in Toyota Land Cruisers.
Who looks like a winner and in power? Those who venture out of their fortresses only through the air or those who dare to go everywhere?

[Ken White]

Keep in mind the enemy reacts. How will he react to helicopter-mobile(/-dependent) occupation infantry? ... and less on the patrols at will ... Meanwhile, the civilian populace knows the foreign troops only from helicopters and foot patrols while the Taliban move at will in Toyota Land Cruisers ...Who looks like a winner and in power? Those who venture out of their fortresses only through the air or those who dare to go everywhere?

the object is to use the helicopter for only initial entry into the area and for resupply -- the troops would move about on foot -- aggressively and frequently -- and we have light vehicles that will provide superior mobility and tactical agility when compared to Toyota pickups. They would be out of the air -- and large vehicles -- for a couple of weeks or more at a time. For various reasons, we have elected to not operate in that manner -- the capability to do it absolutely exists and can be expanded, the will to do that obviously does not.

Remember the IED effect on patrols, especially in cases where no MRAPs/helicopters are available (or practical): The mere threat suffices at times to restrict the troops actions. It may be a subconscious influence, but it's there. Especially the less zealous contingents and troops might even consider to minimize patrol activity.

That over caution is an acknowledged problem. It is a significant training and a tactical employment defect. Many Commanders and leaders know better but are not permitted to do better...

Can't make your neighbors look bad, not egalitarian enough. Uniformity is more important than competence and success. Can't expect much more from an Army that worries about what color reflective belts the Troops wear when moving about on Bases that have 'Mayors'. In a combat zone...

All a result of flawed policy decisions over many years and the Armed Forces just get to pick up the tab at delivery time...

[Pete]

My knowledge of how the MRAP came to be procured may be faulty, but I recall reading that SecDef Gates forced the issue on their procurement after the U.S. Army tank-automotive guys wanted to follow established DoD R&D procedure and spend years conducting studies and analyses to define requirements for a new IED-resistant vehicle.

Gates was in a hurry because it was a problem on his watch and as he saw it the best solution 12 years from now was the enemy of the good next year, hence the MRAP. I don't believe the circumstances that led to the buying of this vehicle will have a pronounced effect on tactics or doctrine in the future, it's just that future designs will have more armor protection than in the past.

What amazes me about this situation is that from 1914 to 2003 thin-skinned tactical vehicles were accepted as the norm by most militaries in the world, and suddenly in 2003-04 they became anachronisms that reflected poorly on the judgement of the leaders of the armed forces that used them..

[Fuchs]

@Ken; many changes need to be done if infantry shall patrol for a long time on foot. Especially in summer time.

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@Pete:
All vehicle armour is a compromise, same as with even the biggest and baddest battleships of history.

Being bulletproof was considered good enough for a tank until 1938 and good enough for support vehicles until very recently. Bullets, fragments and AP mines represent the largest share of troubles and to mostly neutralize them is relatively simple.

The real weight problems come when you want to protect against bomblets, autocannon APFSDS, stacked pressure AT mines or underbelly AT mines.


We'll likely go back to low protection ratings after the wars.
I expect that new programs will incorporate huge mine resistance ratings as "equipped for, but not with" capability of AFVs.
Similar to amhibiousness (for up to 20t AFVs), deep fording (above 20t), 125mm APFSDS-proofed glacis and ADS.

[Ken White]

@Ken; many changes need to be done if infantry shall patrol for a long time on foot. Especially in summer time.

Given that I and millions of others some years ago were doing weeks and rarely even months long stints on foot in all kinds of weather in places like Korea with >38°C summer and <35° C winter and the lovely SE Asia vacation spot known as Cong Hoa Xa Hoi Chu Nghia Viet Nam where it was always summer, always hot, I'm unsure why many changes would need to be undertaken. A few, mostly to offset the current excessive reliance on transport of some sort -- but not many. It's been done before; successfully. Done against an enemy at least as competent, generally better armed and certainly more numerous and in equally forbidding terrain.

