Combat Outpost Penetrated in Afghanistan, 9 dead

[Cole]

A poor truck can only take so much unplanned weight...:

Which is why you buy newer M-ATV and JLTV with V-Hulls and figure new ways to make old HMMWVs more survivable such as "chimneys" that vent the blast and keep the vehicle from getting airborne.

The Army is often guilty of looking backwards instead of forward, and being hesitant to try something new. I'm sure the horse cavalry thought being on a small, agile horse provided more advantages than a mechanically complex and heavy behemoth that uses lots of fuel. Or maybe they were partially correct! What would happen if the mech guys created a 15,000 pound JLTV-variant that was CH-47 or airdrop transportable, carried just three troops, and had glass-armor chimneys running through the middle between tandem-seated troops. At 3 foot wide like an attack helicopter, it would optimize V-Hull angle that doubled as side armor. The resulting armored scout and OP would further disperse Bradley dismounts in a teamed vehicle relationship.

You could spend $10 million buying each new GCV to carry 9 troops. Or for $2 million dollars each, you could upgrade Bradley and Stryker armor, and spend a million $ buying each JLTV-variant as just described. That vehicle would replace LRAS3 HMMWVs and M3 Bradleys, not to mention creating a common vehicle for airborne and air assault divisions. Such a vehicle would be truly full spectrum capable safeguarding isolated OPs and checkpoints, and enhancing cordon and search, not to mention pursuit of insurgents firing from distant locations. Of course you could always run after the insurgents across 500-700 meters of open ground with numerous bounds, while the insurgents disappear and blend in....

A capability provided will be used; if it increases 'safety' its use will be demanded. That leads to a self defeating spiral.

That's a leadership issue...not a procurement one. It also is a branch and sub-branch perception issue.

I'm sure mech and motorized infantry see armored troop carriers differently than light infantry, particularly if facing a major artillery threat. Airborne infantry often won't consider inherent threats to C-130s in a forcible entry. Airlanding 50 miles away across an international border and driving to the objective will be seen as the wimpy way. Those espousing helicopter employment instead of vehicles will face aircraft shortages, weather, high/hot, LZ, and fuel-logistics challenges, and vulnerability landing in obvious LZs/PZs.

On the other hand having multiple options of different infantry types, keeps the enemy guessing and allows optimized employment for the situation. I read that Wanat was taken by the Taliban in the past week. Wonder what the enemy response would be attempting to land in the same location where COP Kahler had been occupied? Yet if the Infantry simultaneously infiltrated on foot, drove in vehicles, and air assaulted to the site, the enemy could not exclusively focus in any single area.

Yes and no -- but it's obvious you haven't been on many real patrols. That's not a slam, it's something one has done or has not and one who has done it knows that the movement is a big part of the object of the patrol in a great many cases. It depends on what the purpose of the patrol happens to be.

So there's no "shock value" in M-ATVs encircling a town or overwatch value in having crew-served weapons aboard? How can advantages in walking 50 miles to an LZ be superior to flying there and then patrolling 10-20 kilometers? Which offers greater surprise. You constantly read that the Taliban is never surprised by our dismounted patrols and an ample system of early warning exists.

Not to mention that Infantry, by definition, walks...

Does it? What about infantry in a Bradley or Stryker, or coming off an aircraft or C-130? If infantry only walks, it covers a very small area. If it does not use COPs and all it does is walk and dig, it has limited weapons, protection, and retains high logistical requirements difficult to support by walking alone.

Nobody needs that much water. Nobody.Nor would anybody with any sense contemplate taking a .50 or a 40mm AGL on a foot patrol or in a foot borne approach march -- if it's an approach march to establish a COP (dumb idea...) you'd fly the stuff in later.

Yet 5.9 gals of water per Soldier was a primary issue in the Wanat blame game. It was a cited rationale justifying not patrolling or digging more during the day. Iodine and hand pumps were available if less water was an option. The Marines used iodine and the ANA drank local water. Yet those became issues for which the C-o-C was going to receive reprimands. There was a helicopter/UAS shortage not under the C-o-C perview. At the time just prior to the Wanat attack, there were ongoing attacks in other valleys the battalion controlled that required attention/resources...yet inability to protect/supply/visit/supervise EVERYWHERE became issues for which the tactical C-o-C was blamed.

Some -- few -- did use it (Vietnam body armor), most did not. It was available, it was lighter than current Vest / plate carriers but it was too constricting and it encased the torso (as does any current model...) and that induced heat casualties. It also too severely impeded mobility and most Commanders at the time knew that and they wanted -- and needed -- that mobility. It was a different Army, different mores...

ADDED: Just for info; USMC M1951 vest weighed ~8 lbs, USA M1952 about 10 lbs. and today's Interceptor about 16 to 25 lbs depending on plates and add-ons.Your calculator works, the rest of the brain isn't considering Drew's statement -- the 'leaders' will compensate for that weight reduction by adding something else -- that is, regrettably, pretty much proven by history.

http://defensetech.org/2006/01/12/vi...s-soooo-light/

I researched it after posting and though flak vests were used, they would not stop 7.62mm while current ones with ceramic plates will. If the flak vest would not stop the primary direct fire threat and no cooling vest existed in very humid conditions, it is understandable that nobody wanted to wear them.

No. False choice. Casualties in combat are a fact of life. Having the technical ability to avoid some only lessens or weakens the skills needed to avoid others and thus increases those others -- sooner or later, in most (not all) circumstances, one has to leave one's vehicles. One should know how to do that. Increased reliance on vehicles lessens the skill in dismounted efforts.

It's a trade off. The real issue is not casualties and where and how caused but tactical and operational success, stasis or failure. That's the choice.

Come one Ken. You know that a primary justification for using bouncing Betty's and IEDs is to inflict casualties that distract Soldiers from their primary mission to a greater extent than combat deaths. They also have a psychological impact.

If a Soldier can survive 7.62mm and shrapnel because he is wearing effective body armor and helmets, he has NODs that give him night vision advantages, and effective fire support and attack helicopter/fixed wing CAS/lethal UAS support is nearby, he has ample tools for success. The sole thing he has little control over is getting blown up en route to the patrol location or objective, or during the patrol or maneuver while chasing Taliban firing from a distance.

If the enemy has effective artillery as many threats do, he has little control if the enemy places effective fires while he is in the open. Dismounted infantry are extremely vulnerable to artillery as you know...particularly without body armor and good helmets. A Stryker, Bradey, or M-ATV/JLTV/uparmored HMMWV also protect against artillery and expedite escape from an area being pounded by an unseen forward observer.