Combat Outpost Penetrated in Afghanistan, 9 dead

[Ken White]

Somehow, not surprising, particularly for anyone who remembers how the Battle of Mogadishu was going to be buried until
Mark Bowden started researching it.
http://afghanistan.blogs.cnn.com/201...battle/?hpt=C1

I have no idea where you got the idea that Mogadishu was or was going to be 'buried' but that is simply not correct.

There was much discussion of the action within the Army, worldwide and most people understood both the political and the military problems -- and the political and the military screwups. I'm not going to waste time culling DoD press releases but there were many and most were pretty accurate other then not directly criticizing the President, the SecDef or senior FlagOs involved -- bad in a way but to be expected. IIRC, they made no bones about the flawed JSOC plan or 3d Ranger Bn screwups.

The Washington Post had fairly detailed coverage at the time LINK.

Time magazine (LINK) in Ocotober of 1993 -- four years before the Philadelphia Inquirer began publishing Bowden articles on the action and before Bowden's book. It was and is a good book and it added detail but it didn't break any news...

Rick Atkinson, BTW, had articles in the Washington Post in early 1994. PBS Frontline had extensive coverage in '95 (and even more in '98).

It wasn't buried, when 41 Silver Stars and a bunch of higher level decorations including two Medals of Honor are handed out and videos of downed US pilots being drug through the streets go viral worldwide, you can't bury much...

No, it wasn't buried -- that no one apparently learned much from the well publicized debacle is the crime...

[Pete]

Col. James H. Johnson III was recently relieved of command of the 173rd Airborne Brigade in Italy. He had been in command since 2008 and I believe he was in command when the engagement at Wanat took place. There's a Stars & Stripes story about it in today's SWJ news roundup.

[Cole]

Col. James H. Johnson III was recently relieved of command of the 173rd Airborne Brigade in Italy. He had been in command since 2008 and I believe he was in command when the engagement at Wanat took place. There's a Stars & Stripes story about it in today's SWJ news roundup.

Nah Pete, COL Johnson replaced COL Charles Preysler in October 2008. The battle of Wanat was July 13, 2008.

Nothing new here. I have personally employed the final (and earlier) CSI study for training, and feel it has extraordinary value in that context.

Believe it unfortunate that many terminated FCS items originally part of the Early Infantry Brigade Combat Team would have greatly assisted OP Topside and the main vehicle patrol base by providing better RSTA of deadspace, hotel and bazaar interiors, and exterior perimeters near OP Topside and COP Kahler. Same for COP Keating a year later in October 2009.

NLOS-LS and other planned UAS would have been highly effective, if perfected. The concepts were sound...the execution, IMHO sucked, probably primarily due to the network. Unfortunately the money is probably gone to AirSea battle concepts. The Army loses once again in efforts to provide the same asymmetric advantages already offered other services.

[Fuchs]

Are you referring to the remote ground sensors?

Afaik the video version was a sad joke in comparison to cheap civilian gadgets and all versions had terrible battery endurance.


There's a huge difference between military equipment for a few weeks of action and military equipment for years of occupation. Those unmanned grounds sensors clearly belonged into the former category.

[Cole]

Are you referring to the remote ground sensors?

Afaik the video version was a sad joke in comparison to cheap civilian gadgets and all versions had terrible battery endurance.


There's a huge difference between military equipment for a few weeks of action and military equipment for years of occupation. Those unmanned grounds sensors clearly belonged into the former category.

The real question is whether it conceptually made sense to have urban and tactical unattended ground sensors, plus UAS and ground combat vehicles at lower tactical echelons. The now terminated NLOS-Launch System would have had a smaller blast radius and greater precision than the 155mm at Camp Blessing 5 miles to the south.

Properly executed, WITHOUT the FCS-specific network problems associated with all FCS systems, the concept made sense for dismounted units. Perhaps it was less necessary for mounted units with good organic vehicle sensors and more frequent movement.