The most significant change would be to the mindset that it is too difficult...

Pete:

As western society has grown far more risk averse over the past three generations, so too have the Armies of those societies. The fact that those societies are also richer allows them to spend money on things that are nice to have but not truly necessary. Thus money gets spent on ultra heavy, poorly mobile vehicles of limited utility but with significant protective capability. Unfortunately, that protection -- cocooning to my mind -- coupled with the lack of combat mobility and function promote mindsets and training approaches that do not bode well for the future.

Instead of lighter, more mobile and agile vehicles that encourage rapid and aggressive tactical action and innovation, vehicles which do not delude the occupants into the belief they are bullet proof, we're creating a generation that will want to go to wars in air conditioned comfort and have no casualties.

That, as they say, ain't gonna happen...

[Dayuhan]

@Ken; many changes need to be done if infantry shall patrol for a long time on foot. Especially in summer time.

One change might be to reassess the loads that individuals carry: 40 kilos at 40 degrees is going to impose some limits. Granted, a very fit person can carry 40 kilos in 40 degree temperatures, but that same person will move a lot farther and be a lot more agile with 20 kilos than with 40. Of course everything these guys carry has an important purpose, but if they carry everything that might possibly be important they won't even be able to stand up. At some point marginal returns diminish and something has to be sacrificed.

[William F. Owen]

Keep in mind the enemy reacts. How will he react to helicopter-mobile(/-dependent) occupation infantry?

Hopefully it will scare the Cr*p out of them.
The point I intended to demonstrate was was that 16 Helicopters, with 200 crew and support staff can provide a very real edge to a 3 Battalion Infantry Brigade. Basically, sound employment of support helicopters is always going to be beneficial.

Done sensibly there are no down sides. We have to wary of pumping out arguments used to justify not having enough helicopters because commanders and politicians make stupid decisions.

[M.L.]

3 weeks? Show a time and place where this has happened?

Khandahar, Afghanistan, winter/spring of 2005. We couldn't get past the clouds that settled in the mountains north of the airfield. Tarin Kowt was cut off for weeks, and we only had a few days we could get to Shindand.

I've had weather keep me down for longer than 3 weeks (40 days once in Hawai'i), though 3 weeks was longest in a combat theater.

I doubt there is anyone contributing to this forum that has more experience with air mobility than I do.

I am telling you, using helicopters as the primary mode of force projection for a large force is impractical. It briefs well, but the cost, maintenance, weather, and fuel considerations make it nearly impossible.

It is a tool in the tool bag, but large armies have always and will always move along the ground.

[William F. Owen]

I've had weather keep me down for longer than 3 weeks (40 days once in Hawai'i), though 3 weeks was longest in a combat theater.

Well I 'll defer to your experience of that, but I'd also suggest that this is a pretty rare situation. I guess mandated operating minima is somewhat responsible, when the Royal Navy is operating in blizzards on the Fortuna glacier - and loosing 2-out of 3 Helicopters but with no deaths.

I am telling you, using helicopters as the primary mode of force projection for a large force is impractical. It briefs well, but the cost, maintenance, weather, and fuel considerations make it nearly impossible.

I agree when qualified with those criteria. I am very sceptical of "Air mobility" for major combat operations, for example. The Air-Mech-Strike stuff for example.

... but I do think we have been remiss in not making more use of Air Re-supply when faced with irregular enemy with very little capability... because why else then do we have helicopters? They exist to be used, and its always better to have more than less.

[Pete]

Perhaps future tactical wheeled vehicles could be designed with chassis and suspensions that allow them to be up-armored without the maneuverability and rollover problems that armored HUMVEEs had. That way basic utility and cargo vehicles could be upgraded from thin-skinned versions to more protected configurations. I'm not an automotive engineer so this wild guess of mine about vehicle design should be taken as just that.

[Ken White]

I doubt there is anyone contributing to this forum that has more experience with air mobility than I do.

As an aside, that's a bad bet around here, surprising folks pop out of the woodwork to respond to challenges.

