The Modular Brigade Combat Team

[Rifleman]

These questions are really targeted to current serving US Army soldiers, but anyone in the know feel free to jump in:

1) How do you feel about the "new" brigade combat team structure at this point; how's the organization working out?

2) Should a third (or fourth?) manuever battalion be added as standard?

3) Are any of the brigades (especially Light/Airborne/Air Assault) deploying with additional manuever battalions attached?

[RTK]

These questions are really targeted to current serving US Army soldiers, but anyone in the know feel free to jump in:

1) How do you feel about the "new" brigade combat team structure at this point; how's the organization working out?

2) Should a third (or fourth?) manuever battalion be added as standard?

3) Are any of the brigades (especially Light/Airborne/Air Assault) deploying with additional manuever battalions attached?

This is a driveby to start since I'm tired and going to bed...

1. Reconnaissance task organization in all 3 BCT models sucks. Manning is horrible, as is the force platforms for these organizations. Resultantly, they're being used, improperly, as another maneuver BN (feeding into #2).

2. Yes, since that would follow doctrine. Task organization cutdown was based upon a premise (much like the FCS) that could prove to be fundamentally flawed, that our future conflicts are non-linear and can be fought with a premium on technology and sensors.

3. No first hand experience. I've heard rumors to the affirmative on this.

[jkm_101_fso]

For the light Divisions, replacing an INF BN with a RSTA was a horrible idea. For many reasons; but most notably, because the MTOE now allows for far less Soldiers overall. Basically, the loss of an entire INF company. But also because CAV Troops are much smaller than INF co.

BCTs need more boots on the ground, not less. It seems that many of the 11B slots that are now either 19D or "went away"...may have migrated to HHC BDE, which are overstocked with bodies, of course.

Not to anger any of my CAV buddies out there, but I had the opportunity as a fire supporter to work with both 19Ds and 11Bs. I just observed an overall better performance by the Infantry, day in and out. Maybe it was just a phenomenon of the unit I was in, going through transformation, adding the 19 series Soldiers, NCOs and Officers into the mix, but it was very apparent that the CAV guys weren't in their element. Especially E-6 and above and many of the officers. The Soldiers adapted the "light infantry" mentality pretty quickly. I also think RSTA is a rediculous concept because we don't employ any of the elements of the R-S-T or A in combat. They are just another manuever element. Why didn't we just leave it as an infantry BN???

[Steve Blair]

I'm interested in the recon/cav side of this based on an article I'm drafting. Looking forward to more discussion.

[jkm_101_fso]

I don't want to insinuate that I am not a supporter of the Cav's mission, in regards to the light BDE, however, I think a recon troop attached at BDE or adding the RSTA to a BDE in addition to the 3 INF BNs would have been wiser. Another option would be to have a RSTA troop attached to each BN. Maybe we don't have the personnel to do that.
Just as RTK highlighted, the RSTA Sqn aren't exclusively conducting the "R" (recon), "S" (surveillance) or "TA" (target acquisition). They are just another maneuver unit...except with less Soldiers, thus handicapped in comparison to the INF units, who also own battlespace in Iraq or Afghanistan, but have more capabilities because they have more companies, with more Soldiers.
Transformation also greatly affected the Field Artillery, as well. Now instead of 3 firing batteries of six guns, we have two firing batteries of eight. There are more platoons, but less commands. The Headquarters Battery was also greatly reduced in size, because the FIST moved to the INF or RSTA and all of the support is now in the Combat Support Companies. HHB now basically consists of the staff, survey, met, radar, medics and ammo. This has hindered the FA because many times, they will own battlespace in Iraq or Afghanistan, in addition to their indirect fire/counter-fire mission, they have to conduct an INF mission as well. Now, we only have three batteries to own battlespace, as opposed to four and HHB is severely hampered by having so few Soldiers, they can basically only function as a platoon.

