Afaik these forces use Wolfpack-like tactics. They move independently, converge on a target, exert their power of numbers (even if only as power projection to turn local militias) and then dissolve till the next target.
That's quite difficult to track. Movement of armed civilians in military age who speak pashtuhn is not something you could simply forbid and interdict there.
I was led to believe that most of the KIA came from the platoon's observation post, which I would bet was overrun pretty quickly. Air support would not have been able to respond in time to save the OP. The actual base itself wasn't taken, although they did breach the perimeter.Originally Posted by Darksaga
Abandoning More Than An Outpost?
The details of this attack will come out in due time and undoubtedly there will be tactical lessons learned. More important to our operational success in Afghanistan is our military and political response to the attack. According to a NY Times article today, the outpost was abandoned despite NATO spokesman assurances that “NATO and Afghan troops would continue to patrol the district and maintain ‘a strong presence in the area.’” The PAO further stated, “We are committed, now more than ever, to establishing a secure environment that will allow even greater opportunities for development and a stronger Afghan governmental influence.” (See Carlotta Gall, NYT, “U.S. Abandons Site of Afghan Attack,” July 17, pg. 10.)
Actions speak louder than words. By withdrawing (i.e. retreating) from the outpost we have taken a tactical win (the Taliban did not overrun the outpost despite their numbers) and granted the Taliban a strategic victory. This victory will be heralded on jihadi websites with videos of triumphant militants dancing on the outpost’s barriers.
Undoubtedly, it wasn’t the infantry brigade that made this decision, but our political and military leaders in Washington who do not understand COIN tactics and the inherent tactical risks involved when conducting offensive combat operations. 10th Mountain and now the 173rd have done a fantastic job departing from the days of FOBs and brigade-sized cordon and search operations. They have established combined platoon and company outposts with Afghan forces in close proximity to rural villages and towns. Decentralized and distributed, U.S. troops can properly compete against the Taliban for the populations’ support, train local security forces, and gather critical HUMINT. More tragic than the loss of nine valiant soldiers, will be for this one attack to alter an otherwise sound strategy (barring discussions of overall troop numbers, Pakistan’s support, and cross-border operations). Hopefully, ADM Mullen’s comments about the outpost not having enough troops (Spiegel and Faiez, LA Times, “New U.S. Afghan Force Plan,” July 17, pg. 4) is not an indication of future policy requirements for larger, consolidated bases—a horrible knee jerk reaction that would be politically safe and militarily irresponsible!
KB,
Reading the media reports on the incident, the COP/OP or whatever it was was on low ground surrounded on three sides by the village of Wanat. Perhaps they "abandoned" the outpost because it was too vulnerable and perhaps another will be built in a more secure location.
Good turn of phrase, colorful even...
Been my experience that dancing does little; such an event if it were to occur will almost certainly ultimately change nothing of significance.Do you have the slightest backup for that statement?Undoubtedly, it wasn’t the infantry brigade that made this decision, but our political and military leaders in Washington who do not understand COIN tactics and the inherent tactical risks involved when conducting offensive combat operations.What you say is true and I totally agree that needs to be done, What you elide is that there is risk involved on several levels; one being that inexperienced leaders and commanders can select poor positions and not always organize them to best serve their purpose; another is that I don't care how good you are, odds of five to one are likely to get to you. Those are risks but they need to be taken -- the down side is that one will occasionally lose people. Goes with the territory.Decentralized and distributed, U.S. troops can properly compete against the Taliban for the populations’ support, train local security forces, and gather critical HUMINT.I agree that knee jerk reactions are poor. I await your response on the decision to withdraw the OP being made in Washington rather than by the 173d.a horrible knee jerk reaction that would be politically safe and militarily irresponsible!
I'll throw this out to the council. Do you agree with the decision to abandon the outpost? If so, is patrolling sufficient, or would you do something else?
Just offhand
If abandoning the position where you were just ambushed in order to chase the buggers down and give em hack, than you bet!
Any man can destroy that which is around him, The rare man is he who can find beauty even in the darkest hours
Cogitationis poenam nemo patitur
How can most of us answer that
with no more information than we have?