I am telling you, using helicopters as the primary mode of force projection for a large force is impractical. It briefs well, but the cost, maintenance, weather, and fuel considerations make it nearly impossible.

I for one agree -- but no one has, to my knowledge, suggested moving a large force; rather they have suggested randomly moving a number of small forces who could then be foot (or light vehicle) mobile and be resupplied by air sporadically.

That of course implies competent, confident units, not always present and the will to trust LTs and CPTs, not a plentiful commodity in the US Army. Both those shortfalls can be remedied.

It is a tool in the tool bag, but large armies have always and will always move along the ground.

No question. What constitutes a large Army and where and when it is deployed and in what type of warfare it is engaged can however determine the ratio of ground versus air movement. Or should...

[Fuchs]

The Air-Mech-Strike stuff for example.

It's professionally called "vertical envelopment".


The German air mechanisation concept of the 90's was probably a racket meant to justify two army helicopter programs against peace dividend demands, but it's nevertheless the gold standard for idiotic helicopter warfare ideas imho.

[SJPONeill]

The feasibility issues of the ground versus helo argument aside, doesn't opting for air movement/mobility essentially cede the land environment and the all-important and much vaunted people to the other guy...? An element of devil's advocacy here...while I'm not a bid believer in the stated value of 'the people' to the outcome of these types of conflicts, I certainly don't think it's going to help the war effort if troops are whop-whop-whopping 'safely' overhead while the poor old people endure IEDs, bombings, intimidation etc etc on the ground...

[William F. Owen]

The feasibility issues of the ground versus helo argument aside, doesn't opting for air movement/mobility essentially cede the land environment and the all-important and much vaunted people to the other guy...? An element of devil's advocacy here...while I'm not a bid believer in the stated value of 'the people' to the outcome of these types of conflicts, I certainly don't think it's going to help the war effort if troops are whop-whop-whopping 'safely' overhead while the poor old people endure IEDs, bombings, intimidation etc etc on the ground...

Everything you say is true, if the folks employing the helicopters are stupid. It always amazes me that we just assume that given a tool, folks will be stupid.
The skill to apply the tool within context is required. Armies actually have to be good at warfare.

[SJPONeill]

Sweet...how will an unstupid heliborne force maintain the same level of contact with the people while avoiding the same threat that MRAP was meant to (key = meant to) mitigate?

Subject to any advice from the aviation fraternity, does a helicopter not become exponentially more vulnerable every time it gets close to the ground and they will have to do that a lot to maintain the same level of environmental engagement...

I think that MRAP v Helo becomes moot when you consider the comments quoted by Ken White on the first page of this thread relating to boots on the ground (rergardless of delivery mechanism being how to win this kind of conflict...

And, with all respect to more learned contributors, but ML has a point...anyone who hasn't spent time on the support side of an aviation TG or TF probably hasn't a good handle on exactly what is involved in keeping large organisations of aircraft operating...

[William F. Owen]

Sweet...how will an unstupid heliborne force maintain the same level of contact with the people while avoiding the same threat that MRAP was meant to (key = meant to) mitigate?

By dropping off and recovering foot patrols.

Subject to any advice from the aviation fraternity, does a helicopter not become exponentially more vulnerable every time it gets close to the ground and they will have to do that a lot to maintain the same level of environmental engagement...

It does. Use deception plans. Employ escorting AH. Fly at night, etc etc etc. Using helicopters means running risk.

I think that MRAP v Helo becomes moot when you consider the comments quoted by Ken White on the first page of this thread relating to boots on the ground

Concur. Match the tool to task.

And, with all respect to more learned contributors, but ML has a point...anyone who hasn't spent time on the support side of an aviation TG or TF probably hasn't a good handle on exactly what is involved in keeping large organisations of aircraft operating...

