All matters MRAP JLTV (merged thread)

[William F. Owen]

Could you point me to the source of your information, or explain your reasoning? Based on my knowledge, the first assertion is completely wrong, and the next two are debatable.

APCs offer more protection than either of these. In addition, the MRAP's gain underneath mine protection at the expense of vehicle dynamics and increased vulnerability to blast from the side (i.e. they blow over easy).

Sure. The sources generally come from wide variety of documentation as well as talking directly with the manufacturers of both MRAPs and APCs. The reasoning is basically as follows.

a.) They are better protected than APCs, in general overall terms. (mines and direct fire)

I can't find an data for an existing and in service APC/MICV meets STANAG 4569 level 3 and/or 4, for both direct fire, fragmentation and under wheel and chassis mine detonation. I can find APCs (M113 variants) that can meet STANAG 4569 level 4, for direct fire, but not under-wheel mine detonation. I think Boxer may, meet both (ARTEC won't say) but it's 32 tonnes compared with 18 tonnes for some MRAPs. - which is why I caveated the statement with "in general overall terms."

b.) They have very low comparative running and acquisition costs. This is from manufactures and pure extrapolation from those designs using COTS technologies and those requiring or that have already incurred extensive development costs. Compare the costs of developing Boxer to that of even the better MRAPs. Running costs is based on the same assumptions. Wildcat and costs the same to run as a commercial TATRA truck.

c.) They have less dust and noise signature for the same given weight.
Four wheels produce less mechanical noise and surface disruption than eight or six.

...but I am not claiming these as absolute or categoric statements in support of some argument. Data indicates that MRAP examples show very good levels of ALL-ROUND protection versus a WEIGHT and COST argument that I do not see APCs readily matching right now.

I am not attempting an MRAP versus APC argument. Mobility alone assures APCs bright future

If you have open source data that shows any of these assumptions to be flawed, I'd be extremely and genuinely grateful. As a Clausewitzian, I am far more comfortable clinging to orthodoxy, than I am wrestling with innovation and all the attention it attracts!

[jcustis]

The clarity makes sense.

[VMI_Marine]

...and why would many Marines would prefer to do so? Comfort? Protection? Simplicity?

Wilf, if I'm still completely missing your point, I apologize, but I'm having a hard time grasping exactly what thesis you're proposing here. I think your mention of the French MRAP-mounted battlegroup might have finally cleared it up for me, but we'll see.

The only advantage MRAPs confer, by design, is protection. I liked my MRAP in Iraq solely because of the comm suite (ok, the TC seat was a lot more roomy and comfortable than an M1114 ), which was superior to most Humvees. It had 3 multiband radios, which was vital since I had typically had to work LOS and SATCOM nets at the same time. This not specific to MRAPs, however, during the period that the Army loaned me that M113 I had the same capability. The MRAP just made it look sexier.

I really don't see the advantage to mounting an infantry force in MRAPs. MTVRs and such provide better mobility with adequate protection, in addition to much better troop capacity. The MRAP is a fine vehicle for convoy and route security, but it does not work well outside of its niche.

[Ken White]

...I really don't see the advantage to mounting an infantry force in MRAPs. MTVRs and such provide better mobility with adequate protection, in addition to much better troop capacity. The MRAP is a fine vehicle for convoy and route security, but it does not work well outside of its niche.

Add to that the cost difference (initial plus more parts and fuel due to excessive weight) and range limitations due to that extra weight; the MRAP advantages do not offset the disadvantages and the cost isn't justified.

A convoy of MRAPs under air attack -- or in a well planned ambush -- will fare little if any better than a convoy of MTVRs or FMTVs.

Sounds to me like a defense contractor is proposing this idea in order to replace his current swimming pool with an Olympic sized pool...

[William F. Owen]

Wilf, if I'm still completely missing your point, I apologize, but I'm having a hard time grasping exactly what thesis you're proposing here. I think your mention of the French MRAP-mounted battlegroup might have finally cleared it up for me, but we'll see.

I think it is I who should apologise if I am not making myself clear! - but that said, I don't have really have a point. It's more a question, and I am getting some answered.

More over, if MRAPs are as limited as their detractors imply, then why have they evolved in the way they have, with the capabilities we see today. They are almost of the purest form of functional military equipment I have ever seen, so seeing that they fulfil a clear operational need, my basic suspicion is that the better designs may have utility beyond they theatres and conflicts we currently see them in.

