Sierra Leone (catch all)

**Rex Brynen** · 07-08-2008

Excellent piece--Chapter 4 (on United Nations and British Forces, 1999–2002) is especially interesting reading.

**William F. Owen** · 07-09-2008

Sankoh and the RUF soon discovered the importance and value of diamonds. As Sankoh and his soldiers took over mining areas in southern Sierra Leone, he found himself with a product he could barter. Sankoh approached Taylor about an exchange and Taylor was interested. Taylor needed a way to finance his operations in Liberia and diamonds were a commodity not easily traced. He established a net- work of illegal buyers and sellers from various countries and was able to smuggle weapons and ammunition to barter with Sankoh and to support his war.

I believe this is not correct. Taylor sent Sankoh to secure the diamond fields as a a source of funding and there are ground to believe that he was directed to do this by outside agents from a middle-eastern nation.

There is also good grounds to believe that the RUF and NPRC may have tactically colluded in keeping the conflict going to secure sources of diamonds for them both.

In April 1995 the NPRC leader contracted with EO to conduct military operations in Sierra Leone against the RUF forces. In addition to paying EO $1.8 million per month for their military services, Strasser also entered into an agreement with Branch Energy and its subsidiary Diamond Works. EO and Diamond Works were financially linked, though the details were murky. The plan called for EO to recapture the diamond mines from the RUF, after which Diamond Works would extract the diamonds using local labor. In exchange for the effort, Diamond Works would pay the govern- ment 37.5 percent of the net profits.8 Strasser believed that if he could return the diamond mines to government control heEO and have enough cash to run the government.

Just as someone asked Taylor to go and secure the diamond fields, someone else asked and funded EO and some other organisations to go and take them back. I have it on extremely good authority that Strasser was "told" to hire them.

The simple choice for those interested in the diamonds was whether to use and insurgency to get them or a bunch of Mercenaries. They may even have done both. The same Middle Eastern elements were in play for most of the war and millions of dollars were accrued, possibly to fund illegal activities in the Middle East.

Hope this helps.

**Stan** · 07-09-2008

Thanks for the email and link. Great read, Tom !
Especially interesting are the similarities with typical African military and the employment of "Special Units". Stevens integration of the ISU with local police may have kept his finger on the pulse of the city, but nothing like the rapid dominance of Mobutu's once hailed DSP.

Seems wherever diamonds are present, there's a Lebanese "businessman". They make for some interesting neighbors too

Regards, Stan

**Jedburgh** · 09-30-2008

Chatham House, 30 Sep 08: Sierra Leone a Year After Elections: Still in the Balance

....the scale of the challenges is large, and past performance, beyond the stabilization of the security sector, has been questionable. The external threats posed by increased oil and food prices are great, but are dwarfed by the severe threat of the increasing drugs trade in Sierra Leone. If these threats are to be met, new bilateral support will be needed. Given that the level of UK commitment has almost certainly peaked, other countries in Europe which will be affected by the establishment of drugs cartels inWest Africa should increase support as a matter of self-interest......

**Jedburgh** · 08-13-2009

GFN-SSR, 31 Oct 08: UK Military Intervention and Progress in Sierra Leone, 2001-2006

The aim of this paper is to examine progress in Sierra Leone between 2001 and 2006, within a regional context, as result of UK military intervention and assistance. It focuses on what is commonly termed post-conflict reconstruction and development. In particular, it will explore the transformation of the security sector and the relationship between security and development. The paper draws on research, but also on first-hand experience of the author, who served in Sierra Leone under United Nations command during 2001 and then as military advisor to the government of Sierra Leone/Commander International Military Advisory Training Team in 2006.

**davidbfpo** · 06-01-2013

A short RUSI commentary:http://www.rusi.org/analysis/comment...519CD2196877F/

Quite reflective and maybe of interest for the role of the international military advisory mission (IMATT); with a now dated Canadian explanation:http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-...=75&CdnOpId=86

**davidbfpo** · 08-26-2015

A new book by Kieran Mitton, a Kings War Studies academic: Rebels in a Rotten State: Understanding Atrocity in the Sierra Leone Civil War:http://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/...one-civil-war/

From the publishers abstract:

The atrocities of civil wars present us with many difficult questions. How do seemingly ordinary individuals come to commit such extraordinary acts of cruelty, often against unarmed civilians? Can we ever truly understand such acts of ‘evil’? Based on a wealth of original interviews with perpetrators of violence in Sierra Leone’s civil war, this book provides a detailed response.

If you register with the publishers you get a discount and free P&P worldwide.