Rural Fence Sitters in Afghanistan

[Rex Brynen]

I bet you're surprised, but I disagree. Our biggest successes have come from dealing directly with tribal chiefs. So I'd suggest that the answer is "whatever it takes to bring a chief on board." Or to use a bit of lingo, there is no strategic solution, just individual tactical successes.

Get out in the field and start talking with the chiefs.

I said part of the key--you can't win the support of the locals if they see you as intrinsically threatening by your very existence. I agree that a strategic "win" of the entire rural population of Pashtun Afghanistan isn't achievable, and was thinking more about individual AORs.

As I commented earlier, Who are they key powerbrokers in this, and what to they need and want? I think in this regard, we're saying the same thing.

[davidbfpo]

Winning local support from a proud, independent people. I do wonder if the model used by the British along the NW Frontier, yes the other side of the Durand Line, offers some guidance - often the people and tribes are the same.

The locals were left to govern themselves as much as possible (not very progressive and confirmed by the Pakistanis when returning to FATA after 9/11. - no schools, no medical facilities etc).

There was a set of rules on what the locals could not do, notably to the supply roads and railways for the military garrisons along the border. The roads were guarded by local raised forces.

There was a well known enforcement tariff, which occassionally meant military action to enforce fines on tribes etc.

Locally recruited para-military forces, paid for - without any local taxes and with long term seconded officers / NCOs.

Nothing I have heard about the situation today indicates the national Afghan government has a proper role outside Kabul. So start local, bottom up.

From my comfortable armchair.

davidbfpo

[William F. Owen]

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/7501538.stm

A good start might not be killing so many civilians (if indeed they are).

[Eden]

I think the first step is recognizing the peculiar (to us) worldview of the rural Afghani. The people you deal with in Nuristan or Oruzgan or Helmand are survivors with a keen understanding of their own socio-political environment - a fact we often do not grasp. Their narrative (built on their own experience and the folklore of centuries) doesn't match the one we want to foist upon them.

They do not see a strong central government as a positive benefit. We think a strong central government will be able to provide them with improved social services and security; in their experience, strong central governments are rapacious and trigger serious violence, as opposed to manageable local violence.

Foreign bayonets always, in the end, go away. When they do, things get very bad for a while, as the locals sort things out. Thus, they view your patrols as portents of future insecurity, despite any local and transitory improvements. Moreover, foreigners only come when a strong Afghanistan would threaten their own interests - they see promises to build a strong central government as a veiled means of installing a puppet who can oppress local perogatives.

Cultural constraints - the Pashtunwali is the best known, though it is by no means universal throughout the country - often cause locals to do things we find perverse. Afghans are not stupid; they grasp that their own mores can work to their temporary disadvantage. But they believe that their endurance, strength, and uniqueness springs from these traditions. Perversity in support of their culture can be, in fact, a source of prestige, respect, and local influence. On the other hand, you will find many Afghans can be quite cynical in defending or abandoning observance of the traditions when it suits them - just to make dealing with them more difficult.

Patronage is so ingrained that Afghans find it difficult to believe in our protestations of disinterested support. They are suspicious of our motives as individuals - what, exactly, is in it for us? - or they delight in and exploit our naivete bordering on stupidity.

Another aspect of the patronage system we find frustrating is that it is far better to have resources (money, gas, weapons, people, expertise) than to dispense them. Once you have given out, say, money, you reduce your ability to bargain, to influence, to bribe, to be flattered and wheedled. This is why money piles up in government coffers. The masters of this finely balance giving out and amassing treasure. And Afghans do not recognize the concept of public funds or unit supplies - they are always considered to belong to the official responsible.

Complicating this, of course, is that like people everywhere, there are many exceptions to these general rule - Afghans who are honest, reliable, and selfless in the Western sense rather than in accord with local standards.

Oh, and take everything I say with a large grain of salt: a year in-country does not make me an expert...but you'll find that many Afghans are as ignorant of distant parts of their own country as any wet-behind-the-ears lieutenant.

[Ron Humphrey]

This is something I have spent a lot of time contemplating and I have a question regarding (How to view) the Afghan makeup.

I get the vision of the Knights of the roundtable, Kingdoms, Fiefdoms, Lords and ladies, etc.

Realizing how different the cultural makeup is would it still not be somewhat realistic to view the makeup of afghanistan in this way.

Ground up (as david mentioned) being a key component. The one commonality which still seems to be consistent whereever you go seems to be that local life happens along hierarchial lines. Head of the family, head of the faith, head of the tribe, head of defense, etc.

Isn't this a situation where less can definately be more, in that the less you actually have to do, pay, build, etc; the more likely those in local control will be more likely to look to you for what they can get towards greater empowerment.

???

[marct]

Hi Ron,

This is something I have spent a lot of time contemplating and I have a question regarding (How to view) the Afghan makeup.

I get the vision of the Knights of the roundtable, Kingdoms, Fiefdoms, Lords and ladies, etc.

Realizing how different the cultural makeup is would it still not be somewhat realistic to view the makeup of afghanistan in this way.

Well, if you want an analog from Western history, Scotland is much better than the mythologized Arthurian Britain. I would look at the faction fights surrounding Robert the Bruce and, also, James VI, for example.

[Ron Humphrey]

Hi Ron,



Well, if you want an analog from Western history, Scotland is much better than the mythologized Arthurian Britain. I would look at the faction fights surrounding Robert the Bruce and, also, James VI, for example.

a researching I will go

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Celtic Geographies: Old Culture, New Times By David Harvey

Is this a good place to start?