Combat Outpost Penetrated in Afghanistan, 9 dead

[Bill Moore]

Ken and Pete,

Well said, and I applaud the efforts to attempt to develop the strategic Corporal, they need to make him a soldier first and foremost. We are engraining a lot of bad habits in this war.

[Cole]

In COIN the key terrain is the populace, and failure to control it puts you in an unwinnable situation. The populace is the key terrain that the insurgent and a good counterinsurgent is struggling to control.

Bill mentioned the above earlier. Someone else mentioned that per FM 3-24 that in COIN you must accept some risk to put the population less at risk. Wanat was simply too much risk for too little population.

But even at Wanat, a fully HESCO'd COP farther from buildings may have helped as would additional RSTA assets taken from the unit the final days...not by the C-o-C that was accused of negligence. And it was not higher headquarters' fault either. Sufficient assets did not exist in country. Secretary Gates has made rectifying that a major priority.

METT-TC and Troop Leading Procedures are essential training skills. But Civil Considerations is part of METT-TC as is its planning tool ASCOPE. Operational variables of PMESII-PT are a key consideration at brigade level and above. Additional RSTA assets can assist evaluation of all these variables while also providing area security, QRF, and precision fires close to friendlies and civilians.

Sustainment of small units is enough of a nightmare in Afghanistan. Making the most of available personnel would seem to indicate dispersion of available personnel to influence key populations. That appears to be exactly what some SF units do. They too take risk. But for GPF it would seem you require sufficient personnel to secure the base and patrol. COPs and HESCO assist that while providing an accessible location for resupply and secure rest.

[Bill Moore]

Cole,

You seemed to be focused on kit, and while kit will always play a role it is critical we train our forces on the principles behind infantry tactics, so they can most effectively operate with whatever kit they have (even if it is just small arms and a FM radio). We may be so used to our technical superiority that we are forgetting/discarding the basics. I am not sure that is the case, but it is an observation validated more than once.

As for risk versus gain, that is an opinion, and one best formed by the tactical commander based on his understanding of the situation at the time. The value of protecting the populace is not reserved for large population centers only. That implies you are not taking the offensive, nor defending in depth, especiallly when the bulk of the insurgency is an outside in (taking the rural areas first, then when the time is right move into the urban areas).

However, my focus remains on not dragging our field leaders through the mud when they take casualties, it sends a terrible message to the force. You have seen the comments on the other posts where commanders are too cowardly to properly execute our COIN doctrine, and that behavoir is rewarded, while units that actually get outside the wire and push into contested areas put their careers at risk. Seems perverse to me, but in the end we may just have to agree to disagree on this on.

[Cole]

You seemed to be focused on kit, and while kit will always play a role it is critical we train our forces on the principles behind infantry tactics, so they can most effectively operate with whatever kit they have (even if it is just small arms and a FM radio).

Bill, that sounds dangerously like former defense secretary Rumsfeld's comment: "As you know, you go to war with the Army you have. They're not the Army you might want or wish to have at a later time."

I hate to envision the ground casualties suffered without modern body armor and MRAP/M-ATVs. Without today's UAS, attack helicopters, lift and MEDEVAC aircraft flying a much broader area than Vietnam and suffering far fewer battlefield and accident losses, our ground forces could have been in a world of hurt. Those casualties easily could have cut the Iraq War short resulting in a different outcome due to homeland pressure ala Vietnam.

We may be so used to our technical superiority that we are forgetting/discarding the basics. I am not sure that is the case, but it is an observation validated more than once.

Sure, things like GPS make us lazy. But we tend to grossly exaggerate the number of nations truly capable of jamming GPS on a sustained basis. Those are the nations typically deterred by MAD. All the rest are the Irans, North Koreas, Libyas, etc.

While I disagreed with Fuchs implied comparison of actions in Libya to WWII Germany, I tended to agree that the Libyan aircraft and air defense threat was/is vastly overblown. I read an AviationWeek article that said the maximum altitude of the SA-6 is 7000 meters and the SA-8 was only 5,000 meters while a new SA-24 based on the SA-18 had a max altitude of only 3,500 meters...all unclassified figures they published. And as Fuchs pointed out, old MANPADS and radar-guided SA-6 don't work well and can be overflown at altitude. They also could have been jammed and taken out with HARMs from altitude. Only a handful of adversary nations have truly effective air defenses.

