Combat Outpost Penetrated in Afghanistan, 9 dead

[Cavguy]

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25663321/

No one else seems to have brought this up yet.

It appears that this remote unit (not sure if PLT or CO) had the perimeter breached by Taliban before being repulsed by the defenders and aircraft.

I am suprised that "several hundred" Taliban were able to mass and do this kind of assault. Will be interesting to find out if the perimeter was inflitrated first and then assaulted externally (infiltration), or if the perimeter was overrun by attacking militants.

Not a good sign when the enemy is massed and organized enough to do this.

Are we in/headed for Phase III insurgency in Afghanistan? I haven't read about such pitched battles of this scale before in OEF. From reading "Bear Went Over the Mountain" I know this was common for the Russians.

Thoughts?

[marct]

I heard about this earlier (CBC I think). I doubt it's the beginning of a Phase III operation. Unfortunately, the report is very vague on who the "insurgents" were. Maybe the CJTF-82 newsfeed will have some more details.

[Rank amateur]

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25663321/

Not a good sign when the enemy is massed and organized enough to do this.

I think it's more a sign of how pathetically undermanned we are in Afghanistan. I'm confident the problem will be addressed though I fear we may get a band aid instead of all the troops we need.

B) Don't stop now Gian. Your message needs to be heard.

C) We need COIN in Pakistan. Even better if the Pakistanis do it, but until we get a "population centric approach" in Pakistan the bad guys will be able to run away every time we have a tactical advantage.

[Ken White]

C. trumps A. (There is no 'A' but I'm guessing the first paragraph could be one) and B is of marginal, if any, relevance in this case. I doubt C. can or will be fixed in the near term therefor A will be of only limited utility.

I'd also suggest that A. is incorrect in that a Company or Platoon sized outpost will always be tempting to the bad guys. The option is to do a Sanchez and cluster in large, well defended bases -- that should be a non-starter. War is risky, you can obviate the risk by excessive concentration on force protection (or Mass...) but that will rarely be effective. You've got to put the troops out to get the job done and Platoons, even Companies, will be risked when one does that -- it goes with the territory.

[Rank amateur]

CNN reported that an "observation platform" was overrun. The base itsself wasn't. Someone who knows what they're talking about can comment further, but it sounds to me like someone may have made a fatal mistake. Sounds like the platform was set up so that the bad guys could generate an intense volume of fire on it from civilian buildings, but the good guys couldn't return fire en masse because of the civilians.

Details are still sketchy, but if the deceased were more worried about being amongst the population than ensuring they always had a firepower advantage, then B is very relevant. (Assuming my assumptions are correct of course, which they may not be.)

[patmc]

NY Times just posted article on the battle:
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/15/wo...afghan.html?hp

Article provides details on the US/Afghan positions and militant tactics and plan. The US occupied the base only a few days ago, and were not finished with construction. They left their previous base because of repeated attacks. They also believe a airstrike that killed civilians may have turned many of the local populace against the US/ANA, though the area is easily infiltrated by fighters.

"The Taliban insurgents who attacked a remote American-run outpost near the Pakistan border on Sunday numbered nearly 200 fighters, almost three times the size of the allied force, and some breached the NATO compound in a coordinated assault that took the defenders by surprise, Western officials said Monday.
The attackers were driven back in a pitched four-hour battle, and appeared to suffer scores of dead and wounded of their own, but the toll they inflicted was sobering. The base and a nearby observation post were manned by just 45 American troops and 25 Afghan soldiers, two senior allied officials said, asking for anonymity while an investigation is under way."

"American and Afghan forces started building the makeshift base just last week and its defenses were not fully in place, said one senior allied official. In some places, troops were using their vehicles as barriers against insurgents.
The militants apparently detected the vulnerability and moved quickly to exploit it in a pre-dawn assault in which they attacked from two directions, American officials said."

[Uboat509]

While I would not characterize them as common, friends of mine who have served in Afghanistan have told me that their bases have been attacked in larger scale attacks similar to this one from time to time though perhaps not as large. The Fox News arcticle mentions that Chechens are known to operate in the area. That might explain the success of this attack. I am told that ordinary Afghans are not particularly spectacular fighters but the Chechans are brutal and very competant.

SFC W

[Ken White]

CNN reported that an "observation platform" was overrun. The base itsself wasn't. Someone who knows what they're talking about can comment further, but it sounds to me like someone may have made a fatal mistake.

People will do that. Poor planning kills more than poor execution. Shame we're not all infallible but we aren't; errors will be made -- and more numbers of troops just mean more errors.

