MRAPs Can't Stop Newest Weapon
31 May USA Today - MRAPs Can't Stop Newest Weapon by Tom Vanden Brook.
New military vehicles that are supposed to better protect troops from roadside explosions in Iraq aren't strong enough to withstand the latest type of bombs used by insurgents, according to Pentagon documents and military officials.
As a result, the vehicles need more armor added to them, according to a January Marine Corps document provided to USA TODAY. The Pentagon faced the same problem with its Humvees at the beginning of the war.
The military plans to spend as much as $25 billion for up to 22,000 Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles by 2009. Last month, Defense Secretary Robert Gates declared that buying the new vehicles should be the Pentagon's top procurement priority.
But the armor on those vehicles cannot stop the newest bomb to emerge, known as an explosively formed penetrator (EFP)...
Hey, if my M1A1 can't keep the EFP from punching through, there isn't alot of wheeled vehicles that are going to do it. Fortunately the amount EFP IEDs are only a small percentage what the troops find daily. Granted, they are much more lethal but I'd rather have my guys in an MRAP than an uparmored humvee. At least we're making improvements against the most common type of IED out there. IMHO, the way to defeat EFP IEDs is to continue to go after the builders, the suppliers and the cells planting these sophisticated devices.
"But the bravest are surely those who have the clearest vision of what is before them, glory and danger alike, and yet withstanding, go out to meet it."
-Thucydides
Perhaps this article should be cut and pasted in the "Why I hate journalists" topic. I read it earlier today, and I'm certain I've read more poorly written articles, but I cannot remember exactly where......
I'll bet it was some "why the US will lose" piece written by a lefty "military analyst."Originally Posted by 120mm
John Wolfsberger, Jr.
An unruffled person with some useful skills.
No, actually it is a "non-news" piece, written by a journalist who doesn't have the slightest idea what he/she is talking about. EFPs, by definition, can defeat ANY vehicle. You could construct an EFP that could defeat the Hoover Dam, if you chose to. And MRAP stands for "Mine-Resistent", not "Mine-Proof." The article is simply an attempt to spread hysteria and appear to be controversial by an ignorant "journalist" who lacks the talent and commitment to do their job, correctly. As a friend told me yesterday, "never assume ill-will, until you've ruled out sheer incompetence."
Very similar to the hatchet pieces being circulated about the M16/M4 by folks like Bryan Cox, to name names, who always seems to write about Heckler and Koch products in glowing terms, (omitting all sorts of inconvenient "facts" about weapons development and availability) and the current Army system as a dangerous failure. Irresponsible journalism like this doesn't help inspire confidence in soldiers' weapons.
Vehicle Delay Blamed for Marines' Deaths
Vehicle Delay Blamed for Marines' Deaths by Richard Lardner, Associated Press.
More at the link above.Hundreds of U.S. Marines have been killed or injured by roadside bombs in Iraq because Marine Corps bureaucrats refused an urgent request in 2005 from battlefield commanders for blast-resistant vehicles, an internal military study concludes.
The study, written by a civilian Marine Corps official and obtained by The Associated Press, accuses the service of "gross mismanagement" that delayed deliveries of the mine-resistant, ambush-protected trucks for more than two years...
Among the findings in the Jan. 22 study:
• Budget and procurement managers failed to recognize the damage being done by IEDs in late 2004 and early 2005 and were convinced the best solution was adding more armor to the less-sturdy Humvees the Marines were using. Humvees, even those with extra layers of steel, proved incapable of blunting the increasingly powerful explosives planted by insurgents.
• An urgent February 2005 request for MRAPs got lost in bureaucracy. It was signed by then-Brig. Gen. Dennis Hejlik, who asked for 1,169 of the vehicles. The Marines could not continue to take "serious and grave casualties" caused by IEDs when a solution was commercially available, wrote Hejlik, who was a commander in western Iraq from June 2004 to February 2005.
Gayl cites documents showing Hejlik's request was shuttled to a civilian logistics official at the Marine Corps Combat Development Command in suburban Washington who had little experience with military vehicles. As a result, there was more concern over how the MRAP would upset the Marine Corps' supply and maintenance chains than there was in getting the troops a truck that would keep them alive, the study contends.
• The Marine Corps' acquisition staff didn't give top leaders correct information. Gen. James Conway, the Marine Corps commandant, was not told of the gravity of Hejlik's MRAP request and the real reasons it was shelved, Gayl writes. That resulted in Conway giving "inaccurate and incomplete" information to Congress about why buying MRAPs was not hotly pursued.
• The Combat Development Command, which decides what gear to buy, treated the MRAP as an expensive obstacle to long-range plans for equipment that was more mobile and fit into the Marines Corps' vision as a rapid reaction force. Those projects included a Humvee replacement called the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle and a new vehicle for reconnaissance and surveillance missions.
The MRAPs didn't meet this fast-moving standard and so the Combat Development Command didn't want to buy them, according to Gayl. The study calls this approach a "Cold War orientation" that suffocates the ability to react to emergency situations.
