All matters MRAP JLTV (merged thread)

[TAH]

Outside of a few spectacular successes along Route 1 that have garnered more media hype than had actual effect, the TB aren't very good at targeting the logistical tail. These are not your Daddy's mujahadeen.

And, at least for the USMC, logistical support convoys aren't a drain on combat formations. The CSS guys (and gals) do it themselves.

To get back to the original thrust of this poster's question (and BTW, I think we missed the fact that he has not resurfaced with any more input), if not the MRAP in future war, what is the alternative?

Glad to see that we can expand our discussion back to the "tail". That is where the biggest bang for the buck is Sorry, could not help myself.

Seesm to be general agreement that the current crop of MRAPs/M-ATVs are something less then ideal troop carriers out at the sharp end of the stick.

However, back in the "rear" where the MSRs live its another story. Not alot of stelly eyed killers (With a nod to our Marine breathen, who appear to be able to self-defend their convoys/Combat Logistic Patrols). For several years now, the Army has been deploying National Guard BCTs for the sole purpose of MSR security/convoy escort.

If that remains the case, then this maybe the best place for MRAPs to operate, in the rear along the MSRs. If not as equipment in mission profiled BCTs then as attachements or plus-ups to either MP companies, truck companies or both.

[Ken White]

SJPOneill:

And, with all respect to more learned contributors, but ML has a point...anyone who hasn't spent time on the support side of an aviation TG or TF probably hasn't a good handle on exactly what is involved in keeping large organisations of aircraft operating...

With an equal amount of respect, how much of that strength is desired versus necessary, a result of peacetime emphasis on factors that receive undue emphasis in such times and are of lesser concern during war? (The US Army is not on a war time footing. Elements are but the Army and the nation are not...) How much is due to very real and necessary concerns for both flight safety and operational capability but exacerbated or increased by open societies and inquisitive news media and a bureaucratic fear of shortfalls? How much is due to the way we western democracies allocate funds in our governmental budgeting process that rewards the larger bureaucracy? How much is due to the residual effects of conscription that once existed in our forces and designed structures where manpower concerns were not an issue? How much is due to structural demands that insist for X rank to be allotted, Y persons must be assigned...

In short, You have a valid point but some of us may have a handle not only on the numbers but the many variations of why. Regardless, reality intrudes and I certainly acknowledge the numbers but do not see them as a deterrent to what several of us have proposed.

I posited more aircraft and fewer MRAPs based on reallocation of funds. My suggestion of more airmobile insertion -- not airmobile operations in the fullest sense in most cases (those would be reserved for very rare occasions...) -- was not predicated on that once possible but now non existent increase but on current assets in theater; just applying some different rules on usage.

Wilf:

Moreover let us not confuse the great skill required to pilot and operate a helicopter with the level of knowledge required to task it effectively. Back in 1970, large quite complicated 14+ aircraft operations were routinely, planned and briefed by 22 year old SF NCOs. In same time period, moving light infantry Battle Groups over 100km were planned by unit commanders and aircraft captains in less than 1 hour. Since then, we have helicopters that are substantially easier to maintain, fly and navigate.

Very true. I may not have the same sort experience in air mobility as that of an Army aviator but I've planned the ground phase on dozens of CAs up to Bn size and smaller unit insertions and extractions, some peacetime but mostly in combat -- and that effectively meant telling the aerial truck drivers what I needed their trucks to do in the way of any required reconnaissance, actual and false LZ operations and so forth as well as the aerial gun jeep drivers what I needed them to do. It also meant getting the USAF FAC or flight leaders in on the show. I use that allegory not at all in the pejorative sense but merely to put some perspective on what's important about the use of air assets in ground combat. The training and skill of the air crews was and is unquestioned but all airborne and airmobile operations are backward planned -- the actions on the ground are first outlined then how to get there and do that is determined. The aircraft are in support.

jcustis:

The reality about weather conditions and flying in limited visibility conditions is simple. It isn't done, I suspect (even when there are times when it's probably really necessary), due to risk and the perceptions on the backlash should several a/c go down trying to fly in "red air". The ability to do it isn't really the issue, just the same as there are a litany of things that impact operations and what/when we are able to operate that would make you scratch your head and go, "how the frack did we let that get like that?" Perhaps M.L. can weigh in on this notion of Wx constraints a bit more.

In answer to the valid question of how it got like that, my belief is that you guys are operating under a more restrictive and risk averse version of the same troubles we had in Korea and Viet Nam -- you're at war, the rest of the country including the services headquarters are not. That risk aversion was present in those wars but it was relatively subdued. It seems far more powerful today and that is, I think, a reflection of the increase of the syndrome in our society at large; the services are merely a reflection of the society to which they belong. The nation has gotten overly cautious, dragging the services along with them. My belief is that given an existential war, that syndrome would be forced into at least abeyance. I hope I'm right on that...