Maybe, but I've I believe spent enough time around military helicopter and, more importantly, helicopter maintainers to effectively understand their limitations within the scope of this basic argument. That is that, effective helicopter support is good to have and requires skilled and sensible employment. The basics of the argument depend entirely on the flight hours available per crew and aircraft, and the operational (not peace time) flight limitations. Cost is really arguing about voodoo magic.

Additionally, I would add that, for example, the US Army or RAF way of doing X or Y with helicopters may not provide the optimum performance that may actually be possible. The truth is usually that X organisation cannot do Y because of A,B,C. Not because it is actually impossible.

Moreover let us not confuse the great skill required to pilot and operate a helicopter with the level of knowledge required to task it effectively. Back in 1970, large quite complicated 14+ aircraft operations were routinely, planned and briefed by 22 year old SF NCOs. In same time period, moving light infantry Battle Groups over 100km were planned by unit commanders and aircraft captains in less than 1 hour. Since then, we have helicopters that are substantially easier to maintain, fly and navigate.

[jcustis]

3 weeks? Show a time and place where this has happened? OK, Arctic circle and Northern Norway. Possible.

...but between the Tropics...SOG operations ran throughout the monsoon. I know of one patrol in Ulster that was "weathered in" for 4 days. Weather got very bad in the Falklands, but it never stopped helicopter operations completely.
None of the Lima Sites in Laos was ever socked in for 3 weeks, - that I am aware of- and numerous locations where Helo-supply only. I'm far more worried about MANPADs than weather.

Wilf,

The reality about weather conditions and flying in limited visibility conditions is simple. It isn't done, I suspect (even when there are times when it's probably really necessary), due to risk and the perceptions on the backlash should several a/c go down trying to fly in "red air". The ability to do it isn't really the issue, just the same as there are a litany of things that impact operations and what/when we are able to operate that would make you scratch your head and go, "how the frack did we let that get like that?" Perhaps M.L. can weigh in on this notion of Wx constraints a bit more.

[jcustis]

I pointed at the truck convoy dependency as an indicator for the inability to dodge the road ambush problem entirely. Targets are available for the Taliban in abundance, and they can simply focus on the supply convoys and less on the patrols at will.

Outside of a few spectacular successes along Route 1 that have garnered more media hype than had actual effect, the TB aren't very good at targeting the logistical tail. These are not your Daddy's mujahadeen.

And, at least for the USMC, logistical support convoys aren't a drain on combat formations. The CSS guys (and gals) do it themselves.

To get back to the original thrust of this poster's question (and BTW, I think we missed the fact that he has not resurfaced with any more input), if not the MRAP in future war, what is the alternative?

I posed the point a few years back that the IED was a revolution in military affairs, but that was understandably knocked down. I'd like to pose to our scholars here a variation on that question. If the IED, used in future applications similar to how it was in OIF and OEF, drives reactions in wheeled and tracked veh development for the future, can that be considered a RMA?

We don't need MRAP, in my opinion, if we lose tactical mobility as a result. We might as well just walk, in most terrain situations. If you need to patrol in vast expanses where there are no people, then no, you don't need MRAP. The deploy I just returned from proves that.

Geronimo's post, which seemed more like an executive summary of sorts, but was back up by comments I agree with, still stands...Will we need MRAPs for the future?

In the Marine Corps, this is a serious question to address if the amphibious capability has to be retained for future contingencies. MRAP constraints are total game-changers when it comes to planning STS movement and even pre-boating them in the first place.

[tequila]

MRAPs should be recognized as the emergency (panic?) measure that they were at the time. We were suffering disproportionate casualties from IEDs at the time in Iraq. MRAPs were seen as a technological, off-the-shelf solution that we could deploy quickly to the troops. Gates was a huge pusher of the MRAP from the understandable desire to "get the warfighter what he needs now", but I don't think any real thought was put into what we would do with a large fleet of engineering vehicles in the future.

I agree with Jcustis that we need to be ruthless about it and junk the MRAP for future operations given the limitations it puts on the force, saving certain design elements should be saved for future light vehicles. Unfortunately, budgets being what they are, I'm not sure if this is in the cards.