Combat Outpost Penetrated in Afghanistan, 9 dead

[Bill Moore]

Ken and Pete,

Well said, and I applaud the efforts to attempt to develop the strategic Corporal, they need to make him a soldier first and foremost. We are engraining a lot of bad habits in this war.

[Cole]

In COIN the key terrain is the populace, and failure to control it puts you in an unwinnable situation. The populace is the key terrain that the insurgent and a good counterinsurgent is struggling to control.

Bill mentioned the above earlier. Someone else mentioned that per FM 3-24 that in COIN you must accept some risk to put the population less at risk. Wanat was simply too much risk for too little population.

But even at Wanat, a fully HESCO'd COP farther from buildings may have helped as would additional RSTA assets taken from the unit the final days...not by the C-o-C that was accused of negligence. And it was not higher headquarters' fault either. Sufficient assets did not exist in country. Secretary Gates has made rectifying that a major priority.

METT-TC and Troop Leading Procedures are essential training skills. But Civil Considerations is part of METT-TC as is its planning tool ASCOPE. Operational variables of PMESII-PT are a key consideration at brigade level and above. Additional RSTA assets can assist evaluation of all these variables while also providing area security, QRF, and precision fires close to friendlies and civilians.

Sustainment of small units is enough of a nightmare in Afghanistan. Making the most of available personnel would seem to indicate dispersion of available personnel to influence key populations. That appears to be exactly what some SF units do. They too take risk. But for GPF it would seem you require sufficient personnel to secure the base and patrol. COPs and HESCO assist that while providing an accessible location for resupply and secure rest.

[Bill Moore]

Cole,

You seemed to be focused on kit, and while kit will always play a role it is critical we train our forces on the principles behind infantry tactics, so they can most effectively operate with whatever kit they have (even if it is just small arms and a FM radio). We may be so used to our technical superiority that we are forgetting/discarding the basics. I am not sure that is the case, but it is an observation validated more than once.

As for risk versus gain, that is an opinion, and one best formed by the tactical commander based on his understanding of the situation at the time. The value of protecting the populace is not reserved for large population centers only. That implies you are not taking the offensive, nor defending in depth, especiallly when the bulk of the insurgency is an outside in (taking the rural areas first, then when the time is right move into the urban areas).

However, my focus remains on not dragging our field leaders through the mud when they take casualties, it sends a terrible message to the force. You have seen the comments on the other posts where commanders are too cowardly to properly execute our COIN doctrine, and that behavoir is rewarded, while units that actually get outside the wire and push into contested areas put their careers at risk. Seems perverse to me, but in the end we may just have to agree to disagree on this on.

[Ken White]

Someone else mentioned that per FM 3-24 that in COIN you must accept some risk to put the population less at risk. Wanat was simply too much risk for too little population.

I think you just made our point...

But even at Wanat, a fully HESCO'd COP ...

Is it just me or do "HESCO'd" and "COP" not constitute an oxymoron. An outpost is a tactical position temporarily occupied; HESCOs imply some permanance and require mechanical aids...

METT-TC and Troop Leading Procedures are essential training skills.

Way wrong -- they are essential cognitive tactical and operational skills, they require training for acquisition and practice for retention and improvement. To be of value they must be applied.

But Civil Considerations is part of METT-TC as is its planning tool ASCOPE. Operational variables of PMESII-PT are a key consideration at brigade level and above.

You get the morning's bureaucratic response prize!!!

The key words there are "brigade level and above." I agree (that's where those acronyms have purchase, rightly or, IMO, wrongly...). However, the selection of the actual location of a COP is not the Bde (or above) call -- or absolutely should not be -- and that siting should be tactically determined. Sensibly tactically determined...

the Additional RSTA assets can assist evaluation of all these variables while also providing area security, QRF, and precision fires close to friendlies and civilians.

True -- and all that can be provided to mobile elements as well as to inefficient and mostly ineffective COPs.

Sustainment of small units is enough of a nightmare in Afghanistan.

True again and yet another reason that the use of these COPs is unwise.

Making the most of available personnel would seem to indicate dispersion of available personnel to influence key populations. That appears to be exactly what some SF units do. They too take risk. But for GPF it would seem you require sufficient personnel to secure the base and patrol.