The small unmanned ground vehicle remains and can perform some functions the unattended sensors would have performed. Batteries are cheap and getting better and small fuel cells are coming. Believe aerostats also perform a similar function as small UAS and unattended sensors. But those are less realistic when longer term COPs/FOBs are not in play.

But then we Americans are stupid. I live in shame for the wanton destruction of the few Libyan air defense systems and their operators who threatened allied aviators. Because I have a half German wife, I concede your point about the direct and obvious parallel between the Holocaust and German aggression in Europe in WWII and NATO's recent "aggression" in Libya.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by AdamG

Somehow, not surprising, particularly for anyone who remembers how the Battle of Mogadishu was going to be buried until
Mark Bowden started researching it.

Strictly opinion, but I'm not buying the "Marine" version, plus Webb was a former Marine, and GEN P has to bend to political winds to get support for other things, so in short this looks like a USMC revenge attack on the Army for their mishandling of the Marine SOF unit's mishap in Afghanistan a few years back where they overreacted to a contact and killed a few civilians, so were pulled out of country. Those trying to make the case that Marines shouldn't be in SOF were unprofessionally using this case as an example. Now they the USMC has a chance to strike back.

Unfortunately the truth is hard to come by in these situations, and judgments like these are not based solely on facts. How many years did it take to the CDR of the USS Indianapolis cleared after its sinking? Due to political pressure he had to be shamed, then years later they admit they were wrong? You go to war, you make contact with the enemy, bad things happen.

Looking at this over time, what lesson should we take from it? Is the Army supposed to become even more risk adverse than it is already? The 173d has a long history of being aggressive, and I think we want light infantry forces that are aggressive if we plan to win in combat, but if winning doesn't matter then O.K. let's have an investigation on every contact where a Soldier was killed. I'm sure that will help us attract and retain dynamic future leaders in our Armed Forces.

[Fuchs]

But then we Americans are stupid. I live in shame for the wanton destruction of the few Libyan air defense systems and their operators who threatened allied aviators. Because I have a half German wife, I concede your point about the direct and obvious parallel between the Holocaust and German aggression in Europe in WWII and NATO's recent "aggression" in Libya.

Indeed, you didn't get anything.
Your primitive response shows how hopelessly far away you're from at least understanding the problem.

The very thought that you're too far away from atrocities is the problem. You're not. You're already one foot in.
The attitude is the problem. It can easily be exploited. It only takes some propaganda to push you over because your attitude is already ripe for it.
You'd be a willing tool if you were in a ethical challenge as others were in many, many conflicts before.


And don't use a false quote for a straw man. I call out attempts to use a straw man argument quite frequently.

[Cole]

And don't use a false quote for a straw man.

Your attempt at making a mountain over the-attack-of-Libyan-air-defenses molehill, followed by the statement below, would lead most observers to infer your implication of some equivalence with your nation's WWII aggression:

Several generations ago, hundreds of thousands of mostly very competent - and in some cases highly experiences - officers were wrong. They fought for victory. They failed their men, they failed their profession, they failed their country and they failed humanity.

This is an experience that added to my country's and our armed services' collective wisdom. It's not about victory alone, not by a long call. Decades of sitting on a potential battlefield with our very own allies plotting my nation's annihilation with nuclear weapons helped us not to forget this.

Flawed correlation aside, your initial mea culpa could not resist a parting shot at allies protecting you during the Cold War. Your implication that the U.S. would devastate then East Germany with small tactical nukes (and Carter's less destructive Neutron bombs) ignores that just as in WWII, the USSR would have devasted Germany far more if they had stormed conventionally across all Germany and Europe with a subsequent occupation. If that had occurred, instead of being the 4th largest economy in the world, today your entire country would resemble East Germany of the 80s.

I have never understood how smart people could have been suckered by Hitler, or let him take power. The current aversion to any form of aggression is equally puzzling because Germans typically are anything but passive personalities. Then I read this and more became clear:

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article...5/stage_fright

[AdamG]

Col. James H. Johnson III was recently relieved of command of the 173rd Airborne Brigade in Italy. He had been in command since 2008 and I believe he was in command when the engagement at Wanat took place. There's a Stars & Stripes story about it in today's SWJ news roundup.

