The Modular Brigade Combat Team

[Rifleman]

Huh? Yeah, yeah. I know. However, much as I think it should disappear, I don't think the Division's going away anytime soon for several reasons, two big ones. Not those, well, them too -- but mostly log and comm...

Uh.....two big stars?

[wm]

Uh.....two big stars?

Actually, I think it's 4 stars--remember the two deputies in each vivision?

On American ineptitude at R&S, I think Norfolk hit the nail on the head when he noted our penchant for recon by fire. If one sends out troops to do a sneak and peek mission, the likelihood that some of those folks will come back hurt or not at all is a distinct possibility. Why would one want to risk that when one has the ability to let "your indirect fire do the walking" (to paraphrase an old Yellow Pages ad). During its more recent struggles (at least since WWI), the US has had the luxury of having plenty of ammo and large calibre, long range bullet launchers, which has allowed us to choose the materiel R&S solution of indirect fire over the personal touch of eyes on the target.

Ken,
Maybe if we couldn't/didn't build up such an iron mountain behind us, we might be able to dispense with that Division HQ, which we both acknowledge has to be around to enable our log and comms efforts. (BTW--IMHO, a large piece of the comms issue is related to IT infrastructure needed to support log function.) But, all those staff weenies would then just migrate down to the brigade TOCs, as they already apparently are doing. What's a force developer to do?

[Tom Odom]

What's a force developer to do?

1st: Burn all extant MTOEs and TDAs

2nd. Start at the tip of the spear and work up

3. Limit all "back ups" to the rule of 3. You can have 3 forms of comms. Period. You can have 3 ways to put direct fire on a target. You can have 3 ways to put indirect fire on a target. Manuever gets 3 subordinate manuever elements from team to division. Staffs have 3 main functions: intelligence, manuever, support. All staffs must fall under that functional organization with no more than --you guessed it--three subordinate functions. Etc etc. This may sound arbitrary; it is but with an intent to limit gilding the friggin lilly as we build capabilities. Commanders don't need 10 ways to communicate. You don't need 10 ways to kill a target with indirect or aerial fires. Dupilcating functions for functions sake is merely form.


That would be a true transformation but we won't do it. I asked a team leader looking at modular issues a couple of years ago, just how they were going to collect on secondary effects of transformation on the battalions and below.

Answer: We don't care. Nothing is changing below brigade.

Tom

[wm]

1st: Burn all extant MTOEs and TDAs

2nd. Start at the tip of the spear and work up

3. Limit all "back ups" to the rule of 3. You can have 3 forms of comms. Period. You can have 3 ways to put direct fire on a target. You can have 3 ways to put indirect fire on a target. Manuever gets 3 subordinate manuever elements from team to division. Staffs have 3 main functions: intelligence, manuever, support. All staffs must fall under that functional organization with no more than --you guessed it--three subordinate functions. Etc etc. This may sound arbitrary; it is but with an intent to limit gilding the friggin lilly as we build capabilities. Commanders don't need 10 ways to communicate. You don't need 10 ways to kill a target with indirect or aerial fires. Dupilcating functions for functions sake is merely form.


That would be a true transformation but we won't do it. I asked a team leader looking at modular issues a couple of years ago, just how they were going to collect on secondary effects of transformation on the battalions and below.

Answer: We don't care. Nothing is changing below brigade.

Tom

Based on that guy's comment about nothing changing below brigade, it should be crystal clear why Effects are not part of Army doctrine.

I agree wholeheartedly with your proposed version of transformation, but when trying to get it implemented, my Latin tag line says it all, I think.

[Ken White]

wm said:

(BTW--IMHO, a large piece of the comms issue is related to IT infrastructure needed to support log function.)

Very true -- and the next biggest --and far less necessary -- slice is generally realtively useless Staff chatter aimed at eliminating potential knowledge gaps (too often predicated on not being embarrassed by a remotely possible question from the boss as opposed to a real need)...

As Tom said:

1st: Burn all extant MTOEs and TDAs

2nd. Start at the tip of the spear and work up.

To which I can only add one suggestion -- do away with the Force Structure bureaucracy and form ad-hoc task forces of people, LTC and below, actually serving in units to design structure. If that's in the too-hard box, then at least have a board of such people who are THE final approving authority for TOEs.

[Eden]

Last few posts are right on, but nothing will change.

It would be an interesting dissertation for some struggling anthropologist grad student to report back from the jungle that is the DoD bureaucracy. How can so many smart, informed, dedicated people work so hard and so long to create such mediocre end-products?