Or you mount platoon and Company sized patrols of two to three weeks from larger, easier to sustain operational bases. You can affect a larger population over far more area that way than you can by sitting in a 'COP' and rusting. Combat entails risk, stasis in combat exacerbates risk. Infantry walks, it's part of what they do and they should be doing it vice sitting in bullet magnets that really have little effect on (or with) the population.

Fighting go-rillas means that one never stays anywhere outside a major well defended base more than 24 hours because your more flexible and knowledgeable of local terrain and conditions opponent will embarrass you. To succeed against guerrillas and insurgents, mobility is more important than presence. Here's an article I read last year (LINK). I don't totally agree but it's pretty good. I do agree with the commenter he quotes...

COPs and HESCO assist that while providing an accessible location for resupply and secure rest.

One could quibble on the secure bit but one should acknowledge that stasis is a combat negative and that stasis in a poorly selected and organized location is an invitation to trouble.

[Pete]

Mobility trumps...

I read that Stonewall Jackson wasn't the best of tacticians but his ability to move around quickly and then hammer his foes hard was his particular genuis. Early on he had been a Light Artilleryman and as such he had to pay a lot of attention to the reconnaissance, selection and occupation of positions for his battery. As a Confederate general he had Jed Hotchkiss making him maps and he also had his staff make him tables of distances between different geographical locations. He moved quickly and struck hard, even though some other officers were better than he was at arranging the disposition of forces during engagements.

[ganulv]

As a student of anthropology and geography I have always found the neologism ‘human terrain’ to be a strange one. Cultural and natural geography do interact but they have some fundamental differences. I might be overthinking it, but I have to wonder if using the terms terrain and human terrain isn’t fundamentally confusing. It might be meant as a metaphor, but the reality is that land relief and local populace are simply unalike things. Why use words that kinda sorta suggest otherwise?

Anyways, I found a copy of the official report and used a couple of the landmarks mentioned in it to locate the settlement on Google Earth from which the snapshot below is taken (the blue line is roughly the bed of the Wayskawdi Creek referenced in the report). I don’t have any background whatsoever in engineering, military or otherwise, but the terrain looks as difficult to defend as I can imagine.

[Cole]

You seemed to be focused on kit, and while kit will always play a role it is critical we train our forces on the principles behind infantry tactics, so they can most effectively operate with whatever kit they have (even if it is just small arms and a FM radio).

Bill, that sounds dangerously like former defense secretary Rumsfeld's comment: "As you know, you go to war with the Army you have. They're not the Army you might want or wish to have at a later time."

I hate to envision the ground casualties suffered without modern body armor and MRAP/M-ATVs. Without today's UAS, attack helicopters, lift and MEDEVAC aircraft flying a much broader area than Vietnam and suffering far fewer battlefield and accident losses, our ground forces could have been in a world of hurt. Those casualties easily could have cut the Iraq War short resulting in a different outcome due to homeland pressure ala Vietnam.

We may be so used to our technical superiority that we are forgetting/discarding the basics. I am not sure that is the case, but it is an observation validated more than once.

Sure, things like GPS make us lazy. But we tend to grossly exaggerate the number of nations truly capable of jamming GPS on a sustained basis. Those are the nations typically deterred by MAD. All the rest are the Irans, North Koreas, Libyas, etc.

While I disagreed with Fuchs implied comparison of actions in Libya to WWII Germany, I tended to agree that the Libyan aircraft and air defense threat was/is vastly overblown. I read an AviationWeek article that said the maximum altitude of the SA-6 is 7000 meters and the SA-8 was only 5,000 meters while a new SA-24 based on the SA-18 had a max altitude of only 3,500 meters...all unclassified figures they published. And as Fuchs pointed out, old MANPADS and radar-guided SA-6 don't work well and can be overflown at altitude. They also could have been jammed and taken out with HARMs from altitude. Only a handful of adversary nations have truly effective air defenses.

Meanwhile, ground forces continue to face far higher ground casualties from current adversaries and a host of potential ones. Yet the money and new developments keep feeding the already safer air and seapower. When was the last major ship-on-ship sea battle? Which potential threats have significant naval power. Only a few deterred by MAD and economics.

As for risk versus gain, that is an opinion, and one best formed by the tactical commander based on his understanding of the situation at the time. The value of protecting the populace is not reserved for large population centers only. That implies you are not taking the offensive, nor defending in depth, especiallly when the bulk of the insurgency is an outside in (taking the rural areas first, then when the time is right move into the urban areas).