Hopefully, M.L. will weigh in on that. It would also be good if Geronimo would reappear -- he raised a valid question and his opinion is as important as anyone else's here..

And, at least for the USMC, logistical support convoys aren't a drain on combat formations. The CSS guys (and gals) do it themselves.

Very true and good for the Corps. My son has a great tale about two convoys he went to aid in minor firefights in Iraq, one Marine and one Army. Very different approaches. The Army has yet to get that smart, partly, I believe partly due to branch turf battles, partly due to a latent inability, certainly an adamant refusal, to realize that every Soldier really needs to be a rifleman. Yet another legacy of WW I / WW II / Drafted manpower thinking in the US Army...

Tequila:

I agree with Jcustis that we need to be ruthless about it and junk the MRAP for future operations given the limitations it puts on the force, saving certain design elements should be saved for future light vehicles. Unfortunately, budgets being what they are, I'm not sure if this is in the cards.

I think you're correct. However, I hope you're wrong...

[Ken White]

For several years now, the Army has been deploying National Guard BCTs for the sole purpose of MSR security/convoy escort.

If that remains the case, then this maybe the best place for MRAPs to operate, in the rear along the MSRs. If not as equipment in mission profiled BCTs then as attachements or plus-ups to either MP companies, truck companies or both.

Not only ArNG BCTs but also AC Airborne and other BCTs. That is a monumental and IMO inexcusable waste of combat power in the case of either component. It is a testimonial to outdated concepts and an abject failure to adapt.

People are expensive. Training is expensive. Misuse of both is fraud, waste and abuse. Failure to adapt to world conditions is borderline criminal. Two wrongs don't make a right and all that...

I go back to an earlier point on the MRAP -- their presence encourages misuses of units and personnel. The vehicles need to go or they will continue to do that.

[Pete]

I posed the point a few years back that the IED was a revolution in military affairs ...

Does that mean Wilf is counter-revolutionary in things military?

[JMA]

Future of the Army MRAP Force

The Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles have proven their worth in theater where they have obviously become an integral part of combat operations. And regardless of where US troops deploy in the future, the persistent threat of IEDs dictates the continued need for this type of vehicle.

But its not as easy as saying "MRAPs are good, the Army should have them."

[snip]

Conclusion
The MRAPs have proven to be an excellent mission specific mobility asset in the CENTCOM Theater that will undoubtedly be utilized by the US in future combat and contingency operations around the world. Incorporating the MRAPs into the operational Army structure in the ways I described above maximizes this asset’s availability while reducing the high logistical cost burden that would prove untenable in the future.

May I offer that the first difference is whether these vehicles are for the use of motorised or mechanised infantry.

To motorised infantry (I suggest) for the purpose of getting from A to B and not fighting from.

I recommend that one attempts to sidestep the procurement system associated with such equipment development. (How many soldiers must die before the clowns involved with the process get their act together?)

As I mentioned in another thread the modifications to existing vehicle configurations can be carried out in theatre (or in a friendly neighbouring state - not Pakistan) on an as and when required basis. In fact as these vehicles will probably not have any application outside the current theatre all the work can be carried out in this factory on commercially available chassis. After the war they can be handed to the ANA or scrapped.

In Rhodesia a total of some 2,500 landmines were detonated. (No figures for which were military/police or civilian vehicles.) 650 deaths and 4,500 injured. Had a number of drivers who had detonated 3 mines with only some hearing damage.

The photos below represent some of the cheap but effective methods used to protect troops from landmines. The Pookie detected mines and was built on a VW Beetle chassis. The Puma and Crocodile were built on a Isuzu or Nissan 5 ton chassis. The Pig was built on the Unimog 2.5 chassis. All (except the Pookie which used low pressure tyres) had water in the tyres.

[JMA]

Geronimo's post, which seemed more like an executive summary of sorts, but was back up by comments I agree with, still stands...Will we need MRAPs for the future?
.

Of course you will. The word has got out that the IED has discovered the soft underbelly of the modern army.

The trick is to be able to improvise and act quickly as the theatre circumstances demand.

Do a Rhodesia... bang them together in theatre on commerciallly available chassis. Follow up with the mods as and when required and ditch the stuff when you go.

[JMA]

Don't forget the logistical side of helicopter operations. You could easily end up replacing half the infantry in-theatre with army aviation people if helicopters would replace MRAPs unless the overall strength is being raised, which creates again logistical overhead....