Taking a flamethrower to the force structure bureaucracy makes for a satisfying daydream, but it would produce sheer chaos (as opposed to the manageable chaos we have today). The interconnectedness of all of our black boxes, systems, processes, and organizations means that sonething as simple as tinkering with, say, the number of companies in an infantry battalion, or the organization of the division staff, produces huge ripples in dozens of overlapping, intermeshed, and/or competing programs. Until you have lived it, it is difficult to communicate the complexity of the beast. All confirming the truism that the larger the organization, the more resistant it is to change.

Same thing with the 1000-soldier division staff. I will guarantee you that you need all of those people to keep the beast running, to do all the things you want to do. Crazy? Yes. But when we keep heaping missions and oddball little units onto division headquarters, you have to have people to keep the gears greased. I can also guarantee that all of the staff sections in that division will swear that they are overworked and undermanned - and they probably are.

All of this is a result of our communal military culture, where if something can be done, it must be done, and done well. Until you change the culture and suppress the appetite for excellence in all things, you will fail at trying to reorganize the supporting structure. If you were to arbitrarily axe the division staff by 50%, it would grow back on its own within three years.

[jkm_101_fso]

I'd like to see the results of research conducted (maybe it was) on the effectiveness of the "pre-modular BCT" operating in Iraq and Afghanistan in the old model, before units "transformed", pre-2005. Of the issues identified with MTOE, etc, did the Modular concept fix them or further complicate it?

At the highest echelons, I'm sure this concept got hairy, with each branch ensuring themselves "slots" in the new BCT. One example would be the Field Artillery, which managed to capture numerous NEW officer, warrant and NCO slots at the BCT/BN staff level in the new "FECC". I think the same could be said for Division FECC, also. This, of course is primarily attributed to the "non-lethal" arena becoming the new AO of Fire Supporters. The problem, especially at the MAJ and CPT level is that so many staff jobs exist now, getting FA CPTs into command (Modular Fires BN now has 3, instead of 4) and MAJ into ONE Fires BN S3 and XO slot is difficult; BDE FSO is not KD for MAJ, to my knowledge.
Other branches suffer from the same issue as FA...most notably EN, MI and MPs. Plenty of staff...no commands, XO or S3 jobs. I think when the personnel effects of Modularity come to fruition in 5 years, it maybe re-looked then. Until that point, some CPTs won't get commands and some MAJs won't get S3 and XO jobs. Not that every CPT or MAJ is entitled to these jobs, but some good people will get screwed because of Modularity and spend a whole lot of time in staff jobs that don't "count".

[Cavguy]

I will say that as an AOE "legacy" BCT staff in Ramadi, we were awed by the size/scope of the 1/3 ID modular staff that replaced us. (about 50% bigger, and much heavier on rank) Lots more majors, a lot more rank and experience.

I'm not altogether convinced this was a bad thing. COL MacFarland replaced his largely pre-company command S3 shop over the tour with former commanders and even a prior BN S3 as the BCT S3 Plans, in addition to the former BN S3 who was the BCT 3. Performance, efficiency, and quality of product measurably improved from having a "stacked" shop of mostly post-command guys who had been on the ground versus the usual "1LT, second award" captains who were good guys but not experienced and hadn't worked on BN staffs or led a company. This is a company commander's war, and must be understood as such.

We were severely strained as a "legacy" unit to fill the non-traditional manpower requirement not filled on MTOE - ISF cell, Engagements Officer, IO Officer, JVB, "Lioness" team to do female searches, BCT CDR's PSD (expanded from MTOE because of requirements in theater), out of hide MiTT teams, FOB Mayor cell, etc.

The larger modular staffs arrived with manpower to execute these tasks, and also had trained for them in garrison, rather than pulling out of hide as we had done.

There is always the effect that when any org gets bigger it doesn't confine itself to what it was doing, it grows beyond its capacity, taking on new tasks. I'm not sure if it's perhaps not TOO big, but I know the larger staff is helping in an environment where BCT's are essentially performing tasks once reserved for divisions.

[Ken White]

Eden, you make some very valid points, not least of which is that little is likely to change...

I agree with your comment on the 1,000 bod staff as things now stand while at the same time disagreeing that it must (or should...) grow back if it were cut. Having been on more staffs at higher levels than I care to recall, I know the truth in your "overworked and undermanned" comment -- yet I can also recall that on several occasions due to the vagaries of the world situation or the Army, heavy, even radical cuts were imposed to much wailing and gnashing of teeth. Know what -- it worked out okay. A lot of seemingly important stuff turned out to be not so important after all and it just got dropped with virtually no impact on things that really mattered...

