Combat Outpost Penetrated in Afghanistan, 9 dead

[Danny]

I'm trying to think of where that might have appeared in the posts. W.R.T. massing of troops I don't think so, but I'll have to go back and look. Not pertinent to the topic.

As for Wanat, I think I might have compared setting up COPs in Anbar to taking a year and negotiating it with tribal leaders who didn't want to be seen negotiating with anyone because the Taliban might be watching. Dumb idea.

It happened to be different in every case of which I am aware at how it was done in Iraq and thus I mentioned it. My knowledge base is very limited to Anbar (not the balance of Iraq) and thus I must refer to how Marines did so and so in Haditha or Fallujah, or whatever (I do have some Army contacts from Anbar, but they are very limited compared to my Marine contacts). Sorry to offend, but it sounds Niel like there are some raw nerves there. Sorry to have hit one.

As for Anbar, yes, not only did Marines win Anbar, but Army (you) and some very good National Guard troops I know. My respect to them all.

[Cavguy]

I'm trying to think of where that might have appeared in the posts. W.R.T. massing of troops I don't think so, but I'll have to go back and look. Not pertinent to the topic.

As for Wanat, I think I might have compared setting up COPs in Anbar to taking a year and negotiating it with tribal leaders who didn't want to be seen negotiating with anyone because the Taliban might be watching. Dumb idea.

It happened to be different in every case of which I am aware at how it was done in Iraq and thus I mentioned it. My knowledge base is very limited to Anbar (not the balance of Iraq) and thus I must refer to how Marines did so and so in Haditha or Fallujah, or whatever (I do have some Army contacts from Anbar, but they are very limited compared to my Marine contacts). Sorry to offend, but it sounds Niel like there are some raw nerves there. Sorry to have hit one.

As for Anbar, yes, not only did Marines win Anbar, but Army (you) and some very good National Guard troops I know. My respect to them all.

Thanks. I know that is not what you mean, just how it reads. When you lose 80+ guys in Ramadi during 2006-2007, and transform the AO, it grates a little to hear "The Marines won Anbar". That's my raw nerve. After our article on Ramadi, I see it many places, but often on your blog. Then most of your Afghanistan posts tend to say (paraphrase) the Army should do what the Marines did in Anbar (or Hemland), when the Army has done those kinds of ops. You're not as bad as the guy over at Free Range International, who has some of the best commentary on AStan around but takes every opportunity to bash the Army, which isn't a monolith any more than the Marines are.

Don't get me wrong, I'm extremely hard on the Army for its failures. But the "Marines are always right" them just grates on me, because they're not. No more so than the Army is.

For example, you talk a lot about Marines transforming Fallujah/Haditha, but seldom mention a similar strategy executed successfully in Tal Afar by the Army in 2005 ... the Army knows this too - you would find a better commentary response from Army audiences if you used examples of where the Army did things well rather than chiding them for not being Marines ... different orgs, different culture, different purposes. For example, a look at 3/10 MTN's Afghan deployment of 2006 may be instructive, as it was related in Kilcullen's book.

Just an observation that may broaden your readership.

Also: Snippet from COL MacFarland on the joint effort:

"You old guys need to get over that s--t."

- Young Marine to Marine sergeant major when asked how he felt about fighting alongside an Army unit in Al Anbar, Iraq.

In the March-April 2008 issue of Military Review, Major Niel Smith and I wrote about the accomplishments of the Soldiers, Marines, Sailors, and Airmen who fought in Ramadi from June 2006 through February 2007. I would like to elaborate on an important point raised in the article: the Al Anbar campaign was a model of joint operational effectiveness.


Altogether, the joint effort in Ramadi worked because, no matter what service uniforms they wore, professionals dedicated to the mission performed as expected. This professional dedication evinced itself in shared values and shared understanding. It was not uncommon to see Soldiers and Marines march forward side by side in final honors at memorial services for their lost comrades. At times, the helmets atop inverted M4 carbines reflected a mix of Army and Marine Corps camouflage.

...

The U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps, each today without peer in its domain of land warfare, have not shared such a strong bond of common experience and understanding since the island campaigns of World War II. The services should nurture those bonds and sustain them over time. Those who share experiences on the battlefield with comrades from sister services can help strengthen these bonds and create closer ones by contributing to the discourse. Articles and other forms of media spawned from joint endeavors, co-written perhaps in cooperative cross-service efforts, will help feed the knowledge base for all services and make us stronger yet as a joint force.

[Danny]

Niel, there are two options for me. I might soon become very much a pro-Army blog if things work out. My son it appears isn't going to re-enlist in the Marines, but an Army recruiter is after him to take a big signing bonus to join up and go SF. If he decides not to do this, I'll shut my blog down.

Tim Lynch is a super nice and great guy and lot's of fun and informative to read. When I see his Oorah stuff I smile and continue reading. You're right. His is some of the best Afghanistan commentary on the web, and it is a must read as far as I am concerned. I don't miss his stuff.