...and I come from a tradition of going to war as 8-10 men inside an FV-432, or 8-6 men in a Saracen, and when push came to shove, 4 men in Land Rover or 16 men in a 4 tonne truck. Only the Saracen ever impressed me!

[jcustis]

As far as evolution and all-round utility, we got to where we are because of the mother's of America syndrome, plain and simple, IMO.

Heck, from what I hear, some of the designs first fielded to Iraq didn't even tow points. Go figure.

[William F. Owen]

As far as evolution and all-round utility, we got to where we are because of the mother's of America syndrome, plain and simple, IMO.

So it's an over reaction to casulty sensitivity? So does FMTV strike the right balance between utility and protection?

[J Wolfsberger]

So it's an over reaction to casulty sensitivity? So does FMTV strike the right balance between utility and protection?

I think so, for its purpose. And thanks for the clarification.

[Uboat509]

I have not yet worked with the MRAP so I do not have first hand knowledge of them. What I do know is that the biggest killer among IEDs in Iraq is the underbody explosion. EFPs get a lot of attention because they are relatively sophisticated and are difficult to defend against because of their ability to penetrate a lot of armor. Underbody attacks, on the other hand, are very unsophisticated, basically a whole lot of boom buried under the road. The thing is an EFP is a linear weapon. The spall that it generates when it penetrates can seriously injure or kill but often it takes a direct hit to kill, meaning that it can kill one or more people in the vehicle depending on seating and the angle of the strike. Even a direct hit can be survivable depending on where it hits and who is seated nearby. Underbody attacks are not at all sophisticated, relying on pure brute force to pulverize the vehicle and its contents. Underbody attacks are often not survivable and will generally kill everyone on the vehicle rather than just the unlucky ones seated in the way. As far as I can see the MRAP was designed to answer that problem and mostly that problem alone. I am simply not sure that they were really considering all the other variables that have been discussed on this board so far. I don't think that they were really thinking about how these would fare in a head to head conventional fight. I suspect that they were concerned with how these will fare in this fight, right here, right now. As far as I can tell, these things are just about perfect for that role.

SFC W

[Cavguy]

I don't think that they were really thinking about how these would fare in a head to head conventional fight. I suspect that they were concerned with how these will fare in this fight, right here, right now. As far as I can tell, these things are just about perfect for that role.

SFC W

Exactly! People miss that when getting wrapped around the axle over the MRAP's shortcomings as a multi-purpose tactical vehicle. It exists to protect soldiers in the unique environments of Iraq and (lesser case) Afghanistan.

That was actually the delay in getting more fielded - the military procurement/force integration staffs didn't see it as having lots of general-purpose utility in the future. Gates shut that argument down hard, to his credit.

[Fuchs]

Maybe it would be interesting to look for its limitations. The general purpose usefulness depends on how much it's specialized or not.

My list of possible shortcomings (in comparison to modern APC project wish lists) that don't hurt in Iraq:

- side slope capability / usefulness in mountaineous terrain
- usefulness in snowy terrain
- no heater (?), possibly not prepared for sub-zero temperatures
- very large/visible
- very limited off-road mobility
- no bomblet protection
- some MRAP have less seating capacity than necessary to fit in a full squad
- no standardization; spare part logistical nightmare

And the vehicles will of course be (almost) worn out after the war.

[arty8]

I got back late last year and fought in Mosul, inside the city for the most part. My squad had uparmoured humvees and a single ASV. I liked having an ASV, it was great to haul broken humvee's and is fast and agile, although the crew was stuck inside for the durationof the patrol.

The humvee simply cannot haul enough troops around for any mout senario, 3 dismounts per truck isn't nearly enough to search multiple buildings. This is assuming a 4 truck patrol. I really envied the infantry with the stryker-fast, really quiet and it held enough troops to be useful and was resistant to most IED's despite having a flat hull. The humvee, on the other hand has close to zero armour on the bottom.

Frankly, for the US this conversation should have been taking place twenty years ago. The US army failed to learn the lessons of the Rhodesian/South African and Northern Ireland conflict and adopt mine protected vehicles. Just another example of a cold war army adapting to a 'modern' counterinsurgency.

[William F. Owen]

Exactly! People miss that when getting wrapped around the axle over the MRAP's shortcomings as a multi-purpose tactical vehicle. It exists to protect soldiers in the unique environments of Iraq and (lesser case) Afghanistan.