If Nuristanis are xenophobes, their gem trade is threatened by the government, and Karzai likewise prevents Korengalis from selling lumber to Pakistan, how is there hope of winning those hearts and minds in areas adjacent to the Pech river? Why are they even relevant?

The rural areas are too large to cover. Do police set up precincts in the sticks? Even the AfPak border is too large and too hard to resupply. We can't even cover our border with Mexico and Canada. Only aerial technology can cover areas that broad and isolated...and not necessarily well.

However, my focus remains on not dragging our field leaders through the mud when they take casualties, it sends a terrible message to the force. You have seen the comments on the other posts where commanders are too cowardly to properly execute our COIN doctrine, and that behavoir is rewarded, while units that actually get outside the wire and push into contested areas put their careers at risk. Seems perverse to me, but in the end we may just have to agree to disagree on this on.

Agreed, particularly field commanders and Soldiers who have served honorably and effectively for 14 months and two weeks which no other service or SOF/SF element has been asked to endure.

However, in this instance from the safety of my couch it is easy to point out that perhaps 1LT Brostrum should have used his ANA to patrol since they were drinking local water and had effective ETT leadership. So in this instance, avoidance of patrol risk or lack of trust in the ANA, actually increased risk to the platoon as a whole.

Another largely unnoticed point in the study was that the platoon-plus at Wanat was newly arriving from Camp Blessing and had been there since, I believe, April, before moving to set up COP Kahler in July. That long rest at a far safer FOB would tend to dispute Ken's point about launching patrols from larger bases. After all, Wanat was just 5 miles north of Camp Blessing. An easy walk right? Well maybe with new body armor and carrying all your own supplies through mountains it is not so easy...

I saw many light loads in old Vietnam footage and some less than flattering equipment and uniform practices, perhaps caused by the long patrols Ken described. The far higher casualty figures also do not necessarily support the value of long random patrols anymore than boring holes in the sky hoping to find the enemy is an effective technique. One could argue patrols and UAS loiters should be cued and focused on CCIR and other IR related to commander's information needs.

[Ken White]

As a student of anthropology and geography I have always found the neologism ‘human terrain’ to be a strange one. Cultural and natural geography do interact but they have some fundamental differences. I might be overthinking it, but I have to wonder if using the terms terrain and human terrain isn’t fundamentally confusing. It might be meant as a metaphor, but the reality is that land relief and local populace are simply unalike things. Why use words that kinda sorta suggest otherwise?

In the minds of many of us it is indeed a misleading and inappropriate term. Here's one Thread: LINK.

IMO its an attempt to put people in a rather immobile and little changing category as is the terrain. Won't work. People won't stand for it. Bad pun intended...

You can use the search function on the board and find half a dozen or more Threads and literally hundreds of posts dating back to the birth of the term about five years ago. All with some pros and some cons...

[Cole]

As a student of anthropology and geography I have always found the neologism ‘human terrain’ to be a strange one. Cultural and natural geography do interact but they have some fundamental differences. I might be overthinking it, but I have to wonder if using the terms terrain and human terrain isn’t fundamentally confusing. It might be meant as a metaphor, but the reality is that land relief and local populace are simply unalike things. Why use words that kinda sorta suggest otherwise?

Anyways, I found a copy of the official report and used a couple of the landmarks mentioned in it to locate the settlement on Google Earth from which the snapshot below is taken (the blue line is roughly the bed of the Wayskawdi Creek referenced in the report). I don’t have any background whatsoever in engineering, military or otherwise, but the terrain looks as difficult to defend as I can imagine.

You are looking north up the Waygal river valley and can make out the road on the east valley ridgeline that the platoon and ground QRF and supply trucks employed.

If you zoom in using computer zoom to 400% and look just southwest of the blue creek line, you can make out the road that Vehicle Patrol Base (or COP) Kahler was sitting next to less than 50 meters from multiple buildings from which the enemy fired. OP Topside was next to Wayskawdi Creek and trees and deadspace just south of OP Topside allowed the enemy to sneak up within meters. So LRAS3 dismounted at OP Topside did little to safeguard the platoon from a close-in threat. Likewise, as the photo depicts, no amount of digging in without overhead cover would have safeguarded platoon fighting positions. A large overhead or small tactical UAS and unattended sensors or small unmanned ground vehicle quite possibly would have detected infiltration attempts.

It was a lousy position, but you could certainly argue that COP Bella further north was far worse and had even fewer members of the population to influence. If you look at it on 400% zoom and see other closer pictures you also see few places to park 5 HMMWVs with crew served weapons. The ridge adjacent to the blue line was terraced with several foot high walls creating each steppe.

