Stop that crazy talk!My solution would be for everyone to live harder, and cut the number of useless HQs units, so we need less stuff in theater.
Stop that crazy talk!My solution would be for everyone to live harder, and cut the number of useless HQs units, so we need less stuff in theater.
Interesting
Well, thanks for the water, I guess...Originally Posted by 82redleg
However, I did not say he was in the BCT that did the route security / convoy escort mission. He was not, had departed for another assignment shortly before that rotation. I said he had responded to attacks on two convoys, one Army, one Marine. That was during an earlier tour in a different Bn, same Bde, outside Fallujah / Abu Gharaib in 2003-04. He and the Platoon responded because the attacks occurred in their AO and the firing was heard. The larger Army convoy was in deep trouble and his and another RD Platoon helped extract them. The Marine Convoy was smaller and in even more trouble and defended itself to the extent that when the 82d Platoon arrived, the GySgt (note the rank of the convoy commander...) in charge of the convoy said thanks for coming but we've got it covered, so the Platoon just pulled back and watched.
I separately mentioned the Airborne BCT and its mission without addressing any type of convoy, the issue was only the infantry BCT being misapplied to an MP mission. Who provided the convoys was immaterial.I certainly can and I believe many would agree. I did not mention I find it particularly troublesome that the BCT had specifically trained for another higher priority mission at the request of a Cdr in-country and was diverted at the last minute to that totally different mission. I know Army politics when I see them and I find it troublesome -- always have, this is not new -- that troops can get yanked around because the Pachyderms are cross with each other and some Staffer does what he thinks (I use the word loosely) might please his Boss.You can say its a waste of combat power...True but that does not excuse the waste for the period of misuse and it totally ignores the disastrous effect on the Troops from such foolishness. Nor does it address the larger problem that it was a poor ad-hoc arrangement. I have no problem with ad hocery, totally support it in fact, it's the American way of war but I sure don't agree with ignorant hoccing....but at least a BCT doing this mission can do something else the next rotation (or change during the rotation, like we did).All true but really indicative of a far larger problem than the number of CSS units or what contractors should do.The problem is that, in the overall force structure...and the CSS units wouldn't be able to do something else the next rotation.
All this is illustrative of an Army that is attempting to operate just as it did when it had 12M personnel in WW II or even 2M in Viet Nam -- even 800K in Desert Storm. That is absolutely unsustainable and trying to operate as we do is patently failing. The Army has steadfastly refused to bite the bullet, reform an archaic personnel system, scrap a terribly flawed training system and impose needed and sensible force structure changes on Branch communities that play politics and conduct turf battles over end strengths and flags. It is not really fair to the people serving and it certainly isn't in the best interests of the nation. Afghanistan and Iraq are wake up calls that are being ignored to the maximum possible extent. That is terribly short sighted. Admittedly, Congress is part of the problem but the Army is so concerned with protecting the institution it seems they've lost track of reality. That's not harsh, that's an understatement -- the handwriting has been on the old wall since the 1980s -- over 20 years.
One can say "We did the entry and major combat mission well..." I would agree. I'll also point out that the caliber of the opponent, Saddam's apparent decision to minimally resist and roll into an insurgency and some luck aided that success -- and that takes nothing away from the commanders and units that did a great job. It does point out that the Army was not prepared to cope with the totally predictable after effects even though the Army itself did accurately predict those effects.I strongly agree in the short term. However, for the long term we -- the Army -- must radically rethink composition, equipment, roles and missions. To operate as some suggest -- more CSS, fewer contractors -- or as we are doing rotating units between AOs on a haphazard basis, using Tank and Arty Bns as Infantry, using Infantry Bns to substitute for MPs in the route security mission, having oversized CSS elements (and Contract elements) that cannot defend themselves has worked ONLY because it's all taking place in relatively benign theaters with fifth rate opposition and no real time pressure. The Troops have done great, they have coped. They deserve better. So does the Nation.My solution would be for everyone to live harder, and cut the number of useless HQs units, so we need less stuff in theater. I'm not sure how much difference it would make, but I'd bet we could cut the number of convoys in 1/2, or close to it.
We are inviting disaster if we attempt this mickey mouse stuff in the FID role or anything like it against a reasonably competent determined enemy with any decent strength in numbers...