...Sounds like the platform was set up so that the bad guys could generate an intense volume of fire on it from civilian buildings, but the good guys couldn't return fire en masse because of the civilians.

Possibly true; some of the pictures I've seen of the siting and construction of OPs leave me furious that such tactical incompetence is allowed; that and the tendency to bunch up or herd. ALL the western Armies are bad on both those points. That's why I keep ranting about better training and concentrating on the basics, it's the little things that get you killed and it is criminal to have to learn how to do it right while under fire when that just is not necessary.

Details are still sketchy, but if the deceased were more worried about being amongst the population than ensuring they always had a firepower advantage, then B is very relevant. (Assuming my assumptions are correct of course, which they may not be.)

Not sure B is relevant even in that case. Gian wants High Intensity Conflict / warfare training and advocates greater application of force -- I presume the latter is that to which you refer while I was essentially referring to the former. I did that because the harsher application of force is not an option. Rightly or wrongly international consensus and current US Government guidance is to minimize civilian casualties even to the extent of increasing own casualties. This, if that is the case, will be just one more out of many in both theaters where our attempts to minimize civilian casualties has increased our own. Whether you, Gian or I -- or the Troops in contact -- agree or not is immaterial; that's the guidance and it is highly unlikely to change barring an existential war.

I suspect they were more worried about minimizing civilian casualties than they were about being among the population though the OP was established in that location in an effort to control the population. As I've said elsewhere, controlling the population isn't all that easy, may not be all that desirable and as I said above, it entails putting Platoons out where they become targets -- the option being to adopt a fortress mentality (which IMO is not at all a good idea). Counterinsurgency is not fun or nice, mostly due to that factor; if it's done correctly, the friendly casualty count is always going to go up (one reason why doing it right was deliberately avoided by many senior people in the early days in both Afghanistan and Iraq). The seven Ps? Piss Poor Prior Planning Promotes Poor Performance. They've been around even longer than I have...

[Darksaga]

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25663321/

No one else seems to have brought this up yet.

I have read a number of accounts of what happened. All open source and accounts vary wildly.

It seems the only thing they have in common was a temporary outpost was overun resulting in 9 US dead and 15 wounded. Some say 4 ANA were wounded as well. Reports of militant casualties are from 15 to 100+. They, for the most part, are also reporting that ISAF patrols will continue in the area. Some are reporting that the militants held the outpost. Some reports are stating that they have moved on.

The reported size of militant force has been placed at 200+ vs 45 US and 25 ANA. Even with those parameters the 101st did a good accounting for themselves and gave them hell.

Some reports says 'Taliban' some say insurgents some say enemy combatants. Truth is it was probably a breif joining of various groups (my theory). This outpost could very well have been seen as a threat to keeping the border open which is something the various criminal elements, smugglers (gems, wood, drugs, humans), Taliban and militants want in common.

Good old fog of water that is being stirred up by reporters who don't know jack from shinola.

To me it is looking more and more like a joint raid against an outpost that could have had a detrimental effect for various counter government groups.

My concern is 1) where was the air support during the attack? 2) if the militants did take the outpost after the US pulled it's soldiers then why wasn't it hit by artillery or air power 3)

Final thought: One thing that is clear is that the perpetrators of the attack need to be tracked down swiflty and hit hard by boots on the ground and not by air power. Don't let this incident become a precident or rally cry.

[Fuchs]

Afaik these forces use Wolfpack-like tactics. They move independently, converge on a target, exert their power of numbers (even if only as power projection to turn local militias) and then dissolve till the next target.

That's quite difficult to track. Movement of armed civilians in military age who speak pashtuhn is not something you could simply forbid and interdict there.

[VMI_Marine]

My concern is 1) where was the air support during the attack? 2) if the militants did take the outpost after the US pulled it's soldiers then why wasn't it hit by artillery or air power 3)

I was led to believe that most of the KIA came from the platoon's observation post, which I would bet was overrun pretty quickly. Air support would not have been able to respond in time to save the OP. The actual base itself wasn't taken, although they did breach the perimeter.