[Ken White]

Another largely unnoticed point in the study was that the platoon-plus at Wanat was newly arriving from Camp Blessing and had been there since, I believe, April, before moving to set up COP Kahler in July. That long rest at a far safer FOB would tend to dispute Ken's point about launching patrols from larger bases. After all, Wanat was just 5 miles north of Camp Blessing. An easy walk right? Well maybe with new body armor and carrying all your own supplies through mountains it is not so easy...

I wasn't there and have no idea when the Platoon did what so I cannot comment on that. What I can say is that if you assume that Platoon sat from April to July, I suspect you're doing them a disservice. They most likely were running at least some patrols from the FOB. One would hope, at least.

Patrolling is never easy. In mountains, it is quite difficult -- but it goes with the job. You should not avoid it because it is dangerous, nor should you avoid it because it is really hard work. To do so is to invite trouble.

Also note that you're having them walk with all their supplies to set up a 'COP.' That's not a patrol, that's an approach march to establish a static position. That's a very different thing -- and not a good idea...

I saw many light loads in old Vietnam footage and some less than flattering equipment and uniform practices...

Flattering is in the eye of the peacetime soldier who can afford the time and effort to be pretty. Also note that though armor was available it was worn by virtually no one -- can't do it in jungle heat and if we do another jungle war, all those Armor lovers are going to have either cases of heat stroke or personal conniption fit when some sensible General says 'dump the armor' (which of course means we could drop it in Afghanistan -- but we won't...).

perhaps caused by the long patrols Ken described.

and the short ones. Different Army. Quite different. Better in some ways, not as good in others but definitely different...

The far higher casualty figures also do not necessarily support the value of long random patrols anymore than boring holes in the sky hoping to find the enemy is an effective technique. One could argue patrols and UAS loiters should be cued and focused on CCIR and other IR related to commander's information needs.

That's emphatically mixing Breadfruits and Blueberries...

No patrol should ever be 'random.' Its route should be carefully selected to be purposeful but not predictable and it should appear random only to the untrained observer. Other units should pursue different routes and timings and no one should stay anywhere more than 12 hours. All should occasionally and seemingly carelessly double back to village and populated areas they just left. They should look like they know what they're doing -- the opposition will always head for the low hanging Breadfruits, the poorly trained and the sluffers, the lazy -- who are always with us...

Static outposts have a poor record in COIN efforts while well planned and conducted long patrols are proven very effective in counterguerrilla work. Overall casualty figures from the two approaches differ but little. Extensive patrols worked in WW II, in Korea and in Viet Nam. Elements of the 1/82 BCT employed them also successfully -- as 82 Redleg can attest -- in Afghanistan. They cannot be sent out just to say we did it, they have to have a purpose, a thoroughly planned route and resupply process and be willing to forego own DS Arty support. When the bureaucracy got going in Viet Nam in late 1967, one of their first foolish diktats was that no US unit could move out of US Artillery fans. That stopped the long patrols and the war went downhill from then on. Better safe than effective...

It's the American way.

The far higher casualty figures from Viet Nam compared to Afghanistan are due to the very different type of war plus big differences in terrain and vegetation. It can also be attributed to a very different, more numerous, better trained, better armed and more competent enemy -- that last not my opinion but from an acquaintance who was SF for years to include Viet Nam and now works as a Contractor for somebody or other.

[Cole]

Also note that you're having them walk with all their supplies to set up a 'COP.' That's not a patrol, that's an approach march to establish a static position.

Was implying that for a long patrol, you would need to carry a lot of water, ammunition, and food regardless of whether setting up a COP.

Also note that though armor was available it was worn by virtually no one -- can't do it in jungle heat and if we do another jungle war, all those Armor lovers are going to have either cases of heat stroke or personal conniption fit when some sensible General says 'dump the armor' (which of course means we could drop it in Afghanistan -- but we won't...).

Today's armor is much lighter. Technology could evolve to make armor even more so and include cooling fluid tubes adjacent to Soldier skin using weight saved with lighter armor. Hard? Yes. But if the effort is not made, Soldiers continue to be jeopardized needlessly. To quote a pretty smart General, hard is not impossible.