[Cavguy]

I don't want to insinuate that I am not a supporter of the Cav's mission, in regards to the light BDE, however, I think a recon troop attached at BDE or adding the RSTA to a BDE in addition to the 3 INF BNs would have been wiser. Another option would be to have a RSTA troop attached to each BN. Maybe we don't have the personnel to do that.
Just as RTK highlighted, the RSTA Sqn aren't exclusively conducting the "R" (recon), "S" (surveillance) or "TA" (target acquisition). They are just another maneuver unit...except with less Soldiers, thus handicapped in comparison to the INF units, who also own battlespace in Iraq or Afghanistan, but have more capabilities because they have more companies, with more Soldiers.
Transformation also greatly affected the Field Artillery, as well. Now instead of 3 firing batteries of six guns, we have two firing batteries of eight. There are more platoons, but less commands. The Headquarters Battery was also greatly reduced in size, because the FIST moved to the INF or RSTA and all of the support is now in the Combat Support Companies. HHB now basically consists of the staff, survey, met, radar, medics and ammo. This has hindered the FA because many times, they will own battlespace in Iraq or Afghanistan, in addition to their indirect fire/counter-fire mission, they have to conduct an INF mission as well. Now, we only have three batteries to own battlespace, as opposed to four and HHB is severely hampered by having so few Soldiers, they can basically only function as a platoon.

Concur most with you and RTK, esp. regarding the RSTA limitations. It's a crippled div cav squadron without avn. Recent comment from JRTC was that only 1 of 10 RSTA units coming through did a recon mission, the rest were essentially used the same as infantry, with all the inherent limitations of a cav org doing that task.

Right now the FCS (FBCT) concept returns each BCT to 3 maneuver BN's (CAB's) plus a RSTA. The briefer I went to said the modular design was basically a way to create more BCT's quickly. However, the RSTA under the current design has NO ground cavalry, only UAV and AVN. Each BN gets a scout platoon, however, and the briefer suggested that if the BCT CDR wants ground recon he can pull his scout PLT's and form a BRT like organization. The groans from the assembeld audience at Knox were audible. However, the FBCT MTOE is in constant flux, so be prepared for a number of changes by 2017.

Eliminating a 3rd maneuver BN was a mistake, and violates a number of tactical principles. While the CAB task org was long overdue, most Modular BCT's are still doing cross-attachment of at least a mech company to the RSTA to give it enough boots on the ground capability, from my observations.

There was also no small motive in "adding" BCT's by creating smaller BCT's - a shell game from the 90's where we maintained the same number of BN's while cutting the D Company from each.

[Eden]

...bollixed up by reality.

Current BCT organization is flawed for two primary reasons.

1. The RSTA squadron, as originally envisioned, was much more robust and high-tech than what ended up on the ground. It was not intended to be a maneuver element but to surveill and shape the 'whitespace' between the infantry battalions. In this way, you reduced the need for infantry because they could be employed with max efficiency. Unfortunately, the RSTA organization was reduced to save money/bodies (see #2 below) and some of the technological solutions have yet to show up (cf 'spiral development'). Yet this did not result in the addition of a third infantry battalion to compensate.

2. The driver for this product was we needed a certain number of brigades - the pie just had to be sliced thinner.

Good news is that all involved recognize what we have now is an interim solution - or compromise - that will have to be fixed in the future. Bad news is that interim solutions have a habit of hanging around long past their expiration date.

None of which is helped by the fact that, historically, cavalry has been habitually misused when placed in the hands of infantrymen or tankers.

[Ken White]

...None of which is helped by the fact that, historically, cavalry has been habitually misused when placed in the hands of infantrymen or tankers.

experience that the Cavalryman who tells said Infantryman or Tanker what he should be doing most always got to do that -- and do it his way...

[Tom Odom]

That the BCT commander has to wrassle is the monster BCT staff. I see many better uses for all the field grades in those staffs. Plus as we move along more and more of the divisional assets are being recreated.

the BCT staff is a massive talent sponge and it soaks up talent from the already undermanned battalions. given that we "transformed" into this beast in the current operational environment, I shudder to think what it would take to actually move such a BCT staff in a more conventional setting.

Tom

PS

Concur with all above

[RYNO]

1. I don't think the structure is that bad, and it does have some high points. Infantry and Armor companies together in the CAB--about time. People will argue taking the support/maintenance/DFAC platoons away from BN HHCs and putting them in the FSC of the BSB stinks, but in the end they are going to be attached to the maneuver BNs anyway so it doesn't really matter. Having a Q36/Q37/ 4 LCMRs at the BCT Level in the Fires BN is money...especially in Iraq/Afghanistan. Also creating the BSTB to help handle all the "free agent" platoons and companies attached to the BCT (EOD/Psyop/MI/Signal/CA/NBC/MP) assists a BCT CDR greatly. The low point is that we created "Reconnaissance Squadrons," and that's exactly what we have--units that are equipped to conduct Recon Missions only, and can only do most Security missions or fight for information with augmentation. We can go on and on about that....If we are going to make them do those kinds of missions without aumentation, we either incur mucho risk or will lose alot of bubbas.

