"Pentagon Adviser: Dump Big War Training, Learn New Languages Instead"

[Maximus]

As an outside observer, I'll say that I've become convinced Gian isn't "beating a dead horse." You can't interact with the population while "holding," if you get killed while "clearing."

The video of BLT 1/6 shows this exactly. A balanced approach to training is essential. You can't "clear" if you haven't mastered the kinetic basics (i.e., employing your weapon, fighting within a team and squad, coordinating indirect and close air support, etc.). And you can't "hold" if all you know is the same because you'll continue to piss people off, make more enemies, not understand why security for the people is vital, etc.

[Steve Blair]

The video of BLT 1/6 shows this exactly. A balanced approach to training is essential. You can't "clear" if you haven't mastered the kinetic basics (i.e., employing your weapon, fighting within a team and squad, coordinating indirect and close air support, etc.). And you can't "hold" if all you know is the same because you'll continue to piss people off, make more enemies, not understand why security for the people is vital, etc.

Quite so. The trick is knowing when to flow from one to the other, or how to synchronize them so that both activities take place at the same time, although in different locations. And if you don't train properly, and in both areas, you'll only learn this (if it's learned at all) through very expensive trial and error. Since setting up constabularies or gendarmes doesn't seem to be an option these days, regular troops need to be prepared for those roles...at least until the host nation can take over. Otherwise you end up training a force for another Korea when that might not be the proper response at all...

Breaking out of "either/or" is essential.

[RTK]

gg, personally I still haven't seen an accurate assessment on the Vietnam War. The ones I have read tend to present a notable bias towards more carrots or sticks, and tend to disregard that there were two fronts. There was a conventional front, and more CAP teams with Viet Linguists wouldn't help defeat NVA regulars, while on the other hand more CAP teams would have been key in defeating the insurgency (VC) quicker. From my numerous readings, GEN Westmoreland failed to find the correct balance and his emphasis on defeating both the VC and NVA regulars with the same tactics led to the problems we encountered, which GEN Abrams was later able to correct. Much like what we see in Iraq, we finally got the right General in place who understands where the balance point is for this particular conflict.

Back to your post, I think Krepinevich was half right, his proposal would have helped defeat the VC quicker, but he missed the boat completely on the NVA threat. I strongly concur with your statement below, and that Krepinevich is out of touch with reality. A BCT that I am familiar with is preparing to deploy and they are conducting extensive language and cultural training. The Army and Marines are adapting, but the most important skills an Army brings to a conflict is its combat skills. That is so obvious when stated its seems foolish, but I get the feeling that there are those who are attempting to make the entire Army into a Special Forces Group. Maybe I'm stuck in the past, but I still think we need viable conventional combat arms folks (the big stick) that can dominate any enemy on the battlefield. Contrary to what some academics appear to think, those skills aren't learned overnight, it takes weeks, months, and sometimes years to develop the leaders and Soldiers to conduct HIC at a high proficiency. As everyone stated, the key is finding the correct balance point for each conflict, because it will move.

I concur, which is what I should have started my post with. My tangental thinking during the training exercise I run without the benefits of sleep caused me to neglect that point.

[Rank amateur]

I'm using that in my next brief...

I'm honored and glad that I could make a small contribution.