No patrol should ever be 'random.' Its route should be carefully selected to be purposeful but not predictable and it should appear random only to the untrained observer. Other units should pursue different routes and timings and no one should stay anywhere more than 12 hours. All should occasionally and seemingly carelessly double back to village and populated areas they just left. They should look like they know what they're doing -- the opposition will always head for the low hanging Breadfruits, the poorly trained and the sluffers, the lazy -- who are always with us...

Good point, and perhaps it has been covered. But it just seems to me that if you are protecting the population, your patrols and resupply routes must either avoid the population (and risk becoming irrelevant) and use honesty traces to avoid the same routes/chokepoints so the enemy does not plant IEDs there, or concentrate patrols and surveillance nearly continuously on the same routes and streets used by the population so the enemy has no time to place IEDs without risking being observed. Is that even possible without a nearby COP from which to originate the patrols and use aerostats, sensor towers, and small UAS and unmanned ground sensors/vehicles?

IIRC, one LTC did it in one Iraq city sending patrols out continuously, but believe they originated from COPs. The Marines seemed to have figured something out in Sangin, but suffered a lot of IED casualties initially before patrolling flushed out the problem. They are also using COPs.

Static outposts have a poor record in COIN efforts while well planned and conducted long patrols are proven very effective in counterguerrilla work. Overall casualty figures from the two approaches differ but little. Extensive patrols worked in WW II, in Korea and in Viet Nam. Elements of the 1/82 BCT employed them also successfully -- as 82 Redleg can attest -- in Afghanistan. They cannot be sent out just to say we did it, they have to have a purpose, a thoroughly planned route and resupply process and be willing to forego own DS Arty support. When the bureaucracy got going in Viet Nam in late 1967, one of their first foolish diktats was that no US unit could move out of US Artillery fans. That stopped the long patrols and the war went downhill from then on. Better safe than effective...

It's the American way.

The far higher casualty figures from Viet Nam compared to Afghanistan are due to the very different type of war plus big differences in terrain and vegetation. It can also be attributed to a very different, more numerous, better trained, better armed and more competent enemy -- that last not my opinion but from an acquaintance who was SF for years to include Viet Nam and now works as a Contractor for somebody or other.

Good comment and realize that the North Vietnamese were a tougher foe. But the shorter distance from sea to land bases had to be easier than resupply of Texas-sized land-locked terrain. Most resupply would need to be by air if forces never settled on key terrain protecting key populations. Doesn't that risk revealing friendly positions by either helicopter or airdrop resupply? Guess if done at night with multiple false insertions...
and GPS airdrops...that pesky tech thing again.

BTW, in my earlier text referring to the photo of Wanat's terrain, I should have said the deadspace was north of OP Topside, not south.

[Pete]

Stonewall Jackson's strongest skill was in the area of route reconnaissance, both by map and as well as by aides or cavalry detachments. Like Forrest he got there ''The fastest with the mostest," even though at times his tactics could have been better. He was a cannon-cocker, not a trained Infantryman.

[Ken White]

Was implying that for a long patrol, you would need to carry a lot of water, ammunition, and food regardless of whether setting up a COP.

Not necessarily. Two to three days worth of necessary stuff will run about 40-50 lbs -- including the ubiquitous batteries. The key is resupply and there are several ways to do that. Going out with 60 pounds for a week long patrol isn't unheard of...

I have to caveat that by noting that I believe the water guidelines are for people in reasonable shape, vastly overstated.

Today's armor is much lighter. Technology could evolve to make armor even more so and include cooling fluid tubes adjacent to Soldier skin using weight saved with lighter armor. Hard? Yes. But if the effort is not made, Soldiers continue to be jeopardized needlessly. To quote a pretty smart General, hard is not impossible.

Tech solutions are great and I'm all for them but the jungle armor problem is less pure weight than the enclosure of the trunk and the stifling effect. A cooling tube arrangement would assist but that may entail even ore constraint on the torso...

Does Armor help keep people alive? Yes. Is it necessary that it be worn at all times in all situations? No. METT-TC...

Also note that the fact the technology can be pursued to make a lighter cooler vest, perhaps we should determine, tactically and politically just how important that is. Just because we can do it doesn't mean we should. We really need to prioritize development and procurement a little better; the current process tries to give everyone something and the result is fragments and crumbs...