Apparently, according to an IDF Colonel at their Staff Collage, I am "Classical Orthodox!"
...but as concerns IEDs, back in 1948, the UK designed the Saladin and Saracen, both of which were pretty good at protecting their crews against land mines like the TM-46. You'd loose a wheel and might roll over, but usually the hull held.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Well to secure a population you don't need to live with them you can achieve that by isolating them from the insurgents... that is if they don't come from that village in the first place.
I posted a mention of this product some months ago.
Lifesaver Systems
You can recycle your own urine as well...
Note: I have no commercial interest in this product whatsoever.
Yes... that's the one.
The Husky has South African origins. Link
What are the Brits using?
I've tried this. The CEO of the Company actually got me to drink some water out of the reflecting pools in Washington DC! I was very impressed. Works very well, and ideal for scavenging water from the environment.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
There are some filters which don't let anything pass that's larger than a water molecule.
I can't tell anything about their affordability and durability, though.
My plan is to make that a habit of mine.
Ken,Well, thanks for the water, I guess...
....
You're right- when people moved gets vague very quickly as time passes.
I agree with all of the points you are making- but your're mis-reading the facts of what we did on that deployment in support of your points.
The change in mission, that you find "particularly troublesome" changed because of the surge- when everyone was extended, lots of AOs got switched to align rotations, and we ended up with a crappy mission- I don't think the politics of the pachyderms had much to do with that. Lots of units (a) went early, (b) went somewhere they didn't plan on going or (c) got moved around in theater. We politicked for the special mission (if its the one I'm thinking of), but were never assigned it.
Still, I agree with your points about updating our training and personnel system- just the specific facts of our deployment don't point to those issues as much as the ad hoccery that happens in war.
We'll likely never know -- sorta immaterial in any event...
Not the facts of what you did, that's a matter of record and you acknowledge the mission. We only differ on the matter of how and why you got the mission.Based on things told me at the time by several people not related, your points contributed to the change but were not the determinant.The change in mission, that you find "particularly troublesome" changed because of the surge...Those folks also disagree on that first point but do agree on the second. The original was requested by one GO and was disapproved of, verbally, by another leading to a staff decision. There is no question that the original mission was ever agreed to or assigned by CentCom and MNF-I.We politicked for the special mission (if its the one I'm thinking of), but were never assigned it.
No matter, really, water under the bridge. Without being directly involved, we'll never know the totality of the rationales -- if any...
The basic point -- and the 'surge' effort and chaos clearly proves it -- is that the overall Iraq mission was not well conducted and, specifically, that the assignment of experienced infantry BCTs to route security while assigning Armor and FA Bns re-roled duty as Infantry is, ummm, questionable...
To go to such extremes in an existential war is understandable. To do it in a war of choice is folly.
Add or Swap
So, MRAPs and MSR security/convoy escort seem to be OK.
If we need/want CSS units to self-defend, we need to ensure they are: organized, equipped, manned and trained to do so.
Light/Medium Trcuk, Medium Truck and PLS Companies have 50-60 trucks each. HET Companies have 96.
So how many MRAP escorts should be organic to each company?
I'm thinking 1 MRAP per 8-10 mission trucks. If we add a unit of 8-10 MRAPs we also add 25-30 PAX to each unit.
If we swap mission trucks for MRAPs we would lose close to 20% of the lift capabiity and would still need to add 8-10 PAX as mission trucks will normally only have a 2-man crew and MRAPs shouild probably have at least 3, just like the existing MP gun trucks.
I remember in the mid-1980s when the Military Intelligence branch suggested they should be in charge of rear area security in divisions and to do so they should have an assigned Infantry company so they could play Army just like the big kids.
100% agree.The basic point -- and the 'surge' effort and chaos clearly proves it -- is that the overall Iraq mission was not well conducted and, specifically, that the assignment of experienced infantry BCTs to route security while assigning Armor and FA Bns re-roled duty as Infantry is, ummm, questionable...
To go to such extremes in an existential war is understandable. To do it in a war of choice is folly.