Army officials have not named the three officers originally cited to be disciplined in the CENTCOM review, but news reports have identified them as the company, battalion and brigade commanders for C Company, 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment, 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team.

Col. Charles Preysler, who is now assigned to the Pentagon, was the commander of the 173rd at the time of the battle. Col. William Ostlund, now deputy commander of the 75th Ranger Regiment, was the battalion commander at the time, and Capt. Matthew Myer was the company commander. Early last year Myer received a Silver Star, the third-highest award for valor, for his actions in the battle. He is now assigned to the 6th Ranger Training Battalion at Eglin Air Force Base, Fla.

http://www.armytimes.com/news/2010/0...eport_062310w/

[Fuchs]

Your attempt at making a mountain over the-attack-of-Libyan-air-defenses molehill, followed by the statement below, would lead most observers to infer your implication of some equivalence with your nation's WWII aggression:

"Several generations ago, hundreds of thousands of mostly very competent - and in some cases highly experiences - officers were wrong. They fought for victory. They failed their men, they failed their profession, they failed their country and they failed humanity."

"This is an experience that added to my country's and our armed services' collective wisdom. It's not about victory alone, not by a long call.
Decades of sitting on a potential battlefield with our very own allies plotting my nation's annihilation with nuclear weapons helped us not to forget this."

Flawed correlation aside, your initial mea culpa could not resist a parting shot at allies protecting you during the Cold War. Your implication that the U.S. would devastate then East Germany with small tactical nukes (and Carter's less destructive Neutron bombs) ignores that just as in WWII, the USSR would have devasted Germany far more if they had stormed conventionally across all Germany and Europe with a subsequent occupation. If that had occurred, instead of being the 4th largest economy in the world, today your entire country would resemble East Germany of the 80s.

I have never understood how smart people could have been suckered by Hitler, or let him take power. The current aversion to any form of aggression is equally puzzling because Germans typically are anything but passive personalities. Then I read this and more became clear:

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article...5/stage_fright

A did B, C did B. A still did B, no matter what C did. Period.

Besides - the planning wasn't only about "East German" cities. Like the French, the U.S. forces had no problem with using nukes on West German territory in war games.There was a major NATO war game at SHAPE in the eighties that was aborted when German representatives left it in protest over Americans simulating genocide against Germans.
It should also be noted that 4/5ths Germany protected the West more than the West protected it while 1/5th of Germany wasn't protected by the West at all. 12 of 26 divisions in Germany were German divisions. Add in the huge quantity of reservists of the territorial force and the result is that West Germany provided the majority of NATO land power in Central Europe during the Cold War.
Meanwhile, most of the U.S. contribution were forces beyond the Atlantic, which could impossibly have arrived in time to protect Germans.

And that ####ty article is relevant how? I've delivered the arguments, and I'm not exactly known as a fearful person. Nor does the article even mention the official reason for the non-vote, or is anyhow related to my opinion on the attitude of some other SWC members.

The so-called "correlation" only seems flawed to you because -again- you don't get it. You feel too far away, too secure from the risk of ever being challenged ethically. You're too unprepared.


Feel free to open another thread for the continuation of this topic so I can ignore that one, for I won't wage a pointless forum civil war here anyway.

[Pete]

At a very low level I used to be involved in what Fuchs is alluding to regarding the defense of West Germany during the Cold War. I understand Fuch's point of view and had similar conversations about this very subject with German friends when I was stationed there. Hopefully this thread will not become too heated an exchange.

[Ken White]

Hopefully this thread will not become too heated an exchange.

That would be good...

[Pete]

The defense of West Germany during the Cold War posed some dreadful moral dilemmas. It reminds me a bit of that town in Vietnam where the officer said, "We had to destroy it to save it." The area in which I live was much ravaged during the Civil War but it has been a long time since there was a land war on American soil.

[Granite_State]

The defense of West Germany during the Cold War posed some dreadful moral dilemmas. It reminds me a bit of that town in Vietnam where the officer said, "We had to destroy it to save it." The area in which I live was much ravaged during the Civil War but it has been a long time since there was a land war on American soil.