Meanwhile, ground forces continue to face far higher ground casualties from current adversaries and a host of potential ones. Yet the money and new developments keep feeding the already safer air and seapower. When was the last major ship-on-ship sea battle? Which potential threats have significant naval power. Only a few deterred by MAD and economics.

As for risk versus gain, that is an opinion, and one best formed by the tactical commander based on his understanding of the situation at the time. The value of protecting the populace is not reserved for large population centers only. That implies you are not taking the offensive, nor defending in depth, especiallly when the bulk of the insurgency is an outside in (taking the rural areas first, then when the time is right move into the urban areas).

If Nuristanis are xenophobes, their gem trade is threatened by the government, and Karzai likewise prevents Korengalis from selling lumber to Pakistan, how is there hope of winning those hearts and minds in areas adjacent to the Pech river? Why are they even relevant?

The rural areas are too large to cover. Do police set up precincts in the sticks? Even the AfPak border is too large and too hard to resupply. We can't even cover our border with Mexico and Canada. Only aerial technology can cover areas that broad and isolated...and not necessarily well.

However, my focus remains on not dragging our field leaders through the mud when they take casualties, it sends a terrible message to the force. You have seen the comments on the other posts where commanders are too cowardly to properly execute our COIN doctrine, and that behavoir is rewarded, while units that actually get outside the wire and push into contested areas put their careers at risk. Seems perverse to me, but in the end we may just have to agree to disagree on this on.

Agreed, particularly field commanders and Soldiers who have served honorably and effectively for 14 months and two weeks which no other service or SOF/SF element has been asked to endure.

However, in this instance from the safety of my couch it is easy to point out that perhaps 1LT Brostrum should have used his ANA to patrol since they were drinking local water and had effective ETT leadership. So in this instance, avoidance of patrol risk or lack of trust in the ANA, actually increased risk to the platoon as a whole.

Another largely unnoticed point in the study was that the platoon-plus at Wanat was newly arriving from Camp Blessing and had been there since, I believe, April, before moving to set up COP Kahler in July. That long rest at a far safer FOB would tend to dispute Ken's point about launching patrols from larger bases. After all, Wanat was just 5 miles north of Camp Blessing. An easy walk right? Well maybe with new body armor and carrying all your own supplies through mountains it is not so easy...

I saw many light loads in old Vietnam footage and some less than flattering equipment and uniform practices, perhaps caused by the long patrols Ken described. The far higher casualty figures also do not necessarily support the value of long random patrols anymore than boring holes in the sky hoping to find the enemy is an effective technique. One could argue patrols and UAS loiters should be cued and focused on CCIR and other IR related to commander's information needs.

[Ken White]

Someone else mentioned that per FM 3-24 that in COIN you must accept some risk to put the population less at risk. Wanat was simply too much risk for too little population.

I think you just made our point...

But even at Wanat, a fully HESCO'd COP ...

Is it just me or do "HESCO'd" and "COP" not constitute an oxymoron. An outpost is a tactical position temporarily occupied; HESCOs imply some permanance and require mechanical aids...

METT-TC and Troop Leading Procedures are essential training skills.

Way wrong -- they are essential cognitive tactical and operational skills, they require training for acquisition and practice for retention and improvement. To be of value they must be applied.

But Civil Considerations is part of METT-TC as is its planning tool ASCOPE. Operational variables of PMESII-PT are a key consideration at brigade level and above.

You get the morning's bureaucratic response prize!!!

The key words there are "brigade level and above." I agree (that's where those acronyms have purchase, rightly or, IMO, wrongly...). However, the selection of the actual location of a COP is not the Bde (or above) call -- or absolutely should not be -- and that siting should be tactically determined. Sensibly tactically determined...

the Additional RSTA assets can assist evaluation of all these variables while also providing area security, QRF, and precision fires close to friendlies and civilians.

True -- and all that can be provided to mobile elements as well as to inefficient and mostly ineffective COPs.

Sustainment of small units is enough of a nightmare in Afghanistan.

True again and yet another reason that the use of these COPs is unwise.

Making the most of available personnel would seem to indicate dispersion of available personnel to influence key populations. That appears to be exactly what some SF units do. They too take risk. But for GPF it would seem you require sufficient personnel to secure the base and patrol.