There are so many factors that can influence that decision that to even try to second guess it from here is to go well beyond knee jerkery.
Local population, local government and Afghan government attitudes; as always, all the METT-TC factors. Add; was the withdrawal deliberate to suck in more Talibs or whoevers -- and that's just some of the open source stuff and conjecture.
Bad idea to try to second guess stuff that happens on the ground twelve hours ahead of you and 12,000 miles away based on what you glean from the news media. You're just about guaranteed a screwup...
That all depends on...
...why it was abandoned and if the abandonment is temporary or permanent.
I'm getting the impression here that some are thinking that abandoning the position was somehow bad. Positions are abandoned all the time in war - what matters is why, imo.
Edit: What Ken said above
Last edited by Entropy; 07-18-2008 at 12:26 AM. Reason: Didn't see Ken's post
It's a case study. Based on the information available, what would you do? Why? Why not?
I'm not saying you're wrong, but that's not "population centric."
True, Probably more Pop A Cap Centric
But given what we know/ don't know about the specifics still doesn't seem like the worst thing to do.
Any man can destroy that which is around him, The rare man is he who can find beauty even in the darkest hours
Cogitationis poenam nemo patitur
I do not have enough information to sensibly comment
I'm dead serious, not trying to be obstructionist. I cannot answer your question and I submit that anyone who tries it based on the information available to most of us here in the States is being quite naive.
I don't know what that Battalion's mission is; don't know the enemy situation in any detail whatsoever; I don't even have a map of the area so I don't know the terrain; I don't know what US, ANA and ANP elements are available -- I don't even know what the rest of that Battalion is doing (perhaps something more important that precludes enough troops to stay or go back); don't know the logistic situation or what's available immediately; don't know what's scheduled to be done in that area or elsewhere that effect the timing of what could or should be done; Nor do I know the position of the local, Provincial and National governments -- which could be get out and stay (for domestic political reasons; they are the hosts; we do what they want); don't know the dynamics of the local population or their wishes. I could go on but you get the idea -- and I'll point out that if I were there, I'd know the answer to all those things, no great study would be required.
You have just asked me to prepare a marketing plan for a MacDonald's in Bangalore -- that's a case study, could you do that?
Having pointed out the absolute foolishness of even attempting to provide you with an answer for such a case study; I will now prove I'm a fool by providing an answer. Based only on what I know and assuming passivity or support from the Afghans, I'd pull out, try and lull the bad guys into returning and attempt to determine who's in charge of that sector for them and get him zapped then I'd go back in and reestablish in a nearby location (never the same location -- once it's been hit hard, never, ever use it again. Never do the same thing twice).
Now, question for you -- what's wrong with that solution to your case study?
Abandoning More Than An Outpost? Part II
Ken W,
Touche’ on the knee jerk quip…I’m guilty as charged. Assertion that abandoning outpost was due to D.C. pressure versus command decision on the ground was hasty. Nevertheless, the decision to depart Wanat (assuming media’s reports to be true) will have numerous results. It further emboldens Taliban/Al Qaeda supporters sending a message that one fierce firefight and the Americans will leave the area. It reinforces to the locals (particularly indigenous security volunteers and leaders who begin to cooperate with Afghan gov and U.S. initiatives) that they can’t count on U.S. support...if they want to save their skin that is! Lastly, the international community, American citizens, and our domestic political leaders get the impression that we’re on the run.
When tragedy does strike it affords us an opportunity to demonstrate our resolve.
It is highly possible that the unit involved doesn’t have the available resources to reinforce/reposition the outpost given their casualties and ongoing ops. If there is no operational reserve available that explains the action, it doesn’t change the significance of it. My main concern--and you’re right, it’s too early to tell--is that this action could be indicative of an aversion to risk that could alter our strategy. As a side note, I don’t advocate or excuse unnecessary risk. We still need leaders and soldiers making sound tactical decisions, but there is inherent risk to an aggressive strategy.