• The Combat Development Command has managers — some of whom are retired Marines — who lack adequate technical credentials. They have outdated views of what works on the battlefield and how the defense industry operates, Gayl says. Yet they are in position to ignore or overrule calls from deployed commanders.
MRAP JLTV concept of infantry mobility
A General Concept of Infantry Mobility
I would be interested in the board’s opinions as to MRAP and JLTV “type” vehicles as a base line for general (not all) infantry mobility.
Generally,
- They are better protected than APCs, in general overall terms. (mines and direct fire)
- They have very low comparative running and acquisition costs.
- They have less dust and noise signature for the same given weight.
- They have less mobility under certain soil conditions (deep mud).
YES, we will still need APCs (tracked and wheeled) but as a general approach, for addressing purely protected mobility, against most likely threats they would seem to have considerable merit. Some are designed better than others and some features are better thought out than others, but opinions on this may be worth discussing especially if specific designs are suggested as starting points.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
"better", "less" - in comparison to what?
The cross-country mobility of MRAPs has to be poor on all soft or hard but uneven terrains judged by the mean maximum ground pressure and the running gear.
Such vehicles only provide road mobility. They can negotiate difficult terrain sometimes, but not reliably enough to be used off-road regularly.
The protection is highly specialized against blast, crude EFP and obsolete RPGs. I bet that these vehicles don't have bomblet protection.
The costs are much higher than the costs of unprotected trucks and trucks with protected cabins.
MRAP is huge, even the "smaller" versions. These vehicles cannot easily be hidden against competent enemies with modern sensor technology.
But let's ignore the technical aspects for a while. The focus on armour to enhance survivability seems to me as an outgrowth of LI warfare. It worked because the opponents have only very limited lethality.
An opponent with modern lethality would easily destroy such vehicles despite their armour. There's a reason why so many people demand equal protection of IFVs and MBTs - even IFVs are not really survivable enough in a HIC.
Survivability in HIC requires to keep one's position unknown. Vehicles need to be easily concealable and if possible be silent and leave no traces offroad.
MRAP-sized vehicles cannot be easily hidden and their protection won't help much against battlefield weapons, so I'd say they're the wrong choice.
In short:
MRAP/JLTV look fine as LIC survivable mobility tools if the fuel supply is guaranteed (fuel consumption could be much lower without tons of armour).
I don't trust light armour as stand-alone survivability solution in higher intensity warfare.
So what's the solution to giving all infantry formations sustainable and viable protected mobility? What do you suggest?
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Leather cadillacs and e-tools?
I had an MRAP for two months on my last tour. Fantastic vehicle for convoy ops - it's like having a Tactical Escalade compared to the Humvee. Useless offroad, though. We couldn't travel more than 10-15 kph offroad, and even then you had better be strapped in tight. I operated with an M113 briefly, until my CoC told me to cease and desist from operating Army vehicles, and in retrospect I loved the mobility it provided me over the MRAP. I think tracked vehicles are going to continue to be a better solution for all-around mobility. If we rely on MRAP-type vehicles, we've done part of the enemy commander's job for him by canalizing ourselves on existing roads.
I think that long fast road moves are going to become increasingly important. That means putting tracked APCs on low-loaders and that takes a lot of time and then you are road bound anyway.
I perceive protected road mobility as extremely important, in all conflict. The security of paved surface for wheeled traffic has been pretty inherent to conflict for the past 80 or so years. The world is becoming more and not less paved.
It's worth just taking a look at this,
http://www.defense-update.com/products/w/wildcat.htm
It costs about 1/3rd of what Stryker does, and to my mind is more capable, in that given a choice, I would select this over Stryker.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
I see no all-round solution. I doubt that infantry that's properly embedded in the population really needs armoured trucks for road travels in COIN.
I'd integrate local militiamen into community-embedded platoons/companies anyway; the locals would create a safe environment and warn of dangers more thoroughly with some of them on every "foreign" vehicle anyway.
Soldiers could also use local transport vehicles on raids and intelligence missions.
For higher intensity conflict I'd suggest light trucks (a new category of light trucks!)
- partially fragmentation protected (up to level I (~ 9x19mm ball short barrel, a bit more protection than old kevlar flak vests), also the tarpaulin, windshield and door windows)
- minimized ground clearance when parking (hydropneumatic suspension)
- low height (folding windshield, fragmentation protection panels and roll-over bar)
- probably small enough for civilian car garages (folding mirrors, cabin accessible through folded windshield, bumpers all-round)
- prepared for quick camouflage and de-camouflaging with nets (also capable to fake urban objects with different camouflage materials)
- very low noise level
- self-recovery winch on 50% of vehicles
- several large fuel tanks, several small fresh water tanks, high mpg
- capable to cross irrigation trenches, fences, wet grassland
- driver sits in center, left and right sit gunners with good automatic firepower (pintle mounts)
Such a truck would survive indirect HE fires less well, but it would be much less likely under such and other fires. The small signature to enemy reconnaissance would increase the uncertainty for the enemy.
Imagine an infantry company occupies a community close to a major city to block an important road nearby. It's no rural community, so there's no barn. MRAPs cold be parked under gas stations , but most of them only in the open.