Or you mount platoon and Company sized patrols of two to three weeks from larger, easier to sustain operational bases. You can affect a larger population over far more area that way than you can by sitting in a 'COP' and rusting. Combat entails risk, stasis in combat exacerbates risk. Infantry walks, it's part of what they do and they should be doing it vice sitting in bullet magnets that really have little effect on (or with) the population.

Fighting go-rillas means that one never stays anywhere outside a major well defended base more than 24 hours because your more flexible and knowledgeable of local terrain and conditions opponent will embarrass you. To succeed against guerrillas and insurgents, mobility is more important than presence. Here's an article I read last year (LINK). I don't totally agree but it's pretty good. I do agree with the commenter he quotes...

COPs and HESCO assist that while providing an accessible location for resupply and secure rest.

One could quibble on the secure bit but one should acknowledge that stasis is a combat negative and that stasis in a poorly selected and organized location is an invitation to trouble.

[Pete]

Mobility trumps...

I read that Stonewall Jackson wasn't the best of tacticians but his ability to move around quickly and then hammer his foes hard was his particular genuis. Early on he had been a Light Artilleryman and as such he had to pay a lot of attention to the reconnaissance, selection and occupation of positions for his battery. As a Confederate general he had Jed Hotchkiss making him maps and he also had his staff make him tables of distances between different geographical locations. He moved quickly and struck hard, even though some other officers were better than he was at arranging the disposition of forces during engagements.

[ganulv]

As a student of anthropology and geography I have always found the neologism ‘human terrain’ to be a strange one. Cultural and natural geography do interact but they have some fundamental differences. I might be overthinking it, but I have to wonder if using the terms terrain and human terrain isn’t fundamentally confusing. It might be meant as a metaphor, but the reality is that land relief and local populace are simply unalike things. Why use words that kinda sorta suggest otherwise?

Anyways, I found a copy of the official report and used a couple of the landmarks mentioned in it to locate the settlement on Google Earth from which the snapshot below is taken (the blue line is roughly the bed of the Wayskawdi Creek referenced in the report). I don’t have any background whatsoever in engineering, military or otherwise, but the terrain looks as difficult to defend as I can imagine.

[Ken White]

As a student of anthropology and geography I have always found the neologism ‘human terrain’ to be a strange one. Cultural and natural geography do interact but they have some fundamental differences. I might be overthinking it, but I have to wonder if using the terms terrain and human terrain isn’t fundamentally confusing. It might be meant as a metaphor, but the reality is that land relief and local populace are simply unalike things. Why use words that kinda sorta suggest otherwise?

In the minds of many of us it is indeed a misleading and inappropriate term. Here's one Thread: LINK.

IMO its an attempt to put people in a rather immobile and little changing category as is the terrain. Won't work. People won't stand for it. Bad pun intended...

You can use the search function on the board and find half a dozen or more Threads and literally hundreds of posts dating back to the birth of the term about five years ago. All with some pros and some cons...

[Cole]

As a student of anthropology and geography I have always found the neologism ‘human terrain’ to be a strange one. Cultural and natural geography do interact but they have some fundamental differences. I might be overthinking it, but I have to wonder if using the terms terrain and human terrain isn’t fundamentally confusing. It might be meant as a metaphor, but the reality is that land relief and local populace are simply unalike things. Why use words that kinda sorta suggest otherwise?

Anyways, I found a copy of the official report and used a couple of the landmarks mentioned in it to locate the settlement on Google Earth from which the snapshot below is taken (the blue line is roughly the bed of the Wayskawdi Creek referenced in the report). I don’t have any background whatsoever in engineering, military or otherwise, but the terrain looks as difficult to defend as I can imagine.

You are looking north up the Waygal river valley and can make out the road on the east valley ridgeline that the platoon and ground QRF and supply trucks employed.

If you zoom in using computer zoom to 400% and look just southwest of the blue creek line, you can make out the road that Vehicle Patrol Base (or COP) Kahler was sitting next to less than 50 meters from multiple buildings from which the enemy fired. OP Topside was next to Wayskawdi Creek and trees and deadspace just south of OP Topside allowed the enemy to sneak up within meters. So LRAS3 dismounted at OP Topside did little to safeguard the platoon from a close-in threat. Likewise, as the photo depicts, no amount of digging in without overhead cover would have safeguarded platoon fighting positions. A large overhead or small tactical UAS and unattended sensors or small unmanned ground vehicle quite possibly would have detected infiltration attempts.