Concur. My take, is that it may well be useful to look at these vehicles as having wider utility, and especially for transporting infantry over operational distances. I am not suggesting they follow the tanks across the start line, when confronting a combined arms armour enemy.

Arty 8

Frankly, for the US this conversation should have been taking place twenty years ago. The US army failed to learn the lessons of the Rhodesian/South African and Northern Ireland conflict and adopt mine protected vehicles. Just another example of a cold war army adapting to a 'modern' counterinsurgency.

Exactly. The MRAP designs that have appeared in the last 5 years have made me really question the design and requirements criteria behind things like Stryker and the UK FRES.

From what I saw in Paris last month, even the Russians are now selling/proposing MRAP/JLTV type designs.

[jcustis]

Given the cost of their procurement, I'm not sure what MRAPs have to offer, outside of countering the IED and mine threats. Now, if the designs could be such that ground pressure per axle is reduced, profile/height is lowered, and there was a decent weight to power ratio, they may indeed have wider utility. I do not know what a troop's combat effectiveness would be after a 12 he ride in a current design, across moderately broken ground, because the ride can be very rough due to seat design.

As for not following tanks past the start line, where would they be? I don't have stats on how many troops were motorized vs. Mech'd up in March 2003, but I don't think we could have afforded single-role troop transport vehs. That is the beauty of things like the MTVR. Need to carry troops? Pop the seats up. Got a cargo mission? Drop them. Have you seen any current designs with that sort of modularity?

As for matters of Stryker design, 8-wheelers have been around for a ton of time. Is it something about the Army's use of Stryker that seems off, or simply the platform in general, as it relates to protection and lift?

Unless my stats are off, MRAPs don't have any dash speed comparable to Strykers or LAVs, and they certainly cannot traverse anywhere similar terrain. Outside of the COIN scenario we face now, can anyone help me see a wider utility?

They may be perfect for this role, but we cannot afford to stock MPF or gray-bottom amphibs with them...or can we? Do we need to have a COIN MRAP ability staged for introduction around the beginning of phase IV?


At the end of the day, nothing beats patrolling the beat on foot. Commuting to work, call the MRAP taxi I suppose.

[Tom Odom]

Unless my stats are off, MRAPs don't have any dash speed comparable to Strykers or LAVs, and they certainly cannot traverse anywhere similar terrain. Outside of the COIN scenario we face now, can anyone help me see a wider utility?

Add water tanks, pumps, and hose and they will make dandy mine protected fire trucks...

We could also use then as mobile PSYOPs Billboards, plastering billboard sized messages such as "Ignore me, I am not really a target" on them.

Sorry, I am guilty of sarcasm

Seriously, they are what they are: force protection centric counter-mine/IED vehicles. given their weight, size, and effective capacity, I am not sure they are even good cargo platforms (assuming they were modified to such a role).

Tom

[jcustis]

If we expand this, do we want DO or ECO elements to have vehs with some MRAP capabilities, none, or full-up protection, assuming that they will spend time alone and unafraid?

Force recon units at one point had little Mercedes jeeps for a time, but they had nothing in the way of armor. Is that still the way DO mobility should go?

[William F. Owen]

Unless my stats are off, MRAPs don't have any dash speed comparable to Strykers or LAVs, and they certainly cannot traverse anywhere similar terrain. Outside of the COIN scenario we face now, can anyone help me see a wider utility?

They may be perfect for this role, but we cannot afford to stock MPF or gray-bottom amphibs with them...or can we? Do we need to have a COIN MRAP ability staged for introduction around the beginning of phase IV?


At the end of the day, nothing beats patrolling the beat on foot. Commuting to work, call the MRAP taxi I suppose.

I think it depends which MRAP? - just like which APC. Most of conclusions come from looking at ADI's Bushmaster as the first iteration and the IMI Wildcat as the next. Yes, some of the MRAPs currently deployed are not as capable as those I cite, so I guess I should have referred to specific vehicles, but I am very wary of seeming to advertise, so best not!

...but I became impressed with Wildcat when I compared it to Stryker.

Should they be baseline equipment for some Infantry units is the question I am trying to answer. I think the answer may lie on how you view the progression of future conflict. Personally I don't see clear blue water between what some call "Warfighting" and some call "COIN". This is why I think it's worth having the discussion.

As concerns patrolling on foot? This is what I spend the majority of my Infantry though, working on, so I concur 100%.