An enemy 5 lbs drone makes a fly-over and the enemy knows almost all truck positions and the defender strength. 320mm MRL and 142mm SPH flatten the community with HE, a mech company approaches combat-like and clears the ruins.
Imagine a company occupying the community with my light truck design; you could send much better recon assets, even drive through with some recon AFVs and would still not become aware of the occupation.
In high intensity warfare you need to defeat their sensors, not their munitions for survivability.
Some people believe that "stealth" doesn't work on the ground. They think too much of Arab deserts imho.
Last edited by Fuchs; 07-07-2008 at 12:20 PM.
Stryker and ASV, too?
I'm not sure whether I've unpacked your last paragraph correctly, but I am curious as to why your "MRAP and JLTV" query did not also mention the Stryker family of vehicles, as well as the Armored Security Vehicle. I recently attended a short briefing on the former, and was struck by some tactical and organizational advantages in its current use. For example:
- Tactical: Moving quietly on the battlefield.
- Organizational: Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCT) are organized one battalion "heavier" than other BCT types.
Regarding the ASV, I note that some U.S. infantry with which I am affiliated deployed to OIF Security Force (SECFOR) missions were issued ASV, rather than armored Humvees. I don't know whether this was in order to make them provisional Military Police in all but name, but it did have implications for how they moved and fought.
I mention the Stryker and ASV as two other possible conceptual platforms from which to generate (or should I say "dismount?) some discussions, observations-insights and lessons regarding infantry mobility.
(Just saw your new post regarding the "Wildcat" concept. Must've hit the "send" key around the same time.)
Last edited by Randy Brown; 07-07-2008 at 01:47 PM.
L2I is "Lessons-Learned Integration."
-- A lesson is knowledge gained through experience.
-- A lesson is not "learned" until it results in organizational or behavioral change.
-- A lesson-learned is not "integrated" until shared successfully with others.
I tried not to mention Stryker but the points raised sort of forced me into it for the sake of clarity - something i guess I should try harder for!!-
Both Stryker and ASV seems to have very poor levels of protection. I think technology, operational reality and threat have all left Stryker far behind, but it's here now so folks will have to deal with it.
Another interesting vehicle is the Australian Bushmaster
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
William,
Could you point me to the source of your information, or explain your reasoning? Based on my knowledge, the first assertion is completely wrong, and the next two are debatable.
APCs offer more protection than either of these. In addition, the MRAP's gain underneath mine protection at the expense of vehicle dynamics and increased vulnerability to blast from the side (i.e. they blow over easy).
John Wolfsberger, Jr.
An unruffled person with some useful skills.
I must have missed those points previously, but JW is dead on methinks.
Sure. The sources generally come from wide variety of documentation as well as talking directly with the manufacturers of both MRAPs and APCs. The reasoning is basically as follows.
a.) They are better protected than APCs, in general overall terms. (mines and direct fire)
I can't find an data for an existing and in service APC/MICV meets STANAG 4569 level 3 and/or 4, for both direct fire, fragmentation and under wheel and chassis mine detonation. I can find APCs (M113 variants) that can meet STANAG 4569 level 4, for direct fire, but not under-wheel mine detonation. I think Boxer may, meet both (ARTEC won't say) but it's 32 tonnes compared with 18 tonnes for some MRAPs. - which is why I caveated the statement with "in general overall terms."
b.) They have very low comparative running and acquisition costs. This is from manufactures and pure extrapolation from those designs using COTS technologies and those requiring or that have already incurred extensive development costs. Compare the costs of developing Boxer to that of even the better MRAPs. Running costs is based on the same assumptions. Wildcat and costs the same to run as a commercial TATRA truck.
c.) They have less dust and noise signature for the same given weight.
Four wheels produce less mechanical noise and surface disruption than eight or six.
...but I am not claiming these as absolute or categoric statements in support of some argument. Data indicates that MRAP examples show very good levels of ALL-ROUND protection versus a WEIGHT and COST argument that I do not see APCs readily matching right now.
I am not attempting an MRAP versus APC argument. Mobility alone assures APCs bright future
If you have open source data that shows any of these assumptions to be flawed, I'd be extremely and genuinely grateful. As a Clausewitzian, I am far more comfortable clinging to orthodoxy, than I am wrestling with innovation and all the attention it attracts!
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
The clarity makes sense.
I got back late last year and fought in Mosul, inside the city for the most part. My squad had uparmoured humvees and a single ASV. I liked having an ASV, it was great to haul broken humvee's and is fast and agile, although the crew was stuck inside for the durationof the patrol.
The humvee simply cannot haul enough troops around for any mout senario, 3 dismounts per truck isn't nearly enough to search multiple buildings. This is assuming a 4 truck patrol. I really envied the infantry with the stryker-fast, really quiet and it held enough troops to be useful and was resistant to most IED's despite having a flat hull. The humvee, on the other hand has close to zero armour on the bottom.
Frankly, for the US this conversation should have been taking place twenty years ago. The US army failed to learn the lessons of the Rhodesian/South African and Northern Ireland conflict and adopt mine protected vehicles. Just another example of a cold war army adapting to a 'modern' counterinsurgency.
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