An alternative would be to accept that wars kill your citizens, and pro/contra war reasoning should take this into consideration - and thus end up saying no to wars of choice. You won't be able to opt out of the KIA/WIA mess simply by throwing several billions at the bureaucracy and more billions at the contractors whose PAC has supported you or your representative.

Surely not a wholesale change from vehicles to choppers? I guess at least one can expect a more intelligent balance in resources.

[Infanteer]

I can't beleive I missed this one.

Plus villages are where the people live. The key is to travel light and never stay in the same place more than 12 hours. Not as much fun as working out in an ad hoc gym on a FOB that takes an occasional mortar round but eases resupply in many senses and is considerably more effective.

To an extent, yes. You gave me this advice prior to my deployment and although I took it to heart, it lasted me 30 minutes (as a Pl Comd, I didn't really have a choice). Infact, we travelled heavy - couldn't avoid it - and stayed in the same place for 5 months.

Why. To the first part, "travel light" was almost impossible. Water is heavy and we needed lots of it. There was no way of getting around this except for getting around two force protection concerns. First was we couldn't use local water - most of it was mixed with village waste and agricultural fertalizers. Second was to use a small gator to pack extra supplies, but this was a no-no as we had a patrol killed on one some years back and we tried to avoid roads and paths. Result is we carried lots of water and this limited our range unless we got helo resup; dismounted platoon patrols weren't high enough on the list to justify that.

I've heard of the Brits using local water in Helmand; perhaps this was away from the heavily populated areas?

As to "not staying in one place for 12 hours", someone has to stay in the villages - as you mentioned, that's where the people live. Just coming to their village for a fight is a sure way to really piss them off. Someone has to share the security burden with them against a guerilla opponent, otherwise you are just cedeing a vacuum to the enemy. Galula's "Static" and "Mobile" forces is a good analogy. However, putting highly trained and equipped infantry in the static role is, IMO, a waste of resources, as they should be the "mobile force". But, in Afghanistan, we really didn't have anyone else to do the static piece.

I planned week-long patrols; my NCOs gave me wierd looks when I proposed them. First, the idea of long range patrols were limited by an extremely small AO - I could walk from one end of my company AO to the other in a day. Kandahar, although a big province, features quite a dense concentration of forces. Most of the province is deserts and mountains so all the people, those fighting and not fighting, are in a small green space around the Arghandab River.

So, all this is to say that travel light and never stay in the place is a good practice if the METT-TC provides for it.

Outside of a few spectacular successes along Route 1 that have garnered more media hype than had actual effect, the TB aren't very good at targeting the logistical tail. These are not your Daddy's mujahadeen.

Agreed.

And, at least for the USMC, logistical support convoys aren't a drain on combat formations. The CSS guys (and gals) do it themselves.

Us to - service elements generally get their own "force protection" element.

[Ken White]

I can't beleive I missed this one.

Missing the low hanging fruit is the first sign of aging...

To an extent, yes. You gave me this advice prior to my deployment and although I took it to heart, it lasted me 30 minutes (as a Pl Comd, I didn't really have a choice). Infact, we travelled heavy - couldn't avoid it - and stayed in the same place for 5 months.

Totally understandable on all counts. My 'advice' was actually a statement of what I thought should be the policy in-country and I was probably remiss in not having made that very clear -- I also my have not emphasized the METT-TC factors strongly enough (though I rarely miss an opportunity to flay that... ).

Water is heavy and we needed lots of it.

Having soldiered during the days of one canteen and drink the local water (yes it'll make you sick -- for a day or two, then your system adapts -- and I realize this is not acceptable to many today...) I'll simply pass on that item except to comment on this:

Result is we carried lots of water and this limited our range unless we got helo resup; dismounted platoon patrols weren't high enough on the list to justify that.

That, as the Actress said the the Bishop, is a policy problem. Not to make light of it and I understand; I just do not agree with it -- though I acknowledge the thought of using a $20+M bird and four highly trained people to deliver a Blivet or pallet of water to a lowly grunts at a cost of ~$2K an hour or more is frowned upon by many. Shouldn't be but somewhat understandably is.

My solution, long ago was to use far cheaper birds with a single pilot (LINK) . The Marine's solution is far better (LINK).

I've heard of the Brits using local water in Helmand; perhaps this was away from the heavily populated areas?

My son's unit also did that on his 2006 tour out of Kandahar. They had a larger AO and ranged down as far as Spin Boldak and below on two to three week patrols (HMMWV mounted). Water source selection is obviously critical and METT-TC again hits...