[William F. Owen]

IMI Wildcat compared to M1126 Stryker

Sorry about the formatting. .pdf spread sheet was too large to upload.

Width 2.5m 2.7m with RPG armour 2.71m, without cage
Length 7.15m 6.98m
Height 2.69m 2.64m

Max Speed 104 kph 96 kph
Road Range 700km 530km

GVW 18,000 kg 17,236 kg
Curb Weight 12,600 kg U/K

Side Armour 14.5mm AP and/or RPG 14.5mm AP and RPG with cage
Under wheel IED STANAG 4569 Level 4 U/K

NBC System Full over-pressure and filtration U/K

Crew and passengers 3 crew 9 passengers 3 crew 9 passengers

Side slope 30% 30%
Gradient 60% 60%
Turning Circle 17.5m 17m
Step 40.6cm 58.4cm
Trench 0.9m 1.9m

[Fuchs]

Wilf, I think you look too much at the last line of defence.
Protection is so much more than passive defence.

Armor is really a last ditch protection, and it's one that can be overcome with technical means. That means better-equipped opponents will crack the shell often.

There are so many things that need to go wrong to be hit in the first place, a protection concept can intervene much earlier (armour is nice as last "oh ####" protection, but it comes at a great price).

To be killed by weapons in war while moving in a vehicle, you need
1. to have foes (or dangerous friends)
2. to not have shattered their resolve to fight you previously
3. to be spotted
4. to be identified as foe
5. to be decided upon/to be communicated as target in time
6. to be aimed at well (not applicable to many mines, of course)
7. to not have some form of effective active defense
8. to be hit
9. finally to lack sufficient passive protection

Well, I'd intervene at 3, 4 & 5.

(3)
Bounding, unpredictable off-road movements plus good camouflage and concealment can prevent this. Imagine log trucks moving as carefully as recce AFVs, using hand-held thermals to search for ambushers before moving through dangerous areas.
(4)
Look at Valkiri MRL; it's a MRL that can be disguised as a standard light truck with tarpaulin. SOF sometimes ride mules, have long beards and AK-lookalikes in AFG.
You don't need to drive in military-style vehicles on a recce or raid mission in Iraq/AFG everytime. There are plenty civilian trucks.
(5)
Limit the failure to prevent (3) to short intervals and (5) might be prevented.

(6) and (8) are mostly a function of distance, speed, size and changes of direction. MRAPs don't look so well in this because they drive predictably on (preferably paved) roads at most likely constant speed.

And most importantly, elect politicians that don't fail miserably at (1).

MRAPs represent a simplistic approach that focuses on (9) only. That works fine (for a while) if you want to wage war like the U.S. does in Iraq.

----

Wildcat/Stryker MMP and nominal ground pressure: factor two difference.
No problem on dry, hard ground or even paved roads.

Wildcat/Stryker behaviour after single AT mine hit:
Wildcat immobilized, Stryker moves on.

----

Peacekeepers in Sierra Leone. No MRAP-friendly terrain. Stryker would fail as well.
http://www.mil.se/int/images/local/w060310_07.jpg

[William F. Owen]

@ Wilf, I think you look too much at the last line of defence.
Protection is so much more than passive defence.

@ Peacekeepers in Sierra Leone. No MRAP-friendly terrain. Stryker would fail as well.
http://www.mil.se/int/images/local/w060310_07.jpg

I reject your assertion. My military thought is bounded by the core functions, so I adhere to,

a. Not being found
b. If found do not be fixed (loss of movement, comms, fires and observation)
c. If fixed do not be Struck (the action that creates harm)
d. If struck do not be exploited. Suffer catastrophic loss from the harm.

I am pretty familiar with this area. Transport by "disguised" civilian vehicles was commonly done in Northern Ireland. (I know at least one platoon was regularly carried in a grain lorry)

None of this helps me, if I need to move 650 men, 500km in one night, and sustain them once they are on task.

Actually the UK has looked at this before with AT-105 The problem with Saxon ( and I know it well) was it was a junk vehicle. - but I am now beginning to think elements of the concept were sound.

A concerns Sierra Leone, when I was there, if you wanted to travel the "upline" roads, you went in MAN 4x4 Commercial trucks. They go all over Sierra Leone. In fact most the world relies on pretty simple 4 x 4 commercial lorries. When I used to drive across the Sahara, I regularly encountered commercial lorries ripping along the "piste" with no problem