"Pentagon Adviser: Dump Big War Training, Learn New Languages Instead"

[Steve Blair]

<sigh>

Aside from the standard "either/or" fixation that seems very popular in too many quarters, this stuff (and Linn's book) got me thinking about something. Random thought, and not run through the historical wringer, so I'm not putting it out as a major theory (yet....).

Why is it that each time we've won a major conventional conflict we've turned around and gotten our asses handed to us (at least at first) by either a conventional opponent or an unconventional opponent, while when we've done well against an unconventional opponent we've done reasonably well against either in the next conflict? This is a generalization, obviously, but it seems to stack up pretty well going back a ways.

Again, it's a generalization (almost thinking out loud, if you will). But it does point the way toward a tendency to "either/or" that really damages our overall quality (and ties in with Linn's theories about the three types of leaders within the American Army). At a certain point war is war. Of course. But there are shadings within that framework...techniques and levels of force that work in one situation but can be counterproductive in another. We tried jamming it all into a framework once....it was called massive retaliation. And it didn't work. In fact, I'd say it left us with problems that we have yet to solve or even reasonably address (recent AF issues, anyone?). It also (I think) caused some segments to loose focus on the fundamentals...a focus that we seem to lack in some areas to this day.

Ken makes a good point about units wasting the talents of troops, especially NCOs and younger leaders. Shocking though it may seem, there was a time in the Army when corporals and sergeants DID talk to sheiks (or their local equivalent), and they did pretty well with it. And if they aren't allowed to function, the chain of command has no right to expect them to suddenly morph into experienced and capable leaders once they pin on another stripe or an extra bar (or oak leaf). If you look back through the Marine experience in Latin America, the majority of the gendarme were led by Marine lieutenants, sergeants, and corporals (with local rank, of course). Such people can be the backbone of a unit...if they're allowed to be. If we don't, then shame on us.

"Either/or" is the only bankrupt policy I see here...and it's been a constant thread in too much of our military thought. Outside theorists don't always consider the effects of their recommendations, but I submit than many inside theorists are guilty of the same blindness.

[Maximus]

And really, what does the combat "strategic corporal" do on the ground in Iraq or Astan. He shoots, he stands a post, he secures, he moves, he does what his sergeant tells him to do. Does the stragegic corporal talk to the sheik or imam? I got the need to teach our soldiers about culture so that they can at least understand their surroundings and why they are there.

I don't know about the Army, but Marine infantry corporals and sergeants talk with sheiks, cops, village elders, etc. on almost every patrol they go on. The average corporal or sergeant is a 21-23 year old Warrior and Leader of Marines. They need this training. Our doctrine preaches--demands-- initiative at the small unit leader level. Our lance corporals and corporals--normally our fire team and squad leader ranks--are encouraged to make decisions without their sergeant telling them what to do. They are trained and expected to operate off of commander's intent.

Encourage all to check out the video of BLT 1/6 titled "Marines Shift Focus to Rebuilding" at this link: http://www.iimefpublic.usmc.mil/publ...tSites/24thmeu. Going back to past discussions on whether Iraq or Afghan have degraded our ability to fight high-intensity conflicts, I think the video demonstrates that our Marines today are ready for just about anything. I, for one, would be honored to serve with this sergeant on any battlefield.

[Bill Moore]

It shows how detached from reality Krepinevich actually is. Clearly he has not gotten over his flawed interpretation of the American Army in Vietnam and that it could have won the war if we would have had more infantrymen and scouts trained to speak vietnamese and knowing of Vietnamese culture dispersed into thousands of cap-like outposts starting in 1965; you laugh, that is actually one of the bluf premises to his book. That and of course the usual suspect that the US Army until 68 and Abrams was trying to fight Normandy all over again in the central highlands.

gg, personally I still haven't seen an accurate assessment on the Vietnam War. The ones I have read tend to present a notable bias towards more carrots or sticks, and tend to disregard that there were two fronts. There was a conventional front, and more CAP teams with Viet Linguists wouldn't help defeat NVA regulars, while on the other hand more CAP teams would have been key in defeating the insurgency (VC) quicker. From my numerous readings, GEN Westmoreland failed to find the correct balance and his emphasis on defeating both the VC and NVA regulars with the same tactics led to the problems we encountered, which GEN Abrams was later able to correct. Much like what we see in Iraq, we finally got the right General in place who understands where the balance point is for this particular conflict.