A big point to remember is that the BCT is Modular--the BNs aren't. When you Task Organize a maneuver BN away, which happens plenty in Iraq (at least it did 03-04 and 05-06 from what I saw) now you are in a situation where the BCT CDR has only 1 CAB left or one Rifle BN left in either HBCT/IBCT. Now he is almost forced to give an AO to the Recon Squadron or a small one to the Fires BN--which they are not equipped to do. So that's why it probably happens.

2. Yes, we could use a third--three is always better than 2--mainly it would preserve options for a BCT CDR when faced with a problem of having only 1 Maneuver BN if one was task organized away. The big issue to remember here though is that the Army's end strength is a zero-sum game. We aren't going to get more than 547,000 in the immediate future, and all the Manpower allocations are accounted for in 48 BCTs and the other types of brigades out there--so we can dream about it, but it probably won't happen. The Armor Branch is facing similar roblems right now with trying to fix the above-mentioned problems in the Recon Squadrons when trying to execute Full Spectrum Operations in COIN or fight for information. No other branch is volunteering to give up manpower allocations, and many of the proposed changes to the MTOE, including extra dismounted Cavalry Scouts in all 3 types of Recon Squadons, trade humvees in for Bradleys, add tanks and tank crews--well, the additional people have to come from somewhere. I dare not mention where with so many Brave Rifles around here....wouldn't do that to you, RTK.

3. Don't know.

[Ski]

The concept at the BCT level was good - the execution was terrible for a number of reasons.

The staffs are too large at the BCT and Division levels. 1000 people in the Division HQ now. Not a good idea.

The 3rd maneuver battalion was sacrificed for more BCT's. Even with the GTA initiative, you'll have more BCT's instead of maneuver battalions. Bad move.

Even worse move was making the RSTA's so light, even in the HBCT. I'm fairly certain there is a new design for RSTA's out there with some armor additions. The Army had to make cuts on certain equipment to make sure the RSTA concept could even get off the ground, and it the equipment in question was cut to the point of where they couldn't cut any more or the concept would be null and void.

[patmc]

I am in a Fires BDE, and during the BDE validation exercise, I was amazed at the size of the BDE TOC, and the number of officers, warrants, and senior NCO's that I'd never seen before. There a ton of capabilities, but it seemed a little like information overload.

For the exercise, we simulated HIC in North Korea. Actually jumping a digital TOC is quite an event.

That the BCT commander has to wrassle is the monster BCT staff. I see many better uses for all the field grades in those staffs. Plus as we move along more and more of the divisional assets are being recreated.

the BCT staff is a massive talent sponge and it soaks up talent from the already undermanned battalions. given that we "transformed" into this beast in the current operational environment, I shudder to think what it would take to actually move such a BCT staff in a more conventional setting.

[Randy Brown]

For the exercise, we simulated HIC in North Korea. Actually jumping a digital TOC is quite an event.

Jump a Digi-TOC? You mean you can't just click on "forward"?!

[patmc]

Moving a graphic, closing your eyes, and "jumping" the TOC is a rough mental exercise. Unplugging and reconnecting a TOC of digital systems, is not as much fun.

[RTK]

I also think RSTA is a rediculous concept because we don't employ any of the elements of the R-S-T or A in combat. They are just another manuever element. Why didn't we just leave it as an infantry BN???

I'd argue that we don't employ any of the elements because few and far between is the leader or staff who understand how to do so properly. Reconnaissance and security operations, for whatever reason, scare the hell out of a lot of people. Consequently, few in the force know how to plan, prepare for, and execute reconnaissance and security operations. As Ryno said, we haven't even equipped these organizations to properly conduct security operations.

So, as a default, since we don't know how to conduct reconnaissance and we aren't equipped to do security, we use the RSTA and reconnaissance squadrons as a maneuver battalion because we venture back to our comfort zones and base natures when we're uncomfortable.

That's not the RSTA's fault - that's an Army educational shortcoming that has to be addressed soon. We don't teach recon or security to the level of competency that we need to. Given 60% of the armor force are now reconnaissance organizations that can be commanded by either an infantryman or armor officer, we've already started to slide down the wrong side of the power curve in this arena.

If you can't tell, Tom Odom, Ryno, Cavguy, jcustis and a few others can tell you; this is my pet rock?