Good point, and perhaps it has been covered. But it just seems to me that if you are protecting the population, your patrols and resupply routes must either avoid the population (and risk becoming irrelevant) and use honesty traces to avoid the same routes/chokepoints so the enemy does not plant IEDs there, or concentrate patrols and surveillance nearly continuously on the same routes and streets used by the population so the enemy has no time to place IEDs without risking being observed. Is that even possible without a nearby COP from which to originate the patrols and use aerostats, sensor towers, and small UAS and unmanned ground sensors/vehicles?

That's the current view of things. The real issue is what you want the force to do. If you want it to engage in population security and attempt to protect the people from predators and civic action efforts with persistent presence, then you're on the right track. You will also need a large force and to establish a number of company sized COPs. Platoon sized invite defeat in detail -- or at least raise the risk thereof. You will also have difficulties in your assistance as the opponent will impede you pretty much in any way he can thus causing a two steps forward and one back process which will be quite expensive.

OTOH if you want to provide increased security for the populace so that someone else can do that civic action stuff in relative safety and without much of it being undone, then you find the troublemakers and kill them. You can do that with a far smaller (but better trained) force and COPs are the antithesis of what you should be doing.

What we currently appear to be doing in Afghanistan is an amalgamation of those two techniques with too small a force that is not adequately trained to do much else and the resultant compromise will work but it is terribly inefficient and it is un-American in that it's slow.

The terrain and the settlement patterns in Afghanistan are not conducive to a heavy patrolling approach unless there is adequate air support for lift and resupply. We have the capability to provide that but have elected to not do so for primarily personnel policy reasons. We have elected not to seek and destroy (mostly) -- with the GPF to not 'waste' casualties on a war we cannot win. I do not blame the Army or the Commanders for that. We should've gone in trashed the Talibs and left but Bush was too nice a guy to do that. We're there and the guys are doing their best with the hand dealt.

Howsomeever, ideally, heavy patrols looping through populated zones on varied routes generally under surveillance by technical means or LRS troops (that are now mostly not being used to do what they're nominally trained to do because of the risk factor)...

IIRC, one LTC did it in one Iraq city sending patrols out continuously, but believe they originated from COPs.

Several have, good units will always patrol heavily and frequently.

The Marines seemed to have figured something out in Sangin, but suffered a lot of IED casualties initially before patrolling flushed out the problem. They are also using COPs.

Again, not there so cannot really comment but my perception and information is that the IED problem is mostly a training problem and that as units gain experience in theater, the numbers and effects go down considerably -- personnel policy again...

As an aside I've had several folks recently there tell me they're convinced the MRAP is an invention of the Devil -- good units use them sensibly, poor ones do not and tend to get Cocoonitis...

Most resupply would need to be by air if forces never settled on key terrain protecting key populations. Doesn't that risk revealing friendly positions by either helicopter or airdrop resupply?

Mission dependent, that's not a problem. If it's a combat patrol, seeking to kill bad guys, you don't care if they know where you are once in a while. Plus the resupply strikes great envy in the hearts and mindsof the Evil Ones. If it's a recon patrol then this works:

Guess if done at night with multiple false insertions...and GPS airdrops...

We used to be pretty good at that; even without GPS...

that pesky tech thing again.

I'm not anti tech, not at all -- I just hope the limitations are realized and stay upset because we waste money on dumb things at the behest of Congress and the various communities in the services. That and the fact that we after April 1980 should have worked at developing stealthy insertion and extraction aircraft, tactical and strategic -- but did not because the Big War mafia was in charge. There was also a risk aversion factor in that omission...

We also are belatedly trying out unpiloted K-Maxs and Hummingbirds for resupply. At least the Marines are as the SOF folks have. Where's the Army and Army Aviation in that?

No easy answers to any of it...

[AdamG]

To those who believe the C-o-C was deficient in planning/protecting/supplying COP Kahler, recognize that:
many details.

Good post, thanks for those observations.

[Bill Moore]

Cole,

Your arguments seem to be all over the map and that is fine in a forum like this where we simply exchange ideas, many not fully explored and thought out. I'm no fan of our former SECDEF, but he did get some things right, and while politically unpopular the "fact" of the matter is you go to war with the kit you have (then it approves over time based on requirements from the field).

Regardless of our high tech kit, you still have to employ your forces using sound tactics. High tech doesn't replace what should be common sense. It is important to note that the U.S. military has only been defeated by technically unsophisticated foes. That may imply that our technology edge forces them to be more tactically compentent and encourages us to become less compentent over time?