Cuts to the bone sharpen the instincts; lacking those cuts, the instincts dull. Significantly. I think for soldiers and Marines, instincts are critically important so I say cut. It's amazing how many things are done to assure a comfort level. More about that in a few seconds

That said, I do strongly and quite seriously agree that anthropological study is called for. Both on the facet you cite, changing the zero-defects / can-do culture and on two other issues. You can take a perfectly good and competent SFC or CPT out of a line unit and place him on the Bn / Sqn staff and he'll walk in the door saying "we exist to support the line..." He believes that and he implements it. Yet, almost invariably, within 90 days, he become what I used to call 'Staff-eyes-d' and rails about the incompetence of even his own former Co /By/ Trp; he joins the us and them battle. Why is that?

Very much akin to that issue is the what I call the Action Officer Syndrome; I found long ago that if one was assigning Action Officers taskers and one or more of them vehemently objected to a program, give that program to the one who was the biggest pain about it -- within 90 days he'd marry that program and defend it to the death. Why is that?

I think a good Anthro guy could have field day (no pun intended) with those two very closely related manifestations of the human nature that does not exist

Yet another issue is the Colonel. I have worked for a lot of them. Colonel Commanders are with only rare exceptions aggressive, smart, tolerant of mistakes, innovative and great guys. Staff Colonels, OTOH (and again there are rare exceptions) seem to see themselves as the protectors of their Boss and the Institution (usually in that order) and are pretty intolerant of mistakes no matter how minor. They are highly change resistant, they will fight you for the status quo. That is a general observation and like all generalities is subject to caveats but it has certainly been my observation and experience; it applies broadly but in two specific cases I can recall individuals who I served under in both capacities (one commanded first, the other reversed that) who exhibited the traits I stated, job dependent.

No attack on anyone or anything, merely an observation and agreement that there is likely to be little change yet there could be -- and that there is evidence of a need for some real research

jkm_101_fso makes a very valid point:

I'd like to see the results of research conducted (maybe it was) on the effectiveness of the "pre-modular BCT" operating in Iraq and Afghanistan in the old model, before units "transformed", pre-2005. Of the issues identified with MTOE, etc, did the Modular concept fix them or further complicate it?

Good question and one which ties in with a comment from Cav Guy:

There is always the effect that when any org gets bigger it doesn't confine itself to what it was doing, it grows beyond its capacity, taking on new tasks. I'm not sure if it's perhaps not TOO big, but I know the larger staff is helping in an environment where BCT's are essentially performing tasks once reserved for divisions.(emphasis added / kw)

Just so.

I'd also suggest that "BCT's are essentially performing tasks once reserved for divisions." is a residual of thirty years of peace and vastly underemployed (in peacetime) and oversized (at all times) Division staffs who got far further down in the weeds than they rightly should have. -- that deprived Battalion staffs of the ability or need to do their own jobs. Sad.

I'm aware of much but not all that goes on today and I certainly understand there are added communication and other assets but my suspicion based on anecdotal evidence from a few whov'e been both places is that Bn staffs in Afghanistan or Iraq are doing pretty much what their predecessors did in Viet Nam -- with more and better info and comm sources and twice as many people...

My question is how much of what's done by these large staffs relates to the bosses comfort level? Not to be a smart aleck but combat isn't conducive to comfort; not at anything above low intensity, at any rate.

I cite all that negativity because I'm afraid, at the risk of channeling Gian, you guys won't be able to do that in HIC...

Bad habits are hard to break. Definitely food for the Anthropologists...

[Tom Odom]

To echo Ken and also related to CavGuy's comment "Performance, efficiency, and quality of product measurably improved from having a "stacked" shop of mostly post-command guys who had been on the ground versus the usual "1LT, second award" captains who were good guys but not experienced and hadn't worked on BN staffs or led a company. This is a company commander's war, and must be understood as such", this becomes to talent vacuum I pointed to earlier.

It gets really noticeable when battalion staffs come through that do not have a single branch qualified captain. That is not uncommon.

Reason: they are all on the BCT staff.

As for comparisons, I have spoken with officers who served with a legacy BCT in theater then came home went back with the same unit after transformation. The reviews are decidedly mixed. A common thread regardless of point of view is confusion over functions.

Related to that is as Eden relates those 1,000 person division staffs. Modularitity was intended to push divisional functions down to the BCT; yet we see divisions never went away and they are again growing. If it is a company commander's war, continued additions to higher tactical commands and staffs is not helping. That gets to Ken's very valid point about "comfort".

Finally Eden is correct that a ground up revision would shatter the extant force development nightmare. That it is so confusing and intertwined documents the need swing the wrecking ball.

Tom

[Rank amateur]

How much of the large staff is due to technology? (Somebodies got to watch the sensors, UAV feeds etc.) Plus you need geeks to keep everything running. That's a lot different from one guy listening to a radio and another plotting the info on a map.