As to "not staying in one place for 12 hours", someone has to stay in the villages - as you mentioned, that's where the people live...However, putting highly trained and equipped infantry in the static role is, IMO, a waste of resources, as they should be the "mobile force". But, in Afghanistan, we really didn't have anyone else to do the static piece.

Policy again...

Better decisions early on (i.e. What do we want to do here, is staying required?) might have resulted in a different orientation. Unfortunately, all of NATO is caught up in the failure of the US Army during the 1975-2001 period to address what and how to conduct such campaigns -- or, better, to conduct far differently designed campaigns to achieve the same ends at less cost.

Those "staying in the villages" should be locals, that highly trained Infantry should be doing what they get paid to do -- which is NOT playing Wackenhut Security Guard in a village of 100 people.

So, all this is to say that travel light and never stay in the place is a good practice if the METT-TC provides for it.

I've seen it work and strongly believe that is correct with the caveat that METT-TC MUST rule. My apologies for not emphasizing what should be a force wide policy as opposed to what was or is and for underemphasizing the METT-TC factors. Hope you didn't get embarrassed by adhering to my ramblings...

[Pete]

I'll simply pass on that item ...

Is that anything like Liddell Hart's concept of the "expanding torrent"?

[Infanteer]

Hope you didn't get embarrassed by adhering to my ramblings...

Absolutely not - in fact my boss agreed with and shared my intent, and I think we were both dismayed when we were turned into Wackenhut Security Guards for villages. Hence my disillusionment with pop-centric COIN after doing it for 7 months.

[Fuchs]

First was we couldn't use local water - most of it was mixed with village waste and agricultural fertalizers.

I heard occasionally that the U.S. forces lack good portable water purifiers.

There's some really good stuff available (if you are able and willing to buy enough replacement filters) and I really don't get why its so under-used.

[Kiwigrunt]

Infanteer:

…"travel light" was almost impossible. Water is heavy and we needed lots of it. There was no way of getting around this except for getting around two force protection concerns. First was we couldn't use local water - most of it was mixed with village waste and agricultural fertalizers.

Ken White:

Having soldiered during the days of one canteen and drink the local water (yes it'll make you sick -- for a day or two, then your system adapts -- and I realize this is not acceptable to many today...)

Infanteer:

I've heard of the Brits using local water in Helmand; perhaps this was away from the heavily populated areas?

May be the Brits used purifiers here?
We started using them in Timor and for as far as I know, with great success.
Afghanistan is of course different and issues I can think of from my armchair could be:

• There has to be local water to begin with (duh). In your case, Infanteer, you mentioned that there was, be it contaminated.
• Can the purifier deal with the level of contamination?
• The ‘waterholes’ (well, pump, river…) should not be so few that they become predictable IED spots.
• Fluffing around with purifiers would glue a patrol to a waterhole for some time.

[davidbfpo]

From my armchair I do wonder why such devices as those on the links are not used, adapted etc. Links: http://www.lifesaversystems.com/ and for a longer explanation:http://www.ted.com/talks/lang/eng/mi...er_filter.html

[jcustis]

The photos below represent some of the cheap but effective methods used to protect troops from landmines. The Pookie detected mines and was built on a VW Beetle chassis. The Puma and Crocodile were built on a Isuzu or Nissan 5 ton chassis. The Pig was built on the Unimog 2.5 chassis. All (except the Pookie which used low pressure tyres) had water in the tyres.

JMA, Pookie is reincarnated in "Husky", which is a very capable platform that does its job superbly. Kudos to the guys with the huge brass-ones who drive those things.



At the issue of water purification, if we could employ a reliable filter, we could really reduce a lot of reliance on bulk and bottle water. That is a significant chunk of our logistics tail.

The issue of using the CIF-issued filters came up at least once or twice in my last deploy, but the silly thing is that the in-line filters aren't even issued with specifications that lay out what they filter. That's a terrible flaw in our procurement system. We have filters, but no one in the chain of command knows what they are supposed to protect against.

[SJPONeill]

Making 'good' water is not as simple as just filtration...I note that the Lifesaver bottle only 'reduces' chemical residues and does not filter salts (which are a far broader group than the stuff that is in sea water)...from memory, I don't think that there is any process or combination of processes that will render potable water from some contaminants...

I don't quite remember the one canteen days but definitely recall the days of two canteens and having to fend for ourselves for water for sometimes weeks...one of the factors that I think may have changed between then and know is that then most theatres had relatively good water i.e. not polluted or contaminated except by some local nasties...now, many of our AOs have water sources that are contaminated by industrial and agricultural products that are essentially poisons so the old 'crap it out, harden up' approach may not be as applicable as it once may have been...