Back to your post, I think Krepinevich was half right, his proposal would have helped defeat the VC quicker, but he missed the boat completely on the NVA threat. I strongly concur with your statement below, and that Krepinevich is out of touch with reality. A BCT that I am familiar with is preparing to deploy and they are conducting extensive language and cultural training. The Army and Marines are adapting, but the most important skills an Army brings to a conflict is its combat skills. That is so obvious when stated its seems foolish, but I get the feeling that there are those who are attempting to make the entire Army into a Special Forces Group. Maybe I'm stuck in the past, but I still think we need viable conventional combat arms folks (the big stick) that can dominate any enemy on the battlefield. Contrary to what some academics appear to think, those skills aren't learned overnight, it takes weeks, months, and sometimes years to develop the leaders and Soldiers to conduct HIC at a high proficiency. As everyone stated, the key is finding the correct balance point for each conflict, because it will move.

Serious defense analysts should stop trying to prove academic points and consider the effects of the recommendations that they are making.

[RTK]

gg, personally I still haven't seen an accurate assessment on the Vietnam War. The ones I have read tend to present a notable bias towards more carrots or sticks, and tend to disregard that there were two fronts. There was a conventional front, and more CAP teams with Viet Linguists wouldn't help defeat NVA regulars, while on the other hand more CAP teams would have been key in defeating the insurgency (VC) quicker. From my numerous readings, GEN Westmoreland failed to find the correct balance and his emphasis on defeating both the VC and NVA regulars with the same tactics led to the problems we encountered, which GEN Abrams was later able to correct. Much like what we see in Iraq, we finally got the right General in place who understands where the balance point is for this particular conflict.

Back to your post, I think Krepinevich was half right, his proposal would have helped defeat the VC quicker, but he missed the boat completely on the NVA threat. I strongly concur with your statement below, and that Krepinevich is out of touch with reality. A BCT that I am familiar with is preparing to deploy and they are conducting extensive language and cultural training. The Army and Marines are adapting, but the most important skills an Army brings to a conflict is its combat skills. That is so obvious when stated its seems foolish, but I get the feeling that there are those who are attempting to make the entire Army into a Special Forces Group. Maybe I'm stuck in the past, but I still think we need viable conventional combat arms folks (the big stick) that can dominate any enemy on the battlefield. Contrary to what some academics appear to think, those skills aren't learned overnight, it takes weeks, months, and sometimes years to develop the leaders and Soldiers to conduct HIC at a high proficiency. As everyone stated, the key is finding the correct balance point for each conflict, because it will move.

We are nothing as a fighting force if we cannot conduct reconnaissance to allow our commanders timely and accurate reports to allow them the reaction time and maneuver space to make an informed decision. Further, we aren't conducting our duties as warfighters if we can't react to contact. This baseline core competency is constant and, above all, essential no matter what the operating environment is. Thus, it should always be of paramount importance. As the old adage says, it's easier to throttle back than throttle forward....sometimes.

[RTK]

gg, personally I still haven't seen an accurate assessment on the Vietnam War. The ones I have read tend to present a notable bias towards more carrots or sticks, and tend to disregard that there were two fronts. There was a conventional front, and more CAP teams with Viet Linguists wouldn't help defeat NVA regulars, while on the other hand more CAP teams would have been key in defeating the insurgency (VC) quicker. From my numerous readings, GEN Westmoreland failed to find the correct balance and his emphasis on defeating both the VC and NVA regulars with the same tactics led to the problems we encountered, which GEN Abrams was later able to correct. Much like what we see in Iraq, we finally got the right General in place who understands where the balance point is for this particular conflict.

Back to your post, I think Krepinevich was half right, his proposal would have helped defeat the VC quicker, but he missed the boat completely on the NVA threat. I strongly concur with your statement below, and that Krepinevich is out of touch with reality. A BCT that I am familiar with is preparing to deploy and they are conducting extensive language and cultural training. The Army and Marines are adapting, but the most important skills an Army brings to a conflict is its combat skills. That is so obvious when stated its seems foolish, but I get the feeling that there are those who are attempting to make the entire Army into a Special Forces Group. Maybe I'm stuck in the past, but I still think we need viable conventional combat arms folks (the big stick) that can dominate any enemy on the battlefield. Contrary to what some academics appear to think, those skills aren't learned overnight, it takes weeks, months, and sometimes years to develop the leaders and Soldiers to conduct HIC at a high proficiency. As everyone stated, the key is finding the correct balance point for each conflict, because it will move.

I concur, which is what I should have started my post with. My tangental thinking during the training exercise I run without the benefits of sleep caused me to neglect that point.