I don't agree with Ken's comments on COPs. I think they can be effective (they were effective in Iraq), and don't recall our find, fix and finish operations having a major impact UNTIL they were augmented with sound COIN doctrinal tactics of controlling the populace, and part of that was employing COPs. In remote Afghanistan that is more challenging, and in my "opinion" shouldn't be done country wide to start with, but start at secure areas and gradually push out (leaving secure LOCs/MSRs behind you). More of the classic oil spot approach. Of course we're in a hurry now, so we're taking dangerous shortcuts.

Tactics are like you know what, so we can agree to disagree on those, but principles are principles and should only be violated after careful consideration.

[Ken White]

They were in Iraq due to the compact nature of the operational area (mostly Baghdad and environs) and flooding the zone with a bunch of troops. The COP idea has worked elsewhere to include some -- but not all -- places in Viet Nam.

My point is that METT-TC considerations have to guide what you do and that second 'T' determines whether or not you should opt for persistent presence (lotsa troops...) or for aggressiveness and mobility (fewer but better trained troops). The other two 'Ts' also impact (along with distances, a subset of the first 't' and political issues, a sometimes -- this time -- subset of the third 'T' as well as always of the 'C') and, in Afghanistan, they IMO do not lend themselves to the COP approach. YMMV.

Whatever works...

[ganulv]

The terrain and the settlement patterns in Afghanistan are not conducive to a heavy patrolling approach unless there is adequate air support for lift and resupply.

Many archaeologists take an extensive line of sight (which they tend refer to as viewshed) from a settlement as an indication of concern for defense. The photos and video I have seen taken in Kunar lead me to believe that there is excellent line of sight not only from individual settlements but also on the roads and paths between them. Obviously a recon patrol is going to go off the transportation network and I know that the region is forested, but even so, am I correct in assuming that this is a serious constraint for recon patrolling?

I have to caveat that by noting that I believe the water guidelines are for people in reasonable shape, vastly overstated.

I don’t know, anyone traveling by foot in the Hindu Kush while wearing full body armor and carrying fifteen gallons of water is going to be sweating like nobody’s business. But in all seriousness, I was surprised upon reading the Wanat report to find how much the tempo of getting fortifications up was slowed by limitations in POU water treatment. Does anyone have a sense if this was simply a case of the equipment not being there in a timely manner for this particular unit or if it is generally representative? No POU system is ideal but relying on bottled water so extensively doesn’t seem necessary to me in any area that is not completely arid.

[Pete]

Well said, and I applaud the efforts to attempt to develop the strategic Corporal, they need to make him a soldier first and foremost.

If the Small Wars Journal and Council had medals for leadership, judgement, the passing on of military knowledge, and the counseling and nurturing of younger people, be they current or former officers or enlisted, Ken White's chest would be covered with glory. Attention to Orders!

[Ken White]

...lead me to believe that there is excellent line of sight not only from individual settlements but also on the roads and paths between them. Obviously a recon patrol is going to go off the transportation network and I know that the region is forested, but even so, am I correct in assuming that this is a serious constraint for recon patrolling?

That's true anywhere there was brigandage and among warlike peoples (that includes much of the colonial and post colonial US...). It has an impact but is ordinarily not too significant although exceedingly heavily forested, swampy or mountainous terrain can make it a severe problem on occasion. Key is that the patrolling force recognize and account for it, a training and experience factor...

I don’t know, anyone traveling by foot in the Hindu Kush while wearing full body armor and carrying fifteen gallons of water is going to be sweating like nobody’s business. ... No POU system is ideal but relying on bottled water so extensively doesn’t seem necessary to me in any area that is not completely arid.

Several factors, most notably an overconcern with sanitation to preclude waterborne illnesses, force protection take many guises...

When I was a young Marine, the old guys told us to always eat the local food and drink the water everywhere we went, said it would drive the Corpsmen and Docs nuts (a plus... ) and would probably make us mildly sick for a day or two then our system would adapt and if we later had to live off the land, we could do so with little problem. I was young and foolish, listened to them and did it everywhere. Still do. Worked for me, never had a problem...

Though the tiny Crayfish in rice paddies didn't taste too good. At least, I think they were crayfish...

My basic comment was aimed at the amount; we tend to significantly over hydrate IMO. Your fifteen gallons may be a bit much -- but not by much...

[carl]

Here is an item from the Ares Blog I thought might be of interest.

http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/blogs...entId=blogDest

It is about success the French are having going out on up to 10 day long patrols with Afghan forces.