However on the water supply issue, I do agree that small patrols, certainly up to company level should be able to be resupplied indefinitely by air with drinking water if the air environment allows (terrain, weather and the other guys)...I always hated the log/med tables that insisted that we had to provide dozens of litres per person per day or ops would be untenable when practicality and experience proved that unwashed soldiers were not necessarily ineffective or undisciplined...

[Ken White]

The problem is that the US Armed Forces are required by law to meet US civilian water purity standards. There are plenty of portable devices or methods out there that produce adequately safe drinking water -- not least Chlorine or Iodine tablet; Aquamira Tablets, among others, are better than either. The problem is that the tablets and most of the devices or filters don't meet the EPA standard. That standard is massive overkill but the bureaucracy will have its way...

For current bulk water production this is used (LINK .pdf) and it is to be replaced by this (LINK) with increased capability and it mounts in / on a HMMWV instead of a HMTT or Mk28 MTVR. The Army has a large number of Water Purification and Distribution units and was prepared for a major war and making much pure water. They were not prepared for a small war and making a little bit of pure water.

There are several smaller variants, including a number of Kärcher units and SOCOM in particular buys and uses outpost sized units. For regular Army Co / Plat size patrols, units buy these (LINK) with own funds. They don't advertise that they have and use them due to the extremely stringent US EPA Water Safety standards. This new item (LINK .pdf) apparently meets the standards and is to be bought on a major contract. Note that it already has a NSN and a GSA contract.

I would make a comment about just ignoring civilian rules in combat zone but that might be considered subversion so I will not do that. Sigh...

[Ken White]

one of the factors that I think may have changed between then and know is that then most theatres had relatively good water i.e. not polluted or contaminated except by some local nasties...now, many of our AOs have water sources that are contaminated by industrial and agricultural products that are essentially poisons so the old 'crap it out, harden up' approach may not be as applicable as it once may have been...

My info from folks in several theaters now or recently is that it's still every bit as applicable, it's just less politically and socially acceptable. We are all risk averse now...

Note that is with the caveat, as always, that a bit of common sense must be applied. Do it on first arrival in theater, in the base area where the sickness (if any) can be better tolerated, that way if you later have to do local water -- or food -- operationally, your body will have already been conditioned to the resident fauna, flora and creepy crawlies. A few toxins now and then keep the immune system well tuned.

Still, even then one has to think. For example, one should succumb to thirst in a rice paddy only if one is really extremely parched. A side benefit to paddy water is that you do get the small Crayfish for protein as well.

At least, I think they were Crayfish...

[Pete]

The filters used to purify water can be extremely expensive. During the mid-1980s the U.S. Army medics tried to develop a system that would purify potable water into what medical professionals call Water for Injection and then mix it with additives to make intravenous and irrigation fluids. As a consultant I wrote several iterations of the logistics plan for the system.

About 90 percent of the estimated military medical logistics burden for a potential World War III was shipping IV and irrigation fluids and medical-grade oxygen overseas. The Army medics decided sending products that are mainly water or air overseas on transport aircraft was patently ridiculous, so they tried to develop systems that would make those products in-theater.

The very expensive reverse-osmosis water filters reject about 40 percent of input water, but during development we found that recycling that water can cause what had been once been trace amounts of toxic minerals to become far more concentrated. Also, the logistics costs of MOS training, increasing the field water purification capability of the Army, transporting it to medical logistics battalions, and storing it in bladders there with the associated pumps and hoses would far exceed the cost of air transporting medical fluids overseas.

Also, there's another consideration -- which kind of IV fluid would you want, pharmaceutical quality or home-made, if you're wounded and about to die?

[82redleg]

Not only ArNG BCTs but also AC Airborne and other BCTs. That is a monumental and IMO inexcusable waste of combat power in the case of either component. It is a testimonial to outdated concepts and an abject failure to adapt.

I'll be the bucket of water on this discussion, and I was in the AC Airborne BCT along with your son. We didn't escort CSS units- we escorted KBR and other contract vehicles. The CSS units escorted themselves.

You can say its a waste of combat power, but at least a BCT doing this mission can do something else the next rotation (or change during the rotation, like we did). The problem is that, in the overall force structure, we cut CSS units- we don't have enough Trans units to move everything we want to move, so we contract KBR (and others) to do it instead. If we have "enough" CSS units, we'd have less BCTS, and the CSS units wouldn't be able to do something else the next rotation.

My solution would be for everyone to live harder, and cut the number of useless HQs units, so we need less stuff in theater. I'm not sure how much difference it would make, but I'd bet we could cut the number of convoys in 1/2, or close to it.