Subtract
I don't think MRAPs are good for much of anything. The MPs are supposed to have the convoy escort / route security mission in the rear -- so let them do that with their M 1117s. If route clearance is necessary, that's an Engineer job with specialist vehicles, not MRAPs. One can only add so much armor, the best soution to IEDs and mines is avoidance or elimination.
A better question is how do we eliminate the need for preferably all, hopefully most but at least some of those manpower intensive convoys and escorts...
Convoys are big slow moving targets and have been for over 5,000 years. Add the fact that nowadays, there really is no rear area and you're confronted with the fact we need to look at alternatives. We discovered those facts in Viet Nam, 45+ years ago -- and did nothing...
The elimination is simple. Use dispersed truck movement and secure the area or route.
From Tom Ricks:
Again, I've been hearing about a general shortage of helo's in Afghanistan for a few years now. Just sayin.I remember how I used to listen to various NATO officials complain about how member nations were not sending enough helicopters to Afghanistan. Now it appears that the chickens have come home to roost: The Canadian media is reporting that the Canadian Ministry of Defence has quietly leased a bunch of Russian helicopters to use in southern Afghanistan.
Supporting "time-limited, scope limited military actions" for 20 years.
MRAPs, armour, and tactical flexibility
Apologies if this has already been posted elsewhere and I missed it, but I'm sure many will be nodding in agreement (not necessary on the M1 issue, but rather on the transportation/tactical flexibility/risk aversion issue):
Tanks, But No Tanks
Why heavy armor won't save Afghanistan.
Foreign Policy Magazine
BY MICHAEL WALTZ | NOVEMBER 24, 2010
To be clear, fault does not lie with the MRAP, MATV, or any other armored vehicle. It lies with how commanders are using the vehicles due to their aversion to risk and their attempts to minimize coalition injuries at the expense of the broader counterinsurgency mission. The vehicles' size would not be a hindrance to that mission if junior coalition commanders were also authorized to use other smaller vehicles to access the difficult areas of Afghanistan. For example, if a unit needed to access a village that was only accessible by pickup truck or Humvee, then that is what they would use.
This, however, was not the case during my most recent tour in southeastern Afghanistan, which ended in February of this year. What I found is that commanders were mandating the use of MRAPs only. If a unit did not have MRAPs or some other type of armored vehicle, then troopers were not allowed to leave the base at all.
This sounds like a minor tactical issue, but its consequences are having strategic effects on how we conduct the war and our ability to access the population. As one frustrated company commander told me after the directive, "If an MRAP can't get there, we don't go there. I need the flexibility to decide what type of vehicle to use."
Another commander, looking up at the hills and mountains surrounding his camp, lamented that he was now unable to access more than 70 percent of his assigned districts. "My men can only walk so far with their body armor on," he said as we chatted near the line of Humvees he could no longer use. To make matters worse, there was an additional requirement of a minimum of four vehicles in order to leave the wire even when a unit didn't have enough working MRAPs to meet the requirement.
This seemingly cautious approach not only contradicts the principles behind our counterinsurgency strategy, but it is actually reckless: It will end up causing more casualties in the long run than it prevents in the short run. Using only these behemoth vehicles prevents U.S. troops from accessing large portions of the populace and allows insurgent IED cells to flourish in areas relatively easy to reach by other means. We cannot protect a populace we do not allow ourselves to access.
...
It may be counterintuitive, but we actually need less armor, and we need to be more flexible and unpredictable. Instead of dictating that no unit can leave its base unless in an MRAP or MATV, we must allow them to use Humvees, all-terrain vehicles, snowmobiles, and ruggedized pickup trucks when appropriate. Knowing their movements are being watched at all times, units need to use deception, such as varying the time of day and night they move, their routes of travel, and the types of vehicles in which they conduct missions, to keep the insurgents constantly guessing. Insurgents cannot possibly booby-trap and watch every road, trail, and wadi in Afghanistan but they can and do hammer us on the few roads that will support armored vehicles.
This is a very unconventional war being waged in the most difficult terrain possible, and we are responding very conventionally. Instead of allowing such ingenuity and its associated risk, the coalition's default response has been to add more armor and widgets to ever larger vehicles that are the very antithesis of basic counterinsurgency operations.
...
They mostly come at night. Mostly.
- university webpage: McGill University
- conflict simulations webpage: PaxSims
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