It was a lousy position, but you could certainly argue that COP Bella further north was far worse and had even fewer members of the population to influence. If you look at it on 400% zoom and see other closer pictures you also see few places to park 5 HMMWVs with crew served weapons. The ridge adjacent to the blue line was terraced with several foot high walls creating each steppe.

[Ken White]

Another largely unnoticed point in the study was that the platoon-plus at Wanat was newly arriving from Camp Blessing and had been there since, I believe, April, before moving to set up COP Kahler in July. That long rest at a far safer FOB would tend to dispute Ken's point about launching patrols from larger bases. After all, Wanat was just 5 miles north of Camp Blessing. An easy walk right? Well maybe with new body armor and carrying all your own supplies through mountains it is not so easy...

I wasn't there and have no idea when the Platoon did what so I cannot comment on that. What I can say is that if you assume that Platoon sat from April to July, I suspect you're doing them a disservice. They most likely were running at least some patrols from the FOB. One would hope, at least.

Patrolling is never easy. In mountains, it is quite difficult -- but it goes with the job. You should not avoid it because it is dangerous, nor should you avoid it because it is really hard work. To do so is to invite trouble.

Also note that you're having them walk with all their supplies to set up a 'COP.' That's not a patrol, that's an approach march to establish a static position. That's a very different thing -- and not a good idea...

I saw many light loads in old Vietnam footage and some less than flattering equipment and uniform practices...

Flattering is in the eye of the peacetime soldier who can afford the time and effort to be pretty. Also note that though armor was available it was worn by virtually no one -- can't do it in jungle heat and if we do another jungle war, all those Armor lovers are going to have either cases of heat stroke or personal conniption fit when some sensible General says 'dump the armor' (which of course means we could drop it in Afghanistan -- but we won't...).

perhaps caused by the long patrols Ken described.

and the short ones. Different Army. Quite different. Better in some ways, not as good in others but definitely different...

The far higher casualty figures also do not necessarily support the value of long random patrols anymore than boring holes in the sky hoping to find the enemy is an effective technique. One could argue patrols and UAS loiters should be cued and focused on CCIR and other IR related to commander's information needs.

That's emphatically mixing Breadfruits and Blueberries...

No patrol should ever be 'random.' Its route should be carefully selected to be purposeful but not predictable and it should appear random only to the untrained observer. Other units should pursue different routes and timings and no one should stay anywhere more than 12 hours. All should occasionally and seemingly carelessly double back to village and populated areas they just left. They should look like they know what they're doing -- the opposition will always head for the low hanging Breadfruits, the poorly trained and the sluffers, the lazy -- who are always with us...

Static outposts have a poor record in COIN efforts while well planned and conducted long patrols are proven very effective in counterguerrilla work. Overall casualty figures from the two approaches differ but little. Extensive patrols worked in WW II, in Korea and in Viet Nam. Elements of the 1/82 BCT employed them also successfully -- as 82 Redleg can attest -- in Afghanistan. They cannot be sent out just to say we did it, they have to have a purpose, a thoroughly planned route and resupply process and be willing to forego own DS Arty support. When the bureaucracy got going in Viet Nam in late 1967, one of their first foolish diktats was that no US unit could move out of US Artillery fans. That stopped the long patrols and the war went downhill from then on. Better safe than effective...

It's the American way.

The far higher casualty figures from Viet Nam compared to Afghanistan are due to the very different type of war plus big differences in terrain and vegetation. It can also be attributed to a very different, more numerous, better trained, better armed and more competent enemy -- that last not my opinion but from an acquaintance who was SF for years to include Viet Nam and now works as a Contractor for somebody or other.

[Pete]

Well said, and I applaud the efforts to attempt to develop the strategic Corporal, they need to make him a soldier first and foremost.

If the Small Wars Journal and Council had medals for leadership, judgement, the passing on of military knowledge, and the counseling and nurturing of younger people, be they current or former officers or enlisted, Ken White's chest would be covered with glory. Attention to Orders!