[jkm_101_fso]

To echo Ken and also related to CavGuy's comment "Performance, efficiency, and quality of product measurably improved from having a "stacked" shop of mostly post-command guys who had been on the ground versus the usual "1LT, second award" captains who were good guys but not experienced and hadn't worked on BN staffs or led a company. This is a company commander's war, and must be understood as such", this becomes to talent vacuum I pointed to earlier.

It gets really noticeable when battalion staffs come through that do not have a single branch qualified captain. That is not uncommon.

Reason: they are all on the BCT staff.

I've watched a few BNs manage post-command CPTs and post-PL NBQ CPTs in combat twice, now. For some reason, Commanders are reluctant to "hold on" to post command guys and put them on their BN staff. Not sure why. I've also watched as 1LTs make CPT, they are moved from their platoons to staff (sometimes in a created job) because their time was up and/or they had a replacement, not necessarily because they made CPT.

At one point, my BN had 5 NBQ CPTs in the S-3 shop. A few asked to leave Iraq to attend the Captain's Career Course. There was absolutely no excuse not to send them. Of course, they weren't gainfully employed (or were with BS) and not happy about it and wanted to get on with their careers. But because of the Division's archaic and ridiculous "no one goes home early from deployment" policy (another discussion about ridding the Army of the zero-defect culture), these 5 CPTs festered in the OPS shop for six months and they all, to the man, got out of the Army. They were all good performers that the Army needed. What a tragedy.

Staff requirements are understandable, but shouldn't be the main effort. Quality over Quantity should always be considered. I know what the MTOE says, but if Commanders are smart enough to put capable dudes in critical jobs, they can mitigate the numbers requirements. But that wasn't even the case with my BN! We were over 100% strength on CPTs!

Which leads me to another point...Battalion Commanders should be able to decide what is good for their organization. My commander knew those CPTs should have left Iraq for the career course, but he was trumped by a stupid division policy! He's a LTC! Not wise enough to manage his own personnel?

As a 2LT, I had a crusty, old SFC tell me he thought that “the Army, as a whole, is like a guy that just keeps punching himself in the balls over and over for no reason.” Maybe he was wiser than I thought.

Sorry for the rant…had to throw it out there.

[Tom Odom]

As a 2LT, I had a crusty, old SFC tell me he thought that “the Army, as a whole, is like a guy that just keeps punching himself in the balls over and over for no reason.” Maybe he was wiser than I thought.

And he is right! When I knew him he was a MSG (1977); he must have gotten busted before he met you.

Tom

[Steve Blair]

As a 2LT, I had a crusty, old SFC tell me he thought that “the Army, as a whole, is like a guy that just keeps punching himself in the balls over and over for no reason.” Maybe he was wiser than I thought.

Major sig material! Sorry for the minor derailing of the thread, but that's a great quote.

[jkm_101_fso]

And he is right! When I knew him he was a MSG (1977); he must have gotten busted before he met you.

Tom

You knew him before I was born!

[wm]

You knew him before I was born!

The guys Tom and I knew were your guy's father and uncle. Ken may have been their grandfather

[Ken White]

And I have a lot of that...

I do note that one of my sage sayings has through the generations morphed from 'kicking' to "punching." No matter, it's the thought that counts.

[patmc]

We would kill for some post-command CPTs, or any CPTs. I am the senior CPT on staff right now, and I've been a CPT for one year. I moved to staff as soon as I hit 1LT(P). I was not given a command because I was detailed to MI. Our CPTs that just came out of command went to HRC or BDE for second commands. We'll wait and see what deployment brings, but I expect that the post-command CPTs will have to go to staff, if they're switched at all. My buddy at CCC wants to come back and take a command, but he leaves for an Afghanistan MiTT in a few weeks. There's just not enough bodies to fill these slots (BTRY/COMP, BN, BDE, DIV, CORPS, etc...), and it will only get worse as the Army grows its units.

I would add "then laughs about it" to the hitting oneself in the balls.

I've watched a few BNs manage post-command CPTs and post-PL NBQ CPTs in combat twice, now. For some reason, Commanders are reluctant to "hold on" to post command guys and put them on their BN staff. Not sure why. I've also watched as 1LTs make CPT, they are moved from their platoons to staff (sometimes in a created job) because their time was up and/or they had a replacement, not necessarily because they made CPT.

[Tom Odom]

You knew him before I was born!

He is the eternal grizzled senior NCO whose sage advice is always valuable to those wise enough to listen to it.

I worked with one in Zaire. He often tolld me to quit punching myself in the balls.

[RTK]

He is the eternal grizzled senior NCO whose sage advice is always valuable to those wise enough to listen to it.

I worked with one in Zaire. He often tolld me to quit punching myself in the balls.

God bestowed on every officer an NCO to guide him right and keep him from punching himself.