[Ken White]

Pet Rock, that is...

Agree with all you said; this in particular:

...That's not the RSTA's fault - that's an Army educational shortcoming that has to be addressed soon. We don't teach recon or security to the level of competency that we need to. Given 60% of the armor force are now reconnaissance organizations that can be commanded by either an infantryman or armor officer, we've already started to slide down the wrong side of the power curve in this arena.

Spent a few years in Cav and recon Platoons in Infantry units; only Cdr I had who had a clue what to do with the element in either recon or security modes was an old infantry COL who'd led an I&R Platoon during WW II.

Most of the others were fairly malleable and I could usually convince a series of S3s and an occasional S2 to let us do the right thing -- but there was the occasional hardhead who insisted on dumb missions or methods and, even lacking them, it should not be that way.

I recall being told at Knox back around 1980 that the biggest shortfall in NTC rotations was failure at R&S. Heard that again and again in the late 80s and in the 90s and heard the same of JRTC after it got rolling -- and I'll bet it's still true. I've seen entirely too much misuse and seen people get needlessly killed from that ineptitude.

I mentioned before that my son (A former RSTA C Troop 1SG) had commented at a war game that we did not do recon at all well and the new Troop TOE with Tanks was overkill. He then got told by a Cav COL that "...we (the US Army) don't have the patience to do Recon right so we just go out looking for trouble and to do that you have to have armor." I've given that a lot of thought. The patience aspect is a true statement in a sense -- but the issue is NOT with the Scouts, it's with the overlarge Staffs that don't have enough to keep them occupied and continually play the "Car 54 Where are you" routine on the net -- that's where the impatience is. It's not usually the Commanders, it's the staffs.

Not to mention that I expect the M1A2++ is going to run about $7M -- awfully expensive for a "recon" vehicle...

Whatever, we've been on the wrong side of that curve since WW II -- Northwest Europe has a lot to answer for...

It really, really needs to be fixed.

Oh, and I agree with everyone else; the BCT should have three maneuver Bns and the RSTA -- properly organized. Light Inf Bns should also have four rifle Cos.

[Fuchs]

1000 people in the Division HQ now. Not a good idea.

Is that a typo?

[Norfolk]

Fuchs wrote:

Is that a typo?

Sadly, no. It could have been a reinforced Battalion though.

Pet Rock, that is...

Agree with all you said; this in particular:Spent a few years in Cav and recon Platoons in Infantry units; only Cdr I had who had a clue what to do with the element in either recon or security modes was an old infantry COL who'd led an I&R Platoon during WW II.

Most of the others were fairly malleable and I could usually convince a series of S3s and an occasional S2 to let us do the right thing -- but there was the occasional hardhead who insisted on dumb missions or methods and, even lacking them, it should not be that way.

I recall being told at Knox back around 1980 that the biggest shortfall in NTC rotations was failure at R&S. Heard that again and again in the late 80s and in the 90s and heard the same of JRTC after it got rolling -- and I'll bet it's still true. I've seen entirely too much misuse and seen people get needlessly killed from that ineptitude.

I mentioned before that my son (A former RSTA C Troop 1SG) had commented at a war game that we did not do recon at all well and the new Troop TOE with Tanks was overkill. He then got told by a Cav COL that "...we (the US Army) don't have the patience to do Recon right so we just go out looking for trouble and to do that you have to have armor." I've given that a lot of thought. The patience aspect is a true statement in a sense -- but the issue is NOT with the Scouts, it's with the overlarge Staffs that don't have enough to keep them occupied and continually play the "Car 54 Where are you" routine on the net -- that's where the impatience is. It's not usually the Commanders, it's the staffs.

Not to mention that I expect the M1A2++ is going to run about $7M -- awfully expensive for a "recon" vehicle...

Whatever, we've been on the wrong side of that curve since WW II -- Northwest Europe has a lot to answer for...

It really, really needs to be fixed.

Like several others here, RTK's observations about the BCT in general and the recce and surveillance side of things in particular are spot-on and rectification is required, urgently on the recce side. As an outsider on the matter of the BCT concept here, but not a disinterested observer (seeing as how the SBCT TO&E and especially the RSTA SQN TO&E in particular have been adapted and modified for Canadian purposes fo the sale of interoperability), I note that his and others' points match almost all those deficiencies that have been identified in Canadian service, particularly the consequences of the deemphasis upon ground reconnaissance in favour of "sensors", et al. There is no substitute or being able to sneek-and-peek and to be able to dominate the ground between yourself and the enemy. Sensors are useful, often very useful, but they do not dispense with the need for proper reconnaissance, in all its forms.