Yes, we've been blessed by geography, and would do well to remember that more often.

[Cole]

The reason I believe Wanat, and the Combat Studies Institute effort to document events is a valuable training scenario is that COP Kahler was a microcosm of the future Army concept of wide area security and combined arms warfare in irregular warfare. Likewise it exemplified war's inherent uncertainty. No plan survives enemy contact of this level.

To those who believe the C-o-C was deficient in planning/protecting/supplying COP Kahler, recognize that:

* The first of 50+ 155mm rounds began landing within 5 minutes of the first insurgent rounds. Two mortars were available to the platoon but were immediately destroyed.
* A B-1B arrived in about half an hour but the enemy was too close
* AH-64Ds and MEDEVAC arrived in about an hour from 50 miles away and provided decisive close combat attack and rapid evacuation
* Camp Blessing's ground QRF HMMWVs arrived within about an hour and a half from just 5 miles away, certainly a reasonable distance.
* The COP had over 70 troops guarding it, both US and ANA, This was more than typical for other similar COPs and the battalion was responsible for around 14 such COPs
* Waigal valley that Chosen Company was assigned had an average number of Troops in Contact far lower than other sister companies in the battalion, to include one in Korengal Valley
* The COP had a LRAS3 and Improved TOW sensor and initial UAS support
* It had 5 HMMWVs with crew served weapons thus limiting locations for positioning the vehicles on adjacent terraced and steep slopes
* COP Kahler had been in place only since about midnight 8/9 July and the attack occurred at 0420 on 13 July
* The Chairman of the JCS was visiting the battalion in this timeframe, thus occupying the battalion commander's attention. No reasonable leader would ignore such a visit.
* The company commander was tasked to perform a AR 15-6 investigation over an Apache engagement of trucks with insurgent mortarmen and possible hijacked civilians and thus he arrived the afternoon before the attack after experiencing a one day air transportation delay. He brought supplies and planned to patrol and address OP Topside problems the next day...but time ran out
* Wanat was being built because it was seen as a safer site than COP Bella that was farther from Camp Blessing and only resupplied/reinforced by air. The unit had 14 months and two weeks in country and thus was better suited to moving from COP Bella than the inbound unit that was just arriving.
* It had rained hard, the road to Wanat was incomplete and in poor condition the final leg, and the route clearance package had lost assets just before the planned move to Wanat. The contractor would not move large truck assets without such protection but smaller trucks did bring supplies. Both iodine and hand pump filters were available and a SSG was quoted as believing he had adequate supplies in the five HMMWVs when they departed Camp Blessing.

Given these circumstances, reasonable efforts appeared to be in place by the C-o-C to include 1LT Brostrum.

My point is that other larger Army efforts are justified to help lessen the fog of war by providing dismounted troops better "foglights" to help detect the enemy and IEDs. The need for greater precision fires with a smaller blast radius near friendly troops is another lesson.

[Ken White]

The reason I believe Wanat, and the Combat Studies Institute effort to document events is a valuable training scenario is that COP Kahler was a microcosm of the future Army concept of wide area security and combined arms warfare in irregular warfare...

It's scary because it is an inefficient and generally ineffective method.

While it can work, marginally well, it should be avoided. If the technique is to be employed, much better training is going to be required for new enlistees and Officers. Not to mention the US Army needs to practice digging. By hand. With shovels. In the heat. And the snow (as they did for a great many years... ).

And crew served weapons on vehicles must always be capable of being employed on ground mounts. We used to know that. Why did we forget it?

And...

[Cole]

It's scary because it is an inefficient and generally ineffective method.

While it can work, marginally well, it should be avoided. If the technique is to be employed, much better training is going to be required for new enlistees and Officers. Not to mention the US Army needs to practice digging. By hand. With shovels. In the heat. And the snow (as they did for a great many years... ).

And crew served weapons on vehicles must always be capable of being employed on ground mounts. We used to know that. Why did we forget it?

And...