Lastly, there is a professional benefit in discussing ongoing operations, acknowledging there is a lot we don’t know from immediately available open source. Hence this discussion board, right? While I’ll espouse about operational strategy, you won't find me armchairing the outpost's location, defense plan, or actions of leaders and individuals given available info. Thanks for your earlier feedback. -KB
Ken's right, unfortunately...
As I understand it, those boys were three days from going home.
I've watched a greater number of men die in similar situations in Iraq from the lack of the O's and senior E's preparations in the wake of the enemy's plans. This understanding will never temper the loss of the families, but it's the ground truth.
That's just the way it is. We are not always prepared nor do we always have the best and brightest in charge. In a COIN fight of living amongst and engaging the populace, we will suffer casualties. These loses must not necessarily distract us to proclaim strategic loss in the Long War.
If the enemy wants to videotape dancing along the OP or abadoned patrol base, so be it. It will be temporal. A thorough covert reconnaissance/surveillance will allow us to identify and positively react- thus executing KB's "opportunity to show our resolve."
As foolish as Ken was in applying an answer to the case study, I'm worse over for concurring...I'll simply tread once again amoungst the plane of the Sierra Nevada.
Going back to another thread, I could never call an E9 anything other than Sergeants Major.
It is what it is.
Shudder...
True. Early days, no sense jumping to conclusions just yet, I think. I'm sure the guys there considered the IO costs. We aren't nearly as dumb as a lot of folks think we are.
That didn't make me shudder; this did:At a Dining In once upon a time, the Guest, a Colonel kept referring to 'Sergeant Majors.' After going through the Vice, I asked said guest if he was aware that the proper plural was 'Sergeants Major.' Being a not too shabby Cav Dude; he quickly shot back that the "...Only similar term that comes to mind is Ladies in Waiting." Thus I still shudder when I see 'Sergeants Major.' Haven't corrected anyone else on that since...Going back to another thread, I could never call an E9 anything other than Sergeants Major.
Last edited by Ken White; 07-18-2008 at 04:09 AM.
The story I've heard, this is completely unclass and is confirmed in a few open sources, was that a rifle platoon along with an ANA platoon were occupying (or scouting in some sources) a new COP location. As such, they had only initiated the priorities of work, and there were no fixed protective obstacles or defensive structures. The attack involved between 100 and 150 enemy, and they assaulted by using tactics very similar to ours for a company attack- echelonment of fires, breach, seized a foothold, and exploited it.
Please remember that stubbornness, which is often represented by a jackass, can be mistakenly identified as resolve.
Vir prudens non contra ventum mingit
The greatest educational dogma is also its greatest fallacy: the belief that what must be learned can necessarily be taught. — Sydney J. Harris
That sounds right to me. I wouldn't write a marketing plan for McDonalds - opsec wouldn't let me put it on the net anyway- but I could comment intelligently on McDs India strategy.
If you can't defend a position, you withdraw from it. But it's public record that the population withdrew from the town before the attack. If we withdraw, and only patrol as stated:
A) hasn't the population "gotten away with it?"
B) doesn't it send a message to all the other civilians that there is no price to be paid for cooperating with the Taliban?
As Ken has argued, this is all situationally dependent. At times, it is important to show resolve, and not give ground for operational or political reasons. At other times.. well, Dien Bien Phu....
Yet, you wanted a marketing plan for Wanat? We can both comment intelligently on the US / NATO Afghanistan strategy but that wasn't what you asked; you asked about a low level tactical decision; putting one McDonald's in Bangalore...Gotten away with what?If you can't defend a position, you withdraw from it. But it's public record that the population withdrew from the town before the attack. If we withdraw, and only patrol as stated:
A) hasn't the population "gotten away with it?"
B) doesn't it send a message to all the other civilians that there is no price to be paid for cooperating with the Taliban?
Are you advocating that there should be a price to pay for cooperating with the Taliban?
Have you considered the cost of extracting that price? You've apparently adopted the mantra of population control. Aside from the fact that absent draconian treatment with a whole lot of troops there is no way to obtain that, I'm unsure you realize that it is not an acceptable tactic in today's world and that the US is never going to do that. Nor should we.
Are you going to answer my question?
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