Combat Outpost Penetrated in Afghanistan, 9 dead

[Cavguy]

Summary of the CSI report draft on the battle over at Tom Ricks' blog.

http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts...r_coin_failure

The Army's study of what happened in the Wanat battle a year ago in eastern Afghanistan is even harder on senior U.S. military commanders than I was in my series on it back in February, saying that they didn't understand counterinsurgency doctrine and also that some of their statements about the fight were misleading at best.

The report, which is still in draft form, contradicts a few aspects of the accounts provided by some of the senior officers involved, implicitly raising integrity questions. That's especially significant because two officials at Fort Leavenworth have told me that the Army inspector general's office is investigating how the Wanat incident was reported and reviewed. I also hear that congressional interest in the situation is growing.

The report, which has not been released and was written for the Army's Combat Studies Institute by military historian Douglas Cubbison, finds multiple failures by the battalion and brigade commanders involved, Lt. Col. William Ostlund and Col. Charles Preysler. The core problem, Cubbison writes, is that the battle resulted from "a failure of COIN [counterinsurgency] manifested in a major combat action that although a marked tactical victory, became an operational and strategic defeat." Indeed, the report concludes that the unit's attempts at counterinsurgency were so badly implemented that they "were more likely to foster hostility than reciprocity from the local population."

Interesting ammo for both sides of the COIN debate - COL Gentile can argue that "dogmatic" COIN approach did play a role, and I can confidently state that it isn't the fault of the doctrine, but poor application and understanding.

Of note, is the report praises the combat performance of the troops while questioning the operational concept.

[Ken White]

the Army's attempt to be honest about the action.

He provides one quote that many will be inclined to ignore. I think that would be a mistake:

The report quotes one soldier's view was representative: "These people, they disgust me...Everything about those people up there is disgusting. They're worthless." This is not an attitude that tends to produce productive relationships.

The basic problem with using the GPF in a FID/ SFA roles is not that the leaders cannot learn the TTP and apply them (though we obviously still need to work on that...) nor is is that decent leaders cannot control the actions if not the attitudes of young troops who feel as the quote suggests.

The basic problem is that some people are drawn to the application of force and many of these tend to get into the GPF. Others who see force as a tool to be applied sparingly and only when needed drift into SF or SF like organizations. Two different philosophies and approaches. The second can and will adapt to all cultures; the first is far less likely to adapt and very prone to insist or at some level believe that the other culture must adapt to them or, if it does nor, that said culture is not worth the effort involved.

Those are generalizations of course, with all the standard caveats but I've seen that effect too many places and too many times to discount its importance. To say that the GPF attitude is "look like me or die" is an oversimplification -- but not by much.

Once the training and education issue is fixed, the GPF problem in COIN will not be the troops who don't care for the culture, mission or location of the effort. The larger problem will be their leaders who feel the same way (no matter how good they are at suppressing or concealing that attitude). That deeply seated attitude affects what gets done and how it's done and the Troops are not insensitive to their boss's real thoughts and beliefs...

We need the GPF to be versed and trained in the TTP of FID /SFA, no question and we're working on that. More importantly, we also need to do our national best to avoid having to commit them to such efforts. Commitment of USAid, SF and other elements in an attempt to forestall future problems is vastly preferable. No matter how much avoidance costs, that effort will almost always be less costly to the US, the Host Nation and the local population than will GPF commitment.

[IntelTrooper]

The larger problem will be their leaders who feel the same way (no matter how good they are at suppressing or concealing that attitude). That deeply seated attitude affects what gets done and how it's done and the Troops are not insensitive to their boss's real thoughts and beliefs...

Absolutely. I expect young E-3s (and sadly, E-6's and E-7's) to make dumb comments like "F--- these goat f---ers." What is unacceptable was that I saw/heard these kind of statements made in the presence of lieutenants and captains who made no effort to correct that attitude. At that point it is a failure of the officers who should know better (and if they don't, they need to be riding a desk somewhere).

[Danny]

I am currently reading this long report and will hold my thoughts for now. I will weigh in later on his analysis of Wanat, some I agree with thus far and some I do not. It is a well written and comprehensive analysis regardless of agreement or disagreement one might have with any particular bit of it.

As for the issue of massing of troops that Cavguy brougth up earlier, this doesn't surprise me as it has been a mainstay in their mode of operation. I hate to shill for a post I wrote, but this is important:

http://www.captainsjournal.com/2009/...ing-of-troops/

In my own analysis of Wanat:

http://www.captainsjournal.com/2008/...ttle-of-wanat/

I was very critical of a number of things that he also criticizes (such as the delay in setting up VPB Wanat and the proximity of OP Topside which caused most of the deaths that awful night), but I didn't criticize the practice of COIN for reasons I will address later after I am finished with his report. I think that it's easy and necessary to provide open and honest critique of TTPs and other inanimate objects, but when it gets personal it's much harder and more subjective.

I wish all of these men well and my respect goes out to them all.

[Cavguy]

Hersch,

A little off topic, but ...