I am a little surprised though by the reaction against including MBTs in the 90's Div Cav Sqns. That said, in no way am I disagreeing with anyone that always defaulting to performing reconnaissance-by-fire mode is a bad thing; as has already been stated, it's fundamentally a leadership and training issue. But it needs to be affirmed at the same time that heavy armour has a role to play in ground reconnaissance at Formation-Level, and not just "light" recce elements. While sneek-and-peek really is necessary for proper (and most) ground reconnaissance, so is the ability to fight for information if and when you have to, or being able to perform in the covering force role and not just the screening role.

British and Canadian Armoured Recce units were good at most forms of ground reconnaissance until more recent years, but because they lacked any heavy armour, they were unable to fight to gain information if they needed to. All they could do was try to get out of Dodge if they ran into something that they couldn't hide from, or sit still and await the arrival of regular armour if they came upon a path or place they daren't go themselves. Recce have to be able to both fight and to watch and listen to do their job; each as tactically appropriate or necessary.

Oh, and I agree with everyone else; the BCT should have three maneuver Bns and the RSTA -- properly organized. Light Inf Bns should also have four rifle Cos.

I have been watching the whole BCT thing - IBCT, SBCT, HBCT - unfold for a while now and been slowly grinding my teeth. Besides the glaring lack of the third maneouvre battalion in the IBCT and the HBCT, the two CABs of the HBCT have also simultaneously both intrigued and dismayed me. Perhaps if the HBCTS were called RCTs instead I might buy the concept; that would also be conditional upon employing said RCTs as just that, and understanding that they are not Brigades, but rather Battle Groups.

And I would argue that all Inf Bns should have 4 Rifle Coys.

[Ken White]

Co/Coy/Trp/Sqdrn per Bn/Regt (Commonwealth, not USMC). For the vehicular types, two Tank / SPG and two Inf per Bn. Yes, mixed vehicles. Not a problem; check an H series ACR. The nominal problem is pure branch parochialism...

Div CavSqn (US) should have tanks and four ground troops, one per BCT, plus an air troop. Train the Cav Sqn, put the Troops OpCon or Atchd (METT-TC) to BCT and the relationship will insure, in most cases, the Cav gets to do Cav stuff...

Huh? Yeah, yeah. I know. However, much as I think it should disappear, I don't think the Division's going away anytime soon for several reasons, two big ones. Not those, well, them too -- but mostly log and comm...

[Fuchs]

I note that his and others' points match almost all those deficiencies that have been identified in Canadian service, particularly the consequences of the deemphasis upon ground reconnaissance in favour of "sensors", et al. There is no substitute or being able to sneek-and-peek and to be able to dominate the ground between yourself and the enemy. Sensors are useful, often very useful, but they do not dispense with the need for proper reconnaissance, in all its forms.

I'm very interested in reconnaissance issues and looked into the writings from several nations and periods into it.
One problem seems to be very common. Whenever the different types of ground reconnaissance are listed, nobody seems to integrate reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance.*
The infiltration of the enemy force for reconnaissance will be and usually was the exception.
Most reconnaissance activities seem to happen in friendly-dominated or neutral terrain (I don't deny that the infiltrating recce delivers often especially interesting findings).

My (logical?) conclusion is that we shouldn't discuss and organize for reconnaissance, but for the domination of the neutral ground. We need to deny reconnaissance success to the enemy and at the same time keep an eye on him (& report findings).
That should be done by a stealth+sensors force that can evade superior opponents and overwhelm enemy reconnaissance elements if necessary in direct combat (preferably ambush).

(Norfolk; you know the details about it by my paper.)
This reconnaissance + counter-reconnaissance idea can at low cost be turned into a screen of skirmishers.
That's what I miss.

"Modern" reconnaissance assets seem to be observation forces most of the time (for example the German-Dutch recce car "Fennek; it would likely not survive contact with an opposing 1940's recce vehicle).


(Only problem; my skirmisher idea is about economy of force away from the operational center of gravity, not about spearhead ground recce for fast tactical movements.)


*:
There was a time in the 90's when the Armor Magazine had several articles about recce and counter-recce experiences from the NTC that emphasized the importance to win the recce fight before the major combat actions.