[KB]

The details of this attack will come out in due time and undoubtedly there will be tactical lessons learned. More important to our operational success in Afghanistan is our military and political response to the attack. According to a NY Times article today, the outpost was abandoned despite NATO spokesman assurances that “NATO and Afghan troops would continue to patrol the district and maintain ‘a strong presence in the area.’” The PAO further stated, “We are committed, now more than ever, to establishing a secure environment that will allow even greater opportunities for development and a stronger Afghan governmental influence.” (See Carlotta Gall, NYT, “U.S. Abandons Site of Afghan Attack,” July 17, pg. 10.)
Actions speak louder than words. By withdrawing (i.e. retreating) from the outpost we have taken a tactical win (the Taliban did not overrun the outpost despite their numbers) and granted the Taliban a strategic victory. This victory will be heralded on jihadi websites with videos of triumphant militants dancing on the outpost’s barriers.
Undoubtedly, it wasn’t the infantry brigade that made this decision, but our political and military leaders in Washington who do not understand COIN tactics and the inherent tactical risks involved when conducting offensive combat operations. 10th Mountain and now the 173rd have done a fantastic job departing from the days of FOBs and brigade-sized cordon and search operations. They have established combined platoon and company outposts with Afghan forces in close proximity to rural villages and towns. Decentralized and distributed, U.S. troops can properly compete against the Taliban for the populations’ support, train local security forces, and gather critical HUMINT. More tragic than the loss of nine valiant soldiers, will be for this one attack to alter an otherwise sound strategy (barring discussions of overall troop numbers, Pakistan’s support, and cross-border operations). Hopefully, ADM Mullen’s comments about the outpost not having enough troops (Spiegel and Faiez, LA Times, “New U.S. Afghan Force Plan,” July 17, pg. 4) is not an indication of future policy requirements for larger, consolidated bases—a horrible knee jerk reaction that would be politically safe and militarily irresponsible!

[Entropy]

KB,

Reading the media reports on the incident, the COP/OP or whatever it was was on low ground surrounded on three sides by the village of Wanat. Perhaps they "abandoned" the outpost because it was too vulnerable and perhaps another will be built in a more secure location.

[Ken White]

...granted the Taliban a strategic victory. This victory will be heralded on jihadi websites with videos of triumphant militants dancing on the outpost’s barriers.

Been my experience that dancing does little; such an event if it were to occur will almost certainly ultimately change nothing of significance.

Undoubtedly, it wasn’t the infantry brigade that made this decision, but our political and military leaders in Washington who do not understand COIN tactics and the inherent tactical risks involved when conducting offensive combat operations.

Do you have the slightest backup for that statement?

Decentralized and distributed, U.S. troops can properly compete against the Taliban for the populations’ support, train local security forces, and gather critical HUMINT.

What you say is true and I totally agree that needs to be done, What you elide is that there is risk involved on several levels; one being that inexperienced leaders and commanders can select poor positions and not always organize them to best serve their purpose; another is that I don't care how good you are, odds of five to one are likely to get to you. Those are risks but they need to be taken -- the down side is that one will occasionally lose people. Goes with the territory.

a horrible knee jerk reaction that would be politically safe and militarily irresponsible!

I agree that knee jerk reactions are poor. I await your response on the decision to withdraw the OP being made in Washington rather than by the 173d.

[Rank amateur]

I'll throw this out to the council. Do you agree with the decision to abandon the outpost? If so, is patrolling sufficient, or would you do something else?

[Ron Humphrey]

I'll throw this out to the council. Do you agree with the decision to abandon the outpost? If so, is patrolling sufficient, or would you do something else?

If abandoning the position where you were just ambushed in order to chase the buggers down and give em hack, than you bet!

[Ken White]

I'll throw this out to the council. Do you agree with the decision to abandon the outpost? If so, is patrolling sufficient, or would you do something else?

with no more information than we have?

There are so many factors that can influence that decision that to even try to second guess it from here is to go well beyond knee jerkery.

Local population, local government and Afghan government attitudes; as always, all the METT-TC factors. Add; was the withdrawal deliberate to suck in more Talibs or whoevers -- and that's just some of the open source stuff and conjecture.

Bad idea to try to second guess stuff that happens on the ground twelve hours ahead of you and 12,000 miles away based on what you glean from the news media. You're just about guaranteed a screwup...

[Rank amateur]

with no more information than we have?

It's a case study. Based on the information available, what would you do? Why? Why not?

If abandoning the position where you were just ambushed in order to chase the buggers down and give em hack, than you bet!

I'm not saying you're wrong, but that's not "population centric."

[Entropy]

I'll throw this out to the council. Do you agree with the decision to abandon the outpost? If so, is patrolling sufficient, or would you do something else?

...why it was abandoned and if the abandonment is temporary or permanent.

I'm getting the impression here that some are thinking that abandoning the position was somehow bad. Positions are abandoned all the time in war - what matters is why, imo.

Edit: What Ken said above