As always, I enjoy your analysis, but find the Marine cheerleading a bit much throughout your blog. I love the marines, fought beside them, but there is a theme that constantly implies everything the Army does is bad and the Marines are always right. Also, the Marines didn't win Anbar, the US Military did. It's hard for me to stomach seeing that constantly in your blog when there were many services, and Army troops from 2004+ made up at least 40% of the troops in Anbar. A small point, but it does disservice to those soldiers from other services who also did quite well there.

Niel

[Danny]

I'm trying to think of where that might have appeared in the posts. W.R.T. massing of troops I don't think so, but I'll have to go back and look. Not pertinent to the topic.

As for Wanat, I think I might have compared setting up COPs in Anbar to taking a year and negotiating it with tribal leaders who didn't want to be seen negotiating with anyone because the Taliban might be watching. Dumb idea.

It happened to be different in every case of which I am aware at how it was done in Iraq and thus I mentioned it. My knowledge base is very limited to Anbar (not the balance of Iraq) and thus I must refer to how Marines did so and so in Haditha or Fallujah, or whatever (I do have some Army contacts from Anbar, but they are very limited compared to my Marine contacts). Sorry to offend, but it sounds Niel like there are some raw nerves there. Sorry to have hit one.

As for Anbar, yes, not only did Marines win Anbar, but Army (you) and some very good National Guard troops I know. My respect to them all.

[Cavguy]

I'm trying to think of where that might have appeared in the posts. W.R.T. massing of troops I don't think so, but I'll have to go back and look. Not pertinent to the topic.

As for Wanat, I think I might have compared setting up COPs in Anbar to taking a year and negotiating it with tribal leaders who didn't want to be seen negotiating with anyone because the Taliban might be watching. Dumb idea.

It happened to be different in every case of which I am aware at how it was done in Iraq and thus I mentioned it. My knowledge base is very limited to Anbar (not the balance of Iraq) and thus I must refer to how Marines did so and so in Haditha or Fallujah, or whatever (I do have some Army contacts from Anbar, but they are very limited compared to my Marine contacts). Sorry to offend, but it sounds Niel like there are some raw nerves there. Sorry to have hit one.

As for Anbar, yes, not only did Marines win Anbar, but Army (you) and some very good National Guard troops I know. My respect to them all.

Thanks. I know that is not what you mean, just how it reads. When you lose 80+ guys in Ramadi during 2006-2007, and transform the AO, it grates a little to hear "The Marines won Anbar". That's my raw nerve. After our article on Ramadi, I see it many places, but often on your blog. Then most of your Afghanistan posts tend to say (paraphrase) the Army should do what the Marines did in Anbar (or Hemland), when the Army has done those kinds of ops. You're not as bad as the guy over at Free Range International, who has some of the best commentary on AStan around but takes every opportunity to bash the Army, which isn't a monolith any more than the Marines are.

Don't get me wrong, I'm extremely hard on the Army for its failures. But the "Marines are always right" them just grates on me, because they're not. No more so than the Army is.

For example, you talk a lot about Marines transforming Fallujah/Haditha, but seldom mention a similar strategy executed successfully in Tal Afar by the Army in 2005 ... the Army knows this too - you would find a better commentary response from Army audiences if you used examples of where the Army did things well rather than chiding them for not being Marines ... different orgs, different culture, different purposes. For example, a look at 3/10 MTN's Afghan deployment of 2006 may be instructive, as it was related in Kilcullen's book.

Just an observation that may broaden your readership.

Also: Snippet from COL MacFarland on the joint effort:

"You old guys need to get over that s--t."

- Young Marine to Marine sergeant major when asked how he felt about fighting alongside an Army unit in Al Anbar, Iraq.

In the March-April 2008 issue of Military Review, Major Niel Smith and I wrote about the accomplishments of the Soldiers, Marines, Sailors, and Airmen who fought in Ramadi from June 2006 through February 2007. I would like to elaborate on an important point raised in the article: the Al Anbar campaign was a model of joint operational effectiveness.


Altogether, the joint effort in Ramadi worked because, no matter what service uniforms they wore, professionals dedicated to the mission performed as expected. This professional dedication evinced itself in shared values and shared understanding. It was not uncommon to see Soldiers and Marines march forward side by side in final honors at memorial services for their lost comrades. At times, the helmets atop inverted M4 carbines reflected a mix of Army and Marine Corps camouflage.

...

The U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps, each today without peer in its domain of land warfare, have not shared such a strong bond of common experience and understanding since the island campaigns of World War II. The services should nurture those bonds and sustain them over time. Those who share experiences on the battlefield with comrades from sister services can help strengthen these bonds and create closer ones by contributing to the discourse. Articles and other forms of media spawned from joint endeavors, co-written perhaps in cooperative cross-service efforts, will help feed the knowledge base for all services and make us stronger yet as a joint force.

[Danny]

Niel, there are two options for me. I might soon become very much a pro-Army blog if things work out. My son it appears isn't going to re-enlist in the Marines, but an Army recruiter is after him to take a big signing bonus to join up and go SF. If he decides not to do this, I'll shut my blog down.

Tim Lynch is a super nice and great guy and lot's of fun and informative to read. When I see his Oorah stuff I smile and continue reading. You're right. His is some of the best Afghanistan commentary on the web, and it is a must read as far as I am concerned. I don't miss his stuff.