You are talking Infantry training issues. But not sure given the volume of RPG and machine gun fire that those weapons would have been any more effective dismounted. One mortar was surrounded by HESCO and still got taken out early as did the TOW vehicle that was poorly positioned on an open ramp.

Gunners may have had difficulty elevating over adjacent walls if they had been dismounted. One .50 cal gunner on the commander's vehicle was particularly effective because he had a wall behind him that protected the vehicle from RPG fire from the hotel and bazaar. All the HMMWVs were much too close to the village motel and mosque. The enemy fired from the mosque at both Wanat and COP Keating a year later.

You must admit (but probably won't ) that combat outposts seems pretty ingrained now for irregular warfare. They likewise appear effective when placed near populations as opposed to indefensible and less essential terrain, and when patrolling is involved. Even Vietnam had firebases.

Now there is talk of turning over the entire Pech Valley to the ANA. Camp Blessing is at the mouth of Wanat's Waigal valley and near the Korengal valley. It was the site that took recent mortar fire, causing a helicopter QRF response that tragically engaged older kids instead of insurgents due to a mixed up target handover of unknown (by me) origin.

That was a negative for Army airpower but nearby a few weeks earlier, there were news reports of up to 65 killed insurgents that had the BDA video verifying it was a legitimate engagement.

[Ken White]

Forget that and / or try to do it on the cheap and it'll cost you later...

You are talking Infantry training issues.

No, I'm writing about land combat survival issues and our phenomenal ability to foolishly discard lessons and good practices learned the hard way. People who really know the basic principles of combat, land or air make fewer dumb mistakes that get people needlessly killed. Warfare means killing and dying, that's what it's about -- the object, per George C. Scott, is to make "the other dumb bastard give his life for his country."

But not sure given the volume of RPG and machine gun fire that those weapons would have been any more effective dismounted.One mortar was surrounded by HESCO and still got taken out early as did the TOW vehicle that was poorly positioned on an open ramp.

Was not there so cannot comment on the specifics. What I can say is that HESCO Barriers lead to delusions of safety; that no one should EVER site any position, even a very temporary one, a halt on a march or patrol, on lower ground that allows opposing forces to move to extremely close range and overwhelm a portion of the position by massed fires. I can add that if mortars are taken out deliberately (accidents happen, bad guys can have good luck...) then the individuals responsible for those tubes' position were almost certainly wrong. Badly so.

You must admit (but probably won't) ) that combat outposts seems pretty ingrained now for irregular warfare.

Why would I not admit it -- it's obvious and a fact of life. That does not make it sensible...

They likewise appear effective when placed near populations as opposed to indefensible and less essential terrain...

By essential you mean near a population center, I presume. That's arguable but there is a time and place for it -- it should NEVER be viewed as a reflexive solution or an ideal way to do business. It is not. METT-TC in all things.

and when patrolling is involved. Even Vietnam had firebases.

Bad example -- people in Viet Nam went out on three to five day patrols over tens of kilometers from those firebases. Some folks went out for longer period and for greater distances. I spent thirty plus days roaming around away from any base several times; so too did thousands of others. My sensing is that is not so in Afghanistan. Different wars...

... causing a helicopter QRF response that tragically engaged older kids instead of insurgents due to a mixed up target handover of unknown (by me) origin.

That's a training issue -- a major one -- but it isn't solely an infantry issue...

That was a negative for Army airpower but nearby a few weeks earlier, there were news reports of up to 65 killed insurgents that had the BDA video verifying it was a legitimate engagement.

That's warfare, ups and down. Who dares wins; Who is best trained wins...

He who violates common sense rules on position selection, weapon siting and availability, target identification or anything else will pay, one way or another...

[Pete]

If the technique is to be employed, much better training is going to be required for new enlistees and Officers. Not to mention the US Army needs to practice digging. By hand. With shovels.

Wait a minute here. Are you trying to tell us that basic combat skills are more important than intellectual concepts thought up by people with PhDs in think tanks?

[Ken White]

who you are -- and what you do. And perhaps on whether you want